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1996 DIGILAW 220 (ALL)

RAM NARESH v. D D C PADARAUNA

1996-02-23

R.B.MEHROTRA

body1996
R. B. MEHROTRA, J. The petitioners claimed that on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties in the court of Assistant Consolidation Officer in Case No. 776, the Assistant Consolidation Officer vide his order, dated 14-11-1987 directed that the name of the petitioners be mutated over plot No. 684 area 22 decimal in village, Pakar and at Chak No. 116 area 45 decimal at village, Bartha in place of Gangajali. 2. Aggrieved thereby an appeal has been filed by the respondents wherein an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also moved by the respondents for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The petitioners filed objection against the application filed by the respondents under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and contended that the appeal is not maintainable and also contended before the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation that at first, the issue of limitation in filing the appeal, should be heard and decided. 3. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide his order dated 18-6- 1987 held that the purpose of consolidation proceedings is to resolve the dispute between the parties expeditiously and with an intent to save the time of the court and to avoid the harassment of the parties, it is necessary that both the matters, namely, the application under Section-5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal and the merits of the appeal may be heard together and accordingly directed that both the matters may be heard together. 4. Aggrieved thereby the petitioners filed a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Deputy Director of Consolidation vide his order dated 20-10-1995 rejected the petitioners, revision, taking a view that the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation is of interlocutory character and no revision lay against the said order. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid two orders, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 6. The Deputy Director of Consolidation vide his order dated 20-10-1995 rejected the petitioners, revision, taking a view that the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation is of interlocutory character and no revision lay against the said order. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid two orders, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that since the appeal itself was not competent, unless the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was allowed and the delay in filing the appeal was condoned, it was imperative on the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation to have first decided the tune of condonation of delay in filing the appeal and only after being satisfied that the delay deserves to be condoned, the appeal would have been competent to be heard and it was incumbent upon the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation to have first heard and decided the Question of condonation of delay, thereafter could have heard the appeal on merits. The learned counsel has also contended that the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation was not an interlocutory order, as it has affected the rights of the parties in getting the matter decided at appropriate stage. 7. In support of the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri X. M. Misra has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Bhagwat and others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Bulandshahr and others reported in 1990 AWC 485. 3. In the aforesaid decision, a learned Single Judge of this Court has taken a view that unless an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is decided, there is no competent appeal before the Court and refusing to decide the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act first and directing hearing of these matters together, is not permissible and such an order is not an interlocutory order. 9. With all respect to the learned Single Judge, I am unable to subscribe to the aforesaid view. 10. 9. With all respect to the learned Single Judge, I am unable to subscribe to the aforesaid view. 10. In the present matter, the issue for consideration is as to whether the appellate court while exercising appellate powers for the purposes of expeditious disposal of the matter can regulate its procedure in the manner it thinks fit and proper and should this Court interfere in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such matters which are not in contravention of any prescribed rule or procedure. No provision has been brought to my notice mandating that in cases where an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed alongwith the appeal, the application and the appeal should be heard separately. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation in the present matter has given cogent reasons for hearing both matter together. In the impugned order it has been rightly observed that the purpose of consolidation proceedings is to resolve the dispute between the parties expeditiously. The Consolidation of Holdings Act provides special procedure for deciding the objection, the appeal and the revision arising out of the dispute between the parties. This is unfortunate that despite the desire of the Legislature, the matters nave remained pending for years together in several courts including this Court. Is an order, requiring for the purpose of expeditious disposal, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the appeal itself on merits be heard together, can be said to be violating any norm or procedure or rule? In the context of the present case, such an order does not decide the rights of the parties. The order only regulates the procedure of the Court. 11. The word interlocutory has to be interpreted in its real context. Any order passed during the pendency of a matter, which does not finally decide the rights of the parties, is of an interlocutory character. However, every word has to be understood in the context, it has been used. The word interlocutory as interpreted in Bhagwat and others case (supra) was out of context. A single word has many meanings, what meaning is to be assigned to that word in its context has to be really appreciated. 12. However, every word has to be understood in the context, it has been used. The word interlocutory as interpreted in Bhagwat and others case (supra) was out of context. A single word has many meanings, what meaning is to be assigned to that word in its context has to be really appreciated. 12. In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 264, the Constitution Bench consisting of nine Judges of the Apex Court gave clue of interpreting the meaning of the words, in the context they are used. The Apex Court held : "168. In Chapter 4 of the Treaties titled "the Loom of Language", it is stated : "words are not passive agents meaning the same thing and carrying the same value at all times and in all contexts. They do not come in standard shapes and sizes like coins from the mint, nor do they go forth with a degree to all the world that they shall mean only so much, no more and no less. Through its own particular personality each word has a penumbra of meaning which no draftsman can entirely cut away. It refuses to be used as a mathematical symbol. " "169. In Town v. Eisner, (1917) 245 US 418, Mr. Justice Holmes said that "a word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged ; it is the skein of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. " In Osborns Concise Law Dictionary Sixth Edition, interlocutory order has been defined : "interlocutory order.- While a final order determines the rights of the parties an interlocutory order leaves something further to be done to determine those rights (Ord. 29 ). " In Websters Dictionary Delux Edition the meaning of the word interlocutory is as under: "interlocutory.- Pronounced and arising out during legal procedure not final. " 13. In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, interlocutory applications are defined. 29 ). " In Websters Dictionary Delux Edition the meaning of the word interlocutory is as under: "interlocutory.- Pronounced and arising out during legal procedure not final. " 13. In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, interlocutory applications are defined. Relevant portions are quoted : "interlocutory application.- An interlocutory application is a request made to the Court, or to a Judge in chambers, for its interference in a matter arising in the progress of a cause of proceeding ; and it may either relate to the process of the court, or to the protection of the property in litigation pendents lite, or to any matter on which the interference of the court or judge is required before or in consequence of a decree or order. [wooster v. Handy, 23 F. 40, 53, citing 2 Daniell, Ch. Prac. c. 35]. An interlocutory application is a request to the court or to a judge at chambers for its interference in a matter arising in the progress of a cause or proceeding ; and it may either relate to the process of the court, or to the protection of the property in litigation pendente lite, or to any matter up on which the interference of the court or judge is required before, or in consequence of, a decree or order. Horn v. Pere Marguette R. Co. , 151 F. 626, 636, quoting and adopting Daniell, Ch. PI, & (4th. Ed.) 1734, 1735. " In the aforesaid dictionary the word interlocutory has been defined. The definitions which are relevant in the context are being reproduced below : "interlocutory" means provisional, only temporary, not final, not a final decision of the whole controversy, made or done during the progress of an action, intermediate order. Newell v. Newell, 293 P. 2d 663, 667, 77 Idaho 355. " "interlocutory" in law means that which does not decide the cause, but settles some intervening matter relating to the cause. In re Sullivans Estate, IS P. 945, 946, 36 Wash. 217". In the aforesaid context, language of Section 48 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act (Act) need be interpreted. "48. " "interlocutory" in law means that which does not decide the cause, but settles some intervening matter relating to the cause. In re Sullivans Estate, IS P. 945, 946, 36 Wash. 217". In the aforesaid context, language of Section 48 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act (Act) need be interpreted. "48. Revision and reference.- (1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings ; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order, (other than an interlocutory order) passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. (2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub-section (3) (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1 ). Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officers, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpal, shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. " (*) Amended by Ordinance No. 15 of 1982 w. e. f. 10-11-80 [emphasis added]. Section 48 of the Act at as amended mandates that only final decisions are to be revisable before the Deputy Director of Consolidation in exercise of jurisdiction under the aforesaid section. It prohibits taking of issues at interlocutory stages, as it is defusive of the purpose of the Act. 14. In the present matter, the very object of the Act regarding expeditious disposal of the dispute between the parties, as rightly pointed out by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, stands defeated, if such orders are to be examined by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in exercise of Section 48 of the Act. 15. In the present matter, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation only directed a procedure to be adopted for hearing of Section 5 application and the appeal itself. The impugned order did not decide the rights of the parties. 15. In the present matter, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation only directed a procedure to be adopted for hearing of Section 5 application and the appeal itself. The impugned order did not decide the rights of the parties. By all standard the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation was an interlocutory order and the Deputy Director of Consolidation was perfectly justified in refusing to interfere with the aforesaid order. 16. It may also be noticed that the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation did not hold that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the appeal will be decided together. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation only decided to regulate the procedure of the hearing of two matters. In case Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation was satisfied that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not deserve to be allowed, the appeal would have been rejected, only on the ground of being barred by limitation. In case the delay was to be condoned in filing the appeal, the appeal would have been decided on merits, but to save the time of the court as well as to avoid harassment of the parties, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation directed to hear both the matters together. Interferring with such an order is counter-productive and against basic tenets of the judicial approach. The High Court should not extend its extra ordinary Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere in these trial procedural matters. Such interference only prolongs the agony of the litigants and prolongs the pendency of litigation. 17. With all respect, I say that in Bhagwats case (supra) learned Single Judge has not appreciated the meaning of the word interlocutory in its correct perspective. The reliance placed on the decisions referred to in the aforesaid case was wholly o it of context. Meaning of the word interlocutory referred to and relied upon in the decisions referred to in Bhagwats case (supra) were wholly in a different context and the ratio of the aforesaid decision was not applicable in the context of Section 48 of the Act. 18. Meaning of the word interlocutory referred to and relied upon in the decisions referred to in Bhagwats case (supra) were wholly in a different context and the ratio of the aforesaid decision was not applicable in the context of Section 48 of the Act. 18. Sin A various such matters are coming up for consideration, it is but appropriate that the dispute be resolved, though I am clearly, of the view that the impugned order did not deserve to be interfered with but the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court is squarely attracted in the facts of the present case. 19. Keeping in mind the judicial propriety, I am of the view that the issue should be resolved by a Larger Bench for consideration as to whether the order impugned in the present matter can be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 20. Let the papers be placed expeditiously before the Honble Chief Justice for appropriate orders. Order accordingly. .