JUDGMENT Heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through record with the assistance of the learned counsel. 2. The appellant was prosecuted for having committed offence under Section 5(2) of the prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 467, 471, 477-A of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of Shri Surjit Singh, Special Judge, Mandi, Sessions Division at Mandi in Corruption Case No. 1 of 1988. By means of said judgment dated 1-6-1990, the appellant was found guilty for having committed all the offences, mentioned above, for which he was charged. He was sentenced to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act as also to pay a fine of Rupees 500/-, in default of payment whereof to under go further rigorous imprisonment for 3 months, similarly for offences under Sections 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, he was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months each and to pay fine of Rs. 200/- on each count, in default of payment of fine, he was directed to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment, for commission of offence under Section 477-A of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and also to pay fine of Rs. 100/-, in default of payment whereof, he was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. It is this judgment that has been assailed by the appellant in the present appeal. 3. According to the prosecution case, the appellant was working as Accountant-cum-Cashier in the Government Polytechnic, Sundernagar. While working in this capacity, it was a part of his duty to process the bills, submitted by different persons for supply etc. made by them to the Polytechnic and amount became payable for such supplies. This payment was to be made after obtaining necessary orders for payment of money from Drawing and Disbursing Officer. In the month of April, 1983, Shri Paras Ram Dhhiman, workshop instructor, is stated to have sent the requisition for three cubic metres of sand and coarse aggregate each to the officer-in-charge in the Polytechnic, such requisition was endorsed by the head of department, Shri Hari Chand making recommendation for procuring the same. After observing the codal formalities, supply order was placed with one Shri Biri Ram, PW-4. This supplier-Biri Ram, according to the prosecution, submitted the bill claiming Rs. After observing the codal formalities, supply order was placed with one Shri Biri Ram, PW-4. This supplier-Biri Ram, according to the prosecution, submitted the bill claiming Rs. 180/- for the sand and Rs. 210/- for coarse aggregate and the total value of the bill came to Rs. 390/-. This amount was written both, in words and also in figures. After submission of the bill by Biri Ram to the Store Keeper, entries of it were made by the Store-keeper as well as by Store instructor Paras Ram in the relevant registers. The bill in question was submitted to the branch concerned along with the requisition and was processed by the appellant in his capacity as Accountant-cum-Cashier. Finally, a sum of Rs. 390/- was disbursed to the supplier and entry to that effect exist in the cash book as voucher No. 1067. 4. The prosecution case further revealed is that requisition was actually for three cubic metres of sand and vide Ex. PD approximate value thereof was Rs. 400/-. The appellant is stated to have tampered with the figure 3 and converted the same into 8 whereas figure 1 was pre-fixed to the estimated cost of Rs. 400/-. As a sequel to this figure of Rs. 390/- was re-written to Rs. 1040/- similar tampering is made in the cash book, thus altering the original figure to Rs. 1040/-. It is in this background that F.I.R. Ex. PW-6/A came to be lodged with the police. It was also stated in the F.I.R. that Biri Ram-supplier had written a letter and also handed back a sum of Rs. 650/- which amount stands credited in the records of the Polytechnic. 5. It is in the aforesaid background that the appellant came to be prosecuted for the aforementioned offences. 6. In order to prosecute a public servant under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to have obtained prior sanction in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 7. Both the learned counsel appearing for the parties are not at variance that without proper and legal sanction under Section 6 of the Act ibid the appellant could not have been prosecuted muchless convicted and sentenced. 7. Both the learned counsel appearing for the parties are not at variance that without proper and legal sanction under Section 6 of the Act ibid the appellant could not have been prosecuted muchless convicted and sentenced. Shri Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the sanction accorded by PW-10 Shri R. K. Aggrawal Director of Technical Education, H. P. Sundernagar vide Ex. PW-10/A for prosecution of the appellant under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act is no sanction in the eye of law and according to him without going into other questions, the appellant is entitled to acquittal on this ground alone. He has further submitted that the trial Judge below has fallen into error by ignoring this important aspect of the case and accordingly he has prayed for allowing this appeal. 8. On the other hand, Shri Chauhan, while refuting the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, has pointed out that vide Ex. PW-10/A, the witness concerned, PW-10 has accorded the sanction after due and proper application of mind on due consideration of the entire materials placed before him and thus, no fault can be found with Ex. PW-10/A and he has prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 9. So far the matter relating to sanction is concerned, it hardly needs to be emphasized that it is not a mere formality but the intention behind this provision is to ensure that the government servants are protected against frivolous prosecution and as such the compliance of this provision has to be strictly ensured. In fact, looking to this salutary and sacrosanct purpose the present case needs to be examined on this aspect with reference to Ex. PW-10/A and the statement of PW-10 R. K. Aggarwal. 10. It may not be out of place to mention that there is no particular form of according sanction and none can be expected, because grant of sanction for prosecuting a person under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act depends upon the facts of each case, all that has to be ensured is that the competent authority under Section 6 of the said Act has considered the entire materials concerning the case and after due consideration thereof as well as by application of mind accorded the necessary sanction. In the instant case, PW-10 has stated that he accorded sanction under Section 6(a) of the Act to prosecute the appellant under Section 5(2) thereof and, according to him, this was done by means of Ex. PW-10/A which was typed on his dictation and is signed by him. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the sanction was accorded by him on the basis of report of vigilance people and the relevant documents were before him, however, he further states that documents were those which were tagged with the report of the vigilance people. A bare perusal of Ex. PW-10/A shows that what was the material considered, has not been spelt out by the witness. What was the report of the vigilance people and what were the other documents which were before the said witness and which were taken into account by him, is not stated by him. No doubt, this ought not to have been detailed in the sanction accorded by this witness vide Ex. PW-10/A but at least from the office file, wherein this sanction was accorded, it could be shown by the prosecution that needful was done by this witness while according the sanction (Ex. PW-10/A) to prosecute the appellant. No such evidence has been brought by the prosecution on record. In fact, except Ex. PW-10/A, there is nothing on record to show that what was the material considered by PW-10 before signing this sanction. 11. In AIR 1979 SC 677 : (1979 Cri LJ 633), Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Honble Apex court has observed as under at page 679 of AIR :- "It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the Sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. This should be done in two ways; either (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show the facts placed before the Sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. Any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio. Any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio. What the Court has to see is whether or not the Sanctioning Authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same; any subsequent fact which may come into existence after the grant of sanction is wholly irrelevant. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must, therefore, be strictly complied with before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned. It will not be correct to say that in view of the presumption which is to be drawn under S. 4, even if no facts are mentioned in the Resolution of the Sanctioning Authority it must be presumed that the Sanctioning Authority was satisfied that the prosecution against the accused should be launched on the basis of the presumption that the accused had received a bribe. In the first place, there is no question of the presumption being available to the Sanctioning Authority because at that stage the occasion for drawing a presumption never arises since there is no case in the Court. Secondly, the presumption does not arise automatically but only on proof of certain circumstances, that is to say, where it is proved by evidence in the Court that the money said to have been paid to the accused was actually recovered from his possession. It is only then that the Court may presume the amount received would be deemed to be an illegal gratification. The question of sanction arises before the proceedings come to the Court and the question of drawing the presumption, therefore, does not arise at this stage. The prosecution cannot be given a chance to produce the materials in the appeal before the Supreme Court to satisfy that the Sanctioning Authority had duly applied its mind to the facts constituting the offence. The prosecution cannot be given a chance to produce the materials in the appeal before the Supreme Court to satisfy that the Sanctioning Authority had duly applied its mind to the facts constituting the offence. In a criminal case the Supreme Court or for that matter any Court should not ordinarily direct fresh evidence to fill up a lacuna deliberately left by the prosecution." In 1984 Simla Law Cases 303, Bihari Lal Gupta v. The State of H.P. it has been held that in the absence of a valid sanction under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio and consequently conviction is without jurisdiction and nullity. In order to succeed, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to have shown that the sanction is legal and valid and is in consonance with the provisions of Section 6. For ready reference Ex. PW-10/A, the so-called sanction accorded by PW-10 before launching the prosecution against the appellant is extracted here-in-below :- "SANCTION ORDER TO BE ISSUED BY THE AUTHORITY COMPETENT TO REMOVE THE ACCUSED FROM OFFICE. (See Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Act No. II of 1947) No. Dated : GOVERNMENT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION VOCATIONAL and INDUSTRIAL TRAINING (H.P.) SUNDER NAGAR (DISTT. MANDI) 174401. ORDER Whereas after the careful examination of the file and thoroughly going through the other relevant documents placed before me, I have applied my mind and find that Shri Thakur Singh while functioning as Accountant in Govt. Polytechnic, Sundernagar during the period from 8-4-1971 to 30-11-1984 during the year 1983 in his capacity as such embezzled a sum of Rs. 650/- in account of the Govt. Polytechnic, Sundernagar (Community Development Cell) which was found tampered with the vouchers as per record of the Cash book and vouchers. And whereas the aforesaid acts of Shri Thakur Singh Rahi constitute the offence/offences punishable under/Sections 409/420/467/468/471/477-A IPC and 5(2) P.C. Act, as envisaged under/Section 6(1) of P.C. Act, 1947 and 197 Cr. P.C. And whereas I, R. K. Aggarwal, Director of Technical Education, Vocational and Industrial Training (H.P.) being the authority competent to remove the said Shri Thakur Singh Rahi, previously as Accountant of Govt. P.C. And whereas I, R. K. Aggarwal, Director of Technical Education, Vocational and Industrial Training (H.P.) being the authority competent to remove the said Shri Thakur Singh Rahi, previously as Accountant of Govt. Polytechnic, Sundernagar (Community Development Cell)), after fully and carefully examining the circumstances of the case, consider that the said Shri Thakur Singh Rahi should be prosecuted in a Court of Law for the said offence/Offences. Now, therefore, I do hereby accord sanction under Section 6(1)(c) of prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II of 1947)) for the prosecution of the said Shri Thakur Singh Rahi for the above said offences in respect of the acts aforesaid and for taking of cognizance of the said offences by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Sd/- (R. K. Aggarwal) Director Technical Education, Vocational Industrial Trng. H.P. Sundernagar. A perusal of sanction accorded vide Ex. PW-10/A shows that it is almost identical in terms to the sanction on the basis whereof a learned Judge of this Court in 1984 SLC 303 supra acquitted the appellant. 13. In 1989 Criminal Law Journal 224, B. A. Kameswar Rao v. State of Orissa, it has been held that where the sanction is accorded without applying the mind to materials on record, it is not a valid sanction and thus, conviction under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act or under Sections 409, 477-A of the Indian Penal Code can be sustained. Relevant observations made in this behalf are to the following effect at page 225 :- "Relying upon this decision as well as some other earlier decisions of this Court and applying the ratio to the sanction order in Baikunthanath Mohantys case, this Court came to the conclusion that there has been no valid sanction as all necessary materials had not been placed before the sanctioning authority and the sanctioning authority did not apply his mind. Bearing in mind the ratio of the aforesaid case, if the evidence of P.W. 10 is examined it appears that the prosecution has failed to establish the fact that all materials had been placed before sanctioning authority and the said sanctioning authority accorded sanction by applying his mind to those materials. PW-10 though stated in his evidence that he issued the sanction order (Ext. PW-10 though stated in his evidence that he issued the sanction order (Ext. 39) after fully and carefully examining the materials placed before him and further stated that so far as he remembered, a report containing details of report of the prosecution was placed before him which had been sent by the S.P. (Vigilance), Berhampur and on perusal of that report he arrived at his satisfaction, but in the cross-examination candidly admitted that the said report is not available on record. There is no other evidence on record to indicate as to what are those materials or the report alleged to have been given by the S.P. (Vigilance) which had been placed before the sanctioning authority before the (Sic)(he) accorded sanction. In other words, the prosecution evidence is practically nil to prove what materials had been placed before the sanctioning authority before he accorded the sanction in question. In this view of the matter, merely on the statement of P.W. 10 that he fully and carefully examined the materials placed before him and not being able to state as to what materials had been produced, it must be held that the prosecution had failed to establish that the sanctioning authority accorded sanction by examining the materials on record and applied his mind fully and carefully to those materials. A perusal of Ext. 39, also does not improve the prosecution case in any manner. Following the ratio of the decisions of this Court reported in (1985) 1 Orissa LR 263 : (1985 Cri LJ 563), it must be held that the sanction in this case is invalid and, therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside." 14. Shri Chauhan submitted that the sanction in this case is legally valid and thus, the appellant cannot claim acquittal, as prayed for by him. In support of his aforesaid submission, he has made a reference to (1996) 1 SCC 542 : (1996 Cri LJ 1127), State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri, and has submitted that as per law laid down by the Apex Court, it was not necessary much less required of the officer signing the sanction order to state that he has personally scrutinized the file and had arrived at the required satisfaction. Looking to the facts of that case, it was held that there was application of mind and the materials on record had been examined by the sanctioning authority before according the sanction. Moreover, it was a case where the question of sanction was required to be adjudged at the initial stage when the respondent had prayed for quashing the prosecution proceedings after those were launched. The said judgment, both on facts as well as on principle of law is distinguishable and is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 15. Applying the law as detailed above to the facts of the present case, it is clear that sanction under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 accorded by PW-10 vide Ex. PW-10/A is no sanction in the eyes of law. Thus, on this ground alone this appeal deserves to be allowed without going into other questions. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is quashed and set aside and the appellant is acquitted. Fine, if deposited, be refunded to the appellant. Appeal allowed