JUDGMENT B.U. WAHANE, J. :---By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil, has questioned the legality, propriety, justifiability and bona fides of the order dismissing the petitioner from the post of Civil Judge, Junior Division/Judicial Magistrate, First Class, passed on 2-3-1994, by the respondent No. 1. 2.The case of the petitioner in brief is that the petitioner after obtaining the Degree of Bachelor of Law from Marathwada University at Aurangabad, enrolled himself as an Advocate and started legal practice at Parola in District Jalgaon from 9th June, 1980 till 19th February, 1984. He was appointed as Police Prosecutor and worked as such from 20th February, 1984 to 30th April, 1988 in Jalgaon District in the courts at Yawal and Ravel as also in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate at Jalgaon. On being selected by the Maharashtra Public Service Commission for the post of Civil Judge, Junior Division-cum-Judicial Magistrate, First Class, he was appointed on probation for a period of two years. Initially, he was posted as Civil Judge, Junior Division - J.M.F.C. on 2nd May, 1988 at Parbhani, District Parbhani. He was thereafter posted to the newly established Court at Pathari, District Parbhani, from 30th March, 1989, where he worked for 2 years and 3 months. From Pathari, the petitioner was transferred to Sakoli during the summer vacation and thus, from June 1991, he was working as Civil Judge, Junior Division - J.M.F.C. till 29-4-1992. The petitioner was suspended vide order dated 29-4-1992 in contemplation of a certain Departmental Enquiry. While the petitioner was under suspension, his period of probation was retrospectively extended for a period of two years from 2-5-1990. According to the petitioner, during the entire period of his services in Parbhani District, both at Parbhani and Pathari, he worked in an upright manner giving no cause for any grievance of any type. He maintained cordial relations with the members of the Bar and decided the matters without fear and favour and not succumbed to be brow-beaten or bullied by any member of the Bar. His disposals throughout the period were very good and were treated so and he received the remarks at each quarter as "Noteworthy". Such remarks were communicated to the petitioner by the respondent No. 2-the High Court from time to time through the District Judge, Parbhani. His disposals throughout the period were very good and were treated so and he received the remarks at each quarter as "Noteworthy". Such remarks were communicated to the petitioner by the respondent No. 2-the High Court from time to time through the District Judge, Parbhani. While the petitioner was working at Pathari, the District Judges inspected the Pathari Court in the month of March, 1991 and 1992. On both the occasions, the work of the petitioner was found satisfactory. The petitioner concentrated to decide the old matters as directed by the Hon'ble High Court and endeavoured to reduce the pendency of cases. During his posting at Pathari, as many as three District Judges visited Pathari Court, including Shri R.M. Bapat (Hon'ble Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court), Shri R.G. Barlinge and Shri V.B. Adhatrao. 3.Though Pathari was tahsil head-quarters, there was no Court. The Court was opened on 30th March, 1989. Prior to this, Civil Court at Sailu was catering to the entire judicial work Civil and Criminal of Pathari tahsil. Thus, there was only one bar at Sailu in Pathari tahsil. Some of the lawyers residing at Pathari were required to go to Sailu for their professional work. On being insistent demand for a separate Court at Pathari, the Court was opened at Pathari on 30th March, 1989. The petitioner was the first Presiding Officer at Pathari. Due to the establishment of the Court at Pathari, quite a large number of villages and towns formerly falling under the jurisdiction of Sailu Court were detached therefrom. More than 60% of work was from Pathari area. At Pathari there was a Tahsil Court, but not the Court of Civil Judge. Because of the establishment of the new Court at Pathari, the members of the Bar at Sailu were very much affected and consequently, a writ petition was filed before the High Court at Aurangabad, challenging the exclusion of village Manoli and several other villages which were declared to be attached and falling under the jurisdiction of the newly established Court at Pathari. Some leading members of the Bar including Shri A.S. Kharkar, residing at Sailu were disturbed on account of establishment of new Court at Pathari as they were required to come from Seloo. There appeared to be some disharmony and rivalry between the members of Pathari Bar and those coming from Sailu. Some leading members of the Bar including Shri A.S. Kharkar, residing at Sailu were disturbed on account of establishment of new Court at Pathari as they were required to come from Seloo. There appeared to be some disharmony and rivalry between the members of Pathari Bar and those coming from Sailu. 4.In the month of October 1990, Shri Kharkar, Advocate, presented a civil suit relating to the property at Manoli one of the villages for which the writ petition was pending before the High Court at Aurangabad. The petitioner had received a direction from the District Judge, Parbhani, not to accept any matter relating to village Manoli. Therefore, when the civil suit came to be presented on 12-10-1990, the petitioner refused to accept and entertain it. Due to this, Mr. Kharkar was very much annoyed and there was a hot discussion on this matter. On being told that the writ petition had been withdrawn, on his undertaking, the petitioner accepted the suit. While leaving the Court hall, Mr. Kharkar passed a remark that he would teach a lesson to the petitioner. In the month of December, 1990, the petitioner sought extension of one year at Pathari and this fact was known to all the members of Bar of Pathari and Sailu. However, the request for retention was not considered and the petitioner was transferred to Sakoli, District Bhandara, in the month of May 1991. He handed over the charge of Pathari Court on 3rd June, 1991 and joined at Sakoli on 10th June, 1991. 5.While working at Sakoli, the petitioner was placed under suspension in contemplation of Departmental Enquiry as per the order passed by the respondent No. 2-High Court on 29-4-1992. This was followed by a charge-sheet, statement of imputations, the list of witnesses and the list of documents dated 22-5-1992, served on the petitioner on 5-6-1992. The petitioner submitted his written statement in defence on 3-8-1992 denying all the allegations levelled in the Statement of Imputations and Charges. The Enquiry Officer who had enquired into the matter, held that the charges Nos. 4 and 5 regarding alleged misuse of office by the petitioner for securing the employment for his brother in Sugar Factory at Pathari and one relating to the petitioner's alleged visit to Manwat Rest House enjoying the hospitality of advocates and litigants, indulging in drinking party, were not proved. 4 and 5 regarding alleged misuse of office by the petitioner for securing the employment for his brother in Sugar Factory at Pathari and one relating to the petitioner's alleged visit to Manwat Rest House enjoying the hospitality of advocates and litigants, indulging in drinking party, were not proved. As such the petitioner was exonerated of the charges Nos. 4 and 5 by the Enquiry Officer. Similary, the Enquiry Officer, in respect of charge No. 3 as regard to the delay in passing the order out of three suits, held and observed that there was a justification for delay in passing the orders in two suits viz. Civil Suit No. 3 of 1991, Kadan v. Babarao Devde, and Civil Suit No. 134 of 1990 Ratnamala v. Pandurang. However, the petitioner's explanation as to the delay in passing the order on the application for temporary injunction in Civil Suit No. 138 of 1990, Arjun v. Gangubai, was not accepted. The Enquiry Officer held that charge Nos. 1 and 2 levelled against the petitioner are proved. The order dated 22nd April, 1993 below the report, is as follows : "The delinquent is held guilty of corrupt practice amounting to gross misconduct. He is also held guilty of preparing false judicial record with alterior motive, amounting to gross misconduct. He is also held guilty of gross negligence of duty tantamounting to misconduct." The Enquiry Officer recommended the punishment to be imposed on the delinquent viz. dismissal from his service. 6.Shri Charde, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, raised the following points challenging the impugned order of dismissal which is based on the findings or observations made by the Enquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority as : 1)The enquiry conducted by Shri Nirkhee, Enquiry Officer and Additional Registrar, High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad, was conducted with mala fide intention though there was no foundation or basis for the preliminary enquiry. If begining is bad, everything is bad. 2)The charges levelled against the petitioner were vague. The charges, statement of imputations and the points framed by the Enquiry Officer for determination are at variance. Charge must be definite and specific. If begining is bad, everything is bad. 2)The charges levelled against the petitioner were vague. The charges, statement of imputations and the points framed by the Enquiry Officer for determination are at variance. Charge must be definite and specific. 3)The Enquiry Officer's report ought not to have been given weight by the Disciplinary Authority, as the Enquiry Officer had omitted to appreciate the vital and relevant evidence and consequently, gives jurisdiction to this Hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to reconsider the finding or observations of the Enquiry Officer being arbitrary and perverse having no basis or foundation. 4)Though no witness has deposed that the petitioner asked the Reader or any other officer to write the Roznamachas, still petitioner is found guilty of the charge that he has prepared the false judicial record, which is contrary to the evidence on record. 5)As regards the delay in passing the orders in three suits referred to in the charge No. 3, the explanation is accepted by the Enquiry Officer in respect of two suits, but not in respect of third one, though it has been specifically stated that the petitioner being transferred, he could not pass the order. There is no delay as alleged. He unequivocally stated that he took time to pass the order as, according to him, it was difficult and complicated suit. At the most the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority ought to have said that the petitioner is negligent. But mere delay in passing the order in one matter will not amount to misconduct, the charge itself being for cumulative inference from plural acts and not singular act of delay. 6)No second notice was served upon the petitioner and hearing was given to him before passing the impugned order which amounts to breach of principles of natural justice. 7)Action by the High Court has to be taken by the Full Court under Article 235 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case neither the appointment of the Enquiry Officer, acceptance of the findings of the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, nor the penalty recommended is by the Full Court as envisaged under Article 235 of the Constitution of India and as such contravened the provision of Article 235. In the instant case neither the appointment of the Enquiry Officer, acceptance of the findings of the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, nor the penalty recommended is by the Full Court as envisaged under Article 235 of the Constitution of India and as such contravened the provision of Article 235. Consequently the order impugned and the report of the Enquiry Officer and the findings of the Disciplinary Committee deserve to be quashed and set aside. 7.Shri Thakur the learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 the Hon'ble High Court vehmently argued that the scope of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited and cannot disturb the findings on merits based on evidence as a Court of Appeal, thereby to interfere with or revise the findings of facts arrived at by a properly constituted Tribunal. Further it is submitted that the High Court can issue a writ of certiorari only in exercise of supervisory powers and not appellate jurisdiction and consequently the High Court will not revise the findings of facts reached by the inferior Court or the Tribunal even if they be erroneous, unless the error apparent on the face of the proceeding, as for examble, when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, a patent error which can be corrected by issuance of writ of certiorari. Shri Thakur further submitted that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the findings inasmuch as the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence on a point and the inference of the fact to be drawn from the said findings, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal and as such findings cannot be adjudicated before a writ Court. The Supreme Court has pointed out : "A finding of fact were allowed to be disturbed by the High Court in writ proceeding that may be reached at and would convert the High Court into the Appellate High Court competent to deal with the question of fact and that is why in entertaining the petition for writ of certiorari, it is necessary to prove that finding of facts recorded by the Special Tribunal which has been conferred with jurisdiction to deal with them, can be treated as final between the parties unless of course it is shown that the impugned finding is based on no evidence." Shri Thakur the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 placed reliance on the following cases : 1)A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1723, (State of A.P. v. Shri Ramarao)1, paras 7, 8 and 9. 2) 1972(4) S.C.C. 618 , (Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur)2, para 15. 3) 1994(2) S.C.C. 537 , (S.B.I. v. Samaran Kishore)3, 4) 1996 SCALE 810 , (State of Tamilnadu)4, 5)1995(6) SCALE 465, (State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar)5, 8.No doubt, it is settled principle that the High Court cannot function as a Court of Appeal reappreciating the evidence recorded by the Enquiry Officer when the findings are based on the evidence. Even if the Tribunal/Enquiry Officer has committed errors in appreciating the evidence or drawing inference the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with or revise the finding of facts arrived at by the properly constituted Tribunal on the evidence adduced before it. However, the Lordships of the Supreme Court also laid down the principles that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and competent to interfere with the findings recorded by the Tribunal in the enquiry proceedings in case the findings recorded are not supported by any evidence, or the proceedings conducted against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the Rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory Rules prescribed, or in appeal or enquiry in case of extraneous evidence or influenced by irrelevant consideration or where the conclusion on the very face of it, is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever arrive at that conclusion on the similar grounds. Their Lordships also laid down the principle that the High Court under its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can disturb the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority if the dismissal or any other punishment is on no evidence or where the findings are utterly perverse, or the Enquiry Officer did not consider and discuss the inherent improbabilities in the evidence. The principles enunciated above are illustrated in following cases : 1)A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 404, (State of Orissa v. Murlidhar)6, 2)A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 1723, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Shri Rama Rao, 3)A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 364, (Union of India v. H.C. Goel)7, 4) (1983)2 S.C.C. 442 ; A.I.R. 1983 Supreme Court 454, (Bhapat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh)8, 5)A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 995, (Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan)9, 6)A.I.R. 1987 Supreme Court 117 : 1986(3) Bom.C.R. , (Chandawarkar v. Ashalata)10, 7)A.I.R. 1990 Supreme Court 2205, (State of West Bengal v. Atul Krishna Shaw)11, 9.To appreciate the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties with the assistance of the learned Counsel of the parties, we have perused the copy of the charges, statement of imputations, enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer to the Disciplinary Authority and the order impugned passed by the respondent No. 1 together with the statements recorded by the Enquiry Officer during the Departmental Enquiry. 10.The copy of the charges dated 22nd May, 1992, Statement of Imputations of the same date with list of witnesses were served upon the petitioner. The 1st charge levelled against the petitioner is as under : "That you were working as C.J.J.D. and J.M.F.C. Pathari, District Parbhani between 12-12-1990 and 5-3-1991 when R.C.S. No. 150 of 1990 filed by Uttam Sahebrao Depale through Advocate A.S. Kharkar was pending before you. In the said suit, Exhibit 5 i.e. application for temporary injunction was to be decided when you demanded illegal gratification from Advocate A.S. Kharkar as consideration for deciding the matter in favour of his client and that you thereby indulged in corrupt practice which amounts to gross misconduct." While in Statement of Imputation para 1, it is alleged : "On one occasion when Advocate A.S. Kharkar approached you, you expressed, "i.e. extract something from your client." Advocate Kharkar refused to oblige you. Shri Kharkar advised his client to complain to the High Court after this incident." The Enquiry Officer framed points for determination and the point No. 1 reads as follows : "Whether it is proved that the delinquent Shri S.R. Patil demanded money from Uttam Depale by way of illegal gratification for deciding the application for temporary injunction in his favour?" To substantiate the charge reproduced and the other charges, the Enquiry Officer recorded the statements of witnesses on behalf of the Department. They are twelve in number. (1)Kalidas Govindrao Choudhari, Advocate, Pathari. (2)Uttam Sahebrao Depale, the complainant, Pathari. (3)Ashok Sitarampant Kharkar, Advocate, Sailu. (4)Dinkar Wasudeorao Choudhari, Advocate, Pathari. (5)Shrinivasrao Rangrao Patrikar, retired Assistant Superintendent, Pathari. (6)Satish Nagorao Barhate, Advocate, Manwat. (7)Suresh Uttamrao Barhate, Advocate, Manwat. (8)Sk. Hussain Sk. Chand, Chowkidar Reset House, Manwat. (9)Madan Manikrao Muthal, Stenographer, Pathari. (10)Subhash Damodhar Patil, Sr. Clerk, Pathari. (11)Vitthal Bharat Adharrao, District Judge, Parbhani. (12)Vasantrao Sakharam Kharkar, Advocate, Sailu. Undisputedly, Uttam Sahebrao Depale (Witness No. 2) had instituted a civil suit bearing Regular Civil Suit No. 150 of 1990 for perpetual injunction, in the Civil Court, Pathari, against the defendant for restraining him from disturbing his possession over the suit land. The suit was filed through Advocate A.S. Kharkar (witness No. 3). An application Exh. 5 was also filed for interim injunction. The notice was issued returnable on 12-9-1990. The defendant appeared in the Court on 6-9-1990 through Advocates Shri V.S. Kharkar and Shri M.M. Subhedar. The written statement and say on the application for temporary injunction came to be filed on 21-11-1990, vide Exhs. 18 and 19 respectively. The arguments were heard on 12-12-1990 and the case was adjourned for orders on 29-12-1990. The final order was passed on 28-2-1991. However, the charge No. 2, indicates that no dates were given after hearing on the application Exh. 5, and the Roznamcha has been subsequently prepared. We will deal with this aspect subsequently. 11.Admittedly, till 23-1-1991 i.e. the date of alleged complaint made by Uttam Depale to the High Court, Special Investigating Department Bombay, and District Judge, Parbhani, no order on Ex. 5 was passed. The allegations of the complainant in the complaint were to the effect that the period of six months have been lapsed from the date of hearing the arguments on Ex. 5, is blatant lie ex-facie. 5 was passed. The allegations of the complainant in the complaint were to the effect that the period of six months have been lapsed from the date of hearing the arguments on Ex. 5, is blatant lie ex-facie. The complaint dated 23-1-1991 appears to have been received in the High Court, Appellate Side, Bombay, on 11-3-1991 (Annexure E page 158, true translation is at Annexure E-1 page 158-A). The contents of the complaint are that though the arguments were heard six months ago, the Presiding Officer has not passed any order. No further date was apprised. On several occasions, the complainant consulted his Advocate (Shri Kharkar) as to why the order has not been passed. The counsel replied saying that no orders are passed in several suits and as such we cannot do anything in the matter. The complainant further reiterated that though six months are over from the date of hearing the arguments on Ex. 5, no orders are passed. In view of such situation where poor people like him should approach for redress. He further requested to enquire as to why the orders are not passed in such suits on the application for temporary injunctions. Shri Adharrao, the then District and Sessions Judge, Parbhani (witness No. 11) stated that after the receipt of Exh. 21 i.e. the complaint of Uttam Depale dated 23-1-1991, he sent letter dated 27-2-1991 to the petitioner for his comments. In view of the directions issued by the High Court to enquire into the matter, Shri Adharrao visited the Pathari Court on 13th and 14th March, 1991 and recorded the statement of Uttam Sahebrao Depale, Ashok Kharkar, Advocate, Madan Muthal, Subhash Damodhar Patil, Vasant Sakharampant Kharkar, Kalidas Govindrao Choudhari, Satish Barhate, Shri Suresh Barhate, Sk. Hussain Sk.Chand, Shrinivas Patharikar, Dinkarrao Choudhari. According to Shri Adharrao, he sent a confidential report to the Hon'ble High Court to that effect. During the enquiry he examined Memorandum Book and Daily Boards. Shri Adharrao specifically stated that the enquiry was confined to the allegations levelled in the complaint. Neither the copy of the complaint dated 23-1-1991 was forwarded to the petitioner nor his explanation was sought. Shri Adharrao further stated that besides the complaint dated 23-1-1991, till 18-3-1991, no other complaint was received against the petitioner during his visit at Pathari on 13th and 14th March, 1991. Neither the copy of the complaint dated 23-1-1991 was forwarded to the petitioner nor his explanation was sought. Shri Adharrao further stated that besides the complaint dated 23-1-1991, till 18-3-1991, no other complaint was received against the petitioner during his visit at Pathari on 13th and 14th March, 1991. Shri Adharrao specifically stated that during inspection of the Court at Pathari, he found the work of the petitioner satisfactory. Shri Adharrao admitted in the cross-examination that Shri Uttam Depale did not tell him that Mr. Patil takes money and he had heard about such talks. From the perusal of the complaint dated 23-1-1991 and the evidence of Shri Adharrao, the then District Judge, Parbhani, it is crystal clear that no motive was attributed against the petitioner for not passing the order on Exh. 5 as also there is no whisper about any demand as illegal gratification either from the complainant Uttam Depale or from his counsel Advocate Kharkar. Therefore, according to us, there is sufficient force in the submissions of Shri Charde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there was no foundation or basis to start the Departmental Enquiry against the petitioner, that too on the charge of demanding gratification in Civil Suit No. 150 of 1990. Inspite of this, the enquiry was instituted which demonstrate the bias towards the petitioner. In respect of the above submissions, ground No. 1 is raised in para 23 on page 20 of the paper book, which have not been controverted by the respondent No. 2 in the affidavit filed by Shri N.V. Dabholkar dated 11-4-1996. 12.Uttam Sahebrao Depale (witness No. 2), whose evidence came to be recorded by the Enquiry Officer on 28-12-1992, stated that he got the order in the suit after 2 to 3 months after arguments were heard in the case. He made enquiries from Shri Ashok Kharkar, Advocate, on several occasions and every time he asked him to come on fixed day and then there would be order. He asked his counsel 5 to 6 times. When he asked Shri Kharkar as to why no order is passed on his application, he was told that Shri Patil Saheb was asking for money. He then asked Shri Ashok Kharkar as to how much amount was being demanded by Shri Patil. In reply Shri Kharkar told him that the demand was of Rs. 5,000/-. When he asked Shri Kharkar as to why no order is passed on his application, he was told that Shri Patil Saheb was asking for money. He then asked Shri Ashok Kharkar as to how much amount was being demanded by Shri Patil. In reply Shri Kharkar told him that the demand was of Rs. 5,000/-. He expressed his unability to pay the amount of Rs. 5,000/- either to his counsel or to Mr. Patil. The witness further stated that he asked his counsel as to what should be done in such event. Shri Kharkar advised him that he should make an application and send it to Parbhani and the High Court. In the cross-examination, he further stated that after the arguments were over, he asked his counsel about the next date and he was told the next date. His counsel told him that they got the injunction order. According to this witness, he got the complaint written from the petition writer, he showed the same to his counsel. Even before sending the complaint, he was told by Shri Kharkar, Advocate, that there was a demand of Rs. 5,000/- by Shri Patil. When the complaint was brought to his notice, he admitted that there is no whisper about the demand of money in the complaint. According to this witness, Advocate Kharkar told him as to where the complaint to be addressed and the address was supplied by Advocate Kharkar. 13.The statement of Shri Ashok Kharkar (witness No. 3) came to be recorded by the Enquiry Officer on 28-12-1992. According to this witness, he works at Sailu and Pathari Courts. He filed the civil suit of Uttam Depale in the Civil Court, Pathari. The arguments were heard on the application for grant of temporary injunction. However, the witness expressed his inability to give the date. Witness stated that the order came to be passed by the Court after eight months from the date of argument. Once or twice, he had seen the Presiding Officer in his chamber and requested to decide the application at the earliest. Shri Patil demanded Rs. 5,000/- from him. He specifically declined to oblige him. According to this witness, he used to attend the work in Pathari Court on Thursdays and Fridays. In the meeting with Shri Uttam Depale at Pathari, he disclosed that Saheb is demanding Rs. 5,000/-. Shri Patil demanded Rs. 5,000/- from him. He specifically declined to oblige him. According to this witness, he used to attend the work in Pathari Court on Thursdays and Fridays. In the meeting with Shri Uttam Depale at Pathari, he disclosed that Saheb is demanding Rs. 5,000/-. The complainant expressed that he being a poor man, is unable to meet the demand. Uttam immediately reacted that he would lodge a complaint. After 8 days of his talk with Uttam, the injunction order was passed in favour of the plaintiff, i.e. Uttam Depale. In the cross-examination, this witness expressed his inability to give the date and time when the alleged demand was made by the petitioner. According to this witness, he has no knowledge when Shri Uttam has lodged the complaint with the District Judge, Parbhani and the Hon'ble High Court. He specifically stated that he did not tell him to whom the complaint to be sent and addressed. His client not shows him the complaint after it was written. In para 22 of his deposition, this witness stated that: "The District Judge, Parbhani recorded my statement in respect of this complaint. I do not remember if I stated before the District Judge that Shri S.R. Patil demanded Rs. 5,000/-. (Note---The witness's attention was drawn to the statement recorded by the District Judge.) It is not stated in that statement that Mr. S.R. Patil demanded Rs. 5,000/- from me. ..... Due to inadvertence, I have failed to state before the District Judge that Mr. Patil demanded Rs. 5,000/- from me." Further this witness stated that : "I did state before the District and Sessions Judge that ultimately, I could not help in advising the client to make the complaint to the Bombay High Court." (Note---The portion Marked 'A' is the statement recorded by the District Judge was read over to the witness and he admitted that it was correct. The portion marked 'A' is at Exh. 22-A) 14.From the perusal of the complaint dated 23-1-1991 and the statements recorded by the Enquiry Officer on 28-12-1992, i.e. after about two years of the complaint lodged by Uttam Depale, it is crystal clear that no evidence has been laid either oral or documentary to show that after the arguments were heard on Exh, 5 on 12-12-1990, the petitioner demanded any bribe or gratification either from Advocate Kharkar or the plaintiff Uttam Depale. It is, thus, clear that for the first time, the complainant Uttam Depale and Advocate Kharkar stated before the Enquiry Officer on 28-12-1992, that demand was made by the petitioner. The evidence of these two witnesses is also at variance and contradictory. It appears from the evidence of Advocate Kharkar that he is a leading Advocate at Sailu and Pathari. He admitted that he used to attend the Court at Pathari from Sailu on every Thursday and Friday. 60% of the work of Sailu Court has been transferred to the Court at Pathari. This witness admits that on 12-10-1990, a civil suit in respect of the property situated at Manoli, was filed in the Civil Court at Pathari. Manoli was one of the 18 villages about which the petition was filed in the Aurangabad High Court. The petitioner apprised him that Manoli not being under the jurisdiction of Pathari Court, he will not accept the civil suit. However, undertaking was given by Advocate Kharkar to the effect that in case Pathari Court has no jurisdiction, he will withdraw the suit. On this assurance, the plaint was accepted. Similarly, Advocate Kharkar admitted that in a riot case of Magar Sawangi, which was known as Ram Bhat's case, wherein 19 accused were tried he represented the accused. In the month of January 1991, all the accused were convicted. This witness denied the knowledge about the request for extension of stay by the petitioner for one year at Rathri. It was suggested to the witness that because of the above circumstances, the witness developed grudge against the petitioner and, therefore, he concocted false story to mar the careers and spoil the life of the petitioner. Shri Suresh Barhate, Advocate, (P.W. 7) is a practising lawyer since 1980. He used to work in the Court of Shri Patil. This witness specifically stated "I never heard that Mr. Patil accepts bribe nor I heard that there was any rumour that Patil was given to consumption of liquor or acceptance of parties from advocates. There was never any rumour that he accepts money for passing orders from the Advocates." "There were no complaints from the lawyers at Pathari against Mr. This witness specifically stated "I never heard that Mr. Patil accepts bribe nor I heard that there was any rumour that Patil was given to consumption of liquor or acceptance of parties from advocates. There was never any rumour that he accepts money for passing orders from the Advocates." "There were no complaints from the lawyers at Pathari against Mr. Patil." As regard discussion between Shri Patil and Shri Kharkar at the time of filing the civil suit in respect of the property at village Manoli, Shri Barhate stated that : "There was a serious and very hot discussion between Shri Patil and Shri Kharkar in respect of the institution of the suit by Ashok Kharkar and at that time, about 50 persons had gathered due to such a row." In the cross-examination, this witness stated that the above controversy and discussion was in the month of October. The row was about Manoli town. All the lawyers had gathered. After this incident, Ashok Kharkar stopped visiting Pathari. Ashok Kharkar even used to say that he will see Mr. Patil, saying " ns[k ysxs". Shri Kalidas Govindrao Choudhari, Advocate, legal practitioner of 17 years at Sailu and Pathari, stated that Shri Patil was working as Civil Judge, Jr.Dn., at Pathari. During his stay, the reputation of Mr. S.R. Patil was good. The stay of Mr. S.R. Patil at Pathari was quite good. This witness further stated that after the transfer of Shri Patil the petitioner, the 'Send-Off' party was arranged and advocates from Pathari and Manwat were present. It was known to the members of the Bar that Shri Patil had requested for extension of one year at Pathari. The members of the Bar at Pathari Court being satisfied and happy with the work of the petitioner, they too wanted his further stay for a year at Pathari. On the visit of District Judge, Parbhani at Pathari, to enquire about the work of Shri Patil, he had stated that they have no grudge against him. This witness stated that Ashok Kharkar is a member of the Sailu Bar. He used to attend the Court of Mr. Patil. There was a hot talk between Advocate Kharkar and Shri Patil as regard the acceptance of the plaint regarding the property situated at village Manoli. This witness stated that Ashok Kharkar is a member of the Sailu Bar. He used to attend the Court of Mr. Patil. There was a hot talk between Advocate Kharkar and Shri Patil as regard the acceptance of the plaint regarding the property situated at village Manoli. Further he stated that since the conviction of all the accused in the sensational case, Shri Ashok Kharkar developed a grudge against Shri Patil. 15.To find support to the evidence of Shri Ashok Kharkar (witness No. 3), the Enquiry Officer considered the following circumstances : (1)In para 15 of his report, it is observed that there was absolutely no reason for Shri Ashok Kharkar who is an Advocate of long standing practice, has no axe to grind against the delinquent. (2)Unexplained delay of 78 days in deciding the application for temporary injunction bears out the version of Shri Ashok Kharkar that the delinquent demanded money for deciding the application for temporary injunction in favour of his client. (3)The case was not taken on the board of 29-12-1990, 14-1-1991, 25-1-1991, 8-2-1991 and 28-2-1991 and false judicial record was prepared subsequently with alterior motive. To this effect, the charge is framed as Charge No. 2 as also the Enquiry Officer framed point No. 2 for his determination. (4)The omission regarding the demand of Rs. 5,000/- either from Advocate Kharkar or Uttam Depale, treated to be a minor and insignificant omission or contradiction. 16.In the preceding paras, we have discussed the evidence of Shri Ashok Kharkar, Advocate, Shri Barhate and Shri Choudhari and pointed out various circumstances to show that Shri Kharkar had an axe to grind against the petitioner. In para 15 of the report, the Enquiry Officer has made the following observations : "There is no evidence on record to show that the said case actually ended in conviction. Thus, all these suggestions levelled on behalf of the delinquent are devoid of any merit and they are liable to be rejected and they are rejected." These observations are contrary to the evidence. In para 10, Ashok Kharkar has stated that in a riot case from Magar-Sawangi, he had represented 19 accused in that case, with Suresh Barhate. The accused were found guilty and convicted and sentenced by Shri Patil. In para 10, Ashok Kharkar has stated that in a riot case from Magar-Sawangi, he had represented 19 accused in that case, with Suresh Barhate. The accused were found guilty and convicted and sentenced by Shri Patil. Shri Ashok Kharkar stated in his cross-examination that he did not think that the criminal case in which he defended the accused, would end in conviction. As the case was ended in conviction, which was, as expressed, not thought by Shri Kharkar, naturally, he harboured malice against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer has not considered even the reply of the petitioner wherein he has specifically stated (page 64 of the paper book) to the effect that : "I repeat that Shri A.S. Kharkar never met me for appraising that the dispute as per Regular Civil Suit No. 150 of 1990 being between Hindu as plaintiff and defendant as Muslim - about any communal tension, if the dispute is not decided earlier." In para 10 of his statement, though Shri Ashok Kharkar denied the suggestion that he reduced his visits to Pathari, he admitted that he had entrusted some part of his work to Shri D.M. Kulkarni and Shri Choudhari, the legal practitioners at Pathari. It needs mention that Shri D.M. Kulkarni was working as his junior, while Kalidas Choudhari is his real maternal uncle. The evidence of Shri Kalidas Choudhari and Barhate Advocates is very elocant as regards to the circumstances to demonstrate that Ashok Kharkar had developed a malice and grudge against Shri Patil. Admittedly, the petitioner was transferred in the month of May 1991. Thereafter he was not attached to Pathari Court. This is the universal phenomenon that one prays the rising sun. Nobody would ride on the dead horse. However, the blood relation of Shri Kharkar and another Advocate have supported the case of the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer has not at all considered this evidence, including admissions of Mr. A.S. Kharkar himself. 17.As regards the charge or circumstance which has been taken into consideration to substantiate the charge No. 1 that the petitioner has prepared false judicial record and got the Roznamacha written by the Bench Clerk. The copy of the Roznamacha is on the record as Annexure 'F' page 159. On page 161, against the date 12-12-1990, the order sheet indicates that the arguments of both the sides were heard and the case was adjourned to 29-12-1990. The copy of the Roznamacha is on the record as Annexure 'F' page 159. On page 161, against the date 12-12-1990, the order sheet indicates that the arguments of both the sides were heard and the case was adjourned to 29-12-1990. Thereafter the matter was adjourned to 14-1-1991, 25-1-1991, 8-2-1991, 28-2-1991. The order sheets of dated 14-1-1991, 25-1-1991 and 8-2-1991 show that the Presiding Officer was on leave. No witness has stated that the petitioner directed either to Subhash Patil (witness No. 10) or Shrinivas Patharikar (witness No. 5) to prepare the ordersheets and signed against them. Shri Patharikar stated that whenever Mr. S.K. Patil the Presiding Officer used to be on leave or out of station, his Bench Clerk used to take his signatures on Roznamchas. He was shown Roznamcha dated 19-1-1991, 25-1-1991, 8-2-1991 in Civil Suit No. 150 of 1990. He admitted his signatures on the order sheets of these dates. It needs mention that this witness also stated as under : "I was working as Assistant Superintendent at Pathari. At that time, Shri S.R. Patil was the Judge and his working was good." ....... There was no talk that Patil was given to the acceptance of bribe." Subhash Patil (witness No. 10) stated in para 4 as under : "The Roznamchas dated 12-12-1990, 29-12-1990, 14-1-1991, 25-2-1991, 8-2-1991 and 28-2-1991 in the Civil Suit No. 150 of 1990 are in my handwriting. Whenever the Presiding Officer used to be on leave, I used to take the signatures of the Asstt. Supdt. After the arguments were heard, the next date was given by the Presiding Officer." It is, thus, clear from the evidence of these witnesses that at no time, the delinquent/petitioner directed to write the Roznamchas and put their signatures. The evidence reproduced has not been considered at all. Consequently, no discussion and findings as to interpolation of order-sheets or Roznamchas. Thus, whether the inference drawn against the petitioner is reasonable and probable. According to us, it is case of no evidence against the petitioner regarding interpolation of order-sheets or the petitioner prepared false judicial record by preparing Roznamachas through Bench Clerk. No evidence means whatever evidence is on record, has no probative value, or no value at all. Thus, the inference drawn by the E.O. D. Committee is illegal and manifestly perverse being devoid of any evidence. No evidence means whatever evidence is on record, has no probative value, or no value at all. Thus, the inference drawn by the E.O. D. Committee is illegal and manifestly perverse being devoid of any evidence. Though the Memorandum Book and the Order sheets were before the Enquiry Officer, he did not think it necessary to look into and consider those documents. The petitioner also in his reply (at page 65 of the paper book), very specifically stated that he never instructed Shri S.D. Patil to write any Roznamchas. The Roznamchas were written by the clerk in the regular course of transactions. The Roznamchas dated 14-1-1991, 25-1-1991 and 8-12-1991 are signed by the then Asstt. Superintendent of Pathari Court, in his absence, he being on casual leave. He specifically stated that he never prepared any false judicial record. He had no reason to prepare any false record as he was not aware of the nature of the complaint. He received the copy of the complaint from the High Court with its letter No. VM/30/91/194/92 dated 8/9th July, 1992. The Honourable District and Sessions Judge, Parbhani did not supply him any copy of the complaint at any stage. This aspect has also not been considered by the Enquiry Officer. 18.The Enquiry Officer, while considering the omission regarding the demand of Rs. 5,000/- in the complaint dated 23-1-1991 and the subsequent statement recorded by the District Judge, Parbhani, in the enquiry, treated Uttam Depale as rustic villager and further observed that if he would have disclosed about the demand, the delinquent would have decided the application Exh. 5 against him. This apprehension must have worked on the mind of Uttam Depale. However, he had no such apprehension and, therefore, he had not stated anything about it in his deposition. This is the view of the Enquiry Officer based on no evidence. The circumstances discussed above and the explanation given by the petitioner, though material and vital, proper and just, have not been considered at all, and as such the bias attitude or approach of the Enquiry Officer is writ large. One serious infirmity which the impugned order suffers from, is that the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority have violated yet another basic rule of natural justice. One serious infirmity which the impugned order suffers from, is that the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority have violated yet another basic rule of natural justice. Careful reading of the report and the order passed thereon, shows that though the petitioner has specifically denied the meeting with Advocate Kharkar, the material and important omission which amounts to major, material and vital contradiction, as regards the demand of bribe or gratification, in the report dated 23-1-1991, has been very lightly brushed aside. The burden to prove the charges in administrative enquiries always lies on the employer unless delinquent employee admits the charges. There is no presumption of guilt against the employee and, therefore, unless the employer leads the evidence to establish the charge, the delinquent is not required to adduce any evidence in his defence. The charge of demanding bribe or illegal gratification must independently be proved by leading convincing, cogent, reliable, logical and probable evidence. If the demand is not proved or the circumstances of alleged demand is improbable, charge No. 1 falls to the ground. The circumstances indicated in the charge and relied upon by the respondents would be corroborative and strengthen the allegations levelled in the charges. As observed, the instant case is of no evidence to prove charge Nos. 1 and 2. 19.The Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority have lost sight that the universal phenomenon is that the man is recognised, believed and regarded by his action in support of his words. Man's behaviour also plays vital and important role in life. Admittedly, there is no universal yard-stick as regards the behaviour of man. But what the man does, not what he feels, thinks or behaves, is a universal yard-stick of the behaviour. Man's behaviour, action and re-action, divert according to occasion. As the occasion, so the behaviour. Actions speak louder than words. Great actions speak great mind and great acts come out of great actions. The alleged incident is of a demand of bribe or gratification and that too by a man who adorned a pious seat in the temple of justice. It is no doubt said frequently by one and all that corruption is rampage in our country and spread like cancer disease. However, temples of Justice are exceptions. The alleged incident is of a demand of bribe or gratification and that too by a man who adorned a pious seat in the temple of justice. It is no doubt said frequently by one and all that corruption is rampage in our country and spread like cancer disease. However, temples of Justice are exceptions. In spite of this, if any case of alleged corruption or demand of bribe or gratification is brought to the notice of the Disciplinary Authority, or High Court of a particular State, no erring Judge or Official shall be spared. We are in favour of strict action or punishment of dismissal in case of the Judges or Officers who indulged in corruption so as to maintain the pious image of the Judges and the temple of Justice. 20.Bar and Bench are the two wheels of the chariot in the administration or process of imparting Justice. Thus, duty is cased on both i.e. Bar and Bench to maintain the dignity of the hon'ble profession. Till this date, the citizens of India reposed unequivocal faith and trust in the Judiciary and, therefore, immediately after any incident, accident or calamity, "Judicial Enquiry" is the demand of the day at all levels. If any Judge is tarnishing the image of temple of Justice, indulging in corruption, the prompt report/complaint is expected from the advocates and the litigants as also public in general, to enable the higher authorities to take immediate steps against such Judge/Judges. In the instant case, the complainant Uttam and his counsel Mr. Kharkar tried to pose themselves as persons conscious of their rights and duties. Complaint dated 23-1-1991 is the out come of their consciousness. The demand of gratification is conspicuously absent in the complaint. After the receipt of the complaint, an enquiry was conducted by the District and Sessions Judge, Parbhani, visiting Pathari Court on 13th and 14th March, 1991 and he recorded statements of various Advocates, employees in secrecy, without the knowledge of the petitioner. In those statements too, the demand of Rs. 5,000/- either from Mr. Kharkar or the plaintiff Uttam is absent. No explanation whatsoever has been put forth either by Shri Kharkar or Uttam Depale, as to why the alleged demand of gratification is absent in the complaint. The complainant merely stated that he told the petition writer about the demand of Rs. 5,000/- either from Mr. Kharkar or the plaintiff Uttam is absent. No explanation whatsoever has been put forth either by Shri Kharkar or Uttam Depale, as to why the alleged demand of gratification is absent in the complaint. The complainant merely stated that he told the petition writer about the demand of Rs. 5,000/- from him, but inadvertently the petition writer missed to scribe. Before sending the complaint to the Hon'ble High Court and the District Judge, Parbhani, the same was shown to Shri Kharkar, who supplied the name and address of the addressee. Under the circumstances, the evidence of petition writer would have been the material evidence to show as to whether in reality the complainant had disclosed about the alleged demand of gratification, and the petition writer missed to scribe it. But the petition writer has not been examined. Advocate Kharkar has stated contrary to the evidence of Uttam Depale. As also expressed his innocence as regards the perusal of the complaint dated 23-1-1991. Thus, the evidence is at variance. The vital, important and material omissions, which amount to contradictions, are the foundation of the charge Nos. 1 and 2. If it is found absent and no reasons are assigned, no prudent man would ignore such vital omissions while appreciating the evidence of these witnesses. Thus, before the Enquiry Officer, the evidence as regard the demand of gratification came to be recorded for the first time on 28-12-1992. No explanation whatsoever has been sought from these witnesses for non-disclosure of the material evidence for a period of about 2 years. Lame excuse that petition-writer not scribed, is not a logical and probable one and as such nobody can consider and appreciate in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. It transpires from the evidence of Shri Kharkar that he is a legal practitioner at Sailu and Pathari, having major work at both the places. If any demand is made to such a senior leading Advocate, who flatly declined to oblige the Judge, what could be the immediate action or reaction? Even a man of normal conscious would immediately disclose to his relations, friends and write to the higher-ups of the Presiding Officer. Senior Advocate like Shri Kharkar would not have failed to raise hue and cry in the bar by disclosing the illegal demand of the Judge. Even a man of normal conscious would immediately disclose to his relations, friends and write to the higher-ups of the Presiding Officer. Senior Advocate like Shri Kharkar would not have failed to raise hue and cry in the bar by disclosing the illegal demand of the Judge. In the instant case, Shri Kharkar even did not disclose to his junior Mr. Kulkarni and his own uncle Advocate Choudhari, as also the other members of his Bar either at Sailu or Pathari made no attempts to book the petitioner by arranging trap of Anti-Corruption Bureau. Behaviour is a mirror in which every one shows his image. It is rightly said that do not Judge a man by his appearance and words expressed and that too after a considerable or inordinate delay, but by his actions more. A man does what he means..... inspite of personal consequences, inspite of obstacless and damages and pressure .... and that is the basis of all human morality. Considering the norms of behaviour, in the present situation, on the anvil of propriety and prudence, the behaviour of Shri Kharkar is not transparent, honest and above the board. 21.While considering whether the Public Officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, does not apply. In the Departmental Enquiries the matter is to be decided on the pre-pounderence of the probabilities. The evidence which we have discussed in the preceding paras, according to us, does not support the findings at all of the Enquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority. Neither the Enquiry Officer nor the Disciplinary Authority has applied its mind to the material evidence. No reasonable person could have reached to such a findings of guilty proving the charges. In fact, it is a case of no evidence against the petitioner. The non-consideration of the vital and material evidence which we have reproduced in the preceding paras, demonstrate the bias attitude towards the petitioner. Considering the evidence, according to us, the only view or inference is available that the charges are not proved against the petitioner. No other view is possible. Thus, the conclusions on the face of it, are as a whole arbitrary, perverse and capricious. Considering the evidence, according to us, the only view or inference is available that the charges are not proved against the petitioner. No other view is possible. Thus, the conclusions on the face of it, are as a whole arbitrary, perverse and capricious. 22.The charge No. 3 has a cumulative effect as three circumstances have been indicated in it of not passing the order immediately after hearing the arguments on the application for grant of injunction and this is considered as omission and commission amounting to gross negligence of duty tentamount to misconduct. 23.Shri Charde attracted our attention to Rule No. 8 of Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979. Shri Thakur, on querry made by us, specifically stated that the High Court has adopted these Rules. The relevant provisions of Rule 8 reads as follows :--- "8.Procedure for imposing major penalties---(1) No order imposing any of the major penalties shall be made except after an inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in the rule and Rule 9, or where such inquiry is held under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850) in the manner provided in that Act. (2)Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a Government servant, it may itself inquire into, or appoint under this rule or under the provisions of the Public Servant (Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. Explanation.---Where a disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry under this rule, any reference to an inquiring authority in this rule shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed as reference to the disciplinary authority. (3)Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a Government servant under this rule, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up --- (i)the substance of the imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge; (ii)a statement of the imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, which shall contain --- (a) a statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government servant; and (b) a list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained. (4)The disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government servant, a copy of articles of charge, the statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour, and a list of documents and of the witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained, and shall by a written notice require the Government servant to submit to it within such time as may be specified in the notice, a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. The Enquiry Officer while considering point No. 3 in paras 27 and 28 of the report (pages 211 and 212 of the paper book) held the delinquent guilty of negligence of duty which amounts to misconduct. Mere delay in passing the order in one matter would not amount to misconduct. Actually as stated earlier the Enquiry Officer has ignored the articled charges which are on account of delay in three matters cumulatively. Enquiry Officer landed in confusion because of framing points for determination though unwarranted by rules, instead of enquiring into the charges as framed and relied upon them in one particular way. The Enquiry Officer as also the Disciplinary Authority has not considered the explanation tendered by the petitioner. At the most the delay in passing the order would amount to negligence, but not misconduct. Therefore the findings recorded on this point deserve to be quashed and set aside. 24.Shri Thakur, the learned Counsel appearing for the High Court, while supporting the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the impugned order of dismissal, tried to attract our attention to one anonymous letter dated 25th February, 1991 received by the Registry of the Bombay High Court. Vide letter dated 22nd July, 1991, the respondent No. 2 directed the District and Sessions Judge, Parbhani, to make enquiry in respect of the said anonymous letter. It means that there was second enquiry. Shri Adharrao (witness No. 11) has specifically stated that he was directed to enquire into the complaint dated 23-1-1991. There is no whisper that he enquired into any other complaint much less that anonymous letter dated 25th February, 1991. It means that there was second enquiry. Shri Adharrao (witness No. 11) has specifically stated that he was directed to enquire into the complaint dated 23-1-1991. There is no whisper that he enquired into any other complaint much less that anonymous letter dated 25th February, 1991. Shri Charde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, specifically attracted our attention to the list of documents at page 60 of the paper book, which indicates that only seven documents were supplied to the petitioner along with the charge-sheet, statement of imputations and list of witnesses. There is no reference in the list of documents as regards to the anonymous letter dated 25th February, 1991. Consequently, the copy of the said letter was not supplied to the petitioner. Shri Charde vehemently argued that the Enquiry Officer took anonymous letter on record during the enquiry proceeding. This indicates the bias attitude of the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority. Without proof, this letter was exhibited. No statements, if any, recorded in the second enquiry, were supplied to the petitioner which is clear from the list of documents as stated above. It needs mention that this point has not been pleaded in the return filed by the respondent No. 2. Therefore, the enquiry, according to us, is not in accordance with the Rules. 25.On the careful examination of the submissions and the documents placed before us, we have no doubt that the view taken by the respondent No. 2 the High Court and consequent action against the petitioner to dismiss him from service, is wholly arbitrary, unwarranted and violative of principles of natural justice. It is unsustainable and must be struck down. It needs to observe that considering the facts and circumstances, there is no whisper in the complaint dated 23-1-1991 regarding the demand of bribe of gratification of Rs. 5,000/- or anything either from Advocate Kharkar or the complainant Uttam Depale. Their statements were recorded on 28-12-1992 i.e. after about 2 years and if the version of Advocate Ashok Kharkar is believed, without any corroborative piece of evidence either oral or documentary with inherent and apparent impossibilities, no life and honour of any Judge would be safe. There will always be a sword hanging over the neck of all the members of the judiciary. There will always be a sword hanging over the neck of all the members of the judiciary. Giving credence to the evidence of such persons without scrupules would put a premium on such type of motivated complainants and the career of subordinate Judges would be at their mercy making them to work with terror striken mind. 26.The independence of Judiciary requires undoubtedly an independent Bar. But it also requires to greater extent an independent Judge. Attempt by any member of the Bar to brow-beat and/or bully the Judge only because some of the decisions go against that lawyer, is equally to be depricated as it will deter them from discharging their judicial functions, which will be far more disastrous and will undermine the rule of law as observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of (U.P. Sales Tax Service Association v. Tas (sic) Tax Bar Association, Agra)12, 1995(5) Supreme Court Cases 716. Lordship K. Ramaswami speaking for the Bench, dealing with the rule of law, in para 11, observed as: "11.It is fundamental that if rule of law is to have any meaning and contents, the authority of the Court or a statutory authority and the confidence of the public in them should not be allowed to be shaken, diluted or undermined. The courts of Justice and all tribunal exercising judicial functions from the highest to the lowest are by their constitution entrusted with functions directly connected with the administration of Justice. It is that expectation and confidence of all those, who have or are likely to have business in the Court or tribunal, which should be maintained so that the Court/Tribunal perform all, their functions on a higher level of rectitude without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. Casting defamatory aspersions upon the character, ability or integrity of the Judge/Judicial Officer/authority undermines the dignity of the Court/authority and tends to create distruct in the popular mind and impedes the confidence of the people in the Courts/Tribunals which is of prime importance to the litigants in he protection of their rights and liberties. The protection to the Judges/Judicial Officer/authority is not personal but accorded to protect the institution of the judiciary from undermining the public confidence in the efficacy of judicial process. The protection, therefore, is for fearless curial process. The protection to the Judges/Judicial Officer/authority is not personal but accorded to protect the institution of the judiciary from undermining the public confidence in the efficacy of judicial process. The protection, therefore, is for fearless curial process. Any scurrilous, offensive intimidatory or malicious attack on the Judicial Officer/authority beyond condonable limits, amounts to scandalising the Court/Tribunal amenable to not only conviction for its contempt but also liable to libel or defamation and damages personally or group libel. Maintenance of dignity of the Court/Judicial Officer or quasi judicial authority is, therefore, one of the cardinal principles of rule of law embedded in judicial review. Any uncalled for statement or allegation against the Judicial Officer/statutory authorities, casting aspersions of Court's integrity or corruption would justify initiation of appropriate action for scandalising the Court or Tribunal or vindication of authority or majesty of the Court/Tribunal. The accusation of the Judicial Officer or authority or arbitrary and corrupt conduct undermines their authority and rudely shakes them and the public confidence in proper dispensation of Justice. It is of necessity to protect dignity or authority of the Judicial Officer to maintain the stream of Justice pure and unobstructed. The Judicial Officer/authority needs protection personally. Therefore, making wild allegations of corruption against the Preiding Officer amounts to scandalising the Court/statutory authority. Imputation of motives of corruption to the Judicial Officer/authority by any person or group of persons is a serious inroad into the efficacy of judicial process and threat to judicial independence and needs to be dealt with the strong arm of law." In view of the above observations made by Rheir Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case cited supra, in the case in hand, we cannot refrain ourselves from observing that the conduct of Mr. A.S. Kharkar, Advocate, which gets revealed that from mere non-acceptance of certain suit due to order by the High Court pertaining to the matter from certain villages after creation of separate Court at Pathari, his reaction was then as to create an impression that he has some infatuated notions of himself resulting into such conduct which would result into creating an impression that he wanted to brow-beat the Presiding Officer. 27.Shri Charde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, strenuously argued that the charges levelled by the Disciplinary Authority in the Articles of Charges and the Statement of Imputation, were not enquired into, but the learned Enquiry Officer has framed the points for determination. The Article of Charge as supplied by the Disciplinary Authority to the Enquiry Officer speaks that the petitioner demanded illegal gratification from Advocate A.S. Kharkar as consideration for deciding the matter in favour of his client. While the Statment of Imputation shows that the delinquent expressed to Shri Kharkar to extract something from his client. The Enquiry Officer framed Point No. 1 for determination to the effect that the delinquent Shri S.R. Patil demanded money from Uttam Depale. The Charge No. 1, the Statement of Imputation in para 1 and the point No. 1 framed for determination by the Enquiry Officer, have been reproduced in para 10 of the Judgment. Considering the charge, Statement of Imputation and the point No. 1 for determination. Shri Charde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the charges must be definite and specific against the delinquent. No time, date and month has been specified. Thus, the information provided to the petitioner by the charges is vague. When the Disciplinary Authority framed the Article of Charges and Statement of Impugations of misconduct or misbehaviour of the delinquent, the Enquiry Officer has no jurisdiction or is not competent to alter the charges and frame altogether different one. Reading of the Article of Charges, Statement of Imputation and the Point No. 1 for determination, indicate that those are ipso facto vague. 28.The relevant rules are in part IV page 9 of the Maharashtra Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979. Shri Thakar, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2, has admitted that these rules are adopted by the respondent No. 2. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 and the Explanation of sub-rule (2) provide that whenever a decision to make an enquiry is taken, it can be done by the Disciplinary Authority itself or appoint an Enquiry Officer. As per sub-rule (3) of Rule 8, the Disciplinary Authority shall draw a substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge. As per sub-rule (3) of Rule 8, the Disciplinary Authority shall draw a substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge. This provision makes it clear that there should be statement of imputation in support of Articles of Charges, which shall contain all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government servant and the list of documents and the list of witnesses be provided. Under sub-rule (6) of Rule 8, when the Disciplinary Authority does not enquire into the charges, it is required to forward to inquiring authority, under Clause (i) of sub-rule (6) of Rule 8, a copy of each articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavious, together with the evidence and documents. In case the Government servant pleads guilty, record the findings of guilt in respect of the Articles of charge and return the findings. However, when there is no plea of guilt, the enquiry has to be conducted as provided under Rules. After the completion of the enquiry in accordance with the Rules, the Authority has to prepare the report under sub-rule (25) of Rule 8 and forward the same to Disciplinary Authority. 29.Rule (3) of Maharashtra Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1979 deals with the duty of Government Servant to maintain intergrity, devotion to duty etc. It provides that every Government servant shall at all times --- (i)maintain absolute integrity; (ii)maintain devotion to duty; and (iii)do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government. 30.From the above relevant rules, it emerges clearly that there must be misconduct of any of the types mentioned in the Rules for which alone, there should be charges levelled. It also clearly emerges from the provisions for the purpose of imposition of any major penalty, the Rules which are framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India provides for proper opportunity of hearing and there should be definite and distinct articles of charges, statement of imputation and evidence on which the Department wants to proceed. The Enquiry Officer, when the enquiry is not conducted by the Disciplinary Authority, has jurisdiction only to enquire into those definite and distinct articled charges and record his findings on such articled charges in respect of which he has to hold the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer, when the enquiry is not conducted by the Disciplinary Authority, has jurisdiction only to enquire into those definite and distinct articled charges and record his findings on such articled charges in respect of which he has to hold the enquiry. 31.In the instant case, the enquiry conducted is not in respect of those charges in respect of which the Statement of Imputation was served. The result is that there is infraction of rules and the enquiry conducted is without jurisdiction. The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on the points framed for determination by him, cannot be equated with the definite and distinc charges framed under the Rules over which he has a jurisdiction to enquire. It is apparent that the finding has not been recorded by the Enquiry Officer on the articled charges referred to in the enquiry to the Enquiry Officer in law, the result is: (1)it cannot furnish a valid foundation for any order of penalty; (2)it shows total non-application of mind on the part of the Disciplinary Authority as it failed to see whether charges which were articles and referred to for the enquiry was the subject matter of the enquiry by the Enquiry Officer on his own. (3)It is also against the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the entire enquiry suffers from bias and denial of fair and proper opportunity to the petitioner. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that on this count too the order of imposition of the penalty deserve to be set aside. Shri Charde placed reliance on the case of (S. Subba Rao v. State of Mysore)13, A.I.R. 1964 Mysore 221 (D.B.). In para 18 of the Judgment, Lordships observed : "It is in my opinion plain that the only charge into which a Board of Enquiry appointed under Rule II(4) of the Mysore Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, may make an enquiry would be the charge framed under Rule II(2) by the disciplinary authority or by the authority specially empowered in that behalf. It is not within the competence of the Board of Enquiry to frame fresh charges when it is appointed to enquire into a charge already framed under sub-rule (2). It is not within the competence of the Board of Enquiry to frame fresh charges when it is appointed to enquire into a charge already framed under sub-rule (2). But, if it nevertheless proceeds to do so, it would be clearly acting without the authority of law and any finding recorded by the Board of Enquiry into a charge framed by it not already included in the charge framed under sub-rule (2) would be a finding which has no existence in the eye of law and cannot properly form the foundation for the imposition of a punishment on the delinquent Government servant." Reliance has also been placed on the case of, Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 995, wherein Their Lordships observed : "that the report of the Enquiry Officer finding the delinquent officer guilty could not be sustained as the charges were vague and it was difficult to meet the charges fairly by the delinquent officer. The evidence adduced was perfunctory and did not at all bring home the guilt of the delinquent officer. Consequently the order of termination of service of delinquent officer would be liable to be set aside." A reliance has also been placed on the case of (Jagdish Kumar v. The State of Punjab and another)14, 1994(8) S.L.R. 791, wherein it is held that an employee cannot be punished for a charge which is not levelled against him. Punishing an employee in respect of the charge which is not levelled against him, results in breach of principles of natural justice and it has the effect of rendering the order passed by the employer is nullity. It is an elementary rule of natural justice that a man whose civil rights are going to be affected by an action of a public authority he must know the basis on which the action is being taken against him and must have an opportunity of defending himself. Unless specific charge of misconduct is levelled, the employee cannot be penalised. He cannot be punished for a charge which is not made subject-matter of enquiry. 32.Giving conscious thought to the facts as reproduced in above paras as also the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as other High Courts as reproduced above, we find that there is a considerable force in the submissions of Shri Charde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 32.Giving conscious thought to the facts as reproduced in above paras as also the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as other High Courts as reproduced above, we find that there is a considerable force in the submissions of Shri Charde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The Rules provide that the Enquiry Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority has to enquire into the charges levelled and the Statement of Imputation and has no powers to frame another charge. In this case, it is very clear that the point for determination framed by the Enquiry Officer was not framed on the basis of the charges levelled and the Statement of Imputation to which the reply was sought of the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be valid foundation for the order of penalty/punishment. This attitude smacks of bias as also denial of fair and proper opportunity to the petitioner. On this count too, the order impugned and the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority as also the Enquiry Officer, are set aside. 33.While appreciating the circumstances and evaluating the evidence, it needs consideration of the delinquent's/petitioner's up-bringing in past and conduct in the present situation. The petitioner is a son of School Master, brought in discipline. His disposal throughout his tenure at Pathari was good. All the three District Judges found his work satisfactory and there was no complaint of any type against him. Actually, it was brought to our notice by the learned Counsel of the petitioner that Shri Dinkar Coudhari (witness No. 4) examined by the Department, who is a Senior Advocate, had stated about the petitioner that he has not spared Shri Bhalchandra, the Government Pleader working in the petitioner's Court, as he was not performing his duties sincerely and seriously, also coming to the Court in a drunken state, the petitioner made complaint against him. It is an irony that charges of being given to drinking were also framed against the petitioner, for which he stood exonerated. But, this again shows how bias approach was taken in the whole matter. 34.It is to be remembered that in case of the petitioner, his disposals throughout were found as 'Noteworthy' by the respondent No. 2. It is an irony that charges of being given to drinking were also framed against the petitioner, for which he stood exonerated. But, this again shows how bias approach was taken in the whole matter. 34.It is to be remembered that in case of the petitioner, his disposals throughout were found as 'Noteworthy' by the respondent No. 2. Shri Charde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, vehemently argued that often the total work and file that a Judge is required to handle is out of proportion and at times applications for injunction, etc. are hotly contested that they take heavy toll of time of the work of the Judge, and yet negligible credit or weightage is given while considering the disposal of such applications. Such as for the disposal of a regular civil suit, 1.71 points are given and according to the directions of respondent No. 3, disposal of 4 injunction applications is equivalent to one regular civil suit. Means each application gets 0.42 points only. Hence, the Judge is more inclined to concentrate on regular matters which are given credit and that is how some injunction applications or other applications not so important or urgent, are not immediately attended to. Under the circumstances, the possibility cannot be ruled out that any advocate, to find out fault with the Judge, can make a mountain out of mole hill. The argument appears to be cogent and, therefore, we think that it will be proper to consider this aspect while considering the disposal of the Sub-ordinate Judge that the orders passed on the applications for temporary injunction and other applications be given more weightage than the prescribed one for such work while evaluating the disposal. The High Court from time to time prescribed norms for determining the adequacy of disposal to be given by the members of the subordinate Judiciary in various categories of courts. Revised norms were issued w.e.f. 1-1-1986. Schedule 'A' speaks about the disposal of the main matters or categories of litigations by the Civil Judge, Jr.Dn., for a month i.e. 24 working days, while Schedule 'B' speaks for miscelleneous matters. As per Schedule 'A', a Civil Judge, Jr.Dn., is required to dispose of in a month (24 working days), 14 regular civil suit or 48 small causes suits and mesne profit applications. (It means disposal of each suit will be counted as disposal in 1.71 days). As per Schedule 'A', a Civil Judge, Jr.Dn., is required to dispose of in a month (24 working days), 14 regular civil suit or 48 small causes suits and mesne profit applications. (It means disposal of each suit will be counted as disposal in 1.71 days). As per Schedule 'B', a Civil Judge, Jr.Dn., is required to dispose of within a month (24 working days), 24 F.D. Applications, 120 Misc. Applications (Judl.Enq.) 72 Contested Reg. Darkhasts, 240 contested S.Ca. Darkhast, 240 A.D.R. Darkhasts, 18 Applications under P.W. or M.W. or W.C. Act, 144 Reg. Ex parte Suits. The High Court issued revised norms as regards the weightage to the disposal of applications for Temporary Injunctions under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C. and for appointment of Receivers under Order 40, Rule 1 of C.P.C. Disposal of such four applications are treated as equivalent to one regular suit. It means disposal of each such application would get 0.42 point. The petitioner being probationary, he must have concentrated to dispose of the Regular suits to get better remarks and, therefore, at the most it can be said that he paid no heed to dispose of the miscelleneous matters immediately. Such attitude cannot be said by any stretch of imagination as misconduct. 35.In the instant case, actually, the order on injunction application required no promptitude, which would be evident from the evidence of witness No. 12-Shri Vasantrao Sakharampant Kharkar, Advocate, aged 59 years, who was a counsel for the defendant in Civil Suit No. 150 of 1990. The learned Counsel stated that :--- "Ashok Kharkar was the Counsel for the plaintiff in that case, He argued the matter and I also replied in argument. I being aware of the facts of the case, I was also aware that there was no merits in favour of my client and, therefore, I was not curious enough as regard the result. .......I was knowing that since the record was in favour of the plaintiff, the decision would be in his favour. In this suit, the Presiding Officer had given the date for order, but on that date, no decision was given.......During the tenure of Shri Patil as Judge of Pathari Court, I did not hear any talk or rumour that Patil was a corrupt Judge. ..........I did not received any complaint that the decision was being belated. In this suit, the Presiding Officer had given the date for order, but on that date, no decision was given.......During the tenure of Shri Patil as Judge of Pathari Court, I did not hear any talk or rumour that Patil was a corrupt Judge. ..........I did not received any complaint that the decision was being belated. However, after a long time I came to know that the plaintiff had lodged a complaint and I was surprised about it. I was shocked to know about this because the plaintiff was already in possession and the record was also in his favour and, therefore, was the surprise." 36.We feel it necessary to record our note of anxiety considering the facts and circumstances of the case in hand that under the Constitution of India the High Court has control over the subordinate judiciary and as such while exercising it is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. The petitioner was probationer and thus new entrant in the judicial service. To err is Human. It is the nature of every man to err and mistake. Error is handy plant; it flourishes in every soil. The wisest of wise may err. In other words. "The Best may Err". Thus, the honest error is to be pitied not ridiculed. If errors or mistakes are brought to the notice of the person concerned, he shall try to correct the errors and mistakes and shall adopt new views. In cases of Subordinate Judicial Officers, if errors, mistakes or irregularities are noticed or brought up to the notice of high-ups, we feel it obligatory to bring to the notice of the concerned Judical Officer even by issuing warnings or guidance. Even if no improvement is noticed, then strick action be taken in accordance with law. Their Lordships of the Apex Court while considering the errors or mistakes committed by Probationary Officers in the initial stage of service, what could be the approach of the High Court has been discussed in a case of (Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab Haryana another)15, 1988(3) S.C.C. 370 . In para 13. Their Lordships of the Apex Court while considering the errors or mistakes committed by Probationary Officers in the initial stage of service, what could be the approach of the High Court has been discussed in a case of (Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab Haryana another)15, 1988(3) S.C.C. 370 . In para 13. Their Lordships have observed:--- "Every Judicial Officer is likely to commit mistake of some kind or the other in passing orders in the initial stage of the service which a mature Judicial Officer would not do. However, if the orders are passed without there being any corrupt motive, the same should be over looked by the High Court and proper guidance should be provided to him. If after warning and guidance the officer on probation is not able to improve, his services should be terminated." Their Lordships in para 14 of the aforesaid Judgment observed:--- "Under the Constitution the High Court has control over subordinate judiciary. While exercising that control, it is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect Judicial Officers. An honest, strict Judicial Officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil courts. If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side, no Judicial Officer would feel protected and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for rule of law. If Judicial Officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry on trifling matters and if High Court encourages anonymous complaints to hold the field the subordinate judiciary will not be able to administer justice in an independent and honest manner. It is therefore imperative that the High Court should also take steps to protect its honest officers by ignorning ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and litigants." 37.Shri Charde, learned Counsel for the petitioner, in pursuance to the ground No. 43 submitted that in case of the petitioner neither the Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Full Court or the action contemplated was recommended by the Full Court as envisaged in Article 235 of the Constitution. The Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice and the punishment regarding dismissal from the service was recommended to the State Government by the Disciplinary Committee. The Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice and the punishment regarding dismissal from the service was recommended to the State Government by the Disciplinary Committee. The High Court as expressed in Article 235 of the Constitution means Full Court. Article 235 provides that the control over District Court and Courts subordinate thereto shall be vested in the High Court. Every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deed fit it necessary to appoint. Article 235 has to be construed to mean that the control over the District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto is vested in the entire body of Judges who together constitute the High Court and not in the Chief Justice as representing the High Court or an Administrative Judge or a smaller body of Judges acting as an administrative committee. However, though the control over the sub-ordinate courts is vested institutionally in the High Courts by Article 235, it does not follow that the High Courts have no power to prescribe the manner in which that control may in practice be exercised. The limited object of the present discussion is to show that High Courts possess the power under Article 235 to prescribed the manner in which the control over subordinate courts vested in them by that article may be exercised. In other words, if by Article 235 the control over subordinate courts is vested in the High Court as a whole, is it permissible to the High Court to provide by framing a rule that a matter falling within the area of control may be decided, not by the whole Court, but by a Judge or a Committee of Judges acting on behalf of the courts. In the instant case, in the return filed on behalf of the High Court, it has not been disputed that the decision to appoint the Enquiry Officer, placing the report of Enquiry Officer for taking the necessary decision thereon, not placed before the Full Court. The return even does not state that the matter was placed before the Full Court or the same was circulated to the Judges for consideration. Similarly, no rule has been placed on record to indicate that the Full Court has delegated powers either to the Chief Justice or any other small committee. The return even does not state that the matter was placed before the Full Court or the same was circulated to the Judges for consideration. Similarly, no rule has been placed on record to indicate that the Full Court has delegated powers either to the Chief Justice or any other small committee. Admittedly, there are no separate rules framed by the High Court. It means, the action of dismissal is recommended only by the Disciplinary Committee. 38.However, we find in the return of the respondent No. 2 in para 17 that a reliance is placed on a decision in the form of resolution passed in the chamber meeting dated 2-5-1981 of the Full House, giving authorisation to the Chief Justice in certain matters to constitute smaller committee to consider those matters. The copy of that decision is placed on record as Annexure-II. So also reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in a case of (R.W. Khan v. State of Maharashtra and another)16, 1996(1) Mah.L.J. 899 (D.B.). In para 9 of the Judgment, the relevant part of decision/resolution has been reproduced. The same is also reproduced here as : "IV.(A) Decisions on the following matters shall be taken at a meeting of all the Judges. (1)Promotion of an Assistant Judge as a District Judge if such promotion involves supersession of any Senior Judge or Judges. (2)Appointment of a Civil Judge as a Civil Judge, Senior Division, otherwise than in accordance with the order of seniority. (3)Appointment of a Civil Judge as a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judge of the Court of Small Causes. (4)Promotion of. (a)A Metropolitan Magistrate as an Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or as the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. (b)A Judge of Small Cause Court in Bombay as an Additional Chief Judge or as the Chief Judge of that Court. (5)Postponement of confirmation of a Judge or a Magistrate. (6)Recommendation by way of Disciplinary action against any Judge or Magistrate. (7)Appointment of an Inspecting District Judge. (8)Recommendation of names for appointments to posts other than those of District Judges and Bombay City Civil Court Judges where such appointments are to be made on the recommendation of the High Court. Decision : Accepted. VII.In respect of any matter not mentioned hereinabove a proposal be initiated by the Chief Justice and circulated among all the Judges and decision shall be taken in accordance with the majority opinion. Decision : Accepted. VII.In respect of any matter not mentioned hereinabove a proposal be initiated by the Chief Justice and circulated among all the Judges and decision shall be taken in accordance with the majority opinion. The Chief Justice may, if he so desire, instead refer the matter to the meeting of all the Judges. Decision :To be deleted and substituted by the following residuary clause: "Decisions of all matters except those enumerated in paragraph IV(A) shall be taken in accordance with the practice followed hitherto or in accordance with the directions that the Chief Justice may issue from time to time hereafter." 39.From the bare perusal of the above decision/resolution, it is clear that the matters enumerated in Item No. IV-A from S.Nos. 1 to 8, are required to be decided at by all the Judges of the High Court. Serial No. 6 deals with the recommendations by way of disciplinary action against any Judge or Magistrate. Admittedly, the present case is of a disciplinary action against the Judge/Magistrate. The exception is carved out to those items i.e. 1 to 8 above. That exception specifically states that the decision of all matter except those enumerated in paragraph IV-A shall be taken in accordance with the practice. We wonder in face of this specific decision, how the case of the petitioner is covered by the exceptional power. In our view it being clearly covered by Item No. 6 of Clause IV-A, the decision of the Full Court alone would justify in disciplinary action. 40.The Apex Court while considering the case of compulsory retirement of a Judicial Officer in the case of (The Registrar, High Court of Madras, v. R. Rajiah)17, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1388, has observed as follows :-- "We fail to understand why the Chief Justice cannot appoint a Review Committee or an Administrative Committe. But in one respect the High Court is, in our opinion, correct namely, that the decision of the Revision Committee should have been placed before a meeting of the Judges. In the case of the respondent, K. Rajeswaran, the decision and recommendation of the Review Committee was not placed before the Full Court meeting. Nor is there any material to show that the same was circulated to the Judges. In the case of the respondent, K. Rajeswaran, the decision and recommendation of the Review Committee was not placed before the Full Court meeting. Nor is there any material to show that the same was circulated to the Judges. In that sense, the recommendation of the Review Committee was not strictly legal." With these observations, Their Lordships of the Apex Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the Registrar, High Court of Madras. The Full Bench of Patna High Court in a case of (Syed Iqbal v. State of Bihar)18, A.I.R. 1994 Patna 167 : 1994 Labour Industrial Cases 2202, relying on the interpretation of Article 235 of the Constitution, has observed : "In view of interpretation of Article 235 of the Constitution, the control over the subordinate judicial officers rests in High Court as whole and not in the committee. According to a narrow interpretation, even if it is held that the evaluation committee was competent to finally discharge the suitability of the Judicial Officer for his representation in service, particularly the age of 58 years, in view of the procedure prescribed under Rule 3(x) of the High Court Rules laying down the manner in which the decision to compulsorily retire a Judicial Officer is to be effectuated, the matter had to be circulated amongst the Judges and in the event of the same, the same has to be referred to the Full Court for discussion and decision." Before the Division Bench of Madras High Court in (T.S. Sankaranarayanan v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras)19, 1995 Lab.I.C. 2001, the disciplinary proceeding was against the subordinate Judicial Officer and the Enquiry Committee was appointed by the Chief Justice alone and admittedly not by the Full Court. Their Lordships referring the case of Apex Court and other courts, observed in para 8 as under : "For the purpose of appointment of enquiring committee in matters regarding disciplinary proceedings against sub-ordinate Judicial Officers, the three propositions laid down are as follows : (i)If there are rules framed by the High Court under one or other of the Articles of the Constitution of India, referred to above, then the disciplinary action against the subordinate Judicial Officer can be proceeded in the manner provided by the Rules; (ii)If no such rules are framed by a High Court, even then, it is open to the Full Court, by resolution, to appoint a smaller body of Judges as constituting a Committee to initiate and take disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate Judicial Officer; (iii)In the absence of Rules or Resolution by Full Court the Chief Justice by himself cannot appoint a smaller body constituting the disciplinary committee or the Enquiring Committee." Ultimately, the ratio laid down by their Lordships in paras 12, 15 and 16 has been concised in placitum para 2. "Where in disciplinary proceedings against sub-ordinate Judicial Officer an enquiring committee was appointed by the Chief Justice alone and not by the Full Court, it would be violative of Article 235 and therefore, the entire proceedings against the subordinate Judicial Officer would be vitiated and consequently the order imposing minor punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect would be liable to be quashed. Further, even at the state of initiation of disciplinary proceedings the Full Court must be involved in the exercise of appointing a smaller committee." The conclusion is recorded by Their Lordships in para 15 which is reproduced as under : "In fine, we held that the appointment of the Hon'ble Enquiring Judges in this case by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice alone is vitiated and contrary to Article 235 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, all the subsequent proceedings, commencing from the issue of the First Official Memorandum dated 18-2-1991 becomes vitiated." Perusal of the Judgment in the case of R.W. Khan, (referred supra), shows that the Judgment of Apex Court in A.I.R. 1988 S.C. at page 1388 and of the Full Bench Judgment in the case of Syed Iqbal v. State of Bihar, of the Patna High Court, referred earlier, were not before the Division Bench. The view we have taken also receives support from the ruling of the Supreme Court arising in the case of (High Court of M.P. v. Mahesh Prasad and others)20, A.I.R. 1994 Supreme Court 2595. It will be advantagious to reproduce the observations of the Apex Court in para 21 of the ruling which are to the following effect: "The learned Chief Justice, as the head of the judiciary in the State and in over-all control of its administration, known better than most of his brother Judges about his sub-oridinate Judge. It is his function to appreciate their merits and de-mertis. He is entitled to record his comments upon them and make his views known during relevant discussions at a Full Court meeting. Decisions regarding confirmation, promotion, supersession and the like of subordinate Judges are taken at Full Court meetings. Every High Court Judge is of the same stature, the learned Chief Justice being the first among equals. Every learned Judge is expected to contribute to the discussions of the Full Court and participate in the decisions arrived at. This mode of dealing with the confirmation, promotions and supersessions of those who man the subordinate judiciary is a sure safeguard against arbitrary or motivated decisions. The view of the learned Chief Justice would be heard with due respect, but it would not hold away. It certainly cannot be said that the expression of his view by the learned Chief Justice would prevent independent consideration by the Full Court." 41.In view of the ratio laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and other High Courts referred above, considering the facts that in the instant case the appointment of the Enquiry Officer and the punishment recommended to the State Government was not before the Full Court, the impugned order as also the findings of the Enquiry Officer and that of Disciplinary Committee will have to be quashed being violative of the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution of India. 42.The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Charde, brought to our notice the ruling reported in 1994 Supp. 42.The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Charde, brought to our notice the ruling reported in 1994 Supp. (3) S.C.C. 711, (R.C. Sood v. High Court of Rajasthan)23, and urged that having regard to the absolute control of the High Court over the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution, whereby their independence is ensured and protection from any interfernece, their Lordships observed thus :--- "At a time when fairness and non-arbitrariness are the essential requirements of every administrative State action, it is more so for any administrative act of the Judges. It is necessary that members of the subordinate judiciary get no occasion to think otherwise." 43.Before we part with this Judgment, we may observe that rather a painful task was required to be performed by us inasmuch as we have been required to record our respectful disagreement with the administrative decision taken by respondent No. 2. When the administrative decision is assailed, the matter is required to be decided on a Judicial anvil. Undoubtedly, it opens a new vista and a look at the matter through a judicially prism person, the result of which, in our view, has to prevail over the administrative action, since the administrative and judicial tasks have their areas and the perspective which may not coincide for all the time and in each case. The responsibility of the Constitutional functions which we have been now performing satisfies us to reach a conclusion in this petition that the conclusion to which we arrived in the circumstances, was inevitable and howsoever ephemerally painful was the task as we observed above, we must over come the same and with the requisite independence of our view, regard the same. So we have done. 44.In the result, the petition is allowed. Impugned order of dismissal dated 2-3-1994 is quashed and set aside. Respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and to pay the backwages. Rule made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs. Mr. Thakur, appearing for the respondent No. 2, orally prayed for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not see any reason to refuse the same. Leave is grated. On the oral request of Mr. Thakur, appearing for respondent No. 2, the operation of the order is deferred for a period of six weeks. Petition allowed. *****