JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J —This revision at the instance of State is directed against the judgment passed by Shri J. N, Barowalia, Additional District Judge, Mandi in Civil Appeal No. 20 of 1989, dated 29-1-1996. By means of impugned judgment, the lower appellate Court has reversed the order passed by the Sub-Judge Court No. 3, Mandi, dated 29-3-1989 and consequently dismissed the application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, filed on behalf of the present petitioners. 2. Brief facts of the case out of which this revision has arisen are that a suit for injunction was filed by the respondent against the petitioners. Before filing their written statement, the petitioners filed an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for stay of suit on the plea that matter was referable for arbitration in terms of the agreement entered into between the parties. Further facts which are not in dispute are that the petitioners auctioned lot No. 2 of 1963-64 of standing ‘Cheel’ trees, situated in Sayuri Forest of Mandi Forest Division in an open auction held in Mandi in 1963 A fixed deposit receipt in the sum of Rs. 15,000 as security was pledged with the Conservator of forest, Chamba, Circle Chamba by the respondent According to the respondent, this receipt of security was liable to be released after the close of the work in question. According to the respondent, since the petitioners have failed to release the amount in question, as such prayer for mandatory injunction by way of direction to the petitioners to release the said security receipt in favour of the respondent or any other receipt issued by the bank in lieu and renewal thereof lying with the petitioners in connection with the contract in question was prayed for. 3. An agreement dated 8-2-1964 was entered into between the Himachal Pradesh Government as well as the respondent firm. In terms of the said agreement, the respondent firm exploited the forest and completed the work within the stipulated period which was upto 31-12-1964. In the agreement in question amongst other clauses, there is Clause 29 as well as 39 to which reference has been made by both the courts below. For the purpose of present case. In terms of the said agreement, the respondent firm exploited the forest and completed the work within the stipulated period which was upto 31-12-1964. In the agreement in question amongst other clauses, there is Clause 29 as well as 39 to which reference has been made by both the courts below. For the purpose of present case. Clause 29 is material which is reproduced herein below :— "Clause 29.—That if any question, difference or subject on whatsoever shall arise between the parties to these presents or their respective representatives or between one of the parties hereto and the representatives of the other of them touching these presents or any clause or thing herein contained or the construction thereof or as in any matter to any way connected with or arising out of these presents or the operation thereof or the rights, duties, or liabilities of either parties then save in so far as the decision of any such question or difference or part thereof is already hereinbefore otherwise provided for and has been so decided, every such question, difference or objection including any question or difference as regards whether the decision of any particular matter has been otherwise provided for and/or whether it has been finally decided accordingly failing either of which whether the Arbitrator referred to below should decide it or whether the contract hereinbefore contained should be terminated or has been duly terminated and as regards rights and obligations of the parties as the result of such termination shall be referred for arbitration to the Deputy Commissioner, Chamba, District Chamba or should he be unable or unwilling to not, to such, Assistant as the said D. C. Chamba shall appoint as sole arbitrator and his decision shall be final and binding and where the matter involves a claim for or the payment or recovery or deduction of money only the amount, if any, awarded in such arbitration shall be recoverable in respect of the matter so referred.” 4. The trial Court allowed the application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act filed by the petitioners and thus, ordered the stay of the suit as well as further ordered the matter to be referred to the Forest Conservator Chamba, which was assailed in the appeal filed by the respondent and the order of the trial Court was reversed which is assailed in the present revision petition by the petitioners. 5. Shri Chauhan has pointed out that the lower appellate Court has fallen into error by allowing the appeal and consequently dismissing the application of the petitioners under section 34 of the Arbitration Act and according to him Clause 29 is wide enough in its sweep and scope to cover claim of the parties including the matter relating to the release of security money in respect whereof the present suit has been filed. According to him, the suit was not maintainable and the respondent could get his grievance redressed before the Arbitrator by having recourse to law in terms of Clause 29 supra within the frame work of law subject to applicability of other laws governing the case in question. On the other hand, Shri R. K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondent, while contraverting the pleas of the petitioners has pointed out that so far matter relating to release of F. D. R is concerned, it is beyond the scope of Clause 29 of the agreement and further the suit is competent. According to him, the petitioners could have enforced their claim under the law of limitation and as such now the petitioners are not entitled to invoke the arbitration clause in case it is held to be applicable and thus, has pointed out that dismissal of the application is legal and valid and according to him the impugned order calls for no interference. On this basis, he has prayed for dismissal of the revision petition. 6. The parties are not at variance that the agreement in question was executed between them which embodies amongst others, Clause 29 of the agreement. This clause of the agreement in terms deals with the subject of arbitration. A bare perusal thereof shows that the matter relating to the release of security amount, as claimed in the suit by the respondent, is purely covered by the said clause. Needless to point out that it is a matter which is connected with the agreement in question and the parties are at difference on that issue. This matter clearly falls within the four corners of the Arbitration Clause It may further be appropriate to mention that so far other questions are concerned, those can also be gone into by the arbitrator relating to rights and liabilities of the parties qua its entitlement/ disentitlement by one or the other party. This matter clearly falls within the four corners of the Arbitration Clause It may further be appropriate to mention that so far other questions are concerned, those can also be gone into by the arbitrator relating to rights and liabilities of the parties qua its entitlement/ disentitlement by one or the other party. In these circumstances, the application filed by the petitioners was the right remedy which they have availed as admissible under law. In any case both the parties are at liberty to contest the claim of each other on all permissible grounds as available to them under law So far the present case is concerned, the only question is whether the suit filed by the respondent was liable to be stayed or not in view of the existence of Clause 29, reproduced hereinabove. 7. The factum of an order under section 34 of the Arbitration Act is as to whether the suit was to be stayed or not. In no case it wipes out the suit as it will remain stayed only. The security was deposited by the respondent after execution and for fulfilment of the agreement dated 8-2-1964 which was admittedly, executed between the parties and it is not the case of the respondent that the same was not executed or the amount of security was not deposited pursuant to such an agreement. In the face of this position also, the impugned order cannot be sustained in any circumstance, whatsoever. 8. All the pleas raised by the respondent to negate the claim of the petitioners would be open before the arbitrator if it can lawfully do so. No other point has been urged on behalf of the learned Counsel for the parties appearing in this case. 9. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the present revision petition is allowed and the order passed by the Additional District Judge below allowing the appeal of the respondent is set aside and consequently the order passed by the trial Court allowing the application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is restored. Cost on parties. Revision allowed.