Judgement JUDGMENT :- This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, West Tripura dated 18-1-89 in Title Appeal No. 4 of 1988 affirming the judgment passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, West Tripura in Tile Suit No. 43 of 1981 (T.S. 118 of 1986). 2. The plaintiff, in the suit out of which this Second Appeal has arisen is the respondent Second Appeal instituted the aforesaid suit No. 43 of 1981 (T. S. No. 118 of 1986) on 11-6-81 for a decree declaring her right, title and interest over the suit land which measures 5 gandas approximately appertaining to CS plot No. 6285 in Khatian No. 2284 in Agartala Township, 7, Krishnanagar and also for a decree for recovery of the possession of the aforesaid land (hereinafter referred to as suit land). She also prayed for a decree declaring Na dabi patra and Mortgage deeds alleged to have been executed by her aunt Charubala Devi in the name of defendant Nripendra Debbarma, now represented by the legal heirs, namely, the appellants as null and void. 3. The case of the plaintiff, shortly put, was that one Suresh Chandra Debbarma was the original owner of the suit land and after his death, his wife viz., Charubala Devi got the suit land by way of inheritance as the only legal heir of her late husband and her deceased son. But during the life time of Suresh Chandra Debbarma the latter allowed two persons, namely, Abhoy Chandra Gope and Madhav Chandra Gope who came from erstwhile East Pakistan to reside in a portion of the lands of jote No. 205 on the condition that they would have to vacate the lands by removing the huts within one year on demand. After the death of Suresh Chandra Debbarma, those two persons were unwilling to vacate the land. So, Charubala Devi instituted a suit being No. TS 20 of 1951 for eviction of the aforesaid two persons and since she was unable to attend the Court, she appointed Nripendra Debbarma, her relation as attorney to conduct the case on her behalf by executing a power of attorney. So, Charubala Devi instituted a suit being No. TS 20 of 1951 for eviction of the aforesaid two persons and since she was unable to attend the Court, she appointed Nripendra Debbarma, her relation as attorney to conduct the case on her behalf by executing a power of attorney. Accordingly, Nripendra Debbarma used to conduct the case on her behalf but in course of the pendency of the suit, Nripendra Debbarma got many blank papers signed by Charubala on the pretext that those papers would be necessary in connection with the case. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and this decree was also upheld by the appellate Courts. 4. To get khas possession of the suit land of that suit which is also a part of the present suit land, Charubala started execution proceedings against the judgment of the trial Court and through Court she also got possession of the land. Nripendra Debbarma the predecessor of the appellants who was doing all these jobs was subsequently found to be doing some acts detrimental to the interest of Charubala Devi. Charubala Devi, therefore, revoked the power of attorney. 5. But, meanwhile the other licensees, namely, Raj Ballabh and another started some Misc. cases being Nos. 21 of 74 and 24 of 74 for getting a portion of the decretal land. Those Misc cases were compromised and by compromise Raj Ballabh got 1 ganda, 1 kranta and 10 dhurs and Apama Ghosh got 1 ganda, 2 kranta and 2 1/2 dhurs. Charubala, however, maintained her peaceful possession so far as the suit land is concerned. But after this compromise, Nripendra Debbarma filed a suit being No. TS 95 of 76 for partition of the suit land claiming that he became the owner and possessor of the suit land by virtue of one Na dabi and one Mortgage deed executed by Charubala Devi. This suit was, however, dismissed on withdrawal. 6. Thereafter, Charubala gifted the suit land to the plaintiff who is her brothers daughter by executing registered deeds of gift dated 24-1-78 and also delivered possession thereof. The plaintiff thus became the owner and possessor of the suit land. But it was pleaded that taking advantage of the absence of the plaintiffs husband, Nripendra Debbarma trespassed into the suit land on 10-11-78 and constructed an ekchala hut and thus dispossessed the plaintiff of the suit land. The plaintiff thus became the owner and possessor of the suit land. But it was pleaded that taking advantage of the absence of the plaintiffs husband, Nripendra Debbarma trespassed into the suit land on 10-11-78 and constructed an ekchala hut and thus dispossessed the plaintiff of the suit land. Thereafter, some criminal proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P.C. was also started in respect of the possession of the suit land. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the instant suit for the reliefs as stated above. 7. The original defendant Nripendra Debbarma now represented by his legal representatives, namely, the appellants contested the suit by filing a written statement wherein the defendants denied all the material averments of the plaint. It was stated that the suit was not maintainable as it was barred by law of limitation and adverse possession. It was contended that Nripendra Debbarma got possession of the suit land in the month of August, 1950 on the strength of the registered deed of relinquishment executed by Charubala Devi in his favour on 25-8-50 and since that date he had been possessing the suit land openly and also got the land recorded in his name. The record of right was accordingly prepared in his name in respect of the suit land. It was further averred that Charubala had a very limited interest on the suit land after the death of her husband and son and as such she was not entitled to alienate the suit land. Therefore, the alleged deed of gift was nothing but a paper transaction and it has got no value in the eye of law. It was denied that Nripendra Debbarma got the Na dabi patra executed by Charubala by exercising fraud. It was, therefore, contended that the suit was liable to be dismissed with costs. 8. Upon the pleadings, learned trial Court framed the following issues for determination of the suit. The issues are :- (I) Is the suit maintainable in its present form ? (II) Is the suit barred by limitation? (III) Whether Smt. Charubala Devi got possession of the land through Court? (IV) Whether the defendant dispossessed the plaintiff on 10-11-78? (V) Whether the deed of Na dabi is a false and fraudulent document and whether it was created by practice of fraud upon Charubala Devi? (II) Is the suit barred by limitation? (III) Whether Smt. Charubala Devi got possession of the land through Court? (IV) Whether the defendant dispossessed the plaintiff on 10-11-78? (V) Whether the deed of Na dabi is a false and fraudulent document and whether it was created by practice of fraud upon Charubala Devi? (VI) Whether Smt. Charubala Devi executed any power of Attorney in favour of the defendant to conduct her suits in 1962 ? (VII) Whether deeds of gift dated 24-1-78 are valid gifts? (VIII) Whether the plaintiff acquired any right, title and interest over the suit land by virtue of the deed of gift dated 24-1-78 ? (IX) Any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff is entitled to ? Learned trial Court after discussion of the evidence on record decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and thus decreed the suit. The appellate Court also affirmed the decree of the trial Court. 9. It is an admitted fact that the suit property originally belonged to Suresh Chandra Debbarma, husband of Charubala Devi. There is no dispute about this. But Mr. A. M. Lodh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has argued that even though the suit property devolved upon Charubala as the only legal heir of the deceased Suresh Chandra Debbarma, Charubala had a limited interest as Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was not applicable to the members of the scheduled tribe community within the meaning of Clause 25 of Article 336 of the Constitution of India. It has been submitted by Mr. Lodh that no notification was issued by the Central Government to the effect that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 will be applied to the scheduled tribes. So according to him in view of Section 2 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 for application of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a notification in the official gazette by Central Government is necessary. But in the instant case, there is no such notification that the Hindu Succession Act will apply to the scheduled tribes of Tripura. Therefore, Charubala had no right to gift the property to her brothers daughter, namely, the plaintiff. But on going through the evidence on record, it is found that the appellants did not adduce any evidence in support of this contention that no such notification was issued. Therefore, Charubala had no right to gift the property to her brothers daughter, namely, the plaintiff. But on going through the evidence on record, it is found that the appellants did not adduce any evidence in support of this contention that no such notification was issued. The first appellate Court also made a specific finding to the effect that it has not been proved by any document or evidence that Charubala would not be guided by Hindu Succession Act. 10. The trial Court while deciding the issues Nos. 1 and 2, namely, is the suit maintainable in its present form ? and is the suit barred by limitation? observed that these two issues were not pressed during trial and accordingly the trial Court decided both the issues in favour of the plaintiff. It is true that in the written statement it was contended that Charubala had a limited interest over her suit property. But on going through the evidence on record it is found that the appellants did not adduce any evidence in support of this contention that Charubala was not guided by the Hindu Succession Act. In this context it cannot be lost sight of that in the written statement it was contended that Nripendra Debbarma got the ownership of the suit land on the strength of Na dabi patra executed by Charubala. So if the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is to be accepted then simultaneously it has to be observed that by virtue of Na dabi patra Nripendra Debbarma has also got no right, title and interest over the suit land even if Na dabi patra is accepted to be a genuine one. This Na dabi patra was however, found to be not genuine by the trial Court on the ground that it was obtained by practicing fraud. 11. Leaving apart that question it must be pointed out that neither Nripendra Debbarma nor his legal heirs are the next reversioners of the property of Suresh Chandra Debbarma. Section 185 of the Hindu Law reads as under :- "185. Effect of alienation made without legal necessity and without consent of next reversioners. 11. Leaving apart that question it must be pointed out that neither Nripendra Debbarma nor his legal heirs are the next reversioners of the property of Suresh Chandra Debbarma. Section 185 of the Hindu Law reads as under :- "185. Effect of alienation made without legal necessity and without consent of next reversioners. An alienation made by a widow or other limited heir of property inherited by her without legal necessity and without the consent of the next reversioners is not binding on the reversioners, but it is nevertheless binding on her so as to pass her own interest (that is life-interest) to the alienee (b)." This provision clearly indicates that if alienation made by a widow who have got the limited interest is not binding on the reversioners. But the reversioners may affirm it and if they do so then no one else can raise any question to impeach unauthorised alienation. 12. In the instant case it is, however, found that Charubala executed the deeds of gift as the plaintiff had been looking after her. It appears from the recitals of the deeds of gift that Charubala executed these deeds of gift not only in consideration of the fact that the plaintiff rendered enough services for her maintenance but also in expectation of the fact that the plaintiff would also look her after in future. In view of the facts and circumstances, I am of the view that it is only the actual reversioner who can challenge such alienation, if it is proved that Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was not applicable to the scheduled tribe community of Tripura. The defendant did not adduce any evidence in this regard. 13. The next point as mentioned in the written argument submitted on behalf of the appellants is that the Courts below did not at all touch the material points, namely, points of law involved under issue No. 8. Issue No. 8 is whether the plaintiff acquired any right, title and interest over the suit land by virtue of deeds of the gift dated 24-1-78. On going through the judgment of the trial Court, I find that the trial Court took up issues Nos. 7 and 8 together. Issue No. 7 is whether the deeds of gift dated 24-1-78 are valid gifts. I think both the issues were rightly taken up together. On going through the judgment of the trial Court, I find that the trial Court took up issues Nos. 7 and 8 together. Issue No. 7 is whether the deeds of gift dated 24-1-78 are valid gifts. I think both the issues were rightly taken up together. Learned trial Court under paragraph 11 of its judgment discussed the evidence on record and arrived at a conclusion that these deeds of gift were executed by Charubala in favour of the plaintiff. Charubala who was examined as PW 2 in the case deposed that she gifted the suit property to Gitasree (plaintiff) by registered deeds of gift and she also put her in possession. This witness was thoroughly cross-examined. But on going through the cross-examination, I find that nothing material could be elicited to show that these deeds of gift were not genuine. The appellate Court also discussed this aspect of the case under paragraph 10 of its judgment. I, therefore, fail to understand how it can be said that the Courts below did not touch the material points at the time of deciding issue No. 8. The trial Court elaborately discussed the evidence and arrived at a conclusion that both the deeds of gift were genuine. The first appellate Court also affirmed the finding after discussion of the evidence. The finding of the trial Court being affirmed by the appellate Court after discussion of evidence, I am of the view that this Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings, of facts. 14. In this context, it has been argued by Mr. A. M. Lodh that Nripendra Debbarma had been possessing the suit land since 1950 and the plaintiff having failed to prove her title she cannot get a decree for recovery of possession. In support of this contention, Mr. Lodh has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Bhavnagar Municipality v. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 SC 717 . In this case plaintiff Bhavnagar Municipality filed a suit against the Union of India and the State of Gujarat for a declaration of its title and for possession of the suit property described in the schedule to the plaint. It was held by the Supreme Court that title not having been proved defendant is not required to plead or prove adverse possession. 15. It was held by the Supreme Court that title not having been proved defendant is not required to plead or prove adverse possession. 15. But in the instant case it would appear from the written statement that it was very much contended in the written statement that defendant Nripendra Debbarma had been possessing the suit land since 1950 in assertion of his own right, title etc. It is, however, true that if the plaintiff in a suit for possession alleged that he/she had been dispossessed by the defendant within twelve years from the suit land, Article 64 of the Limitation Act will be attracted. In the instant case, the Courts below have made the finding that the plaintiff was dispossessed of the suit land on 10-11-78. The trial Court under paragraph 8 of the judgment decided the issue, namely, whether the defendant dispossessed the plaintiff on 10-11-78. On going through the records, I find that the learned trial Court after discussion of the evidence on record arrived at a conclusion that the defendant trespassed into the suit land on 10-11-78 and thus dispossessed her of the suit land. The appellate Court also made the same finding under paragraph 10 of its judgment. The suit was filed on 11-6-81. I, therefore, find that the suit was filed within the prescribed period of limitation and hence the decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellants is not applicable to the present case. 16. Now as regards Na dabi patra, it was alleged by the plaintiff that Nripendra Debbarma who was the appointed attorney of Charubala got a number of blank white papers signed by Charubala and thereafter converted some of those into the aforesaid document Na dabi patra. 17. That Nripendra Debbarma was the attorney of Charubala cannot be disputed. Ext. 8 and 9 which are the statements of Nripendra Debbarma in the execution case of Charubala have affirmatively proved that Nripendra was the attorney and he was the Tadbirkarak on behalf of the cases of Charubala. On going through the evidence on record, I have no ray of doubt that this Nripendra was acting as attorney on behalf of Charubala. The other document marked as Exbt. 5 shows that Charubala got the possession of the land in suit through Court. On going through the evidence on record, I have no ray of doubt that this Nripendra was acting as attorney on behalf of Charubala. The other document marked as Exbt. 5 shows that Charubala got the possession of the land in suit through Court. It has, however, been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that this delivery of possession was nothing but a paper transaction. But on going through the statements of Nripendra Debbarma marked as Exbt. 8, 9 etc., I find that Nripendra himself was quite aware of the fact that the possession of the suit land was delivered through Court. PW 3 who is a sub- Inspector deposed that he was present to maintain law and order at the time of delivery of possession of the suit land in favour of Charubala. This PW 3 deposed in a straightway manner that Nazir of the Court delivered possession of the suit land in favour of Charubala in the year 1974. All these facts clearly establish that Charubala got the possession of the suit land through Court. 18. Now, as regards authenticity of the Na debi patra, it has been argued by Mr. D. K. Biswas, learned counsel for the respondent that evidence of Charubala will show that she had no knowledge about this Na dabi patra. Charubala who has been examined as PW 2 in this case deposed that she never executed the Na dabi patra in question. During cross-examination also she stated that she knew nothing about Na dabi patra. She denied having executed any such document. Nripendra Debbarma who was examined as DW 1 stated that this Na dabi patra was executed on 25-8-50 and he got the vacant possession of the suit land. During cross- examination, it was elicited from him that this Na dabi patra was prepared by one Samser Ali Mohari and Ramendra Debbarma and Chintaharan Sen were the witnesses of the said deed. None of the witnesses was examined. Moreover, it was also elicited from him that he could not remember when the Na dabi patra was written. 19. DW 2 Sudhir Bhusan Choudhuri deposed that Nripendra Debbarma got the possession of the suit land in the year 1956. He said nothing about Na dabi patra. None of the witnesses was examined. Moreover, it was also elicited from him that he could not remember when the Na dabi patra was written. 19. DW 2 Sudhir Bhusan Choudhuri deposed that Nripendra Debbarma got the possession of the suit land in the year 1956. He said nothing about Na dabi patra. The trial Court after appreciation of the evidence held that this Na dabi patra was nothing but a paper transaction and it was beyond the knowledge of Charubala. In view of the facts and circumstances, I am of the view that this Na dabi patra was obtained by practicing fraud. It has, however, been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that no suit was brought within the period of three years for cancellation of the Na dabi patra. It may be a fact that the suit was not brought within a period of three years of the date of execution of the Na dabi patra. But the question which actually needs consideration is the date of knowledge. Na dabi patra was executed on 25-8-50. The plaintiff stated in the plaint that Nripendra dispossessed the plaintiff of the suit land on 10-11-78 and sometime before that it came to the notice of the plaintiff about Na dabi patra. If the Na dabi patra was a genuine one then there was no reason why the defendant Nripendra Debbarma did not take possession soon after the execution of Na dabi patra. The evidence of DW 2 clearly shows that the defendant Nripendra was in possession of the suit land since 1956. 20. In view of the evidence on record, I hold that the Courts below rightly held that this Na dabi patra was obtained by fraudulent means. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants in this regard is the decision in the case of Dulahin Jadunath Kaur and others, appellants v. Raja Bisheshar Baksh Singh, respondents reported in AIR 1931 Privy Council 24. This decision is not applicable to the present case in view of the facts and circumstances of this case. 21. In the result, the appeal fails and accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.