JUDGMENT K. G. Balakrishnan, J. 1. This appeal is against the common order passed in I.A. 1841/94 and LA. 2403/94 in O.S. 194 of 1994 on the file of Additional Sub Court, N. Parur. Plaintiff is the appellant. 2. The appellant filed a suit for realisation of Rs. 2,76,145 from the first respondent defendant. The appellant alleged that the first respondent had issued two cheques and these cheques were dishonoured when presented for payment and the same were issued in repayment of a loan advanced by him to the first respondent. According to him, the first respondent had borrowed Rs. 2.50,000 as loan from the appellant agreeing to repay it within five months. When the cheques were dishonoured the appellant filed suit for money and along with the suit sought attachment of an amount of Rs. 3,75,000 out of the bill amount due to the first respondent from the office of the 3rd respondent, the Executive Engineer, PWD (Road Division), Idukki, by filing LA. No. 1841 of 1994. The interim attachment was allowed for an amount of Rs. 3,00,000. 3. First respondent filed objection denying the loan transaction with the appellant. He admitted that he was a contractor and some amounts are due to him from the office of the 3rd respondent towards the work done by him. But he contended that during the course of the work he had applied for financial assistance from the 2nd respondent, the Merchants Association, Thodupuzha and they advanced money for the work and in consideration of that the first respondent executed an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the Merchants' Association. Thodupuzha and there by the Association was authorised to receive all amounts in respect of the contractor. 4. Second respondent, the Merchants Association filed I.A. 2403/94 praying that the interim attachment may be vacated. Second respondent Association contended that they had advanced a sum of Rs. 2,99,650 to the first respondent and the first respondent in turn executed an irrevocable power of attorney on 4th October 1,993 authorising the Association to receive the bill amount and it should have been the amount due from the 3rd respondent. 5. The 3rd respondent contended that he is bound to pay the amount to the 2nd respondent and, therefore, the attachment be vacated. The court below after considering the rival claims raised the interim conditional attachment ordered in LA. 1841/94. 5. The 3rd respondent contended that he is bound to pay the amount to the 2nd respondent and, therefore, the attachment be vacated. The court below after considering the rival claims raised the interim conditional attachment ordered in LA. 1841/94. However, conditional attachment was ordered in respect of Rs. 34,100 which was the security amount deposited by the first respondent with the Department. Thus, I.A. 2403/94 filed for vacating the interim attachment was partly allowed by the court below. 6. In this appeal, the appellant contends that there was no irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the 2nd respondent and therefore the interim attachment ordered by the court should prevail and the 3rd respondent Garnishee was not liable to pay any amount to the 2nd respondent. So, the question depends on as to whether there was any irrevocable power of attorney. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to series of decisions on the subject. In Smart and another v. Sandars and others 1848 (5) CB 895 the question that arose for consideration was whether a factor to whom goods have been consigned generally for sale, and who has subsequently made advances to his principal on the credit of the goods, has got right to sell contrary to the orders of his principal on the latter neglecting to repay the advance. The question arose whether there was an authority coupled with interest and hence there was irrevocable power of attorney. Referring to various authorities it was held thus: "But we think this doctrine applied only to cases where the authority is given for the purpose of being a security, or, as Lord Kanyon expresses it, as a part of the security, not to cases where the authority is given independently, and the interest of the donee of the authority arises afterwards, and incidentally only. As for instance, in the present case, as disclosed by the 13th plea, the goods are consigned to a factor for sale. That confers an implied authority to Sell. Afterwards, the factor makes advances. This is not an authority coupled with an interest; but an independent authority, and an interest subsequently arising. The making of such an advance may be a good consideration for an agreement that the authority to sell shall be no longer revocable; but such an effect will not, we, think, arise independently of agreement". 8. Afterwards, the factor makes advances. This is not an authority coupled with an interest; but an independent authority, and an interest subsequently arising. The making of such an advance may be a good consideration for an agreement that the authority to sell shall be no longer revocable; but such an effect will not, we, think, arise independently of agreement". 8. Reliance was placed on the decision reported in Palani Vannan v. Krishnaswami Konar AIR 1946 Madras 9. There was a preliminary decree in a mortgage suit in favour of one Sethu Madhava Rao against, among others, the appellant therein. There was a final decree in 1936. The decree was assigned by Sethu Madhava Rao to one Govinda Konan. He executed a power of attorney to one Vedavyasachar authorising him to execute the decree. Later in 1941, Govinda Konan assigned the decree to one Krishnaswami Konar. The assignee sent notice to Vedavyasachar revoking the power of attorney. The question arose whether the power of attorney was revocable or not. The court held thus: "The primary object of a power of attorney for executing a decree was to recover on behalf of the principal the fruits of his decree. It contained incidentally a provision for the employment of the agent, V, in order to realise that decree. It provided that his remuneration was to be one-half of the proceeds. It contained an indemnity clause against any out-of-pocket expenses which V was entitled also to recover from the amount of the decree. But the object of the power-of-attorney was not for the purpose of protecting or securing any interest of the agent V. The last words of the power were I shall not for any reason whatsoever, cancel without your permission this authority which I have given to you, without paying the amount expended by you and without giving the aforesaid relief for your trouble." It was held in that case that this was not such an agency coupled with interest as is contemplated by S.202 of the Contract Act. 9. Reference was also made to decisions reported in Narayan Vishnooram v. Maruti Naco AIR 1936 Nagpur 207 and Board of Revenue v. Annamalai and Co. AIR 1968 Madras 50 wherein also similar line of reasoning was adopted. 10. This question was considered in detail in a decision reported in M. John Kotaiah v. A. Divakar AIR 1985 AP 30 . Reference was also made to decisions reported in Narayan Vishnooram v. Maruti Naco AIR 1936 Nagpur 207 and Board of Revenue v. Annamalai and Co. AIR 1968 Madras 50 wherein also similar line of reasoning was adopted. 10. This question was considered in detail in a decision reported in M. John Kotaiah v. A. Divakar AIR 1985 AP 30 . That was a case where a suit was filed for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession and management of the plaint schedule properties. The plaint schedule properties consisted of two items. One was a double storied building and another was a vacant site. The question arose whether the power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff was an irrevocable power of attorney. The Court held: "If the interest created in the agent is in the result or the proceeds arising after the exercise of the power then the agency is revocable and cannot be said to be an irrevocable agency. However, if the interest in the subject matter, say a debt payable to the principal, is assigned to the agent as security simultaneously with the creation of the power and thereafter the agent exercises the power to collect the debt for discharge of an obligation owed by the principal in favour of the agent or owed by the principal in favour of a third party, then the agency becomes irrevocable." 11. Reference was also made to the decision reported in Bharat Nidhi Ltd. v. Takhatmal and others 1968 11 SCWR 357. That is a case where one Malhotra was working as a contractor to the military and other authorities. The appellant Bank formerly known as Bharat Bank Ltd. agreed to finance the contracts and to advance money to Malhotra against his bills for supplied under the contract. For the purpose of carrying out this arrangement Malhotra executed an irrevocable power of attorney and the Court held that there was irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the appellant bank but it is not clear whether there was an agency coupled with an interest. 12. In the present case, Ext. B-1 is the power of attorney executed in favour of the 2nd respondent Association. In Ext. 12. In the present case, Ext. B-1 is the power of attorney executed in favour of the 2nd respondent Association. In Ext. B-1 it is specifically stated in Para.2 that "whereas my said attorney has agreed to render help and financial assistance to me in carrying out the execution of the said work effectively". That indicates that the financial assistance, if any, was received by him only subsequently tat the time of execution of the power of attorney. No interest was created in favour of the agent and the agent had only agreed to advance some money. . So there was no agency coupled with an interest and therefore it cannot be construed as an irrevocable power of attorney as contended by the first respondent. We are of the opinion that the first respondent has not executed an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the 2nd respondent and therefore the conditional attachment, ordered by the court earlier should prevail and we make it clear that the suit was filed for Rs. 2,76,145. There shall be interim attachment to the extent of this amount. Subject to that attachment, the 3rd respondent is at liberty to pay any amount to the 2nd respondent based on the power of attorney executed in their favour. C.M.A is disposed of as above.