D. K. SETH, J. In this case the petitioner had sought for admission in Diploma Engineering Course in Aligarh Muslim University. There is a system of entrance test in which two categories have been classified, one as internal candidate and the other as external candidate. Out of the total seats fifty per cent is reserved for the internal candidates. The petitioner has been reused admission on the ground that he could not be treated as internal candidate because of Item No. 22 regarding the definition of internal candidate under the heading "important Information and Rules of the Guide to Admission Test No. 3" of the year 1995-96 and he was judged as an external candidate. By reason of the fact that the petitioner was considered as external candidate, therefore, he could not qualify for admission as external candidate. Sri S. U. Khan learned counsel appear ing on behalf of the petitioner contends that the University while considering the petitioner as internal candidate the University had wrongly interpreted the definition of "internal candidate", which has been quoted in Para 7 (a) of the counter-affidavit. According to him, three years as have been used in the said definition, means three academic years excluding the academic year immediately preceding the session, in which admission is being sought. His contention is that there would be one year gap in between the session and the qualifying examination, which is wholly misconceived. Inasmuch as according to Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, a person qualifying in the current session is eligible to admission in the next session and it cannot be said that in between there is one year gap. Therefore, he contends that the qualifying session and the admission session should be treated as the same and three years is to be counted from the qualifying session and according to rules of calcula tion, qualifying session is to be excluded. 2. Sri Dilip Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand contends that the external candidate is given three chances and therefore, he gets three chances from the qualifying examination to the next session, which according to him is to be calculat ed from the session, in which admission is sought for and therefore accord ing to the rules of calculation, the session to which admission IE sought is to be excluded. According to him the question of notional gap is immate rial. The intention was to allow a student only three chances. He also relies upon the judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. Aligarh Muslim University, 1987 UPLBEC 250. 3. After having heard Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Dilip Gupta, learned counsel from the respondents, it appears that the entire decisions rests on the interpretation of internal candidate, whether it is three chance or not, which is not clear from the said definition. The definition is to be interpreted to the point from which three academic year are to be calculated. Whether it is to be calculated from the academic year of the qualifying examination or from the session. It is, therefore, necessary to refer to the definition which runs as follows : "an internal candidate is one who has passed the qualifying examination held by this University, as a regular candidate, not earlier than three (3) academic years from the date of admission to the course applied for. " 4. It appears that the point of calculation has been expressed by the expression "from the date of admission to the course applied for" and the three (3) years sought to be calculated, has been expressed to be not earlier than three (3) academic years. According to the golden principle of interpretation a statute is to be interpreted on the basis of plain and simple meaning of the expression used, if there is no ambiguity or doubt. I cannot read anything else which is not present in the Statute itself. The intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the simple meaning appearing in the Statute itself. 5. In the present case, in my view, it does not appear that there is any ambiguity in the construction of the Statute inasmuch as it specified as earlier academic year. Therefore, in order to seek admission in 1995-96 Session the earlier academic session would be 1994-95 and that would be one academic session earlier than 1995-96 session. Therefore, by reason thereof it is clear that the point of calculation as has been expressed is from the date of admission to the course applied and not from the qualify ing year. Inasmuch as the qualifying year is earlier than the course applied for. 6. Therefore, by reason thereof it is clear that the point of calculation as has been expressed is from the date of admission to the course applied and not from the qualify ing year. Inasmuch as the qualifying year is earlier than the course applied for. 6. I, am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, though initially Sri Khans sub mission seems to be having some substance. I must appreciate the manner in which Sri Khan has placed his case and had almost led (me to accept his contentions. Equally appreciateable is the argument of Sri Dilip Gupta. I am supported with my above view by the judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal (suprsupra) where instead of the academic year in the concerned regulation for the admission in M. B. B. S. course in the same University internal candidate was defined as to be the student who had passed the qualifying examination not earlier than three years. The said three years have been calculated by excluding the session, in which admis sion was sought for and the point of calculation was fixed at the session in which admission was sought. 7. Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the question is not related to the academic year which the petitioner has attended. But it relates to the passing of qualifying examination in the academic years. It has relation to the end point and not to the academic session attended by the student. Therefore, according to him since the petitioner has passed in 1992, therefore, three years is to be calculated from 1992 which is within three years from 1995. Therefore, I am unable to accept the contention on the ground that the definition has not used the simple years but has mentioned academic years. It did not relate to the end point but it related to the year, may be examination is held at the end of the session. The use of academic year cannot be interpreted in the manner Sri Khan wanted to. The passing of the examination relates to the academic year, may be examination is held at the end of the year. The use of academic year cannot be interpreted in the manner Sri Khan wanted to. The passing of the examination relates to the academic year, may be examination is held at the end of the year. In that event there would be student of four academic years, who would be consi dered eligible to admission in the session for 1995-96, if Sri Khans con tention is accepted. Inasmuch as the academic session 1995-96 the student who had qualified in 1994-95 would be eligible. Similarly, the students for the academic year 1993-94 and 1^92-93 would also be eligible because the student of 1994-95 session had passed in the year 1995 and those of 1993-94 had passed in 1993 and those of 1992-93 had passed in the year 1993 and those of 1991-92 had passed in the year 1992. Therefore, it is to be taken from the date of examination namely, 1993. Thus according to Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be upto 1992 to cover three earlier years. Therefore, the student who passed in the year 1992, according to him, would be eligible to include academic year 1991-92. Thus in effect it would include four earlier academic years from the date of admission to the course applied for tamely, 1995-96. 8. Such a strained interpretation, in my view, is not possible on the basis of expression used in the definition quoted above, as has been held that earlier three academic years from the date of admission to the course applied for, has relevance to the point of time for admission in the course applied for, which is to be excluded. 9. In that view of the matter, I am unable to find any merit in the writ petition and, as such this petition is dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 10. Let a copy of this order be given to the learned counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within a week. Appeal dismissed. .