JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J —The petitioner it holding the rank of Brigadier in the Indian Army and is posted at Army Training Command, Shimla, with effect from 27-6-1995. He is aggrieved by his non-selection for promotion to the rank of Major General by a Selection Board, held on 21/22-10-1994. According to him, the reason for his non selection is his A. C. Rs. for the periods 30-12-1992 to 30-6-1993 and 1-7-1993 to 30-6-1994 initiated by Major General S. C. Mehra, respondent No 3, under whom he was commanding 19 Infantry Brigade located at Damana near Jammu, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. He had filed a non-statutory complaint against his second A. C. R on 30-9-1994 which was partially accepted by the Chief of Army Staff as conveyed to the petitioner by letter dated 20-4-1995 (Annexure P-16). He had also preferred statutory complaint against his super session to the rank of Major General which was rejected by order dated 11-10-1995 (Annexure P-18), subject to expunction of remarks stated therein The petitioner has impugned both these annexures besides the A.C. Rs and has prayed that respondents No. 1 and 2 may be directed to constitute a selection board to consider him for promotion to the rank of Major General from the due date. 2. Respondents No 1 and 2 and respondent No, 3 have opposed the writ petition on merits by filing separate reply affidavits. Respondent No. 3 has also taken a preliminary objection that no part of cause of action has arisen within the territory of Himachal Pradesh, as such, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition. During the course of arguments, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has pressed this preliminary objection, therefore, we propose to decide the same before hearing the writ petition on merits. In reply to the preliminary objection, learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged that since the order dated 11-10-1995 (Annexure P-18) was communicated to the petitioner at Shimla whereby his statutory complaint against non-selection for promotion to the rank of Major General was rejected, cause of action in part has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. In reply to the preliminary objection, learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged that since the order dated 11-10-1995 (Annexure P-18) was communicated to the petitioner at Shimla whereby his statutory complaint against non-selection for promotion to the rank of Major General was rejected, cause of action in part has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. It is further stated by the learned Counsel that the order dated 29-2-1996 (Annexure P-19) which contains the panel of officers approved for promotion to the rank of Major General and wherein the name of the petitioner is not mentioned, also came to his knowledge at Shimla. Further, the letter dated 15-7-1996 (Annexure P-22) filed alongwith rejoinder to the reply of respondents No. 1 and 2, conveying to the petitioner that he was not selected for promotion to the rank of Major General in review Selection Board, was also received by him at Shimla According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, these facts further constitute a part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of this Court. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to a catena of case law of different High Courts which we will discuss hereinafter. 3 The first authority is of Bombay High Court in Damomal Kausomal Raisinghani v. Union of India and others, AIR 1967 Bombay 355, wherein while deciding the question of territorial jurisdiction in affirmative, the learned Judges have held that since the case in which the impugned order was passed was heard in Bombay and the effect of the impugned order fell upon the petitioner at Ullasnagar in the State of Maharashtra where he was residing at the relevant time, the part of cause of action had arisen within the State of Maharashtra, as such, the High Court of Bombay had the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 4. The next judgment is of Delhi High Court reported in M/s S. S. Light Rly Co Ltd v. The Industrial Tribunal {Central) and others, AIR 1971 Delhi 69, wherein the award of the Industrial Tribunal at Lucknow was under challenge. 4. The next judgment is of Delhi High Court reported in M/s S. S. Light Rly Co Ltd v. The Industrial Tribunal {Central) and others, AIR 1971 Delhi 69, wherein the award of the Industrial Tribunal at Lucknow was under challenge. The preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition was overruled by the learned Judge on the ground that hearings of the said Tribunal had taken place at the Chamber of the Additional Solicitor General of India in the Supreme Court premises, the award of the Industrial Tribunal was sent to and published and was enforceable at Delhi and the main terminus of the petitioner was situate at Shahdra, as such, part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court. 5. Another judgment cited on behalf of the petitioner is of Madras High Court in L. V, Veeri Chettiar and another v. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay, AIR 1971 Madras 155. In this case, the petitioners had challenged the notice issued by the Sales Tax Officer of Bombay calling upon them to produce the accounts of their business carried on in the State of Tamilnadu and proposing to pass best judgment order. While deciding the preliminary objection that no part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras, the learned judges have held that in fiscal laws the proposal to assess forms part and parcel of the machinery of assessment, which was set in motion by the issue of the impugned notice and its impact was felt by the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Tamilnadu as such, the Madras High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. This judgment of Madras High Court has been relied upon by the High Court of Allahabad in M\s Khunnoo hall and Sons v. The Union of India and others, AIR 1974 Allahabad 170 The learned Judges of Allahabad High Court were dealing with a case in which the petitioner had challenged the notice of Collector of Customs Bombay confiscating the goods and imposing fine. Overruling the preliminary objection of territorial jurisdiction, their Lordships observed that: “.... Overruling the preliminary objection of territorial jurisdiction, their Lordships observed that: “.... In the instant case the important limb of the proceedings culminating in the confiscation of goods and imposition of the fine is the issuance of the import license at Kanpur and as such a part of cause of action did arise al Kanpur, even though the ultimate order against which the petitioner is aggrieved was passed by the authority situate outside Uttar Pradesh. ...” 6 The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further referred to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Serajuddin & Co v. The State of Orissa and others, AIR 1971 Calcutta 414, wherein the order impugned was passed by the Government of Orissa whereby the orders of grant of mining lease of manganese ore were revoked and the lessees were asked to stop working of the mines and quit the possession thereof, in answer to the preliminary objection of territorial jurisdiction, the learned Judge of Calcutta High Court held that since all the effective orders, including the impugned order, were served on the lessees at their Calcutta office, and on such service the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Calcutta, therefore, it had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition notwithstanding the fact that all the respondents are located beyond its jurisdiction. 7. The same view was taken in another judgment of Calcutta High Court in United Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. {In Voluntary Lign.) and others v. Industrial Tribunal (III) Uttar Pradesh and others. 7. The same view was taken in another judgment of Calcutta High Court in United Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. {In Voluntary Lign.) and others v. Industrial Tribunal (III) Uttar Pradesh and others. 1974 Lab IC 902 in which a reference order under Section 4 (K) of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act passed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh referring an industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, U P; was challenged, Rejecting the preliminary objection of territorial jurisdiction, the learned Judge held that since the order of reference was sent by registered post to the petitioners at their residence within the jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court and the summons were also served upon them at Calcutta, to appear before the Industrial Tribunal at Lucknow, the consequence of the order of reference had fallen upon the petitioners at Calcutta, therefore, a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court Similarly, in another judgment of Calcutta High Court passed in Uma Sankar Chatterjee v. Union of India and others, 1982 Lab IC 1361, the learned Judges were dealing with the validity of the order of removal of the petitioner from the service of a corporation under the control of the Central Government, who was posted at a place in the State of Assam, While answering the question of territorial jurisdiction, the learned Judges have observed that the order of removal gave rise to cause of action for the appellant to institute an action for the establishment of his right to be in service and since the impugned order of removal became effective only when it was served on him at Calcutta, a part of cause of action had arisen at Calcutta within the jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court, For holding this view, the learned Judges have also relied upon the earlier judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Serajuddin & Co v. The State of Orissa and others (supra). 8. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to a case of Kerala High Court in Union of India and others v. P. Kunhabdulla, 1985 (1) SLJ 471 wherein the order impugned was communication sent to an employee of southern Railway posted at a place in Madras Division where-by he was removed from service The impugned order could not be served upon the employee in person at Madras as well as by post at his Madras address and was redirected to his permanent residence at a place in the State of Kerala where it was served upon him. It was held that since the order of removal had become effective on service upon the employee within the State of Kerala, a part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of Kerala High Court 9. One more judgment cited on behalf of the petitioner is of Karnataka High Court in D. Ramesh v. The Government of India and others, 1989 Lab IC 2190, wherein the question before the learned Judges was whether the petitioner was entitled to payment of gratuity under the Gratuity regulations after he had resigned for a service. The preliminary objection of territorial jurisdiction was raised pointing out that the petitioner had commenced his service in Delhi and had tendered his resignation in Delhi which was accepted at Delhi office, as such no part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Karnataka High Court While rejecting this preliminary objection, the learned Judges have held that since the petitioner had served at Bangalore branch office for more than six months, part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of Karnataka High Court, It was observed : " Cause of action has to be construed with reference to relief sought for and the facts necessary for the purpose of granting the relief sought for. Cause of action is nothing but a bundle of facts necessary for the purpose of granting relief. These vital facts have to be considered as forming part of the cause of action. Therefore, when each completed period of six months qualifies for gratuity, the service rendered at a place for more than six months will become necessarily a part of the cause of action. These vital facts have to be considered as forming part of the cause of action. Therefore, when each completed period of six months qualifies for gratuity, the service rendered at a place for more than six months will become necessarily a part of the cause of action. Admittedly, the petitioner has rendered more than six months at Bangalore, hence I am of the view that part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this court,...." 10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has lastly referred to Division Bench judgment of this court in Brigadier S« P 5. Baswani v, Union of India and others, ?992 (7) SLR 316 in which the court has observed that since the objection of territorial jurisdiction was taken by the respondents for the first time in the supplementary reply to the fourth amended writ petition, it was belated and was liable to be rejected. It was further held that keeping in view the stage to stage development of the case, which was noticed in Para 23 of the judgment, including the fact that objection of territorial jurisdiction was not taken in earlier writ proceedings and also that the petitioner was serving within the jurisdiction of this court when the order of attachment was served upon him for holding his trial at a place at Ahmednagar, it was not possible to uphold the objection that this court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition 11. All these judgments, as discussed above are on the facts of each case In Damomal Kausomal Raisinghani v Union of India and others, M\s. S. S. Light Rly Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (Central) and others and Ad)s. Khunnoo Lall and Sons v. The Union of India (supra), we have noticed that besides service of impugned orders some other facts constituting cause of action had also taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the respective High Courts. It is correct that Calcutta High Court in all its judgments and Kerala High Court in Union of India v p Kunhabdulla, (supra) have taken a consistent view, as discussed above, that the factum of service of the impugned order within the territorial jurisdiction constitutes a part of cause of action, as impugned order becomes effective at a place where it is served. But this view has not found favour with the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and others, (1994) 4 SCC 711, which judgment we will discuss in later part of our judgment So far the judgment of Karnataka High Court in D. Ramesh v. Government of India and others, (supra) is concerned, it pertains to payment of gratuity, therefore, it cannot be a precedent for other cases. 12. On the other hand, the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that service of order dated 11-10-1995 (Annexure Pl-8) rejecting the statutory complaint ; acquisition of knowledge of order dated 29-2-1996 (Annexure P-19), declaring the panel for promotion to the post of Major General approved by the Selection Board held on 11/13 10-1995 and the receipt of communication dated 1-7-1996 (Annexure P-22), conveying to the petitioner his non-selection for the rank of Major General in the review Selection Board held on 24/25-4-1996, during the pendency of the writ petition, do not form part of bundle of facts essential and necessary to be proved by him for the purpose of succeeding in the present writ petition. It is further submitted that the cause of action had already been completed during the period the petitioner was posted at Damana in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. when the disputed A C Rs were recorded and the Non- statutory complaint against the second disputed A C R was field on 30-9-1994 and also decided by order dated 20-4-1995 Order of his super-session dated 30-1-1995 to the rank of Major General was also passed and his statutory complaint against it was filed on 12-3-1995 during this period. 13Lastly, in the recent Judgment of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v, Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have reiterated that the expression. 13Lastly, in the recent Judgment of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v, Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have reiterated that the expression. Cause of action means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the court They have referred to their earlier judgment in State of Rajasthan and others v M/s. Swaika Properties and another, (1985) 3 SCC 2)7, to hold that merely because the advertisement was read at Calcutta, the offer was submitted from Calcutta and the representations were made from Calcutta, a part of cause of action had not arisen within the jurisdiction of the State of West Bengal, as these facts were not integral part of cause of action to challenge the rejection of the bid of the Petitioner company on the ground that it 5?d not fulfill the requisite experience criteria stipulated in the tender and was not recommended for short listing by the tender committee whereas all these decisions were taken at Delhi. 14 For the purpose of guidance in the present case reference to the facts of the case in State of Rajasthan and others v. M/s Swalka Properties and another.(supra) will be helpful. In that case, the respondent company had us registered office at Calcutta but owned a large chunk of land on the outskirts of Jaipur which was notified for the acquisition of land which was challenged in the High Court of Calcutta The question arose for consideration whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition and grant ex pane ad interim relief the learned Judges of the Supreme Court observed that upon the said facts, the cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court. It was observed : ".......The mere service of notice under Section 52 (2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B Brabourne Road, Calcutta i. e within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of land under Section 52 (1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i. e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on thorn by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur, under Section 52 (2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52 (1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52 (1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose.” It was further pointed out that after the issuance of the notification by the State Government under Section 52 (I) of the Land Acquisition Act, the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances, hence it was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice under Section 52 (2) for the grant of appropriate direction or order under Article 226 for quashing the notification acquiring the land. Therefore, it was held that no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court. The Supreme Court also regretted and deprecated the practice of exercising jurisdiction and passing interlocutory orders in matters where the High Court of Calcutta lacked territorial jurisdiction. 15. Therefore, it was held that no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court. The Supreme Court also regretted and deprecated the practice of exercising jurisdiction and passing interlocutory orders in matters where the High Court of Calcutta lacked territorial jurisdiction. 15. Clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution begins with a non-obstante clause-notwithstanding anything ia Article 32 and provides that every High Court shall have the power "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any government, "within those territories" directions, orders of writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under Clause (2) of Article 226, the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action wholly or in part had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226, it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part HI of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the government or the authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territory, 16. The expression "Cause of action" as defined in Mullas Code of Civil Procedure is : “Cause of action means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant..,..." The meaning of "Cause of action" in Blacks Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) is ; “The fact or facts which give a person a right to judicial redress or relief against another. The legal effect of an occurrence in terms of redress to a party to the occurrence. The legal effect of an occurrence in terms of redress to a party to the occurrence. A situation or state of facts which would entitle a party to sustain action and give him right to seek a judicial remedy in his behalf....,..." 17. In the light of the above definition and meaning of the expression "Cause of action" and the ratio of the judgments referred to herein-above, we hold that the facts in respect ofservhe of order dated 11 -10-1995 dismissing the statutory complaint subject to expunctions stated therein (Annexure P~ 18), acquisition of knowledge of the approved panel for promotion to the rank of Major General (Annexure P-19) and the service of order dated 1-7 1996 (Annexure P-22) during the pendency of the writ petition, informing the petitioner about his non-selection for promotion to the rank of Major General in the review Selection Board held on 24/25-44996 are not integral part of the cause of action for granting the reliefs sought for by the petitioner In other words, without placing and proving these facts on record, the reliefs sought for quashing the disputed A. C. Rs. the order dated 20*4-1995 (Annexure P-16) and the order dated 11-10-1995 (Annexure P-18) can be granted besides giving directions to the respondents to consider afresh the case of the petitioner for his promotion to the rank of Major General, if succeeds on merit. The impugned AC Rs. pertain to the period when the petitioner was posted at Damana in the State of Jammu and Kashmir wherefrom he had preferred the non-statutory complaint dated 30 9-1994 which was rejected subject to the expunctions mentioned therein by the Chief of Army Staff, whose order was communicated to the petitioner on 20-4-1995 before he joined at Shimla on his posting at Army Training Command. He was considered but not selected for promotion to the rank of Major General in the Selection Board held on 21/22-10-1994 as conveyed to him by order dated 20-4-1995, before he joined at Shimla. So far the decision of his statutory complaint is concerned, it was taken by the Government of India, Ministry of Defence at New Delhi and its service on the petitioner at Shimla did not give him fresh cause of action. So far the decision of his statutory complaint is concerned, it was taken by the Government of India, Ministry of Defence at New Delhi and its service on the petitioner at Shimla did not give him fresh cause of action. Even the fact of the reconsideration of his case by the review Selection Board on 24/25-4-1996 and the communication of its decision by a letter dated 1-7-1996 at Shimla, is not necessary for giving him relief sought for in respect of the disputed A. C, Rs, the order dated 20-4.1995 deciding the non-statutory complaint, non-selection for promotion to the rank of Major General and order dated 11-10-1995 deciding the statutory complaint dated 12-3-1995. 18. In view of this discussion, we have no hesitation to uphold the preliminary objection and hold that, in the case In hand, no part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court and the writ petition is not maintainable. Hence the same is dismissed. Costs easy. Writ petition dismissed.