Judgment Gurusharan Sharma, J. 1. Admittedly, Ramalal Manjhi died leaving behind two sons, Pitho Manjhi and Guna Ram Manjhi. Pitho Manjhi had a son, namely, khela Manjhi, and opposite parties 1 to 3 are the sons of Late Khela Manjhi. Guna Ram Manjhi died leaving behind his widow-Aina Manjhiain and two daughters, namely, Malti Manjhiain and Salgi Manjhiain. Aina Manjhiain inherited the properties of her husband, Late Guna Ram Manjhi and her name was recorded therefor in the Record of Rights of the year 1937. Subsequently, after the death of Aina Manjhiain, the two daughters aforesaid inherited those properties and in the last Revisional Record of Rights of the year 1964 the same was recorded in the joint names of Malti Manjhiain and the two sons of Salgi Manjhiain, who was dead by then. 2. Malti Manjhiain filed Title Suit No. 26 of 1977 for partition of her half shares in the aforesaid properties against the two sons of Late Salgi Manjhiain, which was decreed. 3. The parties to the suit admitted that although they were Scheduled Tribes, but have been sufficiently Hinduism and were governed by Hindu Law in the matters of succession and inheritance. 4. Malti Manjhiain, the decree-holder levied Execution Case No. 12 of 1982 for execution of the aforesaid partition decree and during the pendency of the said proceeding she died on 7.6.1982. 5. According to the two sons of Late Salgi Manjhiain, the judgment debtors, the given properties were the inherited properties of Malti Manjhiain, which developed upon them on her death and the execution proceeding became infructuous and was liable to be dismissed. 6. The aforesaid three grand sons of Pitho Manjhi (sons of Late Khela Manjhi) filed a petition under Sec. 146 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter to be referred to as "the code" for short) in the said execution proceeding claiming to be the heirs and legal representatives of Late Malti Manjhiain, who died un-married and prayed therein to be substituted in her place and to be allowed to prosecute with the execution case. 7. By order dated 5.2.1993 the executing court rejected the said petition and observed that after the death of the original decree-holder, Malti Manjhiain, all her interests vested in the present judgment debtors and they were entitled to get the properties in preference to the claimants (grand sons of Late Pitho Manjhi). 7. By order dated 5.2.1993 the executing court rejected the said petition and observed that after the death of the original decree-holder, Malti Manjhiain, all her interests vested in the present judgment debtors and they were entitled to get the properties in preference to the claimants (grand sons of Late Pitho Manjhi). The said order was challenged in this Court vide C.R. No. 144 of 1993(R), which was allowed on 8.10.1993, and the impugned order dated 5,2,1993 was set aside and the Executing Court was directed to substitute the three grand sons of Late Pitho Manjhi as legal representatives of the de-caused decree-holder, Malti Manjhiain. It was observed in the said order that for the purpose of substitution of the legal representatives, one may not be the heir and an intermidler can also be substituted in place of a deceased party. 8. The judgment debtors, i.e. the petitioner as well as the opposite party No. 4 herein thereafter filed an objection under Sec. 47 of the Code in the said execution proceeding for a declaration that the properties in question devolved on them as the nearest heirs of Late Malti Manjhiain, and after the interest of the deceased decree holder merged with the interest of the present judgment debtors, the decree in question became incapable of execution and the execution case by dismissed. 9. The three grand sons of Late Pitho Manjhi, who were substituted as decree holders, pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 6.10.1993 passed by this Court, filed a rejoinder thereto stating, inter alia, that in terms of Article 151 of the Mullas Hindu Law, they were the nearest agnates of the deceased decree holder. As a matter of fact the deceased decree holder had inherited suit properties from her father and she had limited interest therein and accordingly after hen death, the estate passed not to her heirs but to her fathers heirs, i.e. the refreshers. The present judgment debtors were, therefore, not the preferential heirs of the deceased. 10. By the impugned order dated 25.3.1994 the executing court has been pleased to reject the said objection under Sec. 47 of the Code and held that after the death of Malti Manjhiain to be properties in question vested to her father and not to her sister or sisters son, as she was a limited owner, who got the property by inheritance from her father. The grand sons of her fathers brother were, therefore, entitled to proceed with the execution case. In the present Civil Revision application the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1994 of the executing court has been challenged. 11. Mr. N.K. Prasad, Senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that admittedly the property in question was not Stridhan property of the deceased-Malti Manjhiain, it was inherited by her alongwith the judgment debtors from Aina Manjhiain and stool recorded jointly in their names in the last Revisional Survey of 1964. On the death of Malti Manjhiain, therefore, her undevided interest in the properties in question devolved on the objectors, i.e. the present judgment debtors and her right therein merged with the joint rights of the judgment debtors Article 151 of the Mullas Hindu Law deals with devolution of Stridhan property of a women and so it was not applicable in the present case. The property, therefore, cannot go to a branch descending from Pitho Manjhi, brother of the husband of Aina Manjhiain and the judgment debtors were the only nearest heirs of Late Malti Manjhiain, on whom the properties in question devolved. 12. Mr. Prasad placed reliance on a decision of the Privy Council in Chanta China Ram Subbayya and Anr. V/s. Moparthi Chenchnramayya A.I.R. 1947 Privy Council 124 wherein it was found that the daughters son has a right to succeed before the agnates and held that the famous compiler of the Mitakshara Shaped the law into conformity with the needs of the day and thus gave the daughters son his present place in the law of inheritance. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Eqbal, counsel for the opposite parties 1 to 3 (grand sons of Late Pitho Manjhi) submitted that Malti Manjhiain died unmarried and her property reverted to her (i) full brother (ii) mother (iii) father and in absence of any of them to the nearest relation of her parents, i.e. her fathers Sapindas at the first instance. The present judgment debtors were not the male descendants of the original owner, Guna Ram Manjhi and they were not his Sapindas said Guna Ram Manjhi, were Sapindas and his descendants so the opposite parties 1 to 3 succeeded to the estate left by deceased Malti Manjhiain. 14. The present judgment debtors were not the male descendants of the original owner, Guna Ram Manjhi and they were not his Sapindas said Guna Ram Manjhi, were Sapindas and his descendants so the opposite parties 1 to 3 succeeded to the estate left by deceased Malti Manjhiain. 14. It is not in dispute that Malti Manjhiain had inherited the given properties from her father and held the same as a limited owner and not as absolute owner. It was not her stridhan property. In the present case, therefore, the admitted position is that after the death of Malti Manjhiain, her interest in the given property devolved on her fathers heirs. 15. In my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of this case, after the death of Malti Manjhiain the given properties reverted back to her late fathers heirs and the present judgment debtors who are the grand sons of her father from another daughter-Salgi Manjhiain succeeded to the same. They being the Naties of the said Guna Ram Manjhi have preferential right of inheritence and in their presence, the grand sons of the brother of Maltis father, the agnates of Guna Ram Manjhi were not entitled to succeed to the said estated left by Late Malti Manjhiain. 16. In the circumstances, I find force in the objection raised by the judgment debtors in the execution proceeding under Sec. 47 of the Code, which is allowed. It is held that the given properties after the death of Malti Manjhiain devolved on the judgment debtors. The grand sons of Pitho Manjhi, though substituted in place of deceased Malti Manjhiain, in my opinion, cannot succeed to the estate of Late Malti Manjhiain in presence of the present judgment debtors and as such they are not entitled to execute the decree in question as heirs and legal representatives of the deceased original decree holder. The interest of the deceased decree holder merged with the interest of the present judgment debtors. After the death of Malti Manjhiain, therefore, the decree in question is not capable of execution. The execution case is, therefore, fit to be dismissed. 17. In the result, this Civil Revision application is allowed and the impugned order dated 25.3.1994 passed by the First Subordinate Judge, Jamshedpur, in Execution Case No. 12 of 1992 is set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs.