Judgment J. N. Dubey, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 11th June 1995 of the respondent No.1, the State of Bihar dismissing the appeal of the petitioner and confirming the order dated 28th December 1993 of the respondent No.3, the Inspector-General of Prisons, Bihar, reducing the pay scale of the petitioner as a consequence of the disciplinry proceeding initiated against him. 2. On 21-8-1992 the petitioner, who was working as warder in the District Jail, daltonganj, was placed under suspension by the respondent No.4, the Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya, in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings against him. Subsequently disciplinary proceedings were drawn against the petitioner and on completion thereof his pay scale was reduced by the respondent No.3 on 28th december, 1993. The petitioner filed appeal to the respondent No.1 but the the same was dismissed on 11-6-1995. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner has approached this Court for relief under article 226 of the Constitution. 3. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised several points during the arguments but it is not necessary for me to deal with all of them as in my opinion the writ petition deserves to be allowed on a short point viz. that the respondent No.3 being the appellate authority of the petitoner was himself not justified in awarding any punishment to the petitioner on conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. 5. Admitteldy the services of the petitioner are governed by the Bihar jail Manual. According to Rule 268 punishing authority of the petitioner is Superintendant of Central Jail, while the appellate authority under Rule 190 is the Inspector-General of Prisons. It is not disputed that in this case final order awarding the punishment to the petitioner has been passed by the Inspector-General of Prisons and not by the Superintendent of Central Jail. It is now well settled that when authority higher than disciplinary authority itself imposes the punishment, the order of punishment suffers from no illegality when no appeal is provided to such authority. However, when an appeal is provided to the higher authority concerned against the order of the disciplinary authority or of a lower authority and the higher authority passes an order of punishment, the employee concerned is deprived of the remedy of appeal which is a substantive right given to him by the rules/regulation. However, when an appeal is provided to the higher authority concerned against the order of the disciplinary authority or of a lower authority and the higher authority passes an order of punishment, the employee concerned is deprived of the remedy of appeal which is a substantive right given to him by the rules/regulation. Under Bihar Jail manual an appeal is provided under rule 190 to the Inspector-General of prisons against the order passed by the superintendent of Central Jail under rule 268. There is no further right of appeal provided under Rules. But a revision is provided to the State government against it under Rule 192-A. In view of the fact that no right of appeal is provided under the Rules against the order of the respondent no.3 it is clear that right of appeal of the petitioner has been taken away by him by passing the impugned order himself instead of allowing the respondent No.4 to do so. Since the petitioner has been deprived of his substantive right of appeal it cannot be reasonably claimed that no prejudice has been caused to him because the impugned order has been passed by an i authority higher in rank to the punishing authority of the petitioner. My this view finds support from a decision of the Supreme Court in Surjit Ghosh V/s. Chairman and Managing Director, United commercial Bank and others, AIR 1995 sc 1953 , which reads thus : "some grievances have been made by the appellant in the present appeal touching upon the illegalities in the conduct of the proceedings such as that (a) the disciplinary proceedings were initiated by an incompetent disciplinary authority in breach of Regulation 8 (2) (iii) read with Regulation 3 (8) of the regulation (b) the statement of witnesses recorded earlier were not supplied to him in breach of Regulation 8 (10) (b) (iii) and (c)he has denied opportunity to explain circumstance appearing against him in evidence in breach of Regulation 6 ( 17) of the Regulations. However, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the said grievances since we are of the view that one of the objections taken by the appellant to the dismissal viz that the appellant was deprived of an opportunity to prefer an appeal provided under the Regulations, goes to the root of the dismissal order. However, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the said grievances since we are of the view that one of the objections taken by the appellant to the dismissal viz that the appellant was deprived of an opportunity to prefer an appeal provided under the Regulations, goes to the root of the dismissal order. The undisputed fact relating to the said grievance of the appellant arc that the disciplinary action was taken against him by the deputy-General Manager. As the Regulations stood then, the disciplinary authority or officers in Grade E,d,c, and B (excepting divisional Manager in Grade B) was the divisional Manager/agm (Personnel) and the appeal against their order lay to the deputy General Manager or any other officer of the same ranki. Against the order of the Deputy Genera! Manager, the review lay to the General Manager. It is not disputed that the appellant was an officer in Grade D. Hence in his case as per said Regulation, the disciplinary authority was either the divisional Manager or the AGM (Personnel)and if the action was taken by either of them, he had an opportunity to appeal to the deputy General Manager or any other officer of the same rank and thereafter he had a further right of review to the General manager. However, since the action against him was taken by the Deputy General manager although the Divisional Manager and AGM (Personnel) were available for taking the action, the appellant was denied the right of an appeal and also the right of a review which lay only against the appellate order. The impugned order of dismissal passed by the Bank, therefore, suffers from an inherent defect". "the respondent Bank in its submission contended that although it is true that the Deputy General Manager had acted as the disciplinary authority when he was in fact named under the Regulations as an appellate authority, no prejudice is caused to the appellant because the Deputy General manager is higher in rank than the disciplinary authority, viz. the Divisional manager/agm (Personnel ). According to the Bank, it should be held that when the order of punishment is passed by a higher authority to appeal is available under the, regulations as it is not necessary to provide for the same. It was also contended that there is no right to appeal unless it is provided under the rules or Regulations. According to the Bank, it should be held that when the order of punishment is passed by a higher authority to appeal is available under the, regulations as it is not necessary to provide for the same. It was also contended that there is no right to appeal unless it is provided under the rules or Regulations. Although the argument looks attractive at first sight, its weakness lies in the fact that it tries to place the Rules/regulations which provide no appeal on par with the Rules/regulations where appeal is provided. It is true that when an authority higher than the disciplinary authority itself imposes the punishment the order of punishment suffers from no illegality when no appeal is provided to such authority, however, when an appeal is provided to the higher authority concerned against the order of the disciplinary authority, or of a lower authority and the higher authority passes an order of punishment, the employee concerned is deprived of the remedy of appeal which is a substantive right given to him by the Rules/regulations. An employee cannot be deprived of his substantive right. What is further, when there is a provision of appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority and when the appellate or the higher authority against whose order there is no appeal, exercises the power of the disciplinary authority in a given case, it results in discrimination against the employee concerned. This is particularly so when there are no guidelines in the rules/regulations as to when the higher authority or the appellate authority should exercise the power of the disciplinary authority. The higher or appellate authority may chose to exercise the. power of the disciplinary authority in some cases while not doing so in other cases. In such cases, the right of the employee depends upon the choice of the higher/appellate authority which patently results in discrimination between an employee and employee. Surely, such a situation cannot savour of legality. Hence we are of the view that the contention advanced on behalf of the resppndent-Bank that when an appellate authority choose to exercise the power of disciplinary authority, it should be held that there is no right of appeal provided under the Regulations cannot be accepted. The result, therefore, is that the present order of dismissal suffers from an inherent defect and has to be set aside. " 6. The result, therefore, is that the present order of dismissal suffers from an inherent defect and has to be set aside. " 6. Thus, the impugned order may not be strictly illegal but at the same time it is improper and deserves to be quashed. Learned State Counsel contended that in view of the fact that power under Rule 268 by the Superintendent of Central Jail have to be exercised under over all supervision and control of the Inspector-General of prisons, it cannot be said that the later was not legally competent to impose any punishment on the petitioner. It is true that under Rule 268 the powers are vested in the Superintendent of Central jail subject to supervision of the Inspector-General of Prisons but that does not mean that the Rule provides two parallel punishing authority-one Superintendent of Central Jail and another the inspector General of Prisons. In other words, irrespective of the fact that the powers under Rule 268 have to be exercised by the Superintendent of Central jail subject to the supervision of the Inspector-General of Prisons, the later does not become the punishing authority of the petitioner. It is further clear from the fact that the Rules themselves specifically provide a right of appeal under Rule 190, against the order passed by the Superintendent of Central jail under Rule 268, to the Inspector-General of Prisons. The very fact that a right of appeal has been provided to the inspector-General under Rule 190 against the order passed by the Superintendent of Central Jail under Rule 268 makes it quite clear that the rule framing authority by providing that power under Rule 268 is to be exercised by the superintendent of Central Jail subject to the supervision of the Inspector-General of Prison did not intend to make the later as punishing authority of the petitioner. Otherwise also power of supervision conferred on the Inspector-General of prisons under Rule 268 cannot include the power of awarding final punishment to a delinquent officer under that Rule. 7. Learned State Counsel then contended that admittedly in this case an appeal was filed by the petitioner to the respondent No.1 against the impugned order of respondent No.3, which has been dismissed. 7. Learned State Counsel then contended that admittedly in this case an appeal was filed by the petitioner to the respondent No.1 against the impugned order of respondent No.3, which has been dismissed. It is true that the petitioner filed an appeal to the respondent No.1 but in view of the fact that no such appeal is provided under rules it must be treated as revision under Rule 192-A. Mere fact that the petitioner instead of mentioning revision has used the word appeal is of no legal consequence, when the Rules them selves do not provide any such appeal. 8. Respondent No.1 has rejected the revision of the petitioner in a most summary manner without any application of mind. Moreover, the claim of the petitioner that respondentno.3 being the appellate authority was not justified in passing the order of punishment, has not even been referred in the order what to say of the same being considered on merit. Both the impugned orders suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record and are liable to be quashed. 9. In the result the writ-petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 11th June, 1995 and 28th december 1993 passed by respondents 1 and 3, respectively (Annexures 12 and 7 to tthe writ-petition) are quashed. The petitioner will be entitled for Rs.2,000/- as costs. Petition Allowed.