D.N. Chowdhury, J.- The issue is as to whether the three petitioners are fairly dealt with by the disciplinary authority. Does the impugned action of the respondents has abridged the constitutional guarantee of the petitioners. The facts are summarised herein below. 2. The petitioner No.1 and 2 were appointed as Constable, in the Nagaland Armed Police with effect from 4.5.1964. Petitioner No.1 was promoted to the post of Lance Naik with effect from 1.9.92. Petitioner No.2 was promoted by order dated 13.9.72 to the post of Lance Naik and by order dated 15.2.82 to the post of Naik in the Nagaland Armed Police. Petitioner No.3 was initially appointed as Lance Naik in the Nagaland Armed Police in the year 1970. He was promoted to the post of Naik and Havildar and thereafter he was promoted as ABSI, GD, in the Nagaland Armed Police. At the time of issuance of the impugned order of dismissal all the three petitioners were posted at the First Battalion in the Nagaland Armed Police and were discharging their duties in their respective capacities. At the relevant time the personnel of Nagaland Armed Police were deployed in the various location in the Peren Sub Division of Nagaland. In course of such deployment, Armed Police numbering about 20 (twenty) under the Command of petitioner No.3 were deputed from Coy Athibung Head Quarter to Chalkot Village for guard duty. It is averred that after personnel reached their assigned areas the Jawans performed law and order duties in and around Old Chalkot Village but due to incessent rain the Platoon was unable to construct any defence position in the assigned area. On 14.6.93 the rain stopped and Platoon was getting ready to construct their defence position and in the meantime an order was received by the Platoon Commander for withdrawal of the Platoon from the assigned areas. Petitioner No.3 the Platoon Commander made necessary arrangement for withdrawal of the Platoon from the assigned area i.e. Chalkot Village. Accordingly, petitioner No.3 went to the Head Gaon Burah (GB) of the village to inform him about the order of withdrawal of Platoon from the area. According to the petitioner No.3, when he was in the Gaon Bura's house, a large number of miscreants attacked the Chalkot Village with sophisticated weapons. Accordingly, petitioner No.3 went to the Head Gaon Burah (GB) of the village to inform him about the order of withdrawal of Platoon from the area. According to the petitioner No.3, when he was in the Gaon Bura's house, a large number of miscreants attacked the Chalkot Village with sophisticated weapons. Writ petitioner No.3 on being attacked escaped through the kitchen window of the Gaon Bura's and joined his men who were awaiting for their transport on withdrawal back to the Head Quarter at an elevated position. The petitioner No.3 tried to organise his Platoon to defend the villagers from the attack of the miscreants. It was averred inter alia that when the petitioner organised to defend the villagers from the attack of the miscreants they seriously handicaped in their endeavour as the attackers have mixed up with the villagers. However exchange of fire took place and some of the armed Jawan under the command of the petitioner No.3 were able to retaliate fire and take position so that innocent villagers would not be killed. The miscreants were however able to set fire some villagers house and granaries. And in the exchange of fire a few villagers and some constables were killed. In view of the confusion some arms and ammunitions belonging to a few Jawans who were absent from their post were also lost in the melee. After 1/2 an hour the arms group left the village and returned to the jungle. Thereafter the incident was reported to the Company Commander in Athibung Head Quarter and the three writ petitioners and other Jawans who were stationed at Chalkot Village returned to their head quarters and were assigned various other patrolling duties in the Athibung Town and & other nearby areas. On 9.8.93 the three petitioners were summoned to the Battalion Head Quarter at Chumukedima and in the said Battalion Head Quarter the three petitioners were served the impugned order of termination dated 23rd July, 1993 dismissing the three petitioners from service under Rule 11 of the Nagaland Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967. The impugned reasons recorded for not holding the enquiry which is specified in the paragraph 2 of the order. The impugned reasons recorded for not holding the enquiry which is specified in the paragraph 2 of the order. The relevant portion of paragraph 2 are culled out below : "….Thus because of their cowardice and negligence to duties 32 houses and 8 granary houses were set on fire by the antisocial elements and killed 5 (five) persons including one Policeman who was caught by UGs in the incident. The misconduct stated above on the part of ABSI Satkolam Kuki and all his men under his Command call for a very serious disciplinary action. For the purpose of collecting evidence in a departmental enquiry that may be held, it is not possible to secure the presence of the members of the armed gang involved in the murder and arson in Chalkot Village could be obtained as they had deserted the village after seeing the killing of their village folk and even those eye witnesses remaining the village are in a state of shock and are unable to tender evidence." The aforesaid order was impugned by way of writ petition before this Court which was registered and numbered as Civil Rule No. 87 (K) of 1993. In the writ petition it was contended that the impugned order of dismissal was in contravention of the principles of natural justice and also in violation of the provisions contained in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The petitioners also questioned the legality and validity of the action of the respondents in adopting special procedure under Rule 11 without any just cause and therefore the impugned action was challenged as being arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The respondent filed counter affidavit along with record and asserted that the act of cowardice and lack of devotion of duties on the part of the petitioners warranted stringent disciplinary action against the erring officials. It was also asserted that the Director General of Police, Nagaland personally visited the place of occurrence and met the villagers who have confirmed the desertion of the Nagaland Armed Police Personnel from their post when the above mentioned incident took place at Chalkot Village. The statement of NAP Personnel were also recorded and they have admitted of having deserted the spot without putting up any resistance against the underground elements. The statement of NAP Personnel were also recorded and they have admitted of having deserted the spot without putting up any resistance against the underground elements. It was also averred that inaction of the NAP personnel was found to be due to loose command control of the Post Commander/petitioner No.3 and 2 Ncos/petitioner Nos.2 and 1. 3. After hearing the learned counsel of the respective parties and perusal of ' the materials on record, the learned Single Judge upheld the order of dismissal dated 23rd July, 1993 and dismissed the writ petition. Hence the appeal. 4. Mr. H. Roy, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that 3 (three) petitioners at all relevant time were denied from procedural fairness and also averred that Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India conferred a valuable right on the petitioners and said right was taken away by the respondents by resorting to Rule 11 of the Nagaland Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967 in a most illegal fashion without any just cause. The ground assigned for dispensation of the enquiry is no ground for getting rid of the enquiry submits Mr. Roy, the learned counsel. Mr. Roy submitted that the reason assigned by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition is not sustainable in law. 5. Mr. CT Jamir, learned Govt Advocate, Nagaland strenuously argued that the learned Single Judge has examined the matter in depth and considering all the aspect of the matter rightly upheld the impugned order of dismissal. According to MrJamir the petitioners belong to an Armed Force who were assigned with duties to protect the lives of the Chalkot Village and that instead of protecting the lives and properties of the villagers they in most cowardice manner ran away and brought disreputation to the department and on consideration of these aspects of the matter the authority rightly dismissed the three petitioners/appellants. The learned Single Judge took into consideration all the relevant considerations and thereafter considering all the materials did not find any merit and accordingly learned Single Judge rightly dismissed the writ petition. 6. Before going further into the matter, it would be pertinent to look into the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India which are extracted below: "311. 6. Before going further into the matter, it would be pertinent to look into the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India which are extracted below: "311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State - (1) No persons who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an All India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such persons as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, it impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such persons any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed : Provided further that this clause shall not apply (a) Where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) Where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) Where the President or the Governor as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry (3) If, in respect of any such persons as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in Clause (2) the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final." 7. A set of rules known as the Nagaland Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967 was made in exercise of power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India to regulate the disciplinary matters. A set of rules known as the Nagaland Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967 was made in exercise of power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India to regulate the disciplinary matters. Part IV of the said Rules provides the procedure for imposing penalties. The relevant provisions of Rule 9(1) and (2) are quoted below: "9. Procedure for imposing penalties: (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiry) Act, 1850, no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in Rule 7 shall be passed except after an inquiry, held as far as may be in the manner hereinafter provided. (2) The disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the enquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based shall be communicated in writing to the Government servant and he shall be required to submit, within such time as may be specified by the disciplinary authority, a written statement of his defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. Standard form of memorandum of chargehseet and memorandum are specified in Schedule IV and V..." The said Rule cast duty on the disciplinary authority to frame definite charge on the delinquent officer and call upon the officer to submit his explanation to the charges. Delinquent officer is entitled to as a matter of right inspect and take extract of the official record for preparing his defence. On receipt of the explanation unless the same are admitted, the authority is duty bound to enquire into the same through enquiry officer who is clothed with the power to enquire into the matter in the manner prescribed by the Rules. On receipt of the explanation unless the same are admitted, the authority is duty bound to enquire into the same through enquiry officer who is clothed with the power to enquire into the matter in the manner prescribed by the Rules. Disciplinary authority thereafter on consideration of report of the Enquiry Officer is required to record its findings on each of the charges and in the event the authority finds that in its opinion any of the penalties specified in the clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 7 is required to be imposed in that even it shall be furnished to the Govt servant a copy of the report of the inquiry authority and where the disciplinary authority is not the inquiring authority a statement of its findings together with the brief reason for disagreement if any, with the finding of the inquiring authority and give the delinquent officer a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him to submit such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty. Rule 11 is an exception to Rule 9 which is also quoted below: Special procedure in certain cases: Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 9. (i) Where a penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charges; or (ii) Where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said rule; or (iii) Where the Governor is satisfied in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to follow such procedure the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deem fit: Provided that the Commission shall be consulted before passing such orders in any case in which such consultation is necessary." 8. Part XIV of the Constitution of India which deals with service of the Union of India and the State provides certain protection to the civil servant in the public interest and for the public good. No member of civil services shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry into the charges against him and giving a reasonable opportunity for being heard in respect of those charges is a mandate of the Indian Constitution. No member of civil services shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry into the charges against him and giving a reasonable opportunity for being heard in respect of those charges is a mandate of the Indian Constitution. It is meaningful in content and dispensation of the same is an exception when the collection and presentation of evidence for a proof is not reasonably practicable. The reasonability and impossibility is to be assessed keeping in mind the Constitutional protection guaranteed to civil servant. Proviso two is curved out as an- exception to the clause (2) of the Article 311 of the Constitution. Article 310 (1) of the Constitution opens up with the expression "Except as expressly provided by this Constitution". Rule 11 of the Rules is also exception of Rule 9. Therefore the authority under the normal circumstances is required to hold enquiry. The enquiry provided under Article 311 (2) can be avoided only on those cases where it is not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. The power under clause (b) of the second proviso is limited and circumscribed hen the power conferred under the clause (2) of the said proviso. The primary consideration for the exercise of power under the second proviso is the conduct of the civil servant in a given case and if the conduct of the civil servant warrants an order of punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Only on those cases the clause (a) to (c) of the second proviso come into play. 9. The clause (2) of the Article 311 has specifically excluded the proviso two of the clause (2) of the said Article when the conditions set out therein are fulfilled. The second proviso to Article 311 (2) comes into play only on the accomplishment of any of the three conditions laid down therein. The three conditions are of different nature. A civil servant can be dismissed, removed . The second proviso to Article 311 (2) comes into play only on the accomplishment of any of the three conditions laid down therein. The three conditions are of different nature. A civil servant can be dismissed, removed . etc, without holding any enquiry on the ground of conduct which led his/her conviction or criminal charges, clause (b) will come into play in the case where the authority is satisfied for some reasons, to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry; or when the President or Governor of a State as the case may be satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient in the case of clause (c) of second proviso to hold such enquiry. However, if the-repository of power exercises its discretion alien to the conditions specified in the constitutional scheme the said action would suffer from the vices of malafide and therefore the same would be unlawful thus invalid. When the operative reason is extraneous and alien to the condition specified in the proviso to Article 311 (2) as well as to the statutory rules, it would be discriminatory and arbitrary and therefore it would be violative of Article 14 which strikes at the arbitrariness in the said action and to secure fairness and equality of treatment. In the words of Justice DP Madan, in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 at para 101 p.479 "where a clause of second proviso is applied on an extraneous ground or a ground having no relation to the situation envisaged in that clause, the action in so applying it would be malafide and therefore void. In such case the invalidating factor may referable to Article 14. This is, however the only scope which Article 14 can 8 have in relation to the second proviso, but to hold that once the second proviso is properly applied and clause (2) of Article 311 excluded. In such case, the said action, falls outside the province of clause (b) of the second proviso. Clause (b) of the second proviso comes into play when the authority holds a view that reasonably practicable to hold enquiry on the facts and situation". The said view must be that of reasonable man on reasonable ground. Decision which are fanciful or absurd cannot be reasonable and therefore legitimate. Clause (b) of the second proviso comes into play when the authority holds a view that reasonably practicable to hold enquiry on the facts and situation". The said view must be that of reasonable man on reasonable ground. Decision which are fanciful or absurd cannot be reasonable and therefore legitimate. If decision is within the parameter of reasonableness, it is not the domain of the Court to look further into the merit of the case as observed by Warrington LJ, in Short vs. Pool Cpn, (1926) Ch 66 and 91 "with the question whether a particular policy is wise or foolish the Court is not concerned; it can only interfere if to pursue it is beyond the powers of the authority." If the decision is capricious, it is a unlawful decision. English lawyers commonly call such thing as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' which has been used by Lord Green MR in Association Provincial Picture House Ltd vs. V. Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) 1 KB 223 at 229. Lord Green made the following observation; "... It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word unreasonable in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with discretion must, so to speak direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matter which is irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said to be acting 'unreasonably' similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. Warrington LJ in Short vs. Pool Corporation gave the example of the red haird teacher dismissed because she had red hair. This is unreasonable in sense. In another it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. Warrington LJ in Short vs. Pool Corporation gave the example of the red haird teacher dismissed because she had red hair. This is unreasonable in sense. In another it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and, in fact, all these things run into one another." In the case in hand the authority spelt out the reason for arriving at the conclusion as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. The impugned order shows three reasons namely No.(l) it is not possible to secure the presence of the members of the armed gang involved in murder and arson in the village, (2) No eye witness from the said Chalkot Village could be obtained as they had deserted the village after seeing the killing of their village folk, (3) Even those eye witnesses remaining in the village are in a state of shock and are unable to tender evidence. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in their affidavit stated that "in spite of dangers, the DGP, Nagaland, visited the place of occurrence and met the villagers and they have confirmed the desertion of the NAP personnel from their posts when the above mentioned incident took place at Chalkot Village. In the meantime the statement of NAP personnel were also taken and they have admitted of having deserted the post without putting up any resistence against the underground elements. Thus the inaction of the NAP personnel was found to be due to loose command and control on the part of the Post Commander/petitioner No.3 and two Ncos\petitioner No.2 and 1...." Alongwith the affidavit the respondents annexed the statements of two important village functioneries as well as statements of NAP personnel recorded by the Disciplinary authority. From the records available before us it appears that two witnesses of the Old Chalkot Village, Mr. Kamjang Kuki, Assistant Gaonbura and Mr. Paothang Kuki, Council Secretary, deposed before the authority .These two are statutory authority and narrated the facts. According to the version of Assistant Gaon Burah, Old Chalkot Village that NAP who were deployed in the village did not return the fire as because of the NAP personnel deployed at the Old Chalkot were on the verge of withdrawal and just waiting for transport. According to the version of Assistant Gaon Burah, Old Chalkot Village that NAP who were deployed in the village did not return the fire as because of the NAP personnel deployed at the Old Chalkot were on the verge of withdrawal and just waiting for transport. Suddenly the underground rounded up the village and opened fire from different direction. Similar is the statement of the Council Secretary, Old Chalkot village. We have also examined and perused the statement made by 3 (three) petitioners and 15 other NAP personnel and these persons were eye witnesses. From the record it appears that at least two important village functionaries were found and they deposed about the factual situation. The statement recorded so far are from the records and no materials were discernible that eye witnesses were in a state of shock. Three petitioners were examined by the authority who did not examined their guilt. 10. We have given our anxious consideration on this matter but reasonable practicability for holding or not holding of enquiry is a matter reposed on the disciplinary authority which the said authority required to address itself properly to the provisions contained to the relevant laws, taking into consideration all aspect of the matter which he is bound to take over-looking the relevant considerations. We are fully conscious of the parameter of judicial review "it is not an appeal from a decision" to evaluate the correction of the decision itself. The Indian Constitution however reposed on the Supreme Court of India and the High Court the power to oversee that Constitutional organs are kept within their limits so that there will be "Government of laws and not of men". Essentially it is a duty to see that the discretionary powers conferred on the administration is not misused or abused. On perusal of the materials on record we are of the firm opinion that the respondent No.2, the Director General of Police, Nagaland acted without due care and caution and exercised his discretion on irrelevant grounds in dispensing with the enquiry. The learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition made the following observation: "...The disciplinary authority was of the opinion that under the circumstances mentioned in the impugned order, it would not be possible to collect evidence if a regular departmental enquiry is held. The learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition made the following observation: "...The disciplinary authority was of the opinion that under the circumstances mentioned in the impugned order, it would not be possible to collect evidence if a regular departmental enquiry is held. Even if assuming the statements recorded in a preliminary enquiry is taken into consideration it speaks volume against the petitioners. This apart, the petitioners could not have improved their case with regard to the factual position as mentioned in the impugned order even if the regular departmental proceeding is held. In the instant case the facts speaks for itself (res ipsa locquitur). I am afraid, under the present facts and circumstances of the case the petitioners could have improved their case if the regular departmental enquiry was held...." Therefore according to the learned Single Judge even if the petitioners would have been afforded the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, the said exercise would have made no difference. The question before us in judicial review is not the merit of the decision itself but the decision making process. We are concerned with the procedural fairness. The essential dictate of justice is that those who are affected by the decision should be dealt with in a fair manner. That is also the philosophy of the Indian Constitution to attain justice, social, economic and political. The issue is not conduct of the petitioners but it is issue of higher importance namely fairness in action. The basic principle is the fair procedure which comes first, that is, only after hearing both the sides merits are to be considered. Professor Wade in his Administrative Law Sixth Edition (at page 533) pithily made the following observations : "Where a fair hearing 'would no difference': Procedural objections are often raised by unmeritious parties. Judges may then be tempted to refuse reliefs on the ground that a fair hearing could have no difference to the result. But in principle it is vital that the procedure and the merits should be kept strictly apart, since otherwise the merit may be prejudice unfairly. Lord Wright once said. If the principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision it is, indeed immaterial whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure .from the essential principles of justice. Lord Wright once said. If the principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision it is, indeed immaterial whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure .from the essential principles of justice. The decision must be declared to be no decision (1943) AC 627 (644) General Medical Council vs. Spackman. The dangers were vividly expressed by Megarry J, criticising the contention that the result is obvious from the start. As everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn with examples of open and shut cases which somehow,-were not; of unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely .answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that by discussion, suffered a change (John vs. Rees (1970) CH 345 at 402. The last few words are especially apt for administrative decisions they were adopted in a later case where the Court quashed a Secretary of State's order reducing a local authority's rate support grant for failure to grant them a hearing at the proper time. Even though it was 'certainly probable' that the decision would have been the same, since all the arguments had been fully reheard at an early stage, the. Court declined to hold that a hearing would have been a useless formality (1963) QB 556. This question profoundly affected the course of Ridge vs. Baldwin. The arguments favoured by the lower Courts, and in Lord Evershed's dissenting speech, was that natural justice need not be enforced in the absence of a miscarriage of ° justice or some probable effect on the result. The House of Lords rejected this reasoning decisively.... ... A distinction might perhaps be made according to the nature of the decision. In the case of a Tribunal which must decide according to law, it may be justifiable to disregard a breach of natural justice where the demerits of the claim are such that it would in any case be hopeless. But in the case of the discretionary administrative decision such as the dismissal of a teacher or the expulsion of a student hearing his case will often the heart of the authority and alter their decision, even though it is clear from the outset that punitive action would be justified. But in the case of the discretionary administrative decision such as the dismissal of a teacher or the expulsion of a student hearing his case will often the heart of the authority and alter their decision, even though it is clear from the outset that punitive action would be justified. This is the essence of good and considerate administration; and the law should take care to preserve it...." The disciplinary authority is not to dispense with a disciplinary enquiry readily and indifferently with a view to avoid lengthy departmental enquiries. It is a serious business having far reaching ramifications. The Supreme Court of India in Jaswant Singh vs. State of Punjab others reported in AIR 1991 SC 385 (para 4, 388, para 5 pp 390) made the following observation : The scope of Article 310 and 311 of the Constitution was examined by this Court in Union of India vs. Tulsi Ram Patel, 1985 (Suppl) 2 SCR 131: ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ), wherein by majority of this Court held that once the requirements of the relevant clause of the second proviso are satisfied, the service of a civil servant can be terminated without following the audi alteram partem rule. It was held that since the requirement of Article 311 (2) was expressly excluded by the second proviso, there was no question of introducing the same by the back door. On this line of reasoning, the majority held that Challapan's case, (1976) 1 SCR 783 : ( AIR 1975 SC 2216 ) was not correctly decided. It, therefore, took the view that it is not necessary to offer a hearing to the civil servant even on the limited question of punishment. In so far as clause (b) is concerned this Court pointed out that two conditions must be satisfied to sustain any action taken thereunder. These are (i) there must exist a situation which render holding of any inquiry "not reasonably practicable", and (ii) the disciplinary authority must record in writing its reasons in support of its satisfaction. Of course the question of practicability would depend on the existing fact situation and other surrounding circumstances, that is to say, that the question of reasonable practicability must be judged in the light of the circumstances prevailing at me date of the passing of the order. Of course the question of practicability would depend on the existing fact situation and other surrounding circumstances, that is to say, that the question of reasonable practicability must be judged in the light of the circumstances prevailing at me date of the passing of the order. Although, clause (3) of that Article makes the decision of the disciplinary authority in this behalf final such finality can certainly be tested in a Court of law and interferred with if the action is found to be arbitrary or malafide or motivated by extraneous considerations or merely a ruse to dispense with the inquiry. Also see Satyavir Singh vs. Union of India, (1985) 4 SCC 252 : ( AIR 1986 SC 555 ), Shivaji Atrrraji Sawant vs. State of Maharastra, (1986) 2 SCC 112 : ( AIR 1986 SC 617 ) and Ikramuddin Ahmed Borah vs. Superintendent of Police Darrang, 1988 (Suppl) 1 SCC 663 : ( AIR 1988 SC 2245 ). It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent No.3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the following observation at p.270 of !985 (Suppl) SCR 131 : (At p 1479 of AIR 1985 SC 1416 ) of Tulsi Ram's case : A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary preceding lightly or arbitrarily or not of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an enquiry or because the Department's case against the Government servant is weak and must fail." The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer...." In our view, there is no sufficient materials or good ground for dispensing with the inquiry. On consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case we find that the disciplunary authority acted in a mechanical fashion in dispensing with the disciplinary enquiry in exercise of the power under clause (b) of the proviso two to Article 311. The learned Single Judge no doubt took into consideration the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh (supra) held that the said decision is riot applicable because the disciplinary authority according to the learned Single Judge has recorded its objective satisfaction. The learned Single Judge, in arriving at its finding relied in Ikramuddin Ahmed Bora vs. Superintendent of Police Darrang & others reported in 1988 (Suppl) SCC 633. In the said decision the enquiry was dispensed against the SuInspector of Police, Sri Bora due to non availability of witnesses on account of fear of the officer concerned. The factual situation in the present j case are distinct from Ikramuddin Ahmed (supra). The learned Single Judge observed that the decision was based on the objective satisfaction of the disciplinary authority recorded upon the inspection of the place of occurrence and therefore such satisfaction cannot be interferred with lightly. In our view the said objective satisfaction is the ipse dixit of the concerned officer without adjudicating the controversy lawfully and arrived at a decision which is the opinion of the disciplinary authority. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 18.3.1^94 (1994 (2) GLJ 16) and quash the order No.PHQ (B-II)/3/15/93/167 dated Kohima the 23rd July, 1993 (Annexure N of the writ petition). It would however be open to the department to proceed with the departmental enquiry, if they are so advised. The respondents shall pay costs for both the Courts.