MOHD. SHAMIM ( 1 ) THIS second appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated August 4. 1982 passed by an Additional District Judge whereby the Judgment and decree passed by a Sub Judge were set aside and the suit for the plaintiff/respondent (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the respondent in order to facilitate the reference) for recovery of possession over property bearing No. 765-769. Katra Rishi Bhawan, Tilak Bazar. Delhi (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the disputed property) was decreed. ( 2 ) THE matrix of the case of appellant is : that the appellant No. 1 is in occupation over the disputed property as a tenant thereof on a monthly rent of Rs. 18. 55 paisa. The respondent herein filed a suit for recovery of possession over the said property. The said suit was dismissed vide Judgment and decree dated March 2. 1981. The respondent thereafter preferred TO an appeal before the District Judge against the abovesaid judgment and decree. The said appeal was allowed by the impugned judgment and order dated August 4. 1982 by the Additional District Judge. ( 3 ) THE Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit inasmuch as the appellant No. 1 is a tenant in the disputed property being the legal heir of Smt. Brij Rani Baijal, deceased tenant. Thus. the suit is barred by Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Smt. Brij Rani Baijal was a tenant under the appellant She during her life-time executed a will in favour of the appellant whereby she appointed the appellant as her sole heir after her death. The appellant No. 2 is the wife of the appellant No. 1. The appeallants are thus in occupation over the disputed property in their own right as tenants of the same. The appellant No. 1 being a legatee under the said will inherited the tenancy rights from the late Smt. Brij Rani Baijal. ( 4 ) THE appellant No. 1 is also the adopted son of Smt. Brij Rani Baijal i. e. the deceased tenant. She adopted him as her son in the year 1946 as her only son had died. In view of the said adoption the deceased always treated the appellant as her son. It was she who performed the marriage of the appellant as her son in the year 1948 at her house i. e. the disputed property. She adopted him as her son in the year 1946 as her only son had died. In view of the said adoption the deceased always treated the appellant as her son. It was she who performed the marriage of the appellant as her son in the year 1948 at her house i. e. the disputed property. The appellants had thus been residing with Smt. Brij Rani Baijal as her son and daughter-in-law. ( 5 ) THE case of the respondent as set up in the plaint is that one Smt. Brij Rani Baijal wife of Shri Ram Baijal was the owner of the disputed property by virtue of a judgment and decree vide Ext. P1. The said Smt. Brij Rani Baijal executed a will dated March 12. 1974 whereby she bequeathed all her properties to the respondent including the disputed property. The respondent is thus the owner of the said property. Smt Brij Rani breathed her last on December 20,1977. Her tenancy, however, had been terminated during her life-time. She kept the appellants with her in the disputed property to look after her as they were her distant relatives. Thus they are not entitled to inherit the tenancy rights. The appellants, consequently continued to be in possession over the disputed property even after her death. They are thus in occupation over the disputed property w ithout any right and title. Hence arose the need for a suit for recovery of possession over the said property. ( 6 ) THE following. substantial questions of law were formulated by my learned predecessor: (1) Whether the suit for possession on the basis of title is maintainable against the heirs of a tenant without terminating the tenancy during the life time of a tenant? (2) Whether the appellant No. 1 is an heir of the deceased tenant Smt. Brij Rani Baijal? ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants Mr A C. Shubh has vehemently contended that the learned lower appellate court fell into grave error by coming to the conclusion that the appellants have no right title to remain in possession over the disputed property. According to the learned counsel there is ample evidence on record to show and prove that the appellant No. 1 is a tenant in the disputed property and he had inherited the tenancy rights from his aunt, Smt. Brij Rani Baijal. According to the learned counsel there is ample evidence on record to show and prove that the appellant No. 1 is a tenant in the disputed property and he had inherited the tenancy rights from his aunt, Smt. Brij Rani Baijal. who was the earlier tenant of the disputed property. The appellant No. 1 is the adopted son of Smt. Brij Rani Baijal. Hence he was entitled to succeed to the tenancy rights after her death being her legal heir. The next contention of the learned counsel is that the deceased Smt. Brij Rani Baijal executed a Will. vide Ext. DW4/l dated 15. 6. 68 in favour of the appellant No. 1. where through she bequeathed her entire property to the appellant No. 1 including the tenancy rights in the disputed property. Thus even as a legatee under under the said will, he had stepped into the shoes of the deceased and became a tenant after her death It has then been urged on behalf of the appellants that even otherwise the appellant No. 1 inherited the tenancy rights from the deceased being her nephew and as tile deceased was issueless she did not leave behind any other legal heir/relations except the appellant No. 1 ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the respodent Mr. Badri Dass has urged to the contrary. He has contended that the appellant No. 1 is neither the adopted son nor the legal heir of the deceased Smt. Brij Rani Baijal. The tenancy rights cannot be a subject matter of a bequest as the same cannot be transferred through a will. ( 9 ) I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties at sufficient length and have very carefully examined their rival contentions and have given my anxious thoughts thereto. ( 10 ) THE first submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that appellant No. 1 is the adopted son of Smt. Brij Rani Baijal. To the same effect are the statements of the appellant No. l i. e. Shri Jagdish Kishore (DW1) and Shri Prashad Learned counsel on the basis of the said statements has urged to conclude therefrom that the appellant No. 1 is the adopted son and if it is so. he was entitled to inherit the tenancy rights from the deceased Smt. Brij Rani Baijal. he was entitled to inherit the tenancy rights from the deceased Smt. Brij Rani Baijal. ( 11 ) I am sorry I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel Neither the adoption deed nor any other document was placed on record to show that the appellant No 1 was ever treated as the adopted son of Smt Brij Rani Baijal No photograph was also placed on record to show the factum of alleged adoption ( 12 ) ADMITTEDLY, the appellant No. 1 in his earlier written statement dated March 2,1974 had not taken any such plea It was subsequently that he got the written statement amended and took up the said plea Thus. it is inconceivable as to ho\\ he forgot to inention tliat he was the adopted son of Smt. Brij Ram Bayal No person is likely to forget such an important event which leads to severance of Ins relations from Ins family and his becoming the member of the family which adopts him. In fact. [lie appellant No 1 should ha^ e shown the name of his adoptive father in the memo of parties at the time of the institution ofthe suit But. for the reasons best known to him he did not do so The appellant No 1 has admitted in his statement before the learned lower court that he has nowhere described himself as the adopted son of Smt Brn Ram Baijal from 144. 6 till the filing ofthe written statement. He has admitted this fact during the course of his cross-examination that he had always been using the name of his natural father Shri. Yaduvant kishore and had been describing himself as his son. Thus it does not appeal to the reason that if the appellant No. I had been adopted by Smt Brij Rani Baijal then why he would have been using the name of his natural father for the last more than 30 years. Thus it casts suspicion on the entire case of the appellants. ( 13 ) ADMITTEDLY, the case of the appellant No. 1 is that on June 15,1968 Smt Brij| Rani Baijal executed a will (vide Ex. DW 4/1) in his favour whereby she bequeathed all her assets and properties, including the tenancy rights in the disputed property. Thus it casts suspicion on the entire case of the appellants. ( 13 ) ADMITTEDLY, the case of the appellant No. 1 is that on June 15,1968 Smt Brij| Rani Baijal executed a will (vide Ex. DW 4/1) in his favour whereby she bequeathed all her assets and properties, including the tenancy rights in the disputed property. However curiously enough she has nowhere in the said will mentioned the appelant No. 1 as her adopted son Surprisingly even in the said will the appellant No. I has been shown as the son of Shri Yaduvant Singh. ( 14 ) IN view of the above I agree with the courts below that the appellant No 1 miserably failed to prove and show that he was the adopted son of Smt. Brij Rani Baijal. Thus the appellant No. 1 could not have inherited the impugned tenancy rights in the disputed property. ( 15 ) IT has next been contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the deceased Smt. Brij Rani Baijal through the abovesaid will bequeathed the said tenancy rights in favour of the appellant No. 1. Thus the appellant has become a legal and valid tenant of the disputed property under the said will ( vide Ex. DW4/l ). 1 am sorry 1 am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel. ( 16 ) SECTION 14 (b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act deals with sub-letting, assigning or parting with possession over tenanted accommodation without the prior permission of the landlord. In case a tenant does so in that eventuality he is liable to eviction under the said provision of law. Thus. if the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is to be accepted as correct, then the same would be in utter disregard and clear violation of Section 14 ( 1 ) (b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act which is in the following words:- " that the tenant has. on or after the 9th day of June. 1952, sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord. on or after the 9th day of June. 1952, sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord. " ( 17 ) 1 thus feel that the courts below w ere correct in their conclusion that the tenancy rights cannot be the subject-matter of a bequest ( 18 ) I am tempted here to cite the observations of thier Lordships of the Supreme Court as reported in Vasant Pratap Pandit v. Dr. Anant Trimbak Sabnis, (1994) 3 SCC 481 . Their Lordships while dealing w ith Section 15 of the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 which is pari matena with the provisions of Section 14 ( 1 ) (b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act observed as under:-" THE matter may be viewed from another angle also. If the word heir is to be interpreted to include a legatee even a stranger may have to be inducted as a tenant for there is no embargo upon a stranger being a legatee. The contention of Mr. Sorabjee that heir" under a will may be confined to only members of the family cannot be accepted for there is no scope for giving such a restrictive meaning to that word in the context in which it appears in the Act as earlier noticed, unlike in other Rent Acts. Coming now to meaning of the words assign" or "transfer as appearing in Section 15 we find that transfer has been qualified by the words in any other manner and we see no reason why it should be restricted to only transfer inter vivos. As has been rightly pointed out by the High Court in the impugned Judgment the Transfer of Property Act limits its operation to transfer inter vivos and therefore, the meaning of the word "transfer" as contained therein cannot be brought in aid for the purpose of the Act. on the contrary, the wide amplitude of the words in any other manner clearly envisages that the word transfer has been used therein in a generic sense so as to include transfer by testament also. on the contrary, the wide amplitude of the words in any other manner clearly envisages that the word transfer has been used therein in a generic sense so as to include transfer by testament also. " ( 19 ) TO the same effect are the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court as reported in M/s Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd v. Church of South India Trust Association, Madras, AIR 1992 SC 1439 . . . . . . " It is clear from provisions of S. 23 which prohibits sub-letting or transfer by the tenant that except in cases covered by the provisos to sub-section (I) of S 23, there is a prohibition for a tenant to sub-let whole or any part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein. This prohibition is. however, subject to a contract to the contrary. A tenant who sub-lets or assigns or transfers the premises in contravention of this prohibition loses the protection of law and can be evicted by the landlord under Section 21 (l) (f ). In the case of a statutory tenant. the relationship is not governed by contract. The prohibition against assignment and transfer is therefore, absolute and the interests of a statutory tenant can neither be assigned nor transferred. This means that the interest of the statutory tenant in the premises in his occupation, as governed by the Karnataka Rent Control Act is a limited interest which enables the surviving spouse or any son or daughter or father or mother of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the premises as a member of the tenant s family up to the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, to inherit the interest of the tenant on his death. The said interest of the tenant is however, not assignable or transferable. ( 20 ) A learned Single Judge of this Court also took the same view as reported in Kenneth Solomon v. Dan Singh, AIR 1986 Delhi 1. . . . . . " However, there is no escape from the conclusion that by his voluntary act the tenant parts with the possession of the tenancy premises though from the date of his death in case the will remains unrevoked. Dr. . . . . . " However, there is no escape from the conclusion that by his voluntary act the tenant parts with the possession of the tenancy premises though from the date of his death in case the will remains unrevoked. Dr. Suri by her act of bequeathing the tenancy rights by means of the will in favour of the petitioner and his brother had parted with possession within the meaning of proviso (b ). " ( 21 ) THE learned counsel, Mr. A. C. Shubh has then argued that even otherwise the appellant No. 1 is the legal heir of the deceased Smt. Brij Rani Baijal and as such, he is entitled to inherit the tenancy rights under Section 15 (1 ) (d) of the Hindu Succession Act, and as such he became the tenant after the death of Smt. Brij Rani Baijal. The contention of the learned counsel is devoid of any merit. The appellant has nowhere in his written statement claimed himself to be the legal heir of Smt. Brij Rani Baijal under Section 15 (l) (d) of the Hindu Succession Act. There is no pleading to that effect. He has also not led any evidence to that effect. The appelants before this Court are in second appeal. Thus they cannot be permitted to raise this point in the second appeal, particularly in the absence of any pleading to that effect. ( 22 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants has however, contended that there are pleadings to that effect. The learned counsel in this connection has led me through the written statement filed by the appellants before the lower court. The learned counsel has in this connection REFERRED TO to para 4 of the written statement wherein it has been stated that the deceased Smt. Brij Rani Baijal was a tenant in the suit premises and after her death the defendant No. 1 i. e. the appellant No. 1 herein, being her legal heir became tenant in the suit premises. He has then adverted to para 6 of the written statement which is in the following words:- " The defendant no. l is the legal heir of the deceased Smt. Brij Rani Baijal and ,. , is entitled to inherit the right of tenancy belonging to her on her death. Smt Brij Rani Baijal, was the aunt of the defendant No. 1. l is the legal heir of the deceased Smt. Brij Rani Baijal and ,. , is entitled to inherit the right of tenancy belonging to her on her death. Smt Brij Rani Baijal, was the aunt of the defendant No. 1. Smt. Brij Rani Baijal, during her life time declared her last will and appointed the defendant no. I as her sole heir upon her death: a copy of document is attached herewith" ( 23 ) IT is manifest from the relevant lines in the said paragraph reproduced above that the appellant No. 1 claimed himself to be a legal heir not by virtue of the fact that he was the sole surviving relation of the deceased Smt. Brij Rani Baijal but on the basis of the will ( vide Ex. DW4/l) which has been alluded to in para 6 of the written statement, cited above. While interpreting a particular document or the pleadings we have to read the pleadings as a whole and not in isolation with other sentences. The appellant while claiming himself to be a legal heir, he does so on the basis of the will. ( 24 ) IN the abovestated circumstances I do not see am force in the present appeal. The same is hereby dismissed with costs.