Order N.K. Sinha, J. By this order the preliminary objection raised by respondent no. 1 to the maintainability of the Miscellaneous Appeal is being disposed of. 2. The appeal has been preferred by the New India Assurance Company Ltd, appelant for setting aside the order and judgment dated 9.10.91 passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner-cum workmen compensation Commissioner in W/C Claim case no. 4/88. As is evident from the court's order dated 11.1.96 an objection was raised by the learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 1 to the maintainability of the appeal when learned counsel for the appellant pressed the application filed for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal. It is the admitted position that no certificate as required by proviso to section 30 (1) of the workmen's Compensation Act 1923 had been filed along with the memo of appeal which according to the learned counsel for respondent no. 1 was obligatory and hence the appeal itself was not maintainable and therefore, the question of condoning the delay in filing the appeal did not arise. Section 30 (1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to the as the 'Act') 1923 reads as follows ;- “30 Appeals.-(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely ; (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum: 17. an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4-A. (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependents; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of Sub-section (2) or Sub-section 12 ; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions. Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount is dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees; Provided further, that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which order of the Commissioner given effect to an agreement come to by the parties: Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against." 3. The bone of contention in between the parties is with regard to the true interpretation of the expression "employee" occuring in third proviso to section 31 (1) the Act. According to the learned counsel for the respondents "employer" will include insurer and according to the appellant it will not. Before deciding the controversy it would be necessary to consider argument advanced on behalf of the Appellant-Assurance Company that the third proviso to Sub Section (1) of section 30 of the Act was not attracted as the appeal had been filed not under clause (a) but under clause (aa) of sub-section (i) of section 30 of the Act. It is significant that if the appeal had not been preferred under section 30 (1) (a) of the Act the provisions of the third proviso were not attracted which required the filing of a certificate of the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. If the contention of the appellant on this score is upheld, there would be no necessity for considering the question whether the expression “employer" occuring in the third proviso will include an Insurer or not. 4. The award by the Commissioner was for a total sum of Rs. 108260 and 25 paise which melded interest of Rs. 16,719 04 paise and penalty of Rs. 8319 and 20 paise. learned counsel for the respondents argued that the appeal had been preferred by the Assurance Co. 4. The award by the Commissioner was for a total sum of Rs. 108260 and 25 paise which melded interest of Rs. 16,719 04 paise and penalty of Rs. 8319 and 20 paise. learned counsel for the respondents argued that the appeal had been preferred by the Assurance Co. for setting aside to the entire award and is not confined to the order awarding interest of penalty. It is true as pointed out on behalf of the appellant that a ground has been taken in the memorandum of appeal denying the liability of the Assurance Co. for payment of damage and of interest or penalty. Moreover, reading the memo of appeal as a whole there is no doubt left that the appellant had not questioned the order awarding compensation including the interest and penalty alone but the entire order awarding compensation including the interest and penalty. This is evident from that part of the memo of appeal where it is stated that the learned court had based the award arbitrarily and the amount is highly exaggarted and imaginary and has been assessed much beyond the scope of the Act and that the learned court had not gone into the requirements of awarding claim as per statutory provisions mentioned therein. The appellant had gone to the extent of alleging that the age, wage manner of accrual of accident and cause of action had not been considered by the court while awarding the final compensation. In the circumstance there is no merit in the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the appeal had been filed under sub-section (1) clause (aa) and not under clause (a) and hence the third proviso to section 30 (1) of the Act not attracted. 5. The question is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case the insurer is required to file a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant had deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. There is no doubt whatsoever that in terms of the third proviso no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memo of appeal is accompanied by a requisite certificate. If we go by the literal meaning of the word “employer” occuring in the third proviso, it would be confined to the insured and will not include the insurer. If we go by the literal meaning of the word “employer” occuring in the third proviso, it would be confined to the insured and will not include the insurer. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a decision of a learned single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High court in the National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Saifuddin and others II (1991) ACC 222. In that case the appeal had been filed by the Insurance Co. and a similar preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal had been raised on behalf of the respondents. The respondents had contended that the expression "employer" will include the Insurance Company and it relied on a decision of the Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Nagour vs. Mohinder Singh and another (1988 ACJ 1101). In reply the appellant relied on a Division Bench decision of the court in Northern India Insurance Co., Indore vs. Commissioner for workmen's compensation (1973 MPLJ 543) wherein it has been held that in an appeal by the Insurance Co. which is not the employer the condition as to deposit in an appeal under Section 30 of the Act does not apply. In other words the learned single Judge in the National Insurance Company Ltd, (supra) rejected the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents in view of the Division Bench decision in Northern India Insurance Co., Indore (supa) without considering the decision of the learned single Judge in New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Nagour (supra) on merits. Another decision relied upon by the appellant is also of a learned single judge of the Orissa High Court in S. D. Sharma vs. Ramesh Mahakud and another II (1994) ACC 139. While taking the view that the insurer does not come within the category (employer) and therefore, was not required to deposit the amount, the court in para 7 of the judgment had this to say :- "In plain reading of the Act, it would not be possible for the Commissioner to give direction to insurer to discharge liability of the employer, who is owner of the vehicle. Employer is to pay the amount and he may recover the same from the insurer under terms of the policy which is a contract. However, both the Act and provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act. Employer is to pay the amount and he may recover the same from the insurer under terms of the policy which is a contract. However, both the Act and provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939, so far as compensation on account of injuries in an accident are beneficial provisions for the claimants. Therefore, by judicial interpretation, this Court has laid down the law which is now settled so far as this Court is concerned that Commissioner can give a direction to the insurer after giving it opportunity of being heard to pay the compensation determined which is normally payable by the employer who is owner of the vehicle. Since insurer has beer dragged in by judicial interpretation, in cases where it is aggrieved, it can prefer appeal. Since under section 30 of the Act, employer is called upon to deposit the amount as a precondition to his preferring appeal, insurer under the law is not required to deposit the same while preferring an appeal. While interpreting a benevolent provision broadly, satisfaction of a precondition for preferring an appeal not being a benevolent provision and being 1cgulatory in nature is to be construed in a manner by which only those persons who are specifically regulated are to satisfy the precondition. Insurer does not come within that category and, therefore, is not required to deposit the amount." The court in taking the view appears to be largely influenced by the fact that satisfaction on a pre-condition i.e. regarding deposit of the amount of the award for prefering an appeal not being benevolent provision and being regulatory in nature is to be construed in a manner by which only those persons who are specifically regulated are to satisfy the pre-condition and because the insurer does not come within that category, is not therefore required to deposit the amount at the time of filing the appeal. 6. Another decision relied upon by the applleant is of a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Shri Anil Chandra Das and others I I (1995) ACC 425. In that case also the respondents had raised an objection that since the appelant had not deposited the amount as provided under section 30 of the Act, the appeal was not maintainable. In that case also the respondents had raised an objection that since the appelant had not deposited the amount as provided under section 30 of the Act, the appeal was not maintainable. This decision is of no help to the appellant for the court had not occassion to consider the objection in merit and the court took the view that the appeal cannot be dismissed under section 30 of the Act in the interest of justice as the impugned judgment had been passed in complete disregard to the principles of natural justice and that it was not a judgment at all and nonest in the eye of the law and that it was a fit case for exercising power of superintendence under Art, 227 of the Constitution. 7. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents in support of his preliminary objection has relied on a Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in New India Assurance Co. vs. M. Jayarama Naik 1982 LAB I.C. 1235. Their Lordiships were dealing with an appeal filed by the Assurance Co. In which the Assurance company was party to the proceeding before the Commissioner and in which a similar preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability or the appeal had been preferred by the respondent on the ground that the appellant Assurance Co. had not deposited with the Commissioner the amount awarded as compensation and had not produced along with the memo of appeal a certificate to that of fact issued by the Commissioner as required by 3rd proviso to section 30 of the Act. Their Lordships Considered the matter in some what great detail and for proper appreciation of the objection the provision of section 96 of the Motor Vehicle Act 1939 were also noticed and considered. Their Lordship upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and observed as follows, to quote ;- "Therefore, the insurer cannot under section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act defeend the procedings disputing the insured's liability for the compensation claimed on any ground, much less of on such grounds as those raised hearin, namely, raising an issue of the amount of monthly salary of the employee, or of the nature of the injury. These are thereunder, contentions to be advanced by the employer and if the findings thereon go against him he can prefer an appeal against the order as provided for in section 30 of the Act. We are not in this case concerned with the question as to whether, the insurer can, because the liability of the insured is statutorily passed on to the insurer, defend the proceedings before the Commissioner, Tribunal or court as the case may be by advancing such grounds as are available to the insured and whether the insurance company can on such grounds available to the insured employer prefer an appeal against the award of compensation. Without deciding that questions, we will assume, that it is possible. But then the insurer is only stepping into the shoes of the insurred, the employer, and the defence is not qua insurer but in the name of the insured and in his place. An appeal preferred on such grounds, if successful, will jeopardise the employee's right to recover the compensation from the employer also. What the insurer seeks in such an appeal is that the insured may be found to be not liable to pay the compensation, and consequently, the insurer may be held to be not liable. The primary relief sought for is the first mentioned relief and the other relief is consequent to the grant of that relief. Hence such an appeal is preferred by the insurer for and on behalf of the employer and in his stead, though the aim of the insurer is to exonerate his own liability. What the insured cannot do by himself viz, filing of an appeal without complying with the requirements of the third proviso to section 30 of the Act governs such appeals. The Division Bench also expressed their agreement with the statement of a law on the point in Central Engineering Corporation; vs. Dorai Raj (AIR 1960 Orissa 39) and also quoted the statement of law therein as follows :- "The principle of section 30 is that if the appeal be such that by it the workman's right to the compensation awarded to him is placed in jeopardy, security for the workman must be provided for by the deposit of the amount of compensation and such a deposit wou1d be essential to the maintainability of the appeal. If on the other hand, the workman's right to the compensation awarded does not come into question in the appeal at all, there is no risk to the workman's getting the compensation awarded to him and there is thus no necessity for requiring anyone, preferring such an appeal to deposit the compensation money" 8. The appellant had relied on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Northern India Insurance co., Indore vs. Commissioner for workmen's compensation (supra). The Devision Bench in New India Assurance Co. (supra) refered to the said decision and observed that there the Insurance Co. had invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court contending that the Insurance Co. should not have been made a party of the proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 The Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that the Insurance Company was a proper party and dealing with the preliminary objection that since the Insurance Company could have filed 'an appeal under section 30 of the Act, the writ jurisdiction could not be invoked and the answer thereto that the Insurance Company cannot challenge the award of compensation by filing an appeal, that the High Court held that on the wording of section 30, any person aggrieved by the order is entitled to appeal and observed in that connection that the third proviso would govern only an appeal preferred by an employer. The Division Bench in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) then went on to observe that the question of applicability of the third proviso to an appeal filed by the insurer on grounds available to the insured only did not arise in that case. It may be recalled that the learned single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the National Insurance co. Ltd. vs. Saifuddin and others (supra) had relied on the aforesaid division Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High court while not relying on a single Bench decision of his court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Nagpur vs. Mohinder Singh and another (supra) which had taken a view contrary to the Division Bench decision. In my opinion, the Division Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Northern India Insurance Co., Indore (supra) cannot be considered an authority for the proposition that the Insurance Co. Ltd. Nagpur vs. Mohinder Singh and another (supra) which had taken a view contrary to the Division Bench decision. In my opinion, the Division Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Northern India Insurance Co., Indore (supra) cannot be considered an authority for the proposition that the Insurance Co. is not included in the expression "employer" occuring in third proviso of section 30 (1) of the Act. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents has also relied on a Division Bench decision of the Karnatak High Court in United India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Kashimsab and others (1993 LAB. I.C. 2241). The court considered the question of the true construction of the word "employer" as found in the third proviso in great detail and in doing so they took the view that they must construct the said proviso with a view to give effect to the scope and object of the Act. While doing so their Lordships had this to say, to quote :- "20 ... .........1n other words we must construct that proviso with a view to advancing cause of Justice and not to defeat it. The Supreme Court in a recent decision in A. A. Raja Muniuddin vs. Indian Railways, AIR 1993 SC 361 , has held in paragraph 5 as follows :- “A view which advances cause of justice must be preferred to the one which defeats it. When an indigent person approaches the Tribunal for compensation for the wrong done to him, the Tribunal cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction merely because he does not have the means to pay the fee. The ends of justice require that the Tribunal should follow the procedure laid down in Order XXXIII of the Code to do justice." Thus," following the ruling of the Supreme Court in the above case, to construct the proviso-3 to S. 30 (1) of the Act, we should not confine to the literal meaning of the Act. The ends of justice require that the Tribunal should follow the procedure laid down in Order XXXIII of the Code to do justice." Thus," following the ruling of the Supreme Court in the above case, to construct the proviso-3 to S. 30 (1) of the Act, we should not confine to the literal meaning of the Act. but on the other hand, we must hold, having regard to the object of the proviso and the fact that the insurer could be adjudged as if a judgment debtor under the decree, that in a case where an appeal is filed by the insurer challenging the judgment and award of compensation in favour of the workman, it cannot be entertained unless it is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against, or otherwise, the very object of the proviso would be defeated. In the instant case, since the insurer has not filed the certificate along with the appeal for having deposited the compensation amount awarded by the Commissioner, the appeal is not maintainable. It is not possible to accede to the contention of Sri Mahesh that the parliament intended to exempt the insurer from complying with the requirement of the third proviso to S. 30 (1) of the Act." 10. I find myself in respectful agreement with the views expessed be the Division Bench of the kerala High court in 1982 LAB I.C. 1235 (supra) and of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in 1993 LAB. I.C. 2241 (supra) relied on behalf of the respondents and prefer to construe The word "employer" occuring in third proviso to section 30 (1) of the Act not in its literal sense but in a way which advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. To do otherwise would defeat the very object for which the proviso was incorporated by Act No. 15 of 1933. It may be placed on record that learned counsel appearing for the appelant and respondents could not produce any decision of either of a learned single Judge or it Division Bench of this Court or for that matter of the Apex Court dealing with the construction of the word "employer occuring in the third proviso to section 30 (1) of the Act. 11. 11. In the instant case the Assurance Company had appeared in the proceeding before the Commissioner and had preferred the appeal for setting aside the entire award and not only the order awarding interest or penalty under section 4 A of the Act. The appeal was thus under clause (a) and not clause (aa) of section 30 (1) of the Act and the appellant was thus required to comply with the requirement of the Third proviso. Since the appellant had not filed a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against the appeal by the Assurance Co. Ltd. was not maintainable. In other words the preliminary objection raised by the respondents that the appeal of the Assurance Co. was not maintainable for the aforesaid reason is upheld and this Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed as not maintainable but in the Circumstances of the case without costs.