Vakil Sah v. State Of Bihar — 1996 DIGILAW 213 (PAT)

Judgment Radha Mohan Prasad, J. 1. -as in all the three writ applications the question involved is common, with the consent of the parties, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment/order. 2. In short, the relevant facts of the three writ applications are as follows : (i) The grievance of the petitioners in the first writ application (C. W. J. C. No.5087 of 1983) relates to r. S. Plots No.205, 227, 243 and 265 measuring 2.97 acres of Khata No.19 of Village Paranpur, Police Station oinara, District Rohtas on account of their non-inclusion in the aggregate of the total land belonging to the petitioners and consequently allotting chak of lesser area to them under the provisions of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The petitioners claimed to have acquired the said land in exchange through registered deed dated 23-3-1974 from respondents Nos.5 and 6 and thereafter they constructed wells in R. S. Plots No.205 and 243 and installed electric pump in the wells in r. S. Plot No.243 for irrigational purposes. It is also claimed by them that their names were mutated by the order of the Anchal Adhikari and are accordingly paying rent to the State of Bihar. According to the petitioners, the register of land in the aforesaid exchange was prepared in their names and draft was also published to which respondents No.5 and 6 never raised any objection and under Sec.10 of the Act it became final. However, the consolidation Officer without appreciating that respondents No.5 and 6 had never raised any objection, vide order dated 2-1-1978, contained in annexure 1, directed for necessary correction in the final publications made under Sec.10 of the Act. The petitioners being aggrieved filed appeal before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, rohtas, which was dismissed on 7-4-1978, vide order contained in annexure 2. Later, the petitioners filed a petition for review of the aforesaid order before the Deputy Director of consolidation, Rohtas, who referred it to the Director of Consolidation for consideration and the Deputy Director of Consolidation (Headquarters), Patna heard the parties in the purported exercise of the power under Sec.35 of the Act and rejected the said petition, vide his impugned order dated 5-10-1983. In the said order it was held that the raiyat was not justified in filing review-application before the Deputy director, but the Deputy Director after disposing of the matter was also not justified in making reference in relation to a particular case nor the law permitted him to do that. Though the deputy Director of Consolidation (Headquarters) held that there is no provision for making reference against the order which was once passed yet he in purported exercise of the power under Sec.35 of the Act entered into the merit of the claim and rejected the review-application by the impugned order.- (ii) In the Second case (C. W. J. C. No.3925 of 1984), the grievance of the petitioners relates to C. S. Khata No.416, Plot No.3550, measuring 0.03 in village Jhewan, District Bhejpur which was recorded as Gairmazarua Malik. According to the petitioners, in the remark column, the name of their grand-father was recorded and since time immemorial their family has been coming in possession and exercising full right over the said land without any hindrance. In the recent revisional survey of 1971 the said land (new Plot No.4311) was recorded in the name one late Harihar Rai, who, according to the petitioners, had no concern with it at all. At the stage of proceeding under section 106 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, a notification under Sec.3 of the Act was published in respect of the village in question and thus, the proceedings under the Bihar Tenancy Act were dropped. Ultimately, register of lands was prepared under Sec.9 of the act. It is claimed by the petitioners that on 18-9-1978 their father filed objection under Sec.10 (2) of the Act bearing Case No.85 (4)/78 in which a prayer was made to cancel the entry made in respect of the aforesaid plot. The Consolidation Officer, vide order dated 19-12-1978, contained in annexure 4, rejected the petitioners Case on the ground that the applicants and others had executed a Bazidawa in favour of Late Harihar Rai. The petitioners alleged that The Bazidawa is a forged and fabricated and in any case, the disputed lands belong to the joint family and thus, the said Bazidawa purported to be executed by petitioner no.4 only would not bind other members of the family. The petitioners alleged that The Bazidawa is a forged and fabricated and in any case, the disputed lands belong to the joint family and thus, the said Bazidawa purported to be executed by petitioner no.4 only would not bind other members of the family. Father of petitioners no.1 to 6 preferred appeal bearing No.43/79 before the Deputy Director of consolidation, Bhojpur against the aforesaid order of the Consolidation officer which after the death of their father on 13-12-1980 was prosecuted by them after getting themselves substituted. It appears that during the pendency of the appeal Harihar Rai also died and his wife and daughter were substituted in his place. Later, private respondents herein filed an application on 7-8- 1982 for being added as parties to the appeal on the ground that Late Harihar Rat had already executed a deed of gift in their favour in respect of the said property, who, however, were not added as parties and heirs of Later Harihar Rai continued to contest the appeal. The appellate court, vide order dated 31-10-1983, contained in Annexure 7, set aside the order of the Consolidation officer. The private respondents, however, preferred revision-application before the Director of Consolidation against the aforesaid appellate order and the petitioners filed rejoinder to it specifically raising the locus standi of the respondents to maintain the said revision-application. Vide order dated 20-7-1984, contained in Annexure 8, the revisional court allowed the application, inter alia, on the ground that the application under Sec.10 (2) of the Act preferred by Bansropan Rai, father of the petitioners, was not maintainable as it was barred by section 10-A of the Act, besides deciding on merit as well. Further, the revisional court gave liberty to the petitioners to take the dispute to the Civil Court after the release of the village from the consolidation under Sec.26-A of the act. The said order has been impugned in the writ-application. (iii) In the third case (C. W. J. C. No.3990 of 1984), the grievance of the petitioner relates to 3.0s acres of land bearing Old Plots Nos.906, 858, 904, 977, 979, 988 1025 and 924 (corresponding to New Plots No.1253, 1173, 1184, 1244, 1216, 1510, 1492, 1529 and 1376) of Cadastral Survey khata No.57 (Revisional Survey Khata no.3) of Mauza Angara, P. S. Piro of bhojpur district. Respondents No.4 and 5 obtained a decree in Mortgage suits No.20/2 of 1963/65 and 21 of 1963 against the respondent No.6 and his co-sharers. In execution of the said decrees, the lands were auctioned and purchased by respondents No.4 and 5 and later possession was also delivered to them in 1969 and they redeemed the two mortgages on 22-6-1969. The petitioner is the purchaser of the said lands which were sold by respondents no.4 and 5 after obtaining the permission from the Consolidation Officer. During the revisional survey which was finally published in 1970-71, the name of the original tenants, including the name of the father of respondent no.6 were recorded as rehandar of the land. It is claimed that the name of the vendors of the petitioners were mutated in the Sherista of the State government and they got rent receipt in token of payments of rent even after the revisional survey. It is stated that the vendors of the petitioner, namely, respondents No.4 and 5, having learnt that suit for correction of survey entry would not be maintainable in view of the consolidation proceeding which had commenced in the area, filed a petition for correction of the. said entry in their names before the consolidation Officer with full facts and figures and also to open the Chak Khata in their names. It appears that the said petition was registered as Case No.44/79-80. The consolidation Officer, vide order dated 1-11-1980, contained in Annexure 3, allowed the prayer of the vendors of the ptitioner in respect of Plots No.1529, 73, 1184, 1492, 1510, 1244, 1253 and 1376. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order respondent No.6 filed appeal before the Deputy Director, Bhojpur in respect of his grievance regarding Plots no.1253 and 1376 comprising an area of 1.13 acres. The Deputy Director set aside the order of the Consolidation officer on the ground that the petition before the Consolidation Officer was barred under Sec.10-A of the Act and that the respondents No.4 and 5 had not taken any action for corrections of the Khatiyan as per decree and execution during the survey operations. The petitioner as well as his vendors, namely, respondents No.4 and 5 filed revision-petition under Sec.35 of the Act against the orders of the deputy Director, Bhojpur in Appeal no.175/80-81 before the Director of consolidation, Bihar, Patna which was registered as Case No.445/82. The petitioner as well as his vendors, namely, respondents No.4 and 5 filed revision-petition under Sec.35 of the Act against the orders of the deputy Director, Bhojpur in Appeal no.175/80-81 before the Director of consolidation, Bihar, Patna which was registered as Case No.445/82. The revision-petition was finally heard by the Principal, Consolidation Training institute, Bihar, who without going into the merits of the respective claims of the parties, held that under the circumstances the learned Deputy Director has rightly held that the petition before the Consolidation Officer was barred under Sec.10-A of the Act and hence dismissed the revision petition, vide order dated 30-3-1984, contained in annexure 1. The validity of the said order has been assailed by the petitioner in the writ application. 3. The question for consideration in all the three writ applications is as to whether the appellate authority or the revisional authority could annul the decision of the Consolidation Officer under Sec.10 of the Act in the absence of any objection filed within the stipulated time, on an appeal or revision preferred by the aggrieved party in view of the specific bar under section 10-A of the Act under which no question in respect of any entry made in the map or register prepared under section 9 or the statement of principles prepared under Sec.9-A relating to the consolidation area, which might or ought to have been raised under Section 10 but has not been raised, shall be raised or heard at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceeding. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents No.5 and 6 in the first case in which besides raising serious disputes on merit in regard to the claim of the petitioners, it is stated that the register under Section 10 of the Act was published in the names of respondents No.5 and 6 on the basis of the revisional survey, but the petitioners got the scheme under section 11 of the Act prepared in their names and when this draft scheme was published under Sec.12 of the Act, respondents No.5 and 6 raised objection to the same. Thereafter the Consolidation. Officer decided the said objection and ordered for correction in the publication of the scheme in allotting chak in the name of the aforesaid respondents. Thereafter the Consolidation. Officer decided the said objection and ordered for correction in the publication of the scheme in allotting chak in the name of the aforesaid respondents. It is, thus, contended in paragraph 8 of the said counter affidavit that the provision of Sec.10-A of the Act has no application since draft scheme was prepared under section 12 of the Act. It is, thus, contended that there was no question of raising any objection under Sec.10 (2) stage and, therefore, the objection was not barred. In the reply filed on behalf of the petitioners, the aforementioned facts regarding preparation of the scheme and raising of objection by the respondents at that stage have not been disputed/denied. 5. In the case of Jagamath Thakur and another V/s. The State of Bihar and others, 1984 PLJR 310, similar question came up for consideration before a division Bench of this Court. In the said case no objection was filed to the draft scheme within the prescribed period before the Assistant Consolidation officer. Later, an objection was filed before the Deputy Director of consolidation with a prayer that necessary orders may be passed directing the petitioners of that case from not interfering with the right of the people. On the basis of that petition, the Deputy director passed the impugned order saying that Plot No.677 was a public land which could not have been settled by the ex-landlords. He further gave a direction that Plot No.677 should be excluded from the Chak of the petitioners and be included in the gairmazarua Khata. It was argued by the learned Additional Advocate-General that in view of the provision of section 10-D of the Act, the Deputy director, under the circumstances, can direct republication of the register of lands giving opportunity to the persons concerned to file objection. 6. The provision contained in Section 10-D was introduced by the amending Act 35 of 1982 and it was not in the Act on the relevant date, i. e. on the 25th July, 1978, when the deputy Director passed the impugned order. The Court, besides noticing the said fact, also held that on a plain reading. 6. The provision contained in Section 10-D was introduced by the amending Act 35 of 1982 and it was not in the Act on the relevant date, i. e. on the 25th July, 1978, when the deputy Director passed the impugned order. The Court, besides noticing the said fact, also held that on a plain reading. Sec.10-D is not applicable where the grievance is made in respect of any particular entry and that the said section is applicable to cases where substantial number of faiyats or under-raiyats for sufficient and unavoidable reasons could not avail of the opportunity to place their claim under subsection (2) of Sec.10, when the deputy Director, for reasons to be recorded in writing, may order republication of the register of lands giving opportunity to persons concerned to file objection. Further, it was held that under Sec.10-D of the Act the Deputy Director could have ordered republication of the register of lands relegating the position of consolidation to the stage of Sec.10 (2), but, could not have passed an order saying that plot No.677 he entered as gairmazarua Khata. In that context the division Bench also held that there is no escape from the conclusion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, that the bar under Sec.10-A shall operate and the Deputy Director could not have entertained an objection on behalf of the respondents when no such objection was filed under sub-section (2) of Sec.10 of the Act. 7. Initially, the learned Additional advocate-General appeared for the state in the said case also attempted to support the order of the Director of consolidation by submitting that in view of Sec.35 of the Act, the director of Consolidation could have passed an order as the one passed by the Deputy Director. The Court held that no doubt, the power under Section 35 is very wide which has to be exercised by the Director of Consolidation but, in the instant case, the power has been exercised by the Deputy Director and not the Director under Sec.35 of the Act. Apart from that the Court also took notice of the fact that Section 35 does not have a non-obstante clause. As such, it is not easy to answer as to whether the provision of Sec.35 shall override section 10-A of the Act. Apart from that the Court also took notice of the fact that Section 35 does not have a non-obstante clause. As such, it is not easy to answer as to whether the provision of Sec.35 shall override section 10-A of the Act. It was further observed that the matter would have been different if Sec.35 contained a clause saying "notwithstanding anything contained in the act", It was also noticed by their lordships that under Sec.10-D which has been introduced in the year 1982, the words "notwithstanding the. provisions of Sec.10-A" are there. However, as later learned Additional. Advocate-General urged that there was no necessity of deciding in the case whether the bar under Sec.10-A operates even on the power of the director of Consolidation under section 35, which might be considered in some other appropriate case, it appears that the Court did not delve into that question any further. 8. The said question, however, again came up for consideration in the case of Shyam Bihari Upadhyay and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others 1985 PLJR 43 , before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of N. P. Singh and M. P. Verma, JJ. In the said case, the Division Bench while pointing out that there is no non obstante clause" in section 10-A so that it can be inferred that the framers of the Act purported to give it an overriding effect even on section 35 of the Act, held that section 10-A does not operate as bar on the power of the Director, Consolidation and that the Director, Consolidation within the limitation prescribed for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, can exercise his power under Sec.35 for rectifying any mistake in the order passed or proceedings taken for ends of justice. In the said case, the Division bench also took aid from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gafoor and another V/s. Deputy Director of consolidation, Meerut and others, AIR 1975 s. C.1716 in which it was held that section 11-A of the U. P. Consolidation of holdings Act, which is a similar provision to Sec.10-A of the Act, bars all objections at later stage of the proceedings. However, the question as to whether the said bar of Sec.11-A operates even on the power of the director under Sec.48 of that Act was not gone into. 9. However, the question as to whether the said bar of Sec.11-A operates even on the power of the director under Sec.48 of that Act was not gone into. 9. In the case of Shiv Kumar thakur V/s. State of Bihar and another, 1985 PLJR 986, B. P. Sinha, J. distinguished the Division Bench judgment of the Court in the case of Jagarnath thakur (supra) and held that although section 35 has no non obstante clause it overrides Sec.10-A of the Act and that the Director under Sec.35 of the Act can examine the regularity of the proceeding and the propriety of any order apart from its correctness and legality. Therefore, according to B. P. Sinha, J. , if at any point of time during the consolidation proceeding any irregularity has been committed or impropriety of any order is questioned the director can interfere and pass necessary orders in the interest of justice. 10. On my request, Mr. Indu Shekhar Sinha, learned Senior Counsel apeared in the case as amicus curiae. Mr. Sinha submitted that the consolidation proceedings and decisions will have chain reaction if a view contrary to the view in the case of Shiv Kumar Thakur (supra) is taken, it was submitted by him that well-known law of interpretation is that it should be such that suppresses the mischief and advances the cause and object of the legislation. He also submitted that while interpreting the scope and power vested in an authority unless there is a chance of misuse of the power, the Court should not deny the power in an authority. According to him, the power under section 35 cannot be controlled or curtailed by the provisions contained in section 10-A under which a time is fixed whereas no time limit is fixed for exercise of the power under Sec.35. Learned counsel also submitted that bar takes away the jurisdiction whereas finality is always subject to judicial review or quasi-judicial review. Thus, according to him, the law laid down by this Court in the cases of Shyam Bihari upadhyaya (supra) and Shiv Kumar thakur (supra) is correct. 11. In paragraph 9 of the judgment in the case of Shyam Bihari upadhyay (supra) the Division Bench has taken aid from the decision of the apex Court in the case of Gafoora (supra ). 11. In paragraph 9 of the judgment in the case of Shyam Bihari upadhyay (supra) the Division Bench has taken aid from the decision of the apex Court in the case of Gafoora (supra ). In the said case the Supreme court, while dealing with Sec.11-A of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings act, which is a similar provision to Sec.10-A of the Act, and bars all objections at later stage of the proceedings, held that there was no error of law in the revisional order of the Deputy director of Consolidation under section 48 of the Act in upholding the rejection (by Consolidation Officer) of the prayer of the purchasers to treat their application under Sec.12 as one under Sec.9 nor did he act in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under Sec.48. According to the apex Court, Sec.11-A bars all objections in respect of claim of the land, partition of joint holdings and violation of plots etc. relating to consolidation area which have been raised under section 9 or which might or ought to have been raised under that section but have not been so raised. Thus, according to the Apex Court, in view of the bar contained in Sec.11-A, no question can be raised or heard at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceedings. 12. It is true that in the said case, the Supreme Court did not specifically considered that the bar of Sec.11-A operates even on the power of the director under Sec.48-A of that act but in the said case, by the revisional order, the Deputy Director of Consolidation had upheld the rejection (by Consolidation Officer) of the prayer of the purchasers to treat their application under Sec.12 as one under Sec.9, and not that he had entertained and nor that he had allowed the prayer of the purchasers, despite the bar under Sec.11-A of that Act. Their Lordships also noticed that the Deputy Director did not act in exercise of his revisional powers under section 48-A, meaning thereby that if the Deputy Director would have acted in exercise of the revisional power under Sec.48-A, then such a decision could not have been sustained. 13. Their Lordships also noticed that the Deputy Director did not act in exercise of his revisional powers under section 48-A, meaning thereby that if the Deputy Director would have acted in exercise of the revisional power under Sec.48-A, then such a decision could not have been sustained. 13. In my opinion, no aid could be derived from the aforementioned decision of the Apex Court for the proposition that the bar under Section 11-A did not operate on the power of the Director under Sec.48 of that act, nor any aid could be derived from it to hold that despite there being no non obstame clause in section 35 of the act, an inference can be drawn that it has overriding effect over the bar under section 10-A of the Act. In my opinion, such an interpretation will make the provision contained in Sec.10-A nugatory and the intention of the legislature to attach finality to the publication of registers of lands and statement of principles and objectives thereon under Sec.10 (6) read with Section 10-A of the Act would stand frustrated. 14. In the recent decision in the case of Ram Dular V/s. Dy. Director of consolidation, Jaunpur and Ors. , JT 1994 (3) S. C.341, the Supreme Court considered the scope and power of the revisional authority, namely, the Director under Sec.48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The case of the appellant was that his great grandfather had ancestral property and as a successor in interest through his grand-father, he had been in joint possession and enjoyment of land of certain khata numbers fallen towards his half share as co-khatader along with his cousins, the respondents, who were entitled to the other half share therein. The Consolidation Officer and the settlement Officer, consolidation upheld the appellants claim in respect of said khata numbers. However, in revision, the orders of both the authorities were set aside. After being unsuccessful in the High Court, the appellant filed the said appeal before the Supreme Court, in which the Apex Court held that in considering the correctness, legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the proceedings or regularity thereof under Sec.48, the Director cannot assume to himself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact-finding authority by appreciating for himself of those facts de novo. He has to consider whether the legally admissible evidence had not been considered by the authorities in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion reached by them is based on no evidence, any patent illegality or impropriety had been committed or there was any procedural irregularity, which goes to the root of the matter, had been committed in recording the order or finding. 15. In my opinion, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ram Dular V/s. Dy. Director of consolidation (supra), I am unable to agree with the view taken by B. P. Sinha, j. in the case of Shiv Kumar Thakur V/s. State of Bihar (supra) that the Director has very wide power and can pass necessary orders in the interest of justice irrespective of the other provisions creating bar from entertaining any claim at subsequent stage, particularly in the absence of a non-obstame clause. 16. It is well settled that the provision of one section cannot be used to defeat those of others unless reconciliation is impossible [air 1967 S. C.1211]. In the case of conflicting constructions, the Court is to adopt which maintains rather than disturbs the equilibrium in the field of execution mahijibhai V/s. Manibhai, AIR 1965 S. C.1477 and construction making section unworkable is to be avoided AIR 1966 s. C.1678, Shyam Kishori Devi V/s. Patna municipal Corporation. 17. Section 10-A completely bars from any question being raised in respect of any entry made in the map or register prepared under Sec.9 or the statement of principles prepared under Sec.9-A relating to the con-1 solidation area which might or ought to have been raised under Sec.10 but has not been raised inasmuch as it cannot be raised or heard at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceeding. Where such a power can be exercised at subsequent stage of the consolidation proceeding, the legislatures are clear in their mind as is evident from the provision contained in section 10-D which vests power in the deputy Director regarding republication of the register of lands etc. under certain circumstances notwithstanding the bar contained in the provision under Sec.10-A. Even in exercise of the said power there is a limitation put under Sec.10-E which provides that dispute decided not to be re-opened on republication of the register of lands etc. 18. under certain circumstances notwithstanding the bar contained in the provision under Sec.10-A. Even in exercise of the said power there is a limitation put under Sec.10-E which provides that dispute decided not to be re-opened on republication of the register of lands etc. 18. There cannot be any dispute that the proceeding under Sec.35 is also part of the consolidation proceeding. There is no such non-obstame clause in Sec.35. Sub-section (6) of section 10 of the Act attaches finality to the order of the Assistant Consolidation officer or Consolidation Officer under sub-section (3), (4) or (5) of section 10 or when an order passed on appeal before the Assistant Director of consolidation. In the absence of non obstante clause in Sec.35, it is difficult to reconcile Sec.10-A with section 35 in any other manner than that power under Sec.35 has no overriding effect over bar under Section 10-A. 19. It is well settled that the Court has to determine the intention of the legislature as expressed by the word "used". A reference in this connection may be made to the decisions of the apex Court in the cases of B. N. Mutto v. T. K. Nandi, AIR 1979 S. C.460 and d. D. Joshi V/s. Union of India, AIR 1983 s. C.420. 20. From the judgment of B. P. Sinha, J. I find that what weighed with his Lordship to hold that the provision of Sec.35 overrides Sec.10-A of 1 the Act is that the Act is a welfare legislation and provides for the consolidation of holdings and prevention of fragmentation of land and the lethargic procedures involving inordinate delay can hardly meet challenges of new social order and it has been replaced by quick action procedures which were only to necessary, if the country was to attain new heights in the field of agriculture. According to his lordship, the legislation was intended to wreck the vested interested in agriculture which wanted to maintain status quo. It was, thus, open to the director of Consolidation to pass an appropriate order to further the cause of social economic justice. 21. With due respects, I regret to contribute to the said reasoning. According to his lordship, the legislation was intended to wreck the vested interested in agriculture which wanted to maintain status quo. It was, thus, open to the director of Consolidation to pass an appropriate order to further the cause of social economic justice. 21. With due respects, I regret to contribute to the said reasoning. In my opinion, the legislature has taken suffient precautions in protecting the speedy justice being imparted and that is why it created bar under Sec.10-A of the Act from raising objection at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceeding and also further giving protection at the stage of preparation of draft scheme under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act whereunder subject to the provisions, contained in Sec.10-A a person has been made entitled to file an objection within thirty days of the date of publication of the draft consolidation scheme whose right or interest is substantially prejudiced or effected by the said scheme or who disputes the propriety and correctness of the entries in the said scheme or the extracts furnished therefrom. One section 10 (6)of the Act makes the publication of registers of lands and statement of principles and objection thereon final under the Act, then to hold that the Director under Sec.35 of the Act will have the power to reopen the same, in my opinion, will be contrary to the aforesaid provision of the Act, particularly in absence of any non obstante clause. 22. According to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ram dular V/s. Dy. Director of Consolidation (supra), in considering the correctness legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the proceedings or regularity thereof, the revisionai authority cannot assume to himself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact-finding authority by appreciating for himself of those facts de novo. Director of Consolidation (supra), in considering the correctness legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the proceedings or regularity thereof, the revisionai authority cannot assume to himself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact-finding authority by appreciating for himself of those facts de novo. The apex Court has held that the revisionai authority has to consider whether the legally admissible evidence had not been considered by the authorities in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion reached by them is based on no evidence, any patent illegality or impropriety had been committed or there was any procedural irregularity which goes to the root of the matter, had been committed in recording the order or finding and not to create right in a person to raise an objection which is barred under Sec.10-A and to entertain such an objection himself. The action of the revisionai authority by entertaining an objection despite bar under Sec.10-A of the Act will, in my opinion, amount to first incorporating a provision in the Act vesting power in him and thereby exercising a legislative power which he does not possess. 23. In the second writ application, the register of land was prepared under section 9 of the Act. Petitioners father filed objection under Sec.10 (2) of the Act to cancel the entry which was rejected by the Consolidation Officer on merit, against which, on appeal, the said order was set aside and thereby the said order became final under sub-section (6) of Sec.10 of the Act. The revision filed by the private respondents against the said order was allowed on the ground that the application under Sec.10 (2) of the act was not maintainable being barred by Sec.10-A of the Act. In the third case, the petitioner is the purchaser from respondents Nos.4 and 5 after permission being granted by the consolidation Officer under Sec.5 of the Act. During revisional survey in 1970-71 the name of original tenants, including the name of the father of respondent No.6, were recorded as rehandar of the. land. In the third case, the petitioner is the purchaser from respondents Nos.4 and 5 after permission being granted by the consolidation Officer under Sec.5 of the Act. During revisional survey in 1970-71 the name of original tenants, including the name of the father of respondent No.6, were recorded as rehandar of the. land. The vendors of respondents Nos.4 and 5 filed a petition for correction of entry in their names before the Consolidation Officer who allowed the prayer, vide order dated 1-11-1980 (Annexure 3), against which respondent No.6 filed appeal in respect of only Plots No.1253 and 1376 comprising 1.13 acres of land before the Deputy Director who set aside the order of Consolidation Officer on the ground that the petition before the consolidation Officer is barred under section 10-A of the Act. In revision also, the order of the appellate authority was upheld. In the first writ application from the counter-affidavit it appears that the register under Section 10 of the Act was published in the name of respondents Nos.5 and 6 on the basis of the revisional survey but the petitioners got the scheme under section 11 of the Act prepared in their names and when this draft scheme was published under Sec.12 of the Act, respondents No.5 and 6 raised objection to the same, whereafter the Consolidation Officer decided the said objection and ordered for correction in the publication of the scheme in allotting chak in the name of the said respondents. 24. The aforesaid fact stated in the counter-affidavit has not been denied in the rejoinder filed on behalf of the petitioners. Thus, it has rightly been contended that the bar under Section 10-A of the Act has no application to the facts of the said case since the objection was filed and considered at the stage of publication of the draft scheme under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act. 25. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in all the three writ petitions, and the same are dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Petitions Dismissed.