JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—This appeal has arisen out of award of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Shimla in MAC No. 6-S/2/1 89/88 dated 20-9-1990 whereby compensation of Rs. 25,000 has been awarded in favour of the appellants in equal shares. Appellant 2 was proforma respondent before the Tribunal and Appellant 1 was the claimant, 2. Claim petition was filed by Appellant 1 claiming compensation under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in respect of the death of Smt. Harvinder Dhawan her daughter-in-law, who was married to her only son Shri S K Dhawan. Sh S K Dhawan s/o Appellant 1 and father of appellant 2 was earlier married to one Smt Yogesh Kaur and from this wed-lock was appellant 2 (Ms.. Neeti Dhawan), It appears that after the child was born, late Sh. S. K Dhawan and Smt Yogesh Kaur parted company and their marriage stood dissolved by a decree of divorce Thereafter, Sh. S.K. Dhawan married Smt Harvinder Dhawao and Smt. Yogesh Kaur married Mr. Rajesh Kumar who was then Deputy Inspector General of Police, However, Mr. Rajesh Kumar died sometime later. Appellant 2 had throughout been under the care and custody of her mother Smt. Yogesh Kaur Facts further reveal that Shri S, K Dhawan and Smt. Harvinder Dhawan, were travelling in Car bearing registration H No. NLK-1770 from Naldehra to Shimla This car belonged to Shri S K. Dhawan who was himself driving the same. There were two other co-passengers with them, namely, Sh Gurinderjit Singh Virk and his wife Smt Satinder Virk. This car met with an accident on 3-11-1986 as a consequence thereof all the four occupants i e. S. K Dhawan, Harvinder Dhawan, Sh. Gurinderjit Singh Virk and Smt Satinder Virk died. Appellant 1 filed this claim petition claiming compensation on the plea that she was being looked after and maintained by Smt Harvinder Dhawan and was being paid Rs, 1,500 p. m. towards maintenance, and that appellant 2 was step daughter of deceased being the daughter of her son Sh. S, K Dhawan from previous wife Smt. Yogesh Kaur. According to appellant 1, appellant 2 was residing with her mother in the house of Sh. S, K Dhawan from previous wife Smt. Yogesh Kaur. According to appellant 1, appellant 2 was residing with her mother in the house of Sh. Rajesh Kumar and she was impleaded as a proforma respondent through her mother and natural guardian Smt. Yogesh Caur In the aforesaid background, the appellant 1 claimed compensation of Rs, 2,50,000 from respondent The petition was barred by time and for condonation of delay in filing the same, it was stated that due to sudden death of her only son Sh S K. Dhawan she was under severe mental shock m account of which she also suffered a heart attack and she could not file he petition within the period of limitation Application under section 5 of he Limitation Act was also filed by the appellant, and it was prayed that delay in filing the claim petition be condoned. 3. This claim petition was resisted by the respondent Insurance Company. According to respondent, the claim was time barred and no sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay in filing the same, therefore, it merited dismissal. In support of this assertion it was pointed out by the respondent that the appellant 1 could not feign ignorance about her rights as she was appearing before M A C. T contesting the claim case filed by the heirs of Sh. Gurinderjit Singh Virk and Smt. Satinder Virk Not only this, she herself preferred a writ petition against the University claiming terminal benefits and an other writ petition was filed against the respondent Insurance Company in this Court. Appellant I had also filed cases under Succession Act in respect of the estate of her deceased son and daughter-in-law. It was further stated that she had best legal advice available to her. According to the respondent, appellant 1 withheld the factum of the appellant 2 being there who was equally entitled with her for compensation payable by Insurance Company and the terminal benefits by H. P. University, where both Sh. S. K. Dhawan and his wife were employed at the time of accident. Appellant 2 filed her reply to the claim petition through her mother Smt. Yogesh Kaur through whom she had been sued She simply stated that she was entitled to compensation alongwith appellant 1 who was her grand-mother as she is also the legal heir of late Smt Harvjnder Dhawan. Appellant 2 filed her reply to the claim petition through her mother Smt. Yogesh Kaur through whom she had been sued She simply stated that she was entitled to compensation alongwith appellant 1 who was her grand-mother as she is also the legal heir of late Smt Harvjnder Dhawan. It was further averred on behalf of appellant 2 that she being a minor, her claim was not barred by time as limitation did not apply to her and, therefore, her claim was within time. It is in the aforesaid background, and facts the parties went to trial on the following issues : (1) Whether Smt. Harvinder Dhawan had died on account of rash and negligent driving of Shri S K Dhawan, who was owner of the car and was driving the car at the time of accident, in question, as alleged ? If so its effect ? OPP (2) If issue No. 1 supra is proved, to what amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to? OPP (3) Whether Miss Neeti Dhawan (Minor) respondent 2 is also entitled to the amount of compensation ? If so, to what extent ? OPP (4) Whether there are sufficient grounds for condonation of delay ? OPP (5) Relief. 4. The tribunal decided all the issues in favour of the claimants and awarded lump sum compensation of Rs. 25,000 in equal shares. On the aforesaid issues appellant 1 examined two witnesses and respondent examined one witness 5. PW 1 Sh Arjun Thakur is an Assistant from Establishment branch of H. P. University, Summerhill Shimla proved the last pay certificate of Smt Harvinder Dhawan According to this witness the deceased was serving as Reader in Public Administration at the time of accident and according to last pay certificate, Ext PA the deceased was drawing a salary of Rs, 4099.80 as per details given therein, and the date of birth of Smt. Harvinder Kaur was 1-1-1994 as per Ext. PB In cross-examination he states that Ext PA does not indicate the deductions such as income tax and other deductions which were being made from the salary of Smt Harvinder Kaur deceased and it only indicated her total salary This witness has further stated that he was unable to exactly tell the increase which the deceaseu was to get after revision of pay scale which according to him were revised w. e. f. 1-1-1986. PW 2 is appellant 1 herself She has stated that she was being maintained by the deceased whose salary was Rs. 4,000 p. m, and both her daughter-in-law and her only son died in the accident in question. According to her appellant 2, who at the time of her examination was 13 year old, was residing with her mother in the house where she had re-married. Appellant 1 further states that she was only dependent upon her son and daughter-in-law. She further states that she had no source of income and she was totally dependent upon her son and daughter-in-law. According to her the deceased Smt. Harvinder used to pay her Rs 1,500 p.m. as maintenance and as a result of this shock she was not keeping good health and had developed heart disease, diabeties and earlier she was being treated by Dr. Kirpa Ram and thereafter at Delhi. She was unable to walk for longer distance and for attending the court for recording her statement she had come in car She has prayed for the grant of compensation of Rs. 2,00,000 on account of death of her son and daughter-in-law. In cross-examination she was confronted with previous litigation in the High Court and District Judge Shimla, not only in two claim petitions filed by Pritender and Ms. Puneet Virk children of Gurinderjit Singh Virk and Smt. Satinder Virk, but also in respect of two cases filed in the High Court as also proceedings initiated under Indian Succession Act in respect of the estate of her deceased son Sh. S K. Dhawan as well as daughter-in-law Smt. Harvinder Dhawan She admits having made no mention in the application regarding appellant 2 on the plea that her mother had given her in writing that she would not claim any share in the property of Sh. S. K. Dhawan. She further states that she got half share out of the D.C.R G issued by the University and other half was granted in favour of appellant 2. She was teaching at Himalayan International School being a graduate on the date of accident. She was working honorary in the School She denied the suggestion that her daughter-in-law did not pay her any amount. 6. She was teaching at Himalayan International School being a graduate on the date of accident. She was working honorary in the School She denied the suggestion that her daughter-in-law did not pay her any amount. 6. In order to controvert the statement of appellant 1 that she was working in an honorary capacity in the Himalayan International School, respondent examined RW 1 Shri Narinder Kumar, junior Accountant in the School, who stated that appellant 1 worked as teacher from March 1978 till December 1979, she again joined on July 1982 and worked till December 1986. Appellant 1 was being paid salary of Rs. 650 p. m. in December 1986 when she left the Institution and she used to stay in the Boarding house of the school, however, he was unable to state whether she was residing alone since he started working in the Institution since, 1987 In cross-examination he denied the suggestion that Rs 650 were being paid to her for fare charges. Rather, he said that basic pay of appellant I was Rs 600 and allowance was Rs. 50. In addition to oral evidence aforesaid, documentary evidence consist of Ext. PA (last pay certificate of late Smt Harvinder), Ext PB (copy of the matriculation certificate of the deceased) and Ext PC (Photostat copy of the registration certificate showing that the vehicle bearing registration NLK 1770 stood transferred to Dr. S K. Dhawan s/o Sh. K, N. Dhawan) has Been produced. 7. At the very outset we may point out that so far as the plea of limitation is concerned it should not detain us any more in view of Division Bench Judgment of this Court in F. A O. (MVA) 41/92 in case titled as Sadh Ram v. State of U. P. and another, (and other connected cases) decided on 9-8-1995. These claim petitions were decided under section 110-A (3) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, like the present case. These claim petitions were decided under section 110-A (3) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, like the present case. Thereafter, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force and section 166 thereof was amended in the year 1994, whereby limitation for filing claim petition was done away with It may further be appropriately mentioned here that under the Motor Vehicles Act, i939,-limitation for filing a claim petition was six months, however, on sufficient cause being made out, the tribunal was competent to entertain the claim petition after the expiry of six months, if it was satisfied that the claimant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. 8. Identical provision was there in section 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Under this provision, limitation of 6 months was provided and it could farther be extended by another period of six months meaning thereby the claim petition could be filed within a period of 12 months, the tribunal being satisfied that applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. 9. The matter id the context of the provision of section 166 (3) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 had come up before the Honble apex Court in Vinod Gurdas v. National Insurance Company and others^ AIR 1991 SC 2156, wherein the period of limitation was fixed 12 months in ail It is in this background that vide section 53 of the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 1994, limitation for filing the petition under section 166 was done away with. 10. It is in the aforesaid circumstances, facts as well as background that the matter came to be considered before this Court in F, A (X 41/92 supra, and the only question involved for determination in this case was to the following effect : "... ... The only question that needs our decision is whether the claim petition filed before coming into force of the Act of 1994 will be governed by the Act of 1988 or by the Motor Vehicles Act, 193 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1939), as the accident took place when this Act of 1939 was in force," The Bench answered the question in the following terms : “......... .For the reasons stated above, we hold that section 166, as amended, shall have the retrospective effect in respect of all pending proceedings whether before the Tribunal or before the appellate authority including the High Court The Tribunal and the Appellate Authority shall have to decide the claim petitions in terms of amended section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, Id other words, if any point of limitation is taken, it has to be dismissed” For the reasons stated above, all the impugned awards passed by the Tribunal are set aside and the claim petitions are remanded to the Tribunal to dispose of the petitions on merit.” 11. A feeble attempt was made by Sh. Deepak Gupta to raise the plea of limitation, however, when the learned Counsel was confronted with the aforesaid judgment, he did not advance his submission, any further. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the Tribunal on issue No. 4 are upheld. 12. Now the question that survives for determination in this appeal is whether the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal is just and reasonable in the facts, circumstances, as well as background of the case if not, what is the just, reasonable and fair compensation to which both the appellants are entitled to. It was streneously argued by Sh. Batish that unit system is a sound, reasonable and proper guide in this behalf and is being universally followed by all courts including the apex Court as well as by this Court and while applying the unit system, the compensation claimed by the claimants deserves to be allowed On the other hand, Sh. Deepak Gupta learned Counsel far the respondent has vehemently opposed the submissions stating that the compensation awarded by the tribunal to both the appellants is just, reasonable, and fair, therefore, it deserves to be upheld and consequently appeal deserves dismissal. He also contended that appellant 1 was teaching at Charaba and there is cogent, reliable as well as trustworthy evidence to this effect and dependence is not to be paid, but only loss to the estate (if any) of the deceased is to be ascertained and it is such loss to the estate of the deceased which could indicate the compensation payable to the claimants He further submitted that the statement of appellant 1, being paid Rs. 19500 p m by the deceased towards her maintenance was not worthy of credence as this appellant not only withheld material facts but also has made wrong statement that she was working in an honorary capacity while teaching in Himalayan International School and in support of his this submission, he placed reliance on the statement of RW 1. 13. We have no hesitation in holding that the statement of appellant 1 is not worthy of credence and the same is not accepted accordingly. 14. Shri Batish in support of his submission submits that unit system has been upheld right from 1979 ILR HP Series p, 267, takes care of all the factors including loss to estate, chance of future promotion, uncertainties of life and therefore is a good, reasonable and proper guide for determining the quantum of compensation He placed reliance on observations in paras 4, 19, 52, 53 thereof which are to the following effect: "4. We have found that in these and other appeals arising out of the claims settled under section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act read with the Fatal Accidents Act. the learned Judges of the different Tribunals functioning in the State are not faking a consistent view and are not adopting a consistent method of assessing compensation in cases where the accident is found to be the result of some negligence. We have, therefore, heard the learned Advocates of the parties on the question of a proper method which could be evolved in determining the amount of damages which could be awarded in such cases. Therefore, before taking up the individual merits of each case we first propose to state some principles and methods for determining the amount of compensation in such cases, Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act prescribes that on receipt of an application for compensation made under section 110-A the Claims Tribunal shall hold an enquiry into the claim and may mal e an award determining the "amount of compensation which appears to it to be just". Thus, under this section of the Motor Vehicles Act the amount of compensation is expected to be just’. Thus, under this section of the Motor Vehicles Act the amount of compensation is expected to be just’. The justness of the award is obviously to be determined with reference to the peculiar facts of each case and therefore no such award can be confined to any rigid mechanical formula However, when the court proceeds to make an award of compensation in cases which have resulted in a fatal accident the court is also expected to take into account two relevant sections of Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. These sections are section 1-A and section 2. Section 1-A reads as under: "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default and the act is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the party who would have been liable is death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action or suit for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances, as amount in law to felony or other crime. Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased." Section 2 reads as under : "Provided that, in any such action or suit, the executor, administrator or representative of the deceased may insert a claim for and recover any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased occasioned by such wrongful act, neglect or default, which sum, when recovered, shall be deemed part of the assets of the estate of the deceased." "19. So far as the first factor of annual dependency is concerned, there is not much difficulty in fixing the zame. The best evidence to fix the figure of this factor is supplied by the net income derived by the deceased at the time of his death. If the amount expended by the deceased for his personal expenditure is deducted from this amount of his net income, the remainder would represent the amount spent by him for his dependents plus the amount saved for future. If the amount expended by the deceased for his personal expenditure is deducted from this amount of his net income, the remainder would represent the amount spent by him for his dependents plus the amount saved for future. If there is satisfactory evidence regarding the amount spent by him for his dependants, the figure of the amount so spent should be taken as the basic figure for calculating loss of dependency. But if no such satisfactory evidence is available it would be reasonable to fix the units of family expenditure and deduct the units consumed by the deceased for his personal expenditure. Normally, an adult member of the family would consume double the units consumed by minors, except those minors who are taking education in college for whom in an appropriate case, two units of expenditure may legitimately be taken into account. Hence, if a minor is consuming one unit an adult member of that family should be taken to consume two units For instance, a family should be taken to consume two units. For instance, a family consisting of two adults and three minors, would, on this basis, consume seven units of expenditure as under: Two adults—-4 units (two each) Three minors— 3 units (one each) If, therefore, the total expenditure of such a family is Rs. 700 per month, the personal expenditure of the deceased who is found to be the earning adult, should be taken as at Rs. 200 per month (two units) The total value of dependency would, therefore, be Rs. 500 per month This would be the datum figure which should be further worked out by applying a suitable multiplier. This was the method adopted by the High Court of Gujarat in Bai Nanda v. Shivabhai Shankerhhai Patel reported in 1966 ACJ 290, (vide paragraph 40) We find this to be a safe method to find out the basic value of dependency where clear and reliable evidence is lacking. 52. The question, however, is that what multiple should be applied. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the multiple of 15 years purchase should be applied looking to the age of the deceased. In our opinion, looking to the facts of the case, the multiple of 16 years purchase should be applied and applying this multiple the loss of dependency would be Rs. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the multiple of 15 years purchase should be applied looking to the age of the deceased. In our opinion, looking to the facts of the case, the multiple of 16 years purchase should be applied and applying this multiple the loss of dependency would be Rs. 57,600.00, To this amount should be added the conventional amount of Rs. 3,000,00 on account of the loss of life expectancy, making the total of Rs 60,600.00. 53. There is no clear evidence as to what amount the deceased was spending for himself and therefore, applying the formula of the unit expenditure it would follow that the deceased must be spending Rs. 172 per month for his personal expenditure. This would leave the amount of Rs. 345.00 per month for the dependents as well as for the estate. The dependency is calculated at the rate of Rs 300 per month and, therefore, Rs. 45 would be saved for accretion to the estate. Thus applying 16 years multiple, the loss to the estate would come to Rs. 8,640." With a view to advance his argument further Sh. Batish also placed reliance on AIR 1994 Gau 28. particularly the following observations in paragraph 7 thereof : "7. It cannot be said that the husband would in any way be economically dependent on the wife, though the wife in the ordinary course of the nature, would have shared a part of the burden of the house-hold The husband cannot claim any compensation on the basis of dependency. The 3 year-old son could be reasonably expected to be dependent partly on the mother for a period of 15 years. Monthly contribution in this regard could be expected to be Rs 250. The annual contribution would be Rs 3,000. The contribution for 15 years would be Rs 45,000. Deduction has to be made on account of uncertainties of life, accelerated payment in lump sum and the net compensation could be estimated to be Rs 35,000 on this account Though it is reasonable to presume that the deceased would have spent a part of per time in rendering service and looking after the husband and the child. Her death must be regarded as having deprived them of her services. On this account a conventional amount of Rs. 5,000 to each of the claimants could be legitimately awarded." 15. Her death must be regarded as having deprived them of her services. On this account a conventional amount of Rs. 5,000 to each of the claimants could be legitimately awarded." 15. Now, the question arises in the absence of evidence of dependence of appellants upon deceased, what compensation they are entitled to. So far as the claim of appellant 2 is concerned there is sufficient evidence to hold that she was not at all dependent upon deceased Smt Harvinder Dhawan as she was residing with and was being looked after the brought up by her mother Smt. Yogesh Kaur. So far the claim of appellant 1 is concerned, we are of the view that she is only entitled to claim compensation on account of love and affection and for this compensation of Rs. 50,000 in all inclusive of what has already been awarded by the M A. C T. would be reasonable, just and fair which we accordingly award. While allowing the appeal to this extent, we order that the same would be shared by both the appellants in equal shares and the respondent is liable to pay interest at the rate of 9% p. a. from 28 12-1988 till payment 16. Share of minor appellant 2 be invested with a Nationalized Bank and paid to her on her attaining majority and in case it is required for her benefit before that, she will be free to approach this Court for release of the amount in question. No costs. Appeal allowed.