JUDGMENT M. Srinivasan, C. J.—At the out-set we would like to point out that the able eloquent and tenacious arguments of Mr. Vinay Kuthiala, counsel for the petitioners have not been able to persuade us to agree with them. 2. The pivotal question, which arises for consideration depends on the understanding of the judgment delivered by this Court in The Nurpur Pvt. Bus Operators v. State and others, 1993 (1) Sim LC 294. According to learned Counsel for the petitioners that judgment dealt with only the provisions of Rule 9 (1) of the H. P. Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1955, but left intact the provisions of Rule 9 (1-A). 3. It is necessary at this stage to refer to some extent the history of the case, which led to the decision in The Nurpur Pvt. Bus Operators Unions case 1993 (1) Sim LC 294. 4. The H. P. Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1955 empowers the State Government by section 3 thereof to levy, charge and collect a tax on all fares and freights in respect of all passengers carried and goods transported by motor vehicles at such rates not exceeding fifty per cent of the value of the fare or freight, as the case may be, and as the Government may, by notification, direct subject to a minimum of five paise in any one case, the amount of tax being calculated to the nearest multiple of five paise by ignoring two paise or less and counting more than two paise as five paise in any one case. Section 4 of the said Act provides for method of collection of tax. The section read as follows : "The tax and surcharge shall be collected by the owner of the motor vehicle and paid to the State Government in the prescribed manner.” There are two provisos to the section. The second of which read as follows: “Provided further that in case of contract carriages the Government may accept a lump sum in lieu of the tax chargeable on fare in the manner prescribed.” 5. Rule 9 at that time enabled the owner of the vehicle to adopt the payment of tax in lump sum by a certain procedure prescribed therein But in the year 1991, the provisos to the section as well as the rules framed thereunder were amended. Rule 9 at that time enabled the owner of the vehicle to adopt the payment of tax in lump sum by a certain procedure prescribed therein But in the year 1991, the provisos to the section as well as the rules framed thereunder were amended. There was an amendment of the proviso to section in the year 1991 and thereafter, the second proviso came to read as follows : "Provided further that in case of motor vehicle (including the stage or contract carriages), other than those specified in the first proviso, in which the passengers are carried, the State Government may assess the tax and surcharge at lump sum, in the manner prescribed, taking into consideration the registered capacity of the vehicle and the distance travelled or to be travelled by such motor vehicles under a permit issued to such vehicle.” 6. Consequently, Rule 9 was also amended and in 1991 Rule 9 (1) was modified by substituting the figures 3/5 and 60 in place 6f figures 3/4’and 75’ Rule 9 (1-A) was introduced by that amendment. The Rule reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (I), the owner of a stage carriage having seating capacity of more than fifteen but not exceeding thirty passengers, plying, under a route permit, within a town, semi-urban or rural area covered by the Himachal Pradesh Passenger Road Transport Service (Modified) Scheme, 1991, notified vide Notification No. 6-5!/8I-Tpt.-VI, dated 7-5-1991 and upto 30 kilometers from the central part of any such town, semi-urban or rural area, shall pay to the State Government tax in lump sum to be determined on the basis of the following formula, subject to the condition that the amount of tax so determined shall be calculated so as to be rounded off to the next one hundred rupees, namely :— Number of seats x number of scheduled kilometers x 15/100* x rate of passengers tax x fare per kilometer. *Explanation,—In this formula 15/100 represents average occupancy taken at 15 per cent, of number of seats.” 7. Before the amendment of 1991 was made a question arose before this Court relating to the validity of Rule 9. A Bench of this Court decided the case in Nurpur Pvt. Bus Operators Union and others v. State of H. P. and another, 1992 (3) Sim LC 117, and upheld the validity of the said rule. Before the amendment of 1991 was made a question arose before this Court relating to the validity of Rule 9. A Bench of this Court decided the case in Nurpur Pvt. Bus Operators Union and others v. State of H. P. and another, 1992 (3) Sim LC 117, and upheld the validity of the said rule. After the amendment, the question that was raised by the petitioners therein was that the option given to the owners of the vehicles was taken away by the amendment to the proviso introduced in the year 1991 and thereafter, the Government retained the option either to collect tax in lump sum or by formula method. It was that question which was considered by the Division Bench in the second case reported in 1993 (1) Sim LC 294. After referring to the amendments to the section and the Rules, the Bench observed with regard to the Rule which stood earlier, as follows : "The emphasis in both these paragraphs is upon the optional nature of payment of the amount of tax in lump sum, payable as it is on the option of the owner or the operator, if the Government accepts to let him do so." Then, referring to the earlier judgment of this Court in 1992 (1) Sim LC 117, the Bench proceeded to extract some observations and stated as follows : "15. By the amendments which are assailed before us in these petitions, the position has materially altered. By amendment of section 4 what has now been provided is that in the case of motor vehicles, including stage carriages, in which passengers are carried, the State Government may assess the tax at lump sum in the manner prescribed The option has now come to vest in the State Government. As far as owner or operator of a stage carriage is concerned, he has to pay tax in lump sum (and in no other manner) if the State Government decides, as has been decided by it through the amended rule, to require the owner or operator to pay tax in lump sum. 16. It is this element of compulsion which h s rendered the provision relating to payment of tax by lump sum invalid. The reason is not far to seek." 8. 16. It is this element of compulsion which h s rendered the provision relating to payment of tax by lump sum invalid. The reason is not far to seek." 8. After discussing the question further, the Bench said that the grievance of the petitioners before it was that by making it incumbent upon them to pay tax by lump sum, they were being required to pay tax even in cases where no passenger may have been carried in their stage carriages and also in utter disregard of the distance actually travelled by a passenger, even in those instances where he may have been carried in stage carriage, by requiring consideration of scheduled kilometers for working out the amount of lump sum in the formula provided for the purpose in the rules. Then, the Bench observed as follows : "If the fixation of the amount of tax by lump sum is legally permissible, as in the case where the option to pay it in lump sum is with the owners or operators of a stage carriage, no exception can be taken to the working out of the quantum of tax on the basis of the formula and on averages. This is the legal position which admits of no doubt. We may only refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in M\s. Sainik Motors, AIR 1961 SC 1480, extracted earlier. In that event, the operator will be deemed to have consented to that mode of calculation of the amount of tax payable by him in lump sum on account of the convenience that he secures for himself by avoiding to-be required to maintain accounts and file returns. The convenience has to be ensured for himself by the owner or the operator by permitting fixation of the amount of tax by lump sum on a reasonable formula provided for the purpose by the Government. But where, as in the present case, the operator is compelled to make payment in lump sum, it is difficult to equate the situation with the one when he likes to do so at his option. That would be a case where the operator, as it were, purchases peace for himself by getting the convenience of not being requiring to maintain accounts and file return.” 9. That would be a case where the operator, as it were, purchases peace for himself by getting the convenience of not being requiring to maintain accounts and file return.” 9. Thereafter, the Bench concluded as follows : "The discussion made by us so far leads to the conclusion that confining payment of tax under the Act to the mode of payment by lump sum makes it invalid. We declare it to be so." 10. The contention now urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the judgment referred to above will operate only with regard to Rule 9 (1), which was extracted in the judgment and not Rule 9 (1-A). For this purpose, reliance is strongly placed on the observation, which was already extracted by us, by which, the Bench said that it was not concerned with the other amendments in the rules excepting the amendments relating to Rule 9 (1), which modified and substituted certain figures. 11. We are unable to accept this contention. It is evident from a reading of the entire judgment that the Bench was concerned with the validity of the amendment of proviso to section 4. The second proviso to section 4 enables the Government to exercise the option and to assess the tax and surcharge at lump sum. It was that amendment, which took away the option from the owner of the vehicle and placed it with the Government, which was considered by the Bench. The Bench came to the conclusion that such a proviso was invalid and declared it to be so. It follows, therefore, that the proviso to section 4 was struck down by the Bench as invalid and thereafter the proviso could not be given effect to by any Rule framed under such proviso. Rule 9 is framed only by virtue of section 22 of the Act, which enables the Government to make rules consistent with the Act for securing the payment of tax and surcharge. The procedure prescribed in Rule 9 was only on the basis of provisos to section 4 which existed previously. After the Bench of this Court struck down the provisos, the rules could not stand independent of the proviso and there cannot be any contention that the rules will continue to be valid inspite of the provisos having been struck down. It will not be possible for this Court to accept this argument. After the Bench of this Court struck down the provisos, the rules could not stand independent of the proviso and there cannot be any contention that the rules will continue to be valid inspite of the provisos having been struck down. It will not be possible for this Court to accept this argument. Even though the root of the tree has been cut and the tree has fallen down, how can the branches of the tree continue to have flowers and fruits when such a tree does not continue to exist. In this case, we have no hesitation to hold that once the provisos to section 4 are struck down as invalid, then the rules, which have prescribed the procedure for enabling the Government to collect tax and surcharge on the basis of the said provisos, will not continue to be valid. Consequently, Rule 9 (1-A) is also invalid, even though the Bench has not expressly referred to the said proviso in its judgment. The fact that the Bench has dealt with the provisos to section 4 and held them to be invalid is sufficient to hold that the procedure prescribed under Rule 9 (1) and Rule 9 (1-A) is also invalid. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the judgment of this Court in 1993 (1) Sim LC 294, should be only treated as a repeal of Rule 9 (1-A). According to him, if the rule is repealed, the provisions of section 23 of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1968, will come into play. That section deals only with enactments repealed and re-enacted with or without modification. It is quite obvious that the section can only refer to a repeal or re-enactment of a statute by the legislature. It cannot apply to a case where a Court of law has declared a particular statute to be invalid, It is a well settled principle of law that the judgment of a court cannot repeal a statute. If at all, the judgment can only declare n statute to be invalid. The effect of such a declaration is that the statute is invalid from its inception The effect of repeal may vary on the basis of language used in the repealing enactment by the Legislature. Hence a repeal can never be equal to a declaration by a Court of law that a particular statute is invalid. The effect of such a declaration is that the statute is invalid from its inception The effect of repeal may vary on the basis of language used in the repealing enactment by the Legislature. Hence a repeal can never be equal to a declaration by a Court of law that a particular statute is invalid. In this case, we have already extracted that sentence of the judgment of this Court, referred to above, that they have declared the relevant provisions to be invalid and they have expressly used the word declare and that is the proper course which could have and should have been adopted by a Court of law. In this case, it is only a declaration of law and it is not a case of repeal of enactment Hence the provisions of section 23 of the H, P. General Clauses Act, 1968 are not available to the petitioner. 13. The next contention of the petitioners counsel is that by an administrative order, the respondents cannot repeal the rule which has been introduced by virtue of power under section 22 of the Himachal Pradesh Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1955. There is no merit in this contention, It is not a question of introducing some amendment or repealing a rule by an administrative order but it is a question of following and implementing a judgment on this Court, which has declared a statutory provision to be invalid. Once the statutory provision is held to be invalid, then it is necessary on the part of the Government to pass such orders as would meet the circumstance in order to implement the judgment. That has been done in this case by an administrative order. 14. The next contention is that principle of estoppel would apply. The Government having already accepted a Scheme by which Mini Buses, which belong to a special category, were permitted by Rule 9 (1-A) to pay tax lump sum under a formula prescribed by that rule, is debarred now from retracing its step and introducing a provision by which the Mini Bus operators are made to pay tax ad valorem The principle of estoppel can-not apply in this case as it is well known that there cannot be any estoppel against law. In this case, when the Court has found that a statutory provision is invalid then the Government is bound to act on that basis and there is no question of the Government taking any action on its own on the basis of a Scheme accepted by it earlier. 15. It is next contended that the principles of natural justice have been violated in view of the fact that the petitioners were not given any opportunity before the Government introduced a procedure for collecting the tax at ad valorem basis. There is no substance in this contention as the principles of natural justice will not apply in view of the fact that a competent Court has declared the statute to be invalid and all necessary consequences would fallow and the Govern meat is a party to the said proceedings and it is bound by it and therefore, no question of Government issuing a notice to somebody and consulting or giving an opportunity to somebody to argue to the contrary. 16. It is next contended that the Mini Buses belong to a different category and they cannot be equated with the other stage carriages and therefore, there is a violation of the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as unequals have been treated as equals by the Government. This question does not arise at all in view of the fact that the Government has only acted in pursuance of the judgment of this Court. In the present writ petition the only prayer is to direct the Government to accept the tax on lump sum basis in accordance with Rule 9 (I-A) of the Rules. Once it is held that Rule 9 (l-A) is no longer in force, the prayer of the petitioners cannot be granted. 17. The last contention is that this Rule 9 (l-A) is a beneficial legislation and it should be interpreted in such a manner that the person concerned will get the benefit and that the interpretation should be beneficial to the tax payers Here again, we have to point out that Rule 9 (l-A) is no longer in existence and no question of interpretation arises for consideration. 18. Learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to certain rulings of the Supreme Court in support of his contentions. 18. Learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to certain rulings of the Supreme Court in support of his contentions. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Palai v T. J. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 1561. That was a case of a repeal of an enactment by the legislature by means of another enactment. The question before the Court was whether it was a partial repeal or complete repeal. The ruling has nothing to do with the question, which has been raised before us. 19. In The Broach District Co operative Cotton Sales Ginning and Pressing Society Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad, AIR 1989 SC 1493, the Supreme Court held that exemption clause in tax statute should be liberally construed so as to be in favour of assessees. As we have already pointed out that the question of interpretation of any statutory provision does not arise in this case as the relevant statutory provision has already been held to be invalid and Rule 9 (l-A) is not valid in the eye of law. 20. In M/s. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd and another v. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1991 SC 672, the Court had to consider the validity of Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) (Amendment and Validation) Act 16 of 1987. The Court held that the amendment Act was valid. We are unable to appreciate how the rule in that case will enable the petitioners in the present case to support their contention. 21. In Additional District Magistrate (City) Agra v. Prabhakar Chaturvedi and another, (1996) 2 SCC 12, the Supreme Court held that when no grievance had been made in a writ petition against the non-supply of Enquiry Officers report, the High Court ought not to have annulled the writ petitioners dismissal on that ground. The Court had pointed out the relevant practice and procedure adopted in such cases. This case far from helping the petitioners will only be against the contention raised by the petitioners. In fact, learned Counsel wanted to place reliance on the judgment for the purpose of saying that the respondents had not made any reference in their pleadings to the notification issued by the Government under section 3 of the H. P Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1955 fixing the rate of tax to be levied from the 15th day of October, 1994. In view of the prayer contained in the writ petition the question as to the validity of the notification does not arise in this case. The learned Advocate General made a reference to that notification only for the purpose of clearing a doubt which arose in the mind of the Court as to how tax could be collected if Rule 9 (1-A) had also become invalid by virtue of judgment of this Court [1993 (1) Sim LC 294]. It is only for clarification of that matter, that the notification was referred to The notification makes a reference to section 3 of the said Act We have already extracted section 3, which enables the Government to levy, charge and collect tax on all fares and freights and also issue notification for that purpose. It is not necessary for us to elaborate the matter at any length Having regard to the scope of the prayer in the present writ petition, it is sufficient to hold that the petitioners cannot insist upon the payment of tax on lump sum basis by virtue of Rule 9 (1-A). We have already held that the rule is not valid in view of the judgment of this Court, referred to earlier. 22. It follows, therefore, that the petitioners are not entitled to get any relief in this writ petition and it is dismissed. CM. P. No. 1000 of 1996: In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, the present application is also dismissed and interim order is vacated. Application dismissed.