Judgment B. L. Yadav, J. 1. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the relief has been sought for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the notification dated 2-6- 1994 contained in Memo no.3791 (Annexure-5) issued by the state of Bihar (Respondent No.1)directing the Special Police Establishment under the Delhi Special Police establishment Act 1946 (compendiously the Act) to investigate the case lodged at Dhansar P. S. Case No.159 of 1993 in respect of offence under Sections 457, 436, 427 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and also to quash the notification dated 26.10.1994 (Annexure-4) issued by the Union of India (Respondent No.2) whereby the Special Police Establishment under the Act has been given jurisdiction to investigate into the said case and also to quash the F. I. R. registered as Crime no. R. C. I. (S)/95 (D), dated 3.1.1995 (Annexure-1 ). 2. In order to appreciate the controversy certain relevant facts may be noticed. The F. I. R. (Annexure-1) was lodged on 9-3-1993 at about 8 A. M. for an occurrence in conection with an offence under Sections 457, 436, 427, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and section 4 of the Prevention of Damages to Public Property Act, 1984. That f. I. R. was registered with Dhansar police Station as Dhansar P. S. Case No.159, dated 9-3-1993. Apart from the petitioner, two other persons were shown as accused. Investigation under the supervision of the Deputy Inspector-General (Coalfields) Bokaro and superintendent of Police, Dhanbad, was taken up on 9-3-1993, the date of information itself, till November, 1994 after about one year and 8 months. The investigation was completed after recording the statements of relevant witnesses. The police took interest in investigating the matter thoroughly. The case was investigated by the Dy. S. P. , Dhanbad, D. I. G. of Police (Coalfields), Bokaro and Superintendent of police, Dhanbad. It appears that the result of the investigation by the local police under the supervision of the Dy. S. P. , Dhanbad, Deputy Inspector-General of Police (Coalfield Range), bokaro and the Superintendent of police, Dhanbad, was that even though the occurrence had taken place, as indicated in the F. I. R. , but the petitioner or the other accused. It appears that the result of the investigation by the local police under the supervision of the Dy. S. P. , Dhanbad, Deputy Inspector-General of Police (Coalfield Range), bokaro and the Superintendent of police, Dhanbad, was that even though the occurrence had taken place, as indicated in the F. I. R. , but the petitioner or the other accused. shown in the F. I. R. (Annexure 1), were not involved in the case and consequently a final report was filed by the local police in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, dhanbad on 31-12-1994 (Annexure-2 ). 3. A perusal of the case diary, however, would also indicate that there was no evidence available against the petitioner and during 1-1/2 years of period of investigation by local police there was no complaint from any quarter about any lacuna in the investigation conducted by the police officials like D. S. P. Dhanbad and D. I. G. of coalfields. The Deputy Inspector-General of Police (Coalfields Range), bokaro and the Superintendent of police, Dhanbad directed the Investigating Officer of Dhansar P. S. Case no.159/93 to submit a final report. In view of Sec.173 of the Code of criminal Procedure a detailed investigation report by the high police officials was submitted before the Chief judicial Magistrate, indicating therein that no offence was committed by the petitioner. Thereafter an application was filed by the petitioner before the chief Judicial Magistrate that the final report submitted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, may be accepted. In view of Sec.173 (8) of the Code of criminal Procedure; it was, however, open to the Chief Judicial Magistrate not to accept the said final report and to direct the police to make further investigation. 4. There was a Notification dated 2-6-1994 (Annexure 5) issued under section 3 of the Act and the C. B. I. (Respondent No.3) was given power to investigate into the matter again (vide Annexure- 3 ). 5. The Central Government has issued the Notification on 26th October, 1994 in view of the provision of sections 5 and 6 of the Act directing the. Delhi Special Police Establishment to investigate the matter and jurisdiction of the Special Police has been to the whole of Bihar. 5. The Central Government has issued the Notification on 26th October, 1994 in view of the provision of sections 5 and 6 of the Act directing the. Delhi Special Police Establishment to investigate the matter and jurisdiction of the Special Police has been to the whole of Bihar. By the order dated 2nd of June, 1994 the government of Bihar in view of the provisions of section 6 of the Act directed the Special Police Establishment to investigate the matter in connection with the offence under Sections 457, 436, 427, 120-B, I. P. C. The jurisdiction was for the whole of the state. 6. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of Respondents 2 and 3 indicating that before filing the instant petition on behalf of petitioner, a petition was filed before the Calcutta High court, on behalf of M/s. Continental transport and Construction Corporation. On 9-2-1995 the petition was disposed of with observations that the venue of the investigation be shifted to Ranchi instead of Dhanbad (Annexure-B ). Against that judgment and order a S. L. P. No.1155 of 1995 was filed before the apex Court in which an order was passed staying the operation of the. order of the Calcutta High Court. During the pendency of the matter before the Apex Court, M/s. Continental Transport and Construction corporation Limited, a registered Company having its Head Office at 46-C, Rafi ahmad Kidwai Road, 3rd Floor, Calcutta filed a petition before Ranchi bench of this Court, and Hon ble brother Chy. S. N. Mishra, J. by order dated 10th May, 1995 has been pleased to dismiss that petition as there was no merit (Annexure- A) Page 27 of the brief ). The S. L. P. that was pending before the Apex Court against the judgment and order of the learned Single judge of the Calcutta High Court came up for hearing. S. N. Mishra, J. by order dated 10th May, 1995 has been pleased to dismiss that petition as there was no merit (Annexure- A) Page 27 of the brief ). The S. L. P. that was pending before the Apex Court against the judgment and order of the learned Single judge of the Calcutta High Court came up for hearing. Their Lordships of the apex Court after hearing the counsel for the parties, by the judgment and order dated the 7th of September, 1995 (Annexure c to the counter affidavit)granted the leave and allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the Calcutta High Court, but left it to the discretion of the Joint director of Central Bureau of Investigation that in case the Joint Director thinks it proper, he may either change the venue of the investigation or to change the officers who were handling the investigation so far. 7. Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, learned senior Counsel for the petitioner, contended that there was no justification to appoint Delhi Special Police Establishment to investigate the matter keeping in view that there was no complaint or slackness on the part of the local police during the period (more than one and half year) the investigation was carried out. The State Government also did not express dissatisfaction over the working of the local police. Under Sec.6 of the Act there appears no consent nor any reasons were assigned while issuing the order under Sec.5 of the Act, entrusting the investigation to the delhi Special Police Establishment (Annexure 4 ). Without the matter being initiated by the State Government and reasons being assigned keeping in view the fact that the local police under the supervision, of the Deputy superintendent of Police, Dhanbad, and the D. I. G. of Police (Coalfield range), Bokaro and the superintendent of Police, Dhanbad, had submitted a final report to the Chief Judicial magistrate, the appointment of Delhi special Police Establishment was erroneous and in violation of fundamental rights under Arts.21 and 14. This has to be considered keeping in view that the petitioner has a fundamental right of personal life and liberty as contained under Article 21 read with Article 19 (1) (d) of the Constitution. Assigning reasons even in an administrative order is an integral part of the principle of natural justice. Unless there are reasons, the order is ineffective. This has to be considered keeping in view that the petitioner has a fundamental right of personal life and liberty as contained under Article 21 read with Article 19 (1) (d) of the Constitution. Assigning reasons even in an administrative order is an integral part of the principle of natural justice. Unless there are reasons, the order is ineffective. Reliance was placed on State of West bengal V/s. Sampat Lal and others, AIR 1985 S. C.195. 8. Mr. Deo Narayan Yadav, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State of Bihar, contended that the order has correctly been issued vide Annexure 4 in pursuance of the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the act. In such matters it is for the State government or the Central Govt. to decide the matter as to whether a particular offence has to be investigated by the local police or by the Delhi Special police Establishment and recording of reasons was not necessary nor the petitioner was entitled to claim protection of fundamental rights under Articles 19 (1) (d) and 21 of the constitution. There is no ground made out for interference. 9. Learned counsel for the C. B. I. (respondent No.3) adopted the arguments of the learned counsel for the state of Bihar and added that as earlier the petition has been dismissed by the ranchi Bench and in view of decision of the Apex Court, there is no propriety for interference by this Court. 10. Having scrutinised the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties the question for" determination is as to whether the petitioner was entitled to fundamental rights under Articles 19 (1) (d) and 21 and Article 14 of the Constitution, under the circumstances of the case; and whether reasons were necessary to be assigned; and whether the Notifications dated 26-10-1994 (Annexure 4) and 2-6-1994 (Annexure 5) have been correctly issued and the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act have been complied with. 11. As the final report has been submitted by the local police after investigation by more than 1-1/2 years, there could be no denial that the petitioner has a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (d) read with Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution. 11. As the final report has been submitted by the local police after investigation by more than 1-1/2 years, there could be no denial that the petitioner has a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (d) read with Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution. Result of the entrustment of the investigation to the Delhi Special Police establishment would be obviously with a view to deprive the petitioner from his personal life and liberty. The provision of Sections 5 and 6, has to be strictly interpreted and it can be done only after following the procedure, which must be reasonable, fair and non-arbitrary. 12. In the instant case, as in the back-ground that the final report has been submitted against the petitioner, the least test of resonableness and non-arbitrariness was that the State government and also the Central government, must have disclosed the reasons as to why the matter was being entrusted to the Delhi Special Police establishment. It is well settled by now that assigning reasons is essential either in quasi-judicial or even in an administrative order. There is a Latin maxim "cessante. RATIONE legis CESSAT IPSA LEX", which connotes that reason is the soul of law and when reason ceases to the law. In the ever-expanding horizon of the principle of natural justice a person, like the petitioner, in whose favour the final report has been submitted, was he not entitled to protection of fundamental right under Articles 19, 21 and 14 of the Constitution and to know the reasons why the State Government or the Central Government gave consent or why the matter was entrusted to the delhi Special Police Establishment and why the Central Government expanded power of investigation to be made by the Delhi Special Police Establishment all over the State. (See West Bengal V/s. Atul Krishna Shaw, AIR 1990 SC 2205 and S. N. Mukherje V/s. Union of India, air 1990 SC 1984 .) 13. There is no denying fact that the petitioner has a fundamental right to freedom, particularly to move freely in the territory of India under Article 19 (1) (d) of the Constitution and the petitioners fundamental right of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution need not be infringed unless it was done in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such procedure must be free, fair and non-arbitrary. Such procedure must be free, fair and non-arbitrary. The least requirement of reasonable procedure in the back drop of all this, the petitioner was certainly entitled to know the reason why the matter was being entrusted to the Delhi special Police Establishment. Assignment of reason was one of the purpose of the fundamental right. 14. In the State of West Bengal V/s. Atul Krishna Shaw, AIR 1990 SC 2205 (supra) it has been held by the Apex court that giving of the reason is an essential element of adminsitration of justice. A right to reason is, therefore, an indispensable part of sound system of judicial review. A reasoned decision is not only for the purpose of showing that the citizen is receiving justice, but also a valid discipline for the Tribunal itself. Therefore, the statement of reasons is one of the essentials of justice. 15. In S. N. Mukherjee V/s. Union of india, AIR 1990 SC 1984 (supra) it was ruled by their Lordships of the Apex court that recording of reasons is one of the principles of natural justice, in view of the expanding horizon of the natural justice. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends on the particular frame work whereunder the jurisdiction has been conferred. . . . . . . The recording of reasons serves a salutary purpose. It excludes arbitrariness and assures a decree of fairness in process of decision making laking in view the back-ground, as the matter was sought to be entrusted to the Delhi Special police Esttablishment and as the petitioner was being deprived of his life and liberty, in that event the procedure established by law must be fair, reasonable and non-arbitrary. 16. In such a fact situation the court has to be cautious in interpreting the law for a civilised society, with a view to serve the needs of society. In such matters, I am reminded of Lord denning is picturesque words as follows: "law does not stand still. It moves continually. Once this is recognised, the test of a judge is put on a higher plane. He must consciously mould the law so as to serve the needs of the time. He must not be a mere mechanic, a mere working mason, laying brick on brick without though to the over all design. It moves continually. Once this is recognised, the test of a judge is put on a higher plane. He must consciously mould the law so as to serve the needs of the time. He must not be a mere mechanic, a mere working mason, laying brick on brick without though to the over all design. He must be an architect thinking of the structure as a whole building for society a system of law, which is strong durable and at the same time just. It is on his work that civilised society depends. " 17. In Ratan Chand Hira Chand V/s. A. N. Jug (1991) 3 S. C. C.67 at page 77)Hon ble P. B. Sawant, J. ruled as follows " Legislature often fails to keep pace with changing needs and values nor is it realistic to expect that it will have provided for all contingencies and eventualities. It is, therefore, not only necessary but obligatory on courts to step into fill the lacuna, when courts perform this function they legislate judicially. But this is a kind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated to them to further the object of legislation and to promote the goals of society or to put it negatively to prevent the frustration of the legislation or perversion of the goals and volumes or. 18. It is not inapt to quote the following passage from Police Powers and accountability by John L. Lambert at page 93 : "more recently, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure recognised that there is a critically important relationship between the police and the public in the detection and investigation of crime and suggested that public confidence in police powers required that these conform to the three principal standards : fairness, openness and workability. " 19. Judge Learned Hand in Fried re (161 F.2nd 465) made following observations : "the protection of the individual from oppression and abuse by the police and other enforcing officers is indeed a major interest in a free society, but so is the effective prosecution of crime, an interest which at times seems to be forgotten. Perfection is impossible, like other human institution criminal proceedings must be a compromise. " 20. Perfection is impossible, like other human institution criminal proceedings must be a compromise. " 20. Justice Cardozo in People V/s. Defore, (242 N. Y.13, 24 : 150 N. E.585, 589 (1926) observed : "the question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On the other hand the social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office. Thereare dangers in any choice. The rule of the adams Case (People V/s. Adam (176 N. Y.351 : 68 N. E.636 (1903) strikes a balance between opposing interest. We must hold it to be the (aw until those organs of Govt. by which a change of public policy is normally effected shall give notice to the Courts that change has come to pass. " 21. In Nandini Satpathy V/s. P. I. Dani, AIR 1978 S. C.1025 at page 1032 their Lordships of the Apex Court has observed, quoting Lewis Mayers : "the paradox has been put sharply by lewis Mayers : To strike the balance between the needs of law enforcement on the one hand and the protection of the citizen from oppression and injustice at the hands of the law enforcement machinery on the other is a paranerial problem of statecraft. The pendulum over the years has swung to the right. " 22. It has been observed by the apex Court at page 1033 of AIR 1978 1025 (supra) as follows : "we have: earlier spoken of the conflicting claims, requiring reconciliation. Speaking pragmatically, there exists a rivalry between societal interest in effecting crime detection and constitutional rights which accused individuals possess. Emphasis may shift, depending on circumstances, in balancing those interest as has been happening in America. " 23. In Jogindar Kumar V/s. State of u. P. and others (1994) 4 S. C. C.260)their Lordships of the Apex Court have observed about the scope of the funda mental rights under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution that the horizon of human rights and fundamental rights is expanding. In the matter of arrest of a person, the arrestee has a right to have his friend informed and the police officer must make an entry in his diary and to who was informed. 24. In the matter of arrest of a person, the arrestee has a right to have his friend informed and the police officer must make an entry in his diary and to who was informed. 24. Keeping in view these salutary principles of interpretation the reasonableness and non-arbitrariness of the procedure legally as well as philosophically have to be considered essential element of equality and non-arbitrariness and it pervades Article 14 of the Constitution. The procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in conformity with Article 14 and it must be right, just and fair, otherwise it will be no procedure at all and the fundamental right under Article 21 will be for no avail. It has to be judged keeping in view the march of law as required by a civilised society. See Smt. Maneka gandhi V/s. Union of India (1978) 2 s. C. R.621 : AIR 1978 S. C.597. In my opinion, there must be a balance between it maintaining public confidence in police power, particularly protecting sacred fundamental rights under Article 21, and the need of law enforcement. With a view to afford protection to the life and liberty of the citizens and to further protect them from injustice and oppression at the hands of law enforcement, the standard must be fairness, workability and openness, and the least would be to disclose the reasons and furnish information. In the instant case the impugned Notifications issued by the Central Government, as well as by the State Government, must disclose reasons as to why the investigation was being entrusted to the Delhi Special police Establishment, when the highly placed police officers made investigations for more than one and a half years and submitted final report. 25. The procedure and provisions contemplated under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act have to be read conjointly, keeping in view the mandates of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, and the same cannot be said to be reasonable unless reasons were recorded. 26. 25. The procedure and provisions contemplated under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act have to be read conjointly, keeping in view the mandates of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, and the same cannot be said to be reasonable unless reasons were recorded. 26. Perusal of the Notification dated 26-10-1994 (Annexure 4) issued by the Under-Secretary to the government of India and the Notification dated 2-6-1994 (Annexure 5) issued with a direction of his Excellency the governor of Bihar, would show that no reason were assigned for the consent being recorded for investigation by the delhi Special Police Establishment and no reasons were given earlier when consent dated 13-5-1993 has been withdrawn (vide page 42 of the brief ). Why the earlier Notification has been cancelled, has also not been indicated nor any reasons have been assigned for issuing a fresh Notification. 27. So far as the decisions of the learned Single Judge of the Ranchi bench dated 10-5-1995 in the writ petition filed by M/s Continental Transport and Construction Corporation Limited (Cr. W. J. C. N o.86 of 1995)- (Annexure a to the counter-affidavit)was concerned, in that case the reasonableness of procedure or fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution were not considered. The present petitioner has not filed that writ petition (Cr. W. J. C. No.86 of 1995 ). That order of Ranchi Bench proceeds on different consideration and is not relevant for our purpose. 28. In the State of West Bengal V/s. Sampat Lal and others, AIR 1985 S. C.195 (supra), it was held that the appointment of Special Officer with a direction to enquire into the commission of an offence can only be made on the basis that there has not been a proper investigation, and in that case as the investigation by the local police was pending, it was held that the High court cannot direct the State Government to appoint the Special Officer under the provisions of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. In the present case also unless the State government takes a view and records reasons as to why the investigation by the local police was not satisfactory, the investigation cannot be entrusted to the delhi Special Police Establishment. In the present case also unless the State government takes a view and records reasons as to why the investigation by the local police was not satisfactory, the investigation cannot be entrusted to the delhi Special Police Establishment. Much emphasis was led on Annexure c to the counter affidavit-judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India and others V/s. M/s Continental Transport and construction Ltd. and others (supra), but that was the case arising out of the order dated 9-2-1995 passed by the Calcutta High Court, where direction was given that the venue of investigation be changed from Dhanbad to Ranchi. Their Lordships of the Apex Court vide annexure c to the counter-affidavit, held that the venue not not be changed and the order of the Calcutta High court was set aside, but it was left to the discretion of the Joint Director of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to consider as to whether shifting of venue of investigation from Dhanbad to Ranchi was a must or it must remain at Dhanbad. It was also left to the Joint director that it was to his discretion either to change the Officer or not. The observations of the Apex Court, with profound regards, were not very material. 29. In view of the premises aforesaid, in the absence of reasons being assigned and the lack of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness and fairness of the procedure and fundamental rights contemplated by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, the impugned Notification dated 26-10-1994 (Anneuxre 4)and 2-6-1994 (Annexure 5) deserve to be quashed. In the result, the present writ petition succeeds and the same is allowed and the notifications dated 26-10-1994 (Annexure 4) and 2-6-1994 (Annexure 5)are hereby quashed. The respondents are restrained to proceed in the matter of investigation against the petitioner. It is, however, open to the State government or the Central Government to issue another valid Notification in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition Allowed.