Judgment N.K.Sinha, J. 1. In this writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks quashing of his criminal prosecution under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 along with 11 others in Bettiah Mufassil P.S. Case No. 444 of 1992. 2. Such of the facts as are necessary for proper appreciation of the petitioners case need only be stated. Mr. Ghulam Rabbani, Depu Superintendent of Police (Hqs), West Champaran received a secret information on 24.12.1992 at about 7 p.m. that one Sita Rajgarhiya was keeping some young girls of Nepal and Kerala in his Rest House near Manua Pool within Bettiah Mufassil Police Station West Champaran, Mr. Rabbani made a Sanha entry in the Police Station and along with the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station and a force of armed police, raided the Rest House and found a number of persons including the petitioner and some girls in compromising position in different rooms 6f the Rest House. The petitioner along with others was arrested and Mr. Rabbani prepared a written report on his own statement at 10.30 p.m. on 24.12.1992 and a formal first information report was drawn up on its basis instituting a case bearing Bettiah Mufassil P.S. Case No. 444 of 1992 under Secs. 3, 4, and 5 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the petitioner and ten others. In so far the petitioner is concerned, the allegations made was that he was found in compromising position with a girl called Savita Kumari aged 15 years in the southern room of the Rest House. It was also alleged that one Prabhu Nath Singh was the Manager of the Rest House who in collusion with some others, used to engage girls obtained from Nepal for immoral traffic in the said Rest House and the amount thus earned used to be shared by them. A sum of Rs. 4228 and a golden type tops were alleged to have been recovered from the possession of the petitioner. The petitioner denies that he was arrested from inside the room of the Rest House. A sum of Rs. 4228 and a golden type tops were alleged to have been recovered from the possession of the petitioner. The petitioner denies that he was arrested from inside the room of the Rest House. He claims that he had left his motor-bike in the Rest House during the night as it had developed some trouble and that the police had arrested him from his residence at Bettiah, the next day and falsely prosecuted in the case. 3. Mr. Rama Kant Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, in course of his argument had pressed this application only on one ground, namely, that the Deputy Superintendent of Police had no authority in law to raid the Rest House and register a case. He referred to Sec. 13 of the Act which reads as follows: 13. Special Police Officer and advisory body,-- (1) There shall be for each area to be specified by the State Government in this behalf a special police officer appointed by or on behalf of that Government for dealing with the offences under this Act in that area. (2) A special police officer shall not be below the rant of an Inspector of Police. It was argued that the State Government had not issued any notification specifying the area and appointing a special police officer for dealing with the offences under the Act in that area. In the absence of any such notification by or on behalf of the Government specifying area or appointing a Deputy Superintendent of Police for dealing area, Mr. Rabbani Deputy Superintendent of Police had no authority in law to either make the raid or arrest the petitioner or, for this matter, register a case under Secs. 3, 4, and 5 of the. Act. In this view of matter, it is pointed out that the prosecution of the petitioner in incompetent in the eye of law. 4. It appears that while this matter was engaging the attention of a Division Bench of this Court, a contention was put forward on behalf of the petitioner that consequent to the amendment of Sec. 13 of the Act in 1987 (an obvious mistake for 1978), it was obligatory for the State Government to appoint a class of persons not below the rank of Inspector of Police as a Special Police Officer. It was contended that though the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Assistant Superintendent of Police were empowered and competent to take necessary action under the Act earlier, they cannot now do so in the absence of any vesting of power by the State Government in that regard. The Court expressed its reservation in the matter as mentioned in the order-sheet dated 27.9.1993, particularly, having regard to the statements made in paragraphs 11 and 14 of the counter affidavit and adjourned the hearing to enable the State to file counter affidavit. The State in its earlier counter affidavit admitted that under the Act, only the special police officer can search without warrant but claimed that the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Sub-division, will be police officer for the purpose of Sec. 13 of the Act with respect to the areas of Sub-division of the district of which he is incharge. Even after the Director General and Inspector General of Police was joined as respondent No. 3 on the direction of the Bench and the learned Advocate General was asked to inform the Court whether the State Government had issued any notification specifying the areas and appointing the special police officer within the meaning of Sec. 13 of the Act, all that was brought on the record on behalf of the State by filing another counter affidavit, was a notification No. 3746, dated 30.6.1980 (wrongly mentioned as dated 30.6.1988 in the counter affidavit). All that the notification states is that after the amendment in the Act incorporated by Act 46 of 1978, even Inspectors of Police are authorized to make raids in Red Light Areas and investigate the case. It only states what is incorporated in Sub-section (2) of Sec. 13 of the Act. What has been circulated by Memo No. 3746 dated 30th June, 1980 is only a circular and not a notification as claimed by the respondent-State. In spite of a number of adjournments granted for the purpose, the State Government had failed to produce any notification specifying the area and appointing a Special Police Office for that area for dealing with the offences under the Act in that area within the meaning of Sec. 13 of the Act. 5. In spite of a number of adjournments granted for the purpose, the State Government had failed to produce any notification specifying the area and appointing a Special Police Office for that area for dealing with the offences under the Act in that area within the meaning of Sec. 13 of the Act. 5. The petitioner, in the supplementary affidavit filed on 5.4.1993, had also referred to the order of the Court dated 24.3.1993 and had mentioned in detail the efforts made by the petitioner to obtain copy of any such notification from the authorities of the State Government. As stated in the supplementary affidavit, the petitioner had approached different departments of the Government including the Home (Police) department and also the Law Department but had failed to either obtain or locate the existence of any such notification It is mentioned therein that under Clause (c) of Sec. 13 of the original Act of 1956, the Deputy Superintendent of Police were vested with the powers to take action in the Act in places other than the Presidency Towns of Madras, Calcutta and Bombay. However, the position had undergone a sea change and under the provisions of Sec. 13 of the Act, as it stand today, only a Special Police Officer for specified area appointed and prescribed by or on behalf of the State Government, can deal with the offences under the Act. 6. It was argued on behalf of the State that Deputy Superintendent of Police was competent to make the raid and arrest the accused within the meaning of Section 14(iii) of the Act which reads as follows: Any police officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector specially authorized by the Special Police Officer may, if he has reason to believe that on account of delay involved in obtaining the order of the Special Officer, in any evidence relating to any offence under this Act is likely to be destroyed or concealed, or the person who has committed or is suspected to have committed the offence is likely to escape or if the name and address of such persons is unknown or there is reason to suspect that a false name or address has been given against the person concerned without such order, but in such case he shall report, as soon as may be, to the Special Police Officer the arrest, the circumstances in which the arrest was made. It appears that the word "Sub-Inspector" was substituted for the word Inspector by the Amendment Act, of 1978. The aforesaid provision authorized rises any police offer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector to do certain things only under circumstances in which the order of the special police officer cannot be obtained. It also requires the police officer acting under the said provision to report as soon as may be to the special police officer the arrest, and the circumstances in which the arrest was made. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, at the time of raid and arrest, was being accompanied with the Inspector of Police, the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station. However, it is not the case of the prosecution that the police had taken action within the meaning of Sec. 14(iii) of the Act. Moreover, the State despite all opportunities, had failed to bring on record any notification appointing any special police officer for the area in which the raid and arrest was made. 7. It appears that there is considerable confusion with regard to the provisions of the Act including its title on the part of every one including the police. The police had registered a case under Secs. 3, 4, and 5 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act in the year 1992 not realizing that the word suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls had been substituted by the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 by Sec. 2 of Act 44 of 1986 with effect from 26th January, 1987. Thus, after 26th January, 1987, the Act could not have been described as Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 but as Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 . It was also not correct to say as has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that Sec. 13 of the Act had been amended in 1987 (an obvious mistake for 1978) when the fact is that the provisions of Sec. 13 of the Act inasmuch as it require the State Government to specify the area and appoint special police officer for dealing with the offences under the Act, was existing from before the amendment of Sec. 13 in the year 1978. The provisions of Sec. 13 of the Act as they stood in the year 1960, were referred to by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Delhi Administration V/s. Ram Singh -- and Sub-sections (i) and (ii) of Sec. 13 of the Act, quoted in the judgment, reads as follows: 13. (1) There shall be for each area to be specified by the State Government in this behalf, a special police officer appointed by or on behalf of the Government for dealing with the offences under this Act in that area ; (2) Special police officer shall not be below the rank of: (a) An Assistant Commissioner of Police in the Presidency town of Madras and Calcutta ; (b) A Superintendent of Police in the Presidency town of Bombay; and (c) A Deputy Superintendent of Police elsewhere. The only point for consideration before the Apex Court was whether a police officer who is neither a special police office under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 nor a police officer subordinate to a special police officer, can validity investigate the offence under the Act. Apex Court by majority judgment decided the point in these words: 24. We are therefore of opinion that the special police officer is competent to investigate and that he and his Assistant Police officers are the only persons competent to investigate offences under the Act and that police officers not specially appointed as special police officers can not investigate the offences under the Act even though they are cognizable offences. The aforesaid decision of the Apex Court had been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that the expression "for dealing with the offences under Act" occurring in Sec. 13(1) of the Act while including any act which the police has to do in connection with the offences under the Act includes power of investigation. In other words, offences under the Act can be investigated only by special police officer and not by any other police officer. On behalf of the State, no decision of this Court or any latest decision of the Apex Court taking a contrary view, was cited. In other words, offences under the Act can be investigated only by special police officer and not by any other police officer. On behalf of the State, no decision of this Court or any latest decision of the Apex Court taking a contrary view, was cited. 8 Since there was nothing on the record to show that the State Government had specified any area or that a police officer had been appointed by or on behalf of the State Government for dealing with the offences under the Act in that area within the meaning of Sec. 13 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 . Hence, the arrest of the petitioner, institution and investigation of the case by Deputy Superintendent of Police or for that matter, the Inspector of Police, that is, the Police officers other than the special police officer appointed for the purpose, was not authorized by law. The criminal prosecution of the petitioner was, therefore, incompetent and deserves to be quashed on that ground alone. 9. In the result, this writ application is allowed and the criminal prosecution of the petitioner for the offences under the Act also against those similarly situated, is hereby quashed.