T. P. GARG, J. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 13-9-1984, striking off the defence of the petitioner passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Banda-respondent No. 2 and the order dated 19-10-1984, passed by the respondent No. 1 affirming the said Order in the revision. 2. Briefly stated facts are that the respondent No. 3 filed S. C. C. Suit No. 16 of 1982, for recovery of arrears of rent of Rs. 2212 for period 1-8-1979 to 26-8-1982, Rs. 25 as expenses of the notice and Rs. 115 as mesne profits from 27-8-1982 to 25-9-82. 3. It was alleged by the plaintiff that the petitioner was tenant of the first floor of the house in dispute at monthly rent of Rs. 60 Smt. Chanda Devi was owner and landlady. She executed a Will and created a trust in the name of Badri Prasad Maheshwar Prasad Omar Dharmanth Trust, Baniyauta Banda. She died on 16-2-1982, and respondent No. 3 became owner and landlord. Petitioner did not pay rent since 1-7- 1979. He was given notice dated 21-7-1982 which was served on him on 27-7-1982. He did not comply with the notice. Respondent No. 3 filed suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment in September, 1932. The summons were issued fixing 4-12-1982, for filing written statement and 10-12-1982 for hearing of the suit. On 10-12-1982 as the petitioner did not appear, the trial court directed to proceed ex parte fixing 20-12-1982 for hearing. On 17-12-1982 petitioner appeared and filed application to set aside the order dated 10-12-1982, whereby the court had directed to proceed ex-pane, on the allegation that he was not aware of the suit and was not served with summons issued by the court. On 20-12-1982, the court allowed the said application and set aside the order to proceed ex parte passed on 10-12- 1982, and further fixed 27-1-1983 for hearing of the case. On 20-12-1982 the court also passed order on the substitution application filed on behalf of plaintiff as during the pendency of suit managing trustee had died on October 1982 and sub stitution was sought to implead another trustee for prosecution of the case. 27th January, 1983 was holiday. On 28th January, 1983, petitioner submitted a tender for depositing Rs. On 20-12-1982 the court also passed order on the substitution application filed on behalf of plaintiff as during the pendency of suit managing trustee had died on October 1982 and sub stitution was sought to implead another trustee for prosecution of the case. 27th January, 1983 was holiday. On 28th January, 1983, petitioner submitted a tender for depositing Rs. 480 as rent from 1-2-1982 to 31-1-1983 which was passed by the court on 5-2-1983 and the petitioner deposited the amount on 8-2-1983. Thereafter, in subsequent months the petitioner deposited rent in court during the pendency of suit which is not in controversy here. 4. Respondent No. 3 moved an application on 20-9-1983 before the respon dent No. 2 for striking off the defence of the petitioner on the allegation that the petitioner failed to deposit admitted rent due against him on the date of first hear ing and his defence was liable to be struck off under the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court allowed the application and struck off the defence of the petitioner holding that the date of first hearing was 20-12-1982 and further even assuming that the petitioner had deposited rent on 28-1-1983 for the period upto 31st January, 1983, he failed to deposit interest, as such, his defence was liable to be struck off. Petitioner fifed revision against this order and the respondent No. 1 has dismissed the revision by order dated 19-10-1984. 5. The main question involved in the case as to what is the date of first hearing of the suit. Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 reads as under : "5. 5. The main question involved in the case as to what is the date of first hearing of the suit. Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 reads as under : "5. Striking off defence on failure to deposit admitted rent etc.- (I) In any suit a lessor for the eviction of a lease after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum and whether or not be admits any amount to be due, he shall thought the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence. Explanation.- The expression first hearing means the date of filing written state ment or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. " Explanation 1 of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure clarifies the expression first hearing. It is the date of filing of the written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such, dates are men tioned, the last of the dates mentioned. 6. Judge Small Cause Court took the view that 4-12-1982 was fixed for filing of the written statement and 10-12-1982, was fixed for hearing. On 10-12-1982, as the petitioner did not appear, the court directed to proceed ex parte and fixed 20-12-1982. The petitioner had filed application for setting aside the order dated 10-12-1982, on the ground that he was never served with summons of the suit. The Court allowed the said application on 20-12-1982 It was held that 20-12-1982 shall be deemed as the date of first hearing. The petitioner had filed application for setting aside the order dated 10-12-1982, on the ground that he was never served with summons of the suit. The Court allowed the said application on 20-12-1982 It was held that 20-12-1982 shall be deemed as the date of first hearing. The petitioner had submitted tender for pay ment of rent on 28th January, 1983, which cannot be taken as the date of first hearing and as such defence is liable to be struck off. 7. The question, as to what would be the date of first hearing in the suit, was considered by the various decisions in this Court prior to the amendment of Order XV, Rule 5 C. P. C. by U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976. The Division Bench of this Court in Ladty Prasad v. Ram Shah Billa and others, 1976 ALJ 494, held as under : "order XV relates to disposal of suit at the first hearing. This stage is arrived after the defendant has filed his written statement, the parties have been examined under Order X, if considered necessary, to clarify the points in controversy, documents on which parties rely have been produced and admission and denal obtained and necessary issues framed as provided under Order XIV. After the framing of the issues the case is ready for hearing. This is the stage when Rule 5 of Order XV comes into play. This is anterior to the stage when the parties examine their witnesses. At the stage of Rute 5 of Order XV the Court is not required to record finding on disputed questions of fact which can be done only after the parties have led evidence in support of their conflicting claims. " 8. In Sasudev Sahai v. Brij Mohan Lal, 1979 ALJ 484, the Division Bench of this Court held that mere fixing of a date for framing of issues does not make it a date of first hearing, If on the date fixed, the case is adjourned for one reason or the other and no issues are actually struck then it would not be the date of first hearing. It is only when the pleadings of the parties are actually gone into by the court and it has applied its mind to the case of the parties and issues are actually framed that the date of first hearing can be said to have been reached and not otherwise. 9. In Shambhu Nath Trivedi v. 3rd Addl. District Judge Hardoi and others, 1984 (1) ARC 1, the distinction of the meaning of first hearing before and after amend ment by U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 has been considered. It was held that definition of first hearing introduced by Explanation was artificial one and it has to be given same meaning as referred in the Explanation but the suits which were filed prior to the enforcement of U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976, they shall be governed by amended Order XV Rule 5, C. P. C. 10. The meaning of first hearing came up for decision by Full Bench in case of Sia Ram v. District Judge Kheri and others, 1984 (1) ARC 410. While interpreting the Explanation added to Section 20 (4) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Let ting, Rent and Eviction) Act,1972, it was held that expression first hearing means "the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant" as the artificial definition has been given under the Explanation, the first date of hearing shall be the date mentioned in the summons. In case the date is fixed for filing written statement it shall be taken as the date of first hearing. 11. In Sri Nath Agarwal v. Sri Nath, 1983 (2) ARC 422 a learned Single Judge had already taken the view as expressed in Sia Rams case (supra) wherein it was held that the date of first hearing shall be the date as specified in summons in accordance with Explanation added to Section 20 (4) of the Act. This decision came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor, (1993) 4 SCC 406 . The interpretion of the meaning of first hearing as given in that case was not accepted. 12. This decision came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor, (1993) 4 SCC 406 . The interpretion of the meaning of first hearing as given in that case was not accepted. 12. The Honble Supreme court referring to the provisions of Section 20 (4) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, held that the date of first hearing means the date when the court preposes to apply its mind, determines the points in controversy between the parties to the suit and frames issues if necessary, and the meaning given in the explanation can be treated to have same meaning. It is useful to quote the observa tions of Honble Apex Court, as under: "the date of first hearing of a suit under the Code is ordinarily and understood to be the date on which the court proposes to apply its mind to the contentions in the pleadings of the parties to the suit and in the documents filed by them for the purpose of framing the issues to be decided in the suit. Does the definition of the expression first hearing for the purpose of Section 20 (4) mean something different? The step or proceeding mentioned in the summons referred to in the definition should, we think, be construed to be a step or proceeding to be taken by the court for it, is after all, a "hearing" that is the subject-matter of the definition, unless there be something compelling in the said Act to indicate other wise; and we do not find in the said Act any such compelling provision. Further, it is not possible to construe the expression "first date for any step or proceedings to mean the step of filing the written statement, though the date for that purpose may be mentioned in the summons, for the reason that, as set out earlier, it is permissible under the Code for the defendant to file a written statement even thereafter but prior to the first hearing when the court takes up the case, since there is nothing in the said Act which conflicts with the provision of the Code in this behalf. We are of the view, therefore, that the date of first hearing as defined in the said Act is the date on which the court proposes to apply its mind to determine the points in controversy between the parties to the suit and to frame issues, if necessary. " 13. The matter came up for consideration again before the Honble Supreme Court in case of Advaita Nand v. Judge, Small Causes Court, Meerut, JT 1995 (5) SC 572 : 1995 (2) JCLR 634 (SC), wherein the Judge Small Causes Court issued sum mons fixing March 20,1990 as date of filing written statement and March 28,1990 for final hearing. Defendants moved application before the court cm March, 28, 1990 praying for supplying of the copy of the plaint. It was supplied to him on same date and the court directed him to file written statement within a month. July 24, 1990 was fixed for final hearing of the case. The tenant had deposited the entire amount on May 2, 1990. It was held that July 24, 1990 would be taken as first date of hearing and not April 27, 1990, the time by which the defendant was to file written statement. 14. The view taken by the Full Bench insia Rama case (supra) was not ap proved and following the decision in Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor it was held that the date of first hearing shall be the date on which the court proposes to apply its mind to determine points in controversy between the parties in the suit, and to frame issue, if necessary. 15. In view of this decision, the date of first hearing shall be the date when the court proposes to apply its mind regarding controversy, involved in the suit. The court had issued summons fixing 4-12-1982 for filing written statement and 10. 12. 1982 for final hearing. On 10-12-1982 the petitioner did not appear and the court directed to proceed ex-pane and fixed 20-12-1982 for hearing of the case. The petitioner appeared on 17-12-1982 and filed application to set aside the order dated 10-12-1982 on the ground that he was never served with summons. The court recalled the said order on 20-12-1982. The petitioner is alleged to have been served with the copy of the plaint on the said date. The petitioner appeared on 17-12-1982 and filed application to set aside the order dated 10-12-1982 on the ground that he was never served with summons. The court recalled the said order on 20-12-1982. The petitioner is alleged to have been served with the copy of the plaint on the said date. In para 4 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 3, it has been stated that after 20-12-1982, the court fixed the date of hearing as 27-1-1983. None of the parties has filed any copy of the Order Sheet. The petitioner had filed application on 17-12-1982 that he was not served with summons and the court accepted his version and allowed his applica tion on 20-12-1982 and as such he was entitled time to file written statement and after the time was granted to file written statement, the court was to fix date for framing issues or hearing of the case. Admittedly on 20-124982 the court had fixed 27-1-1983. In para 3 of the writ petition it has been stated that on 27-1-1983 the courts were closed on account of Gyarahvin Shareef holiday. This fact has not been denied in the counter affidavit. Petitioner submitted tender on 28-1-1983 for depositing of the rent for the period from 1-2-1982 to 31-1-1983. According to him no rent was due for the period 1-8-1979 to 31st January, 1983, and the rate of rent was Rs. 40 per month. 16. As admittedly the case was adjourned to 27-1-1983 the date 20th Decem ber, 1982 can not be treated as the date of first hearing. The petitioner had filed application that he was not served with summons ofthe suit which was allowed only on 20-12-1982 and the court had adjourned case for 27-1- 1983. It cannot be taken as the date of first hearing of the suit. The view of the courts below that the date of first hearing was 20-12-1982, is erroneous is law. 17. Next submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the petitioner had submitted tender for depositing the rent for period 1-2-1983 to 31-1-1983 but had not deposited 9% interest on this amount and thereby he failed to comply with the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. The petitioner had filed application to condone the delay supported with an affidavit. He. He. has stated that he deposited certain amount in excess and that could be taken as amount towards interest. In para 16 of his affidavit dated 3-12-1983, he stated that his counsel did not advise for depositing the interest and it was only Rs. 18. 30, and the total amount Rs. 44 (in round figure) he could have deposited this small amount par ticularly when he had been depositing the entire amount of rent. This assertion was based on his personal knowledge. Taking into account the entire circumstances, there was no reason to disbelieve his version. 18. In Jawahar Lal Verma v. Ram Chandra, 1982 m ARC 31, it was held that if delay in making deposit has been occasioned as result of mistaken legal advice given to him by his counsel, court is not bound to strike off defence of the tenant under Order XV, Rule 5 of C. P. C. Even if representation contemplated under that provisions is not filed within period prescribed thereunder, the court has still dis cretion in the matter and for good and proper reason, the court can refuse to strike off defence. There is no reason to disbelieve the version of the petition. 19. In view of the discussion made above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed, the judgment and order dated 13-9-1984 of the Judge Small Causes Court Banda-respondent No. 2 and the order dated 19- 10-1984 passed by the respondent No. 1, are hereby quashed. 20. The parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed. .