This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 3.3.87 passed by the learned Single Judge in First Appeal No.20 of 1972. A preliminary point has been raised on behalf of the respondents that this appeal is not maintainable, which we have to decide before the appeal is taken up for hearing on merits. 2. The relevant facts for disposal of this preliminary point briefly are that the appellant Smti Kh. Ningol Ninghtemcha Ongbi Thambalnambi Devi filed e Title Suit No.17/1964/S/1971/38/1971 in forma pauperis for some reliefs in respect of the suit land. In the said suit as may as 37 defendants were impleaded. The case made out in the plaint as regards defendant Nos. 1 to 6 was that the suit property fell exclusively to the shares of the said defendants until it was transferred to the plaintiff by execution of three registered Gift Deeds dated 7.3.54,8.3.54 and 21.3.54 with delivery of possession and the plaintiff accepted the said gift and took possession of the suit land from the date of execution of the said Gift Deeds. The plaintiff's case as regards defendant Nos.7 to 10 is that the title of the plaintiff has been clouded by the hostile claim of the defendant Nos.7 to 10. Regarding defendant Nos. 11 to 37, it has been pleaded in the plaint that the said defendants are possessing the said suit land on behalf of defendant Nos.7 to 10 and that defendant Nos.8 to 10 had executed registered Sale Deeds & in favour of some of the defendants which were void and were liable to be cancelled. In the said suit, the plaintiff prayed for declaration of right, title and interest in the said suit land, for adjudging the sale deeds executed by defendant Nos.7 to 10 as void, for recovery of possession of the suit land from defendant Nos.7 to 37, for mesne profit of the suit land for wrongful possession of the suit land by defendant Nos.7 to 37 and for perpetual injunction against defendant Nos.7 to 37 restraining them from invading the rights of the plaintiff to enjoy the suit land. After the trial of the suit, the learned District Judge, Manipur, dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 14.7.72. After the trial of the suit, the learned District Judge, Manipur, dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 14.7.72. Aggrieved, the appellant filed First Appeal No.20 of'1972 before this Court and the learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the said appeal by judgment and order dated 3.3.1987. 3. Against the aforesaid judgment and order dated 3.3.8 7, the present Letters Patent Appeal was presented on 12.6.87 with only defendant Nos.7 to 10 as the principal respondents. In the said appeal, defendant Nos.1 to 6 and defendant Nos. 11 to 37 were not impleaded as respondents. When the appeal was taken by the Division Bench on 16.6.87, Mr. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the appellant prayed for time to file an application under Order 1 Rule 8, CPC, which was allowed by the Division Bench but the Division Bench directed issue of notices to the respondents to show cause as to why the appeal should not be admittted. Pursuant to the said direction, notices appear to have been issued by the office on 30.6.87 and returned after proper service as would be evident from the order sheet. In the meanwhile, an application was presented by the appellant on 19.6.87 which was numbered as Civil (Misc) Application No%.254 of 1987 in which the appellant prayed for granting her permission to sue the contesting defendant Nos.7 to 10 in their representative capacity as representing their privies and transferees of the suit land namely defendant Nos. 11 to 37 in the suit under Order 1 Rule 8 and section 151 CPC arid also prayed 'for striking out the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 6 who were stated to be merely proforma parties who had not contested the suit. When the said Civil (Misc) Application No.254 of 1987 was taken up by the Division Bench on 27.7.89, an order was passed that the Civil (Misc) Application would be posted after service of notices on the respondents of the appeal. The appeal was thereafter taken up for admission on 12.9.89 by the Division Bench and the Division Bench; directed that the appeal shall be heard and allowed the prayer of the appellant to issue notices on the main respondents. More than a year thereafter when 'the aforesaid Civil (Misc) Application No£54 of 1987 was placed before the Division Bench on 21.11.90, Mr. More than a year thereafter when 'the aforesaid Civil (Misc) Application No£54 of 1987 was placed before the Division Bench on 21.11.90, Mr. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, stated mat the Civil (Misc) Application had already been disposed of on 12.9.89 by an order passed in the appeal and accordingly the Division Bench passed orders on 23.11.90 that the misc case bo closed. Thereafter, the appeal was listed for hearing but as there was no rept entaion on behalf of the respondents on 21.11.94, the Division Bench passed an order directing special notice on respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 informing them of the date for hearing. Pursuant to the said order, notices were issued on respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 and in response to the said notices, the respondents appeared through their counsel. 4. When the appeal was taken up for hearing by the Division Bench on 15.3.95, Mr. L. Nandakumar Singh, learned counsel for/said respondents, raised the preliminary point that the appeal has not been properly constituted as necessary parties were not made respondents. The aforesaid preliminary point was heard initially by the Division Bench on 21.8.95 when Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, brought to the notice of the Bench the order passed by the Division Bench on 12.9.89 allowing issue of notices only on the main respondents and the order passed by the Division Bench on 21.11.90 closing Civil (Misc) Application No.254 of 1987 on the ground that the application had already been-disposed of by the Division Bench on 112.9.89 and submitted that since the Divisjon-Bench had in its earlier order dated 12.9.89 and 21.11.90 already allowed the prayer of the appellant to sue defendant Nos. 7 to 10 in representative capacity on behalf of defendant Nos. 11 to 37 as well as the prayer of the appellant to strike out defendant Nos.1 to 6 who were only pro forma defendants, the question that all the defendants in the suit have not been impleaded as respondents in the appeal could not be reopened again by the learned counsel for the respondents. 11 to 37 as well as the prayer of the appellant to strike out defendant Nos.1 to 6 who were only pro forma defendants, the question that all the defendants in the suit have not been impleaded as respondents in the appeal could not be reopened again by the learned counsel for the respondents. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length, the Division Bench passed an order on 21.8.95 stating therein that it was of the view that the prayer made under Order 1, Rule 8, CPC by the appellant could not be granted on the facts of the present case and referring the matter to the Hon'ble the Chief-Justice for constitution an appropriate Bench for deciding the question as to whether during the pendency of the LPA an application filed by the appellant under Order 1, Rule 8 CPC to grant him permission to sue the contesting defendants only for themselves and on behalf of other defendants in their representative capacity was tenable in law. The appeal was thereafter placed before Hon'ble Chief Justice who was pleased to direct that the matter be laid before the appropriate Court on 3.1.7.96. However, a Division Bench presided by Hon'ble Chief Justice passed orders stating therein mat as there was no conflict of decisions of Division Bench of this Court on the question sought to be referred, a reference to a larger Bench was not necessary. Thereafter Hon'ble the Chief Justice directed that the matter be posted before this Division Bench on 19.8.96. It is in the back ground of the aforesaid facts that we have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the maintainability of the appeal and as to whether the defendant Nos. 1 to 6 and defendant Nos. 11 to 37 are required to be impleaded as respondents in this appeal at this stage. 5. Mr. L. Nandakumar Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that since out of 37 defendants only 4 defendants, namely defendant Nos.7 to 10 have been impleaded as respondents in the appeal, the appeal is not property constituted and is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. He pointed out that under the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Order 41, Rule 20, CPC all the parties to the suit interested in the appeal are to be impleaded as respondents and airy . He pointed out that under the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Order 41, Rule 20, CPC all the parties to the suit interested in the appeal are to be impleaded as respondents and airy . party to the suit who have not been impleaded as respondent in the appeal cannot be added after the expiry of the period of limitation for filing the appeal except for reasons to be recorded by the Court as stated in sub-rule (2) thereof. He relied on the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Chockalingam vs. Seethai Ache, AIR 1927 Privy Council 252, in support of his submission. He also cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the. case of Ch. Stirat Singh (dead) & others vs. Manohar Lal & others, AIR 1971SC 240, in which the Supreme Court dismissed the civil^ appeals filed before it on the ground that a party who had been impleaded as respondent in the appeal before the High Court out of which the civil appeals arose had not been impleaded in the two civil appeals and the Supreme Court did not permit adding of the said parties as respondents in the said two civil appeals at a belated stage. Mr. Nandakumar Singh also relied on the decisions of the Kerala High Court in the case of Narayana Pillai Gopala Pillai & another vs. Krishna Filial Chelappal Pillai & another, AIR 1966 Kerala 317 and in the case of Ammukutty Amma & another vs. Madhabi Amma, AIR 1971 Kerala 90 and the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Palacheria Ananda & another vs. Mallipudi Acharyulu & another, AIR 1958 Andhra Pradesh 743, in support of his submission mat all the defendants hi the suit ought to have been impleaded as respondents in the appeal and could not be added after the right of appeal against them had become barred by limitation. Mr. Nandakumar Singh further submitted that defendant Nos. 1 to 6 and 11 to 37 were necessary parties without which the appeal could not be decided and he cited the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shitladia & others vs. Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 Allahabad 549, in support of his submission that the said defendant Nos. Nandakumar Singh further submitted that defendant Nos. 1 to 6 and 11 to 37 were necessary parties without which the appeal could not be decided and he cited the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shitladia & others vs. Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 Allahabad 549, in support of his submission that the said defendant Nos. 1 to 6 and 11 to 37 were necessary parties to the suit as well as in the appeal and that the appeal could not be decided in their absence. 6. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, on the other hand reiterated that by the order dated 12.9.89 passed in the appeal and the order dated 21.11.90 passed in the Civil (Misc) Application 254 of 1987, the Division Bench of this Court has already allowed the prayer of the appellant to ? sue defendant Nos.7 to 10 on then behalf as well as on behalf of the defendant Nos. 11 to 37 in representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8; CPC and has also I allowed the prayer of the appellant to strike out the proforma defendant Nos. 1 to 6 from the present appeal. Mr. Nilamani Singh further pointed out that the aforesaid orders dated 12.9.89 and 21.11.90 were passed by the Division Bench after notices were served on the respondents (defendant Nos.7 to 10) in the year 1987 pursuant to- order dated 16.6.87 of the Division Bench. Despite the said notices, the respondents did not appear before this Court and raise any objection regarding non joinder of necessary parties in the appeal. He cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath & others, AIR 1976 SC 2335 , wherein it has been held that a plea relating to non joinder of necessary parties should be raised at the earliest occasion and submitted that the respondents not having raised the said plea after receiving notices in the year 1987, cannot at this belated stage raise the plea that the appeal was not maintainable on the ground of non joinder of necessary parties. According to Mr. Nilamani Singh, therefore, the question regarding nonjoinder of necessary parties in this appeal having been closed by the Division Bench in the aforesaid orders dated 12.9.89 and 21.11.90 cannot be reopened at this stage. He further contended that though defendant Nos. According to Mr. Nilamani Singh, therefore, the question regarding nonjoinder of necessary parties in this appeal having been closed by the Division Bench in the aforesaid orders dated 12.9.89 and 21.11.90 cannot be reopened at this stage. He further contended that though defendant Nos. 1 to 6 and 11 to 37 had put in their written statements, they did not really contest the suit as they did not lead any evidence in the trial. Similarly, the said defendant Nos. 1 to 6 and 11 to 37, though made respondents in the first appeal before the learned Single Judge of this Court, did not appear in the said appeal pursuant to notices issued by the Court and did not contest the appeal. He further argued that defendant Nos.11 to 37 had not led any evidence in the trial of the suit showing that any sale deed was executed in their favour by defendant Nos.7 to 10 in respect of any portion of the suit land and that the said defendant Nos.11 to 37 are at best claiming possession of the portion of the suit land under defendant Nos.7 to 10 as their tenants. On these a facts, defendant Nos. 11 to 37 were privies to defendant Nos.7 to 10 and the said defendant Nos.7 to 10 could be sued in their representative capacity not only on their behalf but also on behalf of the defendant Nos.11 to 37 under Order 1, Rule 8, CPC. Mr. Nilamani Singh also submissted that at any rate defendant Nos.1 to 6 and 11 to 37 were not necessary parties and in support of his said submissions he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi vs. Ram Krishna Narain, AIR 1953 SC 521 ; State Bank of India vs. Ramkrishna Pandurang Barve & another, AIR 1990 SC 1981 and Ramesh Hirananda Kundarmal vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & others, (1992) 2 SCJ149. He argued that the said defendant Nos.1 to 6 and 11 to 37 not being necessaary parties, the appeal could not be dismissed for non-joinder of the said defendants as Order 1, Rule 8, CPC makes it clear that the suit shall not be defeated by reason of non-joinder of parties unless the parties who have not been joined are necessary parties. Finally, Mr. Finally, Mr. Nilamani Singh contended that if the appellant has chosen not to implead the said defendant Nos.1 to 6 and 11 to 37 as respondents in the appeal, she has done so at her own risk and the decree passed in mis appeal may not be executable against the said defendants, but the appeal against the defendant Nos.7 to 10 cannot be dismissed on the ground that the said defendant Nos. 1 to 6 and 11 to 37 have not been impleaded as respondents in the appeal. 7. Order 41, Rule 20, CPC, which is relevant for the purpose of deciding the present controversy between the parties is quoted herein below: "20. Power to adjourn hearing and direct persons appearing interested to be made respondents - (1) Where it appears to the Court at the hearing that any person who was a party to the suit in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, but who has not been made a party to the appeal, is interested in the result of the appeal, the Court may adjourn the hearing to a future day to be fixed by the Court and direct that such person be made a respondent. (2) No respondent shall be added under this rule, after the expiry of the period of limitation for appeal, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded allows that to be done, on such terms as to costs as it think fit." Sub-rule (1) of Order 41, Rule 20 CPC, quoted above shows that it is only a party to the suit who is 'interested in the result of the appeal' but has not been impleaded as a respondent who can be added by the Court as a respondent. In the case of Chockalingam vs. Seethal Ache & others (supra) cited by Mr. L. Nandakumar Singh, the Privy Council interpreting Order 41, Rule 20 CPC held: "The addition of a respondent whom the appellant has not made a party to the appeal is expressly dealt with in Order 41 Rule 20 on which the plaintiff relied, both, in the appellate Court and before their Lordships. The rule empowers the Court, to make such party a respondent when it appears to the Court that he is interested in the result of the appeal. The rule empowers the Court, to make such party a respondent when it appears to the Court that he is interested in the result of the appeal. Giving these words their natural meaning and they cannot be disregarded - it seems impossible to say that in this case the defendants against whom these suits have been dismissed, and as against whom the right of appeal has become barred, are interested in the result of the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the other defendants. It was for the plaintiff-appellant, who applied to the Court to exercise its powers under this rule, to show what was the nature of their interest and this he has failed to do." (emphasis supplied). It is thus clear from the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council that in the facts of some cases when a suit has been dismissed against the defendants and the appeal has been filed within the period of limitation as against some of the defendants, the defendants against whom the appeal has not been filed and against whom right of appeal has become barred by limitation are not interested in the result of the appeal filed by the appellant against other defendants. 8. Coming to the facts of the present appeal, so far as the defendant Nos. 1 to 6 are concerned, the plaintiff-appellant did not implead the said defendants as respondents in the present appeal at the time of filing the appeal and instead made a prayer before this Court in Civil (Misc) Application No.254 of 1987 that the names of the said defendant Nos. 1 to 6 be struck off on the ground that they were merely proforma defendants, and according to Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, the said prayer of the appellant was allowed by order dated 12.9.89 passed in the appeal and by order dated 21.11.90 passed in the said Civil (Misc) Application No.254 of 1987. 1 to 6 be struck off on the ground that they were merely proforma defendants, and according to Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, the said prayer of the appellant was allowed by order dated 12.9.89 passed in the appeal and by order dated 21.11.90 passed in the said Civil (Misc) Application No.254 of 1987. The result is that no appeal as such as filed by the plaintiff-appellant against defendant Nos.1 to 6 and by expiry of the period of limitation for filing the appeal against the said defendant Nos.1 to 6, the dismissal of the suit against the said defendants by the first appellate Court has become final and the said defendant Nos.1 to 6 as per the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council cannot be held to be parties interested in the result of the appeal against defendant Nos.7 to 10. The said defendant Nos.1 to 6 may still have been necessary parties to the appeal, if the right, title and interest of the respondents was derived from the said defendant Nosl to 6, but the respondents (defendant Nos.7 to 10) have made out no such case in their written statement filed in the suit. On the facts of the present case therefore we are of the considered opinion that defendant Nos. 1 to 6 are not necessary parties in this appeal against the defendant Nos.7 to 10. 9. But so far as defendant Nos.1 1 to 37 are concerned, it is not as if the appellant did not intend to pursue this appeal against the said defendants. Soonafter die presentation of the present appeal on 15.6.87, the appellant made a prayer before this Court in Civil (Misc) Application No.254 of 1989 for permission to sue the said defendant Nos.7 to 10 not only on their behalf but also in their representative capacity on behalf of the said defendant Nos.1 1 to 37 under Order 1, Rule 8 CPC and according to Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, the said prayer of the appellant was allowed by the Division Bench by order dated 12.9.89 passed in the appeal and by order dated 21.11.90 passed in Civil (Misc) Application No.254 of 1987. Order 1, Rule 8 CPC is extracted herein below: "8. A. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, the said prayer of the appellant was allowed by the Division Bench by order dated 12.9.89 passed in the appeal and by order dated 21.11.90 passed in Civil (Misc) Application No.254 of 1987. Order 1, Rule 8 CPC is extracted herein below: "8. One person may sue or defend on behalf of all in same interest - (1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit: (a) One or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested; (b) The Court may direct that one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested. (2) The Court shall, in every case where a permission or direction is given under sub-Rule (1), at the plaintiffs expense, give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons so interested, either by personal service, or, where, by reason of the number of persons or any other cause, such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct. (3) Any person on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, a suit is instituted, or defended, under sub-rule (1), may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit. (4) No part of the claim in any such suit shall be abandoned under sub-rule (1), c and no such suit shall be withdrawn under sub-rule (3), or Rule 1 of Order XXIII, and no agreement, compromise or satisfaction shall be recorded in any such suit under Rule 3 of that Orders, unless the Court has given, at the plaintiffs expense, notice of all persons so Interested in the manner specified in sub-rule (2). (5) Where any person suing or defending in any such suit does nor proceed with due (diligence in the suit or defence, the Court may substitute in his place any other person having the same interest in the suit. (6) A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended, as the case maybe. (6) A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended, as the case maybe. Explanation: For the purpose of determining whether, the persons who sue or are sued, or defend, have same interest in the one suit, it is not necessary to establish that such persons have the same cause of action as the persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or defend the suit, as the case may be." We have grave doubts as to whether the aforesaid provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 CPC could be invoked to allow defendant Nos.7 to 10 to be sued in their representative capacity on behalf of defendant Nos. 11 to 37 and as to whether by the orders dated 12.9.89 and 21.11.89, the Devision Bench actually permitted the appellant to sue defendant Nos. 7 to 10 on behalf of defendant Nos. 11 to 3 7 in their representative capacity as contended by Mr. Nilamani Singh. Assuming, however, that the said provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 CPC could be so invoked and the prayer of the appellant to sue defendant Nos.7 to 10 in their representative capacity on behalf of the defendant Nos. 11 to 37 was allowed by orders dated 12.9.89 and 21.11.90 of the Division Bench any decree passed in the appeal shall be binding on the said defendant Nos. 11 to 3 7 by virtue of what is provided in sub-rule (6) of Order 8 Rule 1 CPC and the said defendants therefore are parties interested in the result of this appeal. Sub-rule (2) of Order 1, Rule 8 CPC further makes it clear that in every case in which permission is granted by the Court for suing a defendant on behalf of other persons interested, the Court is under an obligation to give notice of the institution of the suit to all the persons so interested either by personal service or if such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement. But in the present case, it does not appears a from the records that such notices were issued under sub-rule (2) of Order 1 Rule 8 CPC, to defendant Nos.11 to 37. Thus, .the practical consequence of accepting .the position taken by Mr. But in the present case, it does not appears a from the records that such notices were issued under sub-rule (2) of Order 1 Rule 8 CPC, to defendant Nos.11 to 37. Thus, .the practical consequence of accepting .the position taken by Mr. Nilamani Singh that the prayer of the appellant to permit the plaintiff-appellant to sue defendant Nos.7 to 10 not only on their behalf but also on behalf of defendant Nos.11 to 37 was allowed by the Division Bench on 12.9.89 and 21.11.90 would be that before hearing the appeal on merit, the Court would have to give notice of the-institution of the appeal to the said defendant Nos. 11 to 37 in accordance with sub-rule (2) of Order 1, Rule 8 CPC. 10. Coming now to the alternative argument of Mr. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, that even otherwise defendant Nos. 11 to 37 were not necessary parties and, therefore, not parties interested in the result of the appeal, we find that the plaintiffs own case in the plaint is that the said defendant Nos.11 to 37 are in possession of a portion of the suit land and the plaintiff has claimed relief in the suit for recovery of possession and for mesne profit for wrongful possession and for a perpetual injunction not only against defendant Nos.7 to 10 but also against the said defendant Nos. 11 to 37. In the case of Ramesh Hirananda Kundarmal (supra) cited by Mr. Nilamani Singh, the Supreme Court has held that for being a necessary party, the person must be directly and legally interested in the action i.e. the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally by curtailing his legal rights. Applying the aforesaid test, we are of the view that defendant Nos.11 to 37 who are in possession of a portion of the suit land may be affected in the enjoyment of their legal rights by any decree that this Court may pass in this appeal for recovery of possession, mesne profit, perpetual injunction and hence the said defendants are necessary parties and are interested in the result of the appeal. The appeal therefore cannot be heard and decided in their absence. In either view of the matter, therefore, notice of this appeal has to be given to the said defendant Nos. The appeal therefore cannot be heard and decided in their absence. In either view of the matter, therefore, notice of this appeal has to be given to the said defendant Nos. 11 to 37 before hearing of the appeal on merits is taken up by the Court. 11. Faced with the difficulty of serving notices on defendant Nos. 11 to 37 whose where abouts are not now dully known to the appellant, Mr. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel made a statement that in the event the Court takes the view that notices will have to be served on the said defendants, the plaintiff-appellant would under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC abadon her claim in the suit against the said defendant Nos.11 to 37 and the appellant has filed an application on 29.8.96 leaking such prayer under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC. Mr. LNK Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that such prayer of the appellant for abandoning her claim against the said defendant Nos. 11 to 37 cannot be allowed at this stage. We fail to appreciate as to how the respondents can oppose the said prayer of the appellant. The prayer of the appellant for abandoning her claim against defendant Nos.11 to 37 in the suit is thus allowed. The result is that the said defendant Nos. 11 to 37 would no longer be affected by any decree that may be passed in the present appeal and are no longer parties interested in the result of the appeal. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the present appeal survives only against the principal respondents and is maintainable and will now be heard on merits.