Suresh Manishankar Bhatt v. Heirs and Legal Representatives of Nandwana B. Jatashankar
1996-04-08
J.N.BHATT
body1996
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : J.N. Bhatt, J. Both these petitions raise identical questions. Therefore, upon a joint request, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The predecessors-in-title of the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 1286 of 1995 had preferred an application under Section 3 read with Section 7(3) of the Bombay Inams (Kutch Area) Abolition Act, 1958 (the Act for short) before the Mamlatdar Kutch on 1-9-1975 which came to be dismissed on 9-2-1976 and also came to be confirmed in appeal before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal decided on 3-1-1977. 3. The predecessor-in-title of the respondents one Nandwana Jatashanker Dosa had filed an application under Section 8 of the Act before the Special Mamlatdar, Anjar which was dismissed by the Special Mamlatdar by his order dated 14-3-1985 and it was confirmed in appeal by the Secretary (Appeals) Revenue Department, State of Gujarat on 12-8-1994. Hence, these petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 4. The following question emerges for examination and adjudication in these two petitions : Whether the authorities below committed an error of law by not following the principles of natural justice in calling for the revenue record without giving an opportunity of hearing or explanation to the other side viz. petitioners and not dealing with and deciding specifically such contentions by the appellate authority? 5. Since this Court finds that the question of violation of principles of natural justice goes to the root of the matter other contentions are not required to be gone into in greater details. 6. In order to appreciate the aforesaid aspect raised in these two petitions, it may be mentioned at the outset that there is no dispute about the fact that Mamlatdar had called for the revenue record in course of the proceedings before him and opportunity was not given to the petitioners to meet with or explain the said documentary evidence emerging from the record of the revenue authorities. The only contention which is advanced on behalf of the respondents is that even if the revenue record which was called for is ignored or excluded, then also, the decision of the Mamlatdar is not vitiated or remains legal and valid. This submission that there is sufficiency of other evidence is of no avail.
The only contention which is advanced on behalf of the respondents is that even if the revenue record which was called for is ignored or excluded, then also, the decision of the Mamlatdar is not vitiated or remains legal and valid. This submission that there is sufficiency of other evidence is of no avail. It may also be stated that there is no dispute about the fact that in the appeal against the order of the Mamlatdar before the Special Secretary (Appeals), this contention that there was violation of the principles of natural justice in not giving an opportunity to explain and meet with the evidence called for by the Mamlatdar from the revenue record, is not dealt with and decided. The same submission is raised to meet with the aforesaid submission as narrated herein above. 7. The Mamlatdar decided against the petitioners on 28-3-1977 after holding an inquiry under Section 3 of the Act. The decision of the Mamlatdar is that the agricultural land bearing survey number 322 admeasuring 8 acres 34 gunthas and second agricultural land bearing survey number 324/1 admeasuring 36 gunthas were not held as Inams lands and the petitioners or their producessors-in-title were not the tenants. It would therefore, be material to examine the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. Provisions of Section 3 of the Act read as under : "3.(1) If any question arises - (i) whether any land is held as inam or sub-inam and as to the category thereof, (ii) whether any inam or sub-inam is a grant of the soil, or an assignment of land revenue, or both, or is a grant of the total or partial exemption from payment of land revenue, (iii) whether any person is a butadar or ret butadar, or (iv) whether any person is a tenant, the State Government or an officer authorised by that Government shall decide the question. (2) Where any such question is decided by an officer so authorised by the State Government, any person aggrieved by such decision may file an appeal to the State Government within ninety days from the date of such decision.
(2) Where any such question is decided by an officer so authorised by the State Government, any person aggrieved by such decision may file an appeal to the State Government within ninety days from the date of such decision. (3) Where from a decision of such officer no appeal is filed under sub-section (2), the State Government may, after the expiry of the period for appeal, but not later than one year from the date of the decision, call for the record of the proceeding of such officer for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, propriety or regularity of such proceeding or decision and may pass such order thereon as it thinks fit. (4) The decision of the State Government under sub-section (10) or (2) in appeal, or under sub-section (3), and subject thereto the decision of the officer, shall be final." 8. It could very well be seen from the aforesaid provisions that powers are conferred on the Government or the authorised officer to decide and determine certain questions including the question as to whether any land is held as Inam land and whether any person is a tenant. Section 3(1)(i) prescribes power to decide the question whether any land is held as Inam land or not and Section 3(1)(iv) prescribes power to decide whether any person is a tenant or not. The application of the predecessor-in-tile of the petitioner under Section 3 of the Act came to be decided against the petitioners whereby it is held by the Mamlatdar in his order dated 28-3-1977 that lands in question were not held as Inam lands and the petitioners were not the tenants. Upon an appeal to the State Government, the order of the Mamlatdar came to be confirmed on 14-3-1985. 9. In view of the facts and circumstances emerging from the record, it becomes very clear that the Mamlatdar while passing the impugned order dated 28-3-1977, had considered and relied on some documents by calling them from the revenue office without giving any opportunity to explain to the petitioners. There is also no dispute about the fact that a specific contention was raised in para 43-F of the appeal memo and it has not been dealt with and decided by the appellant authority. What is more required to hold that there was breach and violation of the principles of natural justice?
There is also no dispute about the fact that a specific contention was raised in para 43-F of the appeal memo and it has not been dealt with and decided by the appellant authority. What is more required to hold that there was breach and violation of the principles of natural justice? In the opinion of this Court, this is a fit and appropriate case wherein the matter is required to be allowed and remanded back to the Mamlatdar concerned for a fresh adjudication after giving an opportunity to the petitioners on the aforesaid aspect. 10. In the result, the petitions are allowed and the matters are remanded back to the Special Mamlatdar, Anjar for afresh decision under Section 3 of the Act after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and the concerned parties. Since the matter is pending for more than a period of two decades, it is desirable to give a direction for early hearing. Therefore, the Special Mamlatdar, Anjar is directed to decide and dispose of the inquiry under Section 3 of the Act after giving an opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible but not later than three months from the date of receipt of file from this Court. Petitions are accordingly allowed and Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent in each of the petitions with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Petition allowed.