JUDGEMENT Bhawani Singh, J. :- Through this writ petition the petitioner seeks quashing of First Information Report No. 11/79 pending before the Special Judge (Forests), Shimla for offences under Ss. 409/420/467/468/477, Indian Penal Code read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 2. The petitioner has stated that he applied for Leave Travel Concession ('LTC') while he was posted as Extension Officer in the Department of Industries. Permission was granted and advance amount of Rs. 1,900/- was paid to him for journey from Shimla to Madras and back. Accordingly, he and his family members including his father and mother visited Madras by Bus as well as by Taxi. He was entitled to First Class Railway fare under the Service Rules, however, he hired a private Taxi from Delhi for Madras since he wanted to stay at Nagpur with his sister and his aged parents could not undertake long journey. The petitioner completed his journey during the month of January/February, 1979 and submitted LTC bill for Rs, 2,710/- out of which he had already received rs. 1,900/- by way of advance. Thus, balance amount of Rs. 810/- was receivable by him against which he was paid lesser amount. 3. A case under Ss. 467/468/471/477, Indian Penal Code read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered against him for claiming false LTC. It was thoroughly investigated by a senior Police Officer who recorded the statements of the petitioner, his relatives stationed at Delhi and Nagpur and other witnesses including owner of the private Taxi. No offence was made out against the petitioner. Consequently, the Investigating Officer submitted a report for cancellation of the First Information Report No. 11/79. The report was duly scrutinised by the Special Judge (Forests), Shimla. It was accepted and the petitioner was discharged (Annexure-PA). Due to the registration of the case against the petitioner, he was placed under suspension vide order dated September 12, 1979 but it was revoked on May 4, 1980 due to non-progress in the investigation of the case. On account of the cancellation of the First Information Report, the petitioner requested the Department for the release of his pending dues and other service benefits which had been withheld for the past more than six years. On account of the cancellation of the First Information Report, the petitioner requested the Department for the release of his pending dues and other service benefits which had been withheld for the past more than six years. The claim of the petitioner was allowed and he was paid entire arrears of increments, pay and allowance treating the suspension period as on duty under F.R. 54(2). 4. The petitioner was promoted as Industry Promotion Officer and continued to occupy this post for a number of years to the satisfaction of his superiors and thereafter he became entitled to the post of Block Development Officer in accordance with his seniority in the Department. The petitioner was shocked to receive summons from the Court of Special Judge (Forests), Shimla in respect of the First Information Report No. 11/79 directing him to appear before the Court on May 3, 1995. The petitioner has serious grievance against this action, hence this writ petition. 5. According to the petitioner, initiation of prosecution on the basis of First Information Report No. 11/79 is not legal since it has been cancelled by the Court on submission of the report by the prosecution as required under S. 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code ('Cr. P.C.'). Further, the criminal proceedings have been initiated after a period of sixteen years from the commission of the alleged offence and more than eight years from the date of cancellation of the First Information Report, therefore, these criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed under Art. 21 of the Constitution which guarantees speedy trial and fair justice to him. Besides, it is difficult for him to defend himself properly after long lapse of time due to many reasons including non-availability of certain witnesses, for example, material witness Kultaran Singh of Nagpur, his parents have expired. Joginder Singh of Delhi is having a feable health and is not in a position to appear in the Court which is also likely to take sufficient time due to the pendency of large number of other important cases. Further, the Investigating Officer put pressure on the witnesses to secure statements prejudicial to the petitioner so that criminal proceedings are revived. 6. Respondents 1 and 2 have admitted that the case pertains to year 1978. Further, the Investigating Officer put pressure on the witnesses to secure statements prejudicial to the petitioner so that criminal proceedings are revived. 6. Respondents 1 and 2 have admitted that the case pertains to year 1978. LTC claim bill of the petitioner appeared suspicious on enquiry by Deputy Director of Industries (Admn.) as the Manager of M/s. Marina Tourist Taxi Service, 8 Marina Arcade Cannaught was not willing to confirm the issue of receipt submitted by the petitioner. D.O. Letter No. 2-3-/78-Ind-1 (Vig.), dated September 11, 1978 was sent to the Director of Vigilance for enquiry which was conducted by Officer on Special Duty, Vigilance who concluded that the claim preferred by the petitioner was false. Consequently, the First Information Report was registered and investigated. It was found that the petitioner dishonestly and fraudulently prepared T.A. bill claim for Rs. 2450/- for journey from Shimla to Madras and back. Thus, the submissions of the petitioner in the petition are incorrect. 7. The case was investigated by various Police Officers who recorded the statements of witnesses and took into possession documents. As there was no sufficient material to prosecute the case, cancellation report was submitted by the police. It has been admitted that the cancellation report was submitted by the police in the Court of Special Judge (Forests), Shimla and order dated July 8, 1985 was passed and the petitioner was discharged. The cancellation report was submitted merely on the ground that at that particular stage there was no sufficient material to prosecute the case. Later, opinion of Law Branch was obtained on the cancellation report vide letter No. LLR(LIT)E(6)-3/86 of Himachal Pradesh Government, Law Department dated January 4, 1987, Dy. Secretary (Law) to the Govt. of H.P. wherein it was directed that fresh and additional evidence against the petitioner be collected and after that challan be produced in the court of law. It was also directed that necessary permission to further investigate the case be obtained from the Special Judge, Shimla. On this, application dated March 7, 1987 was filed by the police in the Court of Special Judge, Shimla which was fixed for hearing on March 20, 1987/March 25, 1987. On March 25, 1987, the Special Judge (Forests), Shimla passed order for re-investigating the case in accordance with law. On this, application dated March 7, 1987 was filed by the police in the Court of Special Judge, Shimla which was fixed for hearing on March 20, 1987/March 25, 1987. On March 25, 1987, the Special Judge (Forests), Shimla passed order for re-investigating the case in accordance with law. On the basis of this order, investigation was carried out and challan against the petitioner was filed in the Court on December 2, 1994. The order dated July 8, 1985 was set aside by the Special Judge (Forests), Shimla vide order dated March 25, 1987 and the petitioner has been linked with the alleged offence by oral as well as documentary evidence, so the trial of the petitioner is competent. Perusal of the evidence collected during the investigation clearly indicates commission of cognizable offence by the petitioner as such the present petition is not maintainable. The order dated July 8, 1985 has been set aside vide order dated March 25, 1987 of the Special Judge (Forests), Shimla whereby permission to re-investigate the case was granted in accordance with law and the challan has been filed against the petitioner for his trial. The investigation continued against the petitioner but due to non-availability of documents, other evidence and non-availability of Investigating Officers for the re-investigation of the case, it could not be completed soon. 8. The petitioner has shown his journey in Taxi hired from Delhi up to Madras and back to Delhi, belonging to Marina Tourist Service, Marina Arcade Cannaught Circus, New Delhi. According to the T.A. bill of the petitioner, he claimed LTC for his mother, father, wife and daughter etc. It has been revealed from the statement of Marina Tourist Taxi Service that the petitioner had hired taxi from them on January 13, 1978 to January 31, 1978 for local use in Delhi only and it was not hired from Delhi to Madras and back. Other record and statements of the witnesses disclose that the petitioner never went with his family members from Delhi to Madras and back. So, there is sufficient documentary evidence against the petitioner to link him with the alleged commission of offence. Permission to re-investigate the case was granted by the Special Judge, Shimla after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. There is no delay in completing the investigation and submission of the challan. 9. So, there is sufficient documentary evidence against the petitioner to link him with the alleged commission of offence. Permission to re-investigate the case was granted by the Special Judge, Shimla after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. There is no delay in completing the investigation and submission of the challan. 9. Respondent 3 has explained the facts relating to the seeking of LTC by the petitioner and the payments released to him. It is also pointed out that it was after the enquiry that the First Information Report was lodged in this case and that the prosecution sanction was granted after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case thoroughly. 10. Having extracted the important facts of the case, we turn to the specific questions raised before us by the petitioner. 11. Shri R. P. Singh contended that after the filing of cancellation report and acceptance thereof by the Special Judge on July 8, 1985 the investigation could not be re-opened nor had the Special Judge power to revise the order dated July 8, 1985 and permit fresh investigation in the matter. Reliance was placed on the Apex Court decision in AIR 1968 SC 117 : (1968 Cri LJ 97), (Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra) of which paragraphs 12 to 18 were particularly referred to : "12. Though it may be that a report submitted by the police may have to be dealt with judicially, by a Magistrate, and although the Magistrate may have certain supervisory powers, nevertheless, we are not inclined to agree with the further view that from these considerations alone it can be said that when the police submit a report that no case has been made out for sending up an accused for trial, it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police of file a charge-sheet. But, we may make it clear, that this is not to say that the Magistrate is absolutely powerless, because, as will be indicated later, it is open to him to take cognizance of an offence and proceed, according to law. We do not also find any such power under S. 173(3), as is sought to be inferred, in some of the decisions cited above. We do not also find any such power under S. 173(3), as is sought to be inferred, in some of the decisions cited above. As we have indicated broadly the approach made by the various High Courts in coming to different conclusions, we do not think it necessary to refer to those decisions in detail." "13. It will be seen that the Code, as such does not use the expression 'charge-sheet' or 'final report'. But it is understood in the Police Manual containing Rules and Regulations, that a report by the police, filed under S. 170 of the Code, is referred to as a 'charge-sheet'. But in respect of the reports sent under S. 169 i.e., when there is no sufficient evidence to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, it is termed variously, in different States, as either 'referred charge', 'final report', or 'summary'." "14. In these two appeals, which are from the State of Bihar, the reports, under S. 169, are referred to as 'final report'. Now, the question as to what exactly is to be done by a Magistrate, on receiving a report, under S. 173, will have to be considered. That report may be in respect of a case, coming under S. 170, or one coming under S. 169. We have already referred to S. 190, which is the first Section in the group of Sections headed 'Conditions Requisite for Initiation of Proceedings'. Sub-Section (1), of this Section, will cover a report sent, under S. 173. The use of the words 'may take cognizance of any offence', in Sub-Sec. (1) of S. 190, in our opinion, imports the exercise of a 'judicial discretion', and the Magistrate, who receives the report, under S. 173, will have to consider the said report and judicially take a decision, whether or not to take cognizance of the offence. From this is follows, that it is not as if, that the Magistrate is bound to accept the opinion of the police that there is case for placing the accused, on trial. It is open to the Magistrate to take the view that the facts, disclosed in the report do not make out an offence for taking cognizance or he may take the view that there is no sufficient evidence to justify an accused being put on trial. It is open to the Magistrate to take the view that the facts, disclosed in the report do not make out an offence for taking cognizance or he may take the view that there is no sufficient evidence to justify an accused being put on trial. On either of these grounds, the Magistrate will be perfectly justified in declining to take cognizance of an offence, irrespective of the opinion of the police. On the other hand, if the Magistrate agrees with the report, which is a charge-sheet submitted by the police, no difficulty whatsoever is caused, because he will have full jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, under S. 190(1)(b) of the Code. This will be the position, when the report, under S. 173, is a charge-sheet". "15. Then the question is, what is the position, when the Magistrate is dealing with a report submitted by the police, under S. 173, that no case is made out for sending up an accused for trial, which report, as we have already indicated, is called, in the area in question, as a 'final report' ? Even in those cases, if the Magistrate agrees with the said report, he may accept the final report and close the proceedings. But there may be instances when the Magistrate may take the view, on a consideration of the final report, that the opinion formed by the police is not based on a full and complete investigation, in which case, in our opinion, the Magistrate will have ample jurisdiction to give directions to the police, under S. 156(3), to make a further investigation. That is, if the Magistrate feels, after considering the final report, that the investigation is unsatisfactory, or incomplete, or that there is scope for further investigation, it will be open to the Magistrate to decline to accept the final report and direct the police to make further investigation, under S. 156(3). The police, after such further investigation, may submit a charge-sheet, or, again submit a final report, depending upon the further investigation made by them. If ultimately, the Magistrate forms the opinion that the facts, set out in the final report, constitute an offence, he can take cognizance of the offence, under S. 190(1)(b), notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police, expressed in the final report." "16. In this connection, the provisions of S. 169 of the Code, are relevant. If ultimately, the Magistrate forms the opinion that the facts, set out in the final report, constitute an offence, he can take cognizance of the offence, under S. 190(1)(b), notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police, expressed in the final report." "16. In this connection, the provisions of S. 169 of the Code, are relevant. They specifically provide that even though, on investigation, a police officer, or other Investigating Officer, is of the opinion that there is no case for proceeding against the accused, he is bound, while releasing the accused, to take a bond from him to appear, if and when required, before a Magistrate. This provision is obviously to meet a contingency of the Magistrate, when he considers the report of the investigating officer, and judicially takes a view different from the police." "17. We have to approach the question, arising for consideration in this case, in the light of the circumstances pointed out above. We have already referred to the scheme of Chapter XIV, as well as the observations of this Court in Rishbud and Inder Singh's case, AIR 1955 SC 196 : (1955 Cri LJ 526), that the formation of the opinion as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial before a Magistrate, is left to the officer in-charge of the police station. There is no express power, so far as we can see, which gives jurisdiction to pass an order of the nature under attack nor can any such powers be implied. There is certainly no obligation, on the Magistrate, to accept the report, if he does not agree with the opinion formed by the police. Under those circumstances, if he still suspect that an offence has been committed, he is entitled, notwithstanding the opinion of the police, to take cognizance, under S. 190(1)(c) of the Code. That provision in our opinion, is obviously intended to secure that offences may not go unpunished and justice may be invoked even where persons individually aggrieved are unwilling or unable to prosecute, or the police, either wantonly or through bona fide error, fail to submit a report, setting out the facts constituting the offence. That provision in our opinion, is obviously intended to secure that offences may not go unpunished and justice may be invoked even where persons individually aggrieved are unwilling or unable to prosecute, or the police, either wantonly or through bona fide error, fail to submit a report, setting out the facts constituting the offence. Therefore, a very wide power is conferred on the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence, not only when he receives information about the commission of an offence from a third person, but also where he has knowledge or even suspicion that the offence has been committed. It is open to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence, under S. 190(1)(c), on the ground that, after having due regard to the final report and the police records placed before him, he has reason to suspect that an offence has been committed. Therefore, these circumstances will also clearly negative the power of a Magistrate to call for a charge-sheet from the police, when they have submitted a final report. The entire scheme of Chapter XIV clearly indicates that the formation of the opinion, as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused for trial, is that of the Officer-in-charge of the police station and that opinion determines whether the report is to be under S. 170, being a 'charge-sheet', or under S. 169, 'a final report'. It is no doubt open to the Magistrate, as we have already pointed out, to accept or disagree with the opinion of the police and, if he disagrees, he is entitled to adopt any one of the courses indicated by us. But he cannot direct the police to submit a charge-sheet, because the submission of the report depends upon the opinion formed by the police, and not on the opinion of the Magistrate. The Magistrate cannot compel the police to form a particular opinion, on the investigation, and to submit a report, according to such opinion. That will be really encroaching on the sphere of the police and compelling the police to form an opinion so as to accord with the decision of the Magistrate and send a report either under S. 169, or under S. 170, depending upon the nature of the decision. Such a function has been left to the police under the Code." "18. Such a function has been left to the police under the Code." "18. We have already pointed out that the investigation, under the Code, takes in several aspects, and stages, ending ultimately with the formation of an opinion by the police as to whether, on the material covered and collected a case is made out to place the accused before the Magistrate for trial, and the submission of either a charge-sheet, or a final report is dependent on the nature of the opinion, so formed. The formation of the said opinion, by the police, as pointed out earlier, is the final step in the investigation, and that final step is to be taken only by the police and by no other authority." 12. From the opposite side reference was made to AIR 1979 SC 1791 : (1979 Cri LJ 1346) (Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.); AIR 1952 Orissa 350 : (1952 Cri LJ 1635) (Prosecuting Inspector, Keonjhar v. Minaketan Mahato); and 1973 Cri LJ 1288 (Kerala). (In the matter of State Prosecutor, Criminal References Nos. 5 and 6 of 1972) and it was contended that after the filing of report under S. 173(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, police can further investigate the matter and file supplementary challan since it may come across evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused and that power of investigation is available notwithstanding that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence upon the police report submitted under S. 173 of the Code, though it may be desirable that such a step may be taken by seeking formal permission of the Court for making further investigation. 13. We gave careful consideration to the rival submissions of both sides on this question. In our considered opinion, further investigation in the matter is not correct legally and factually. There may not be any dispute about the filing of supplementary report in a case where report under S. 173(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code is filed in the Court being permissible under S. 173(8) of the Code, but no provision was brought to our notice which permitted the police to reopen a case and investigate the same when once it has been closed at its request and the Court has also passed final order of closure at its behest that no case was made out against the accused. There is marked difference between "report" for the trial of the accused on the basis of material pointing out the commission of offence and "cancellation report" for the cancellation of the case against him for the reason that on material collected by the Investigating Officer, no offence appeared to have been committed by him. The police may have power to make further investigation and file supplementary report in the former case but it has no powder to do so in the latter case, since it had already obtained final order from the Court for the closure of the case. This part, the Court had no power to revise/review the order competently passed on July 8, 1985, therefore, on this account as well, further action of the police is not sustainable. 14. Apart from the aforementioned conclusion and in the alternative, the statements recorded by the Investigating Officer during the fresh investigation simply point out that they are the result of not only pressure exercised on the witnesses but also point out that the material witnesses have tried to avoid their involvement in the case. We perused material documents during the course of hearing of this case. They did not point out commission of the crime by the petitioner. Rather, they exonerate him. Recording of statements against the documents of payment, contents of which are absolutely plain and clear, do not improve the case of the prosecution since document of receipt of payment is sine qua non for initiation of case against the petitioner. 15. Now, we turn to examine the last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that continuing of the case since 1979 is not only belated but also violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. State has tried to explain the delay, but we are not convinced by it. Perusal of the explanation, rather, indicates that the matter has been investigated quite leisurely. No much importance was given to investigate this case promptly. Instead, attention was paid to some other later cases. There is substance in the contention of the petitioner that he has been subjected to undue harassment all these years. Most of the witnesses, named in the preceding para of this judgment, have died and the petitioner himself has also forgotten much about the case against him by this time. Instead, attention was paid to some other later cases. There is substance in the contention of the petitioner that he has been subjected to undue harassment all these years. Most of the witnesses, named in the preceding para of this judgment, have died and the petitioner himself has also forgotten much about the case against him by this time. Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees speedy trial and fair justice to accused. Unless the delay is satisfactorily explained, criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed against a person under Art. 21 of the Constitution. The Investigation Agency should have completed the investigation promptly. The explanation offered by it is hardly convincing. Great harassment has been meted out to the petitioner and more would descend upon him, in case his prosecution is allowed to continue, since there are large number of witnesses to be examined and documents to be proved before a Court which is already flooded with large number of other older cases pending for trial for the last many years. 16. In AIR 1990 SC 1266 : (1990 Cri LJ 1306) (State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. V. Pavithran), the Apex Court said that (para 7 page 1268) : (of AIR) : (at p. 1307 of Cri LJ) : "7. There is no denying the fact that a lethargic and lackadaisical manner of investigation over a prolonged period makes an accused in a criminal proceedings to live every moment under extreme emotional and mental stress and strain and to remain always under a fear psychosis. Therefore, it is imperative that if investigation of a criminal proceeding staggers on with tardy pace due to the indolence or inefficiency of the investigating agency causing unreasonable and substantial delay resulting in grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused, the Court as the protector of the right and personal liberty of the citizen will step in and resort to the drastic remedy of quashing further proceedings in such investigation." Again, in para 9 of this judgment it has been said that : "9. The determination of the question whether the accused has been deprived of a fair trial on account of delayed or protracted investigation would also, therefore, depend on various factors including whether such delay was unreasonably long or causing deliberately or intentionally to hamper the defence of the accused or whether such delay was inevitable in the nature of things or whether it was due to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused. The Court, in addition, has to consider whether such delay on the part of the investigating agency has caused grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused." 17. In (1992) 1 SCC 225 : (1992 Cri LJ 2717) (Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R. S. Nayak), after detailed analysis of the question by the Apex Court, following propositions have been laid down by way of guidelines, although, they have not been laid exhaustively. These are (para 86, pp. 270-272) : (of SCC) : (para 54 at pp. 2747-2749 of Cri LJ) : "86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are : (1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Art. 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. (2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Art. 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. (3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are : (a) the period of remand and preconviction detention should be as short as possible. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. (3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are : (a) the period of remand and preconviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expenses and disturbances to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. (4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, "delay is a known defence tactic". Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is - who is responsible for the delay ? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior Court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation. (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the Court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on - what is called, the systemic delays. (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the Court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on - what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pendantic one. (6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker "it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate." The same idea has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell in the following words : '....... the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredient; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances.' However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of the given case. (7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the 'demand' rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the Court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot he put in his favour, but the mere non-asking for speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker and other succeeding cases. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker and other succeeding cases. (8) Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors - 'balancing test' or 'balancing process' - and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. (9) Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order - including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded - as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. (10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rue cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case, before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial. (11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, he disposed of on priority basis." 18. (11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, he disposed of on priority basis." 18. In ILR (1982) Him Pra 317 (State of H.P. v. Iqbal Singh Kohli), the learned Chief Justice, while examining this question, said in para 19 that : "19. It is submitted that even after the expiry of 9 years of the police filing the charge-sheet charge has not been framed. Keeping in view of number of witnesses cited and the documents placed on record it is evident that it is likely to take still few years more before the case can be decided. The respondent is stated to be due to retire from service by the end of this year." 19. Again, in ILR (1982) Him Pra 327 (B. N. Ganjoo v. State of H.P.), the same question came for consideration before the same Court and it said that : "............... It is not even known today how long the Court is likely to take before the question of framing a charge against the petitioner can be decided. In my opinion the petitioner has already suffered a lot in terms of not only money but also in mental agony and humiliation for the alleged petty offence ........ It does not credit to the police also that it took more than three years for completing the investigation. The Court is also taking its time. I know that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla is over-burdened with work specially because of the paucity of the Judicial Officers. But then as far as the petitioner is concerned, it is no solace to him. A sword of Damocles has been hanging over his head for a long time in respect of the present alleged offence. It is in the interest of speedy justice that the offences are reported to the police expeditiously and the investigations are completed with utmost despatch. It is for that reason that S. 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enjoins upon the investigation agency to complete the investigation without unnecessary delay ..........." 20. In Prithvi Raj v. State of Haryana, 1981 Cri LJ 984 (PandH), the following observations are worth noticing (at pp. It is for that reason that S. 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enjoins upon the investigation agency to complete the investigation without unnecessary delay ..........." 20. In Prithvi Raj v. State of Haryana, 1981 Cri LJ 984 (PandH), the following observations are worth noticing (at pp. 985 and 986 of Cri LJ) : "To allow the criminal proceedings to continue further after a long lapse of time of about 11 years from the date of alleged commission of offence would, in my opinion, amount to permitting a Court proceeding to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and would not at this stage, achieve any salutary public purpose. On the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, such continuance constitutes gross abuse of process of Court. It is thus imperative for securing the ends of justice that this criminal proceeding should no longer be allowed to stand and must be quashed." 21. Chief Justice Warren, delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Peter H. Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, (1967) 18 Law Ed 2d 1 : 386 US 213 : "We hold here that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment. That right has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. Its first articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have been made in Magna Carta (1215), wherein it was written, 'we will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right', but evidence of recognition of the right to speedy justice in even earlier times is found in the Assilize of Clarendon (1166). By the late thirteenth century, justices, armed with commissions of goal delivery and/or oyer and terminer were visiting the country side three times a year." 22. Another aspect of the right to speedy trial was then highlighted in Barker v. Wingo, (1972) 33 Law Ed 2d 101 : 407 US 514 in these words : "The right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused. Another aspect of the right to speedy trial was then highlighted in Barker v. Wingo, (1972) 33 Law Ed 2d 101 : 407 US 514 in these words : "The right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused. In addition to the general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent and fair procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and, at times in opposition to the interest of the accused." Yet, again, the basic principles underlying the right were concretised in the following terms in Richard M. Sumith v. Fred M. Hooey, (1969) 21 Law Ed 2d 607 : 393 US 374 : "Suffice it to remember that this constitutional guarantee has universally been thought essential to protect at least three basic demands of criminal justice in the Anglo-American legal system : '(1) To prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial. (2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, and, (3) to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." (See AIR 1978 SC 597 (Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India); AIR 1979 SC 1369 : (1979 Cri LJ 1045) (Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar); AIR 1981 SC 1675 : (1981 Cri LJ 1273) (State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punaji Shah); AIR 1983 SC 361 (2) : (1983 Cri LJ 481) (T. V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu); AIR 1987 SC 740 (Rakesh Saxena v. State through C.B.I.) and AIR 1986 Patna 324 : (1986 Cri LJ 1771) (FB) (Madheshwardhari Singh v. State of Bihar). 23. Looking the present case from the angle of principles and precedents, we see great deal of substance in this contention of the petitioner. The subject matter of investigation pertains to the year 1979. We have crossed 1995. There are large number of documents and witnesses to be proved before a Court which is already burdened with large number of old, complicated and big cases involving many accused, numerous documents and witnesses. Already a period of more than sixteen years has gone by since the taking place of the incident. It is, in these circumstances, futile to allow this kind of lame investigation to continue and subject the petitioner to continuous harassment and mental tension. 24. Already a period of more than sixteen years has gone by since the taking place of the incident. It is, in these circumstances, futile to allow this kind of lame investigation to continue and subject the petitioner to continuous harassment and mental tension. 24. Accordingly, we allow this writ petition, quash the proceedings against the petitioner. Costs on parties. Petition allowed.