DEEPAK MISRA, J. ( 1 ) LIBERTY is a priceless treasure. It is a pearl of great price. No one would barter his liberty for all the tea in China. The significance and importance of it is better realised when it is curtailed. Impairment and abridgment of liberty is not permissible without due process of law. In retrogression of liberty there is corrosion of soul - the very essence of life. Man who was lost his freedom questions in despair, "what is the meaning of this life if my liberty is lost ?" This being the quintessence of liberty and freedom, the question that falls for determination in the present case is whether the learned Judicial Magistrate, Banpur is justified, while granting bail to the present petitioners in imposing a condition, restraining them not to go upon the land which is the subject matter of a civil suit. The grievance of the petitioner is with regard to imposition of this condition and the prayer is for quashing of the same in exercise of inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 2 ) THE admitted factual scenario sans unnecessary details is that on the basis of an First Information Report lodged by one Pramila Swain wife of Prafulla Kumar Swain, of village Mangalpur, a case was registered at Banpur P. S. which ultimately gave rise to G. R. Case No. 110/96, under Sections 452, 323, 294, 380, 506 and 354 I. P. C. in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Banpur. The case of the prosecution as stated in the F. I. R. is that on 13-5-1996, the petitioners along with other forcibly entered into the house of the informant, assaulted her and forcibly drove the informant and her children out of the premises and took away cash and other articles. Informant was medically examined and medical report indicated that she had sustained three injuries on her body. The petitioners were forwarded by the Investigating Officer on 27th of May, 1996 and on that day, an application for bail was moved. In the application for bail, as the order reveals, it was mentioned that the present petitioners had purchased the homestead land from Prafulla Kumar Swain, husband of the informant, whereby Prafulla had transferred his interest and had delivered possession. In the application for bail, as the order reveals, it was mentioned that the present petitioners had purchased the homestead land from Prafulla Kumar Swain, husband of the informant, whereby Prafulla had transferred his interest and had delivered possession. He had also purchased by registered sale deed dated 14-2-1996 from one Jayakrushna Mohapatra who had also transferred his interest in favour of the petitioner No. 1. Record-of-rights and rent receipts for three years were produced to satisfy the factum of possession. These documents were produced by the accused persons to highlight their plea that they being the owners in possession the question of trespass did not arise. In addition to this they produced a copy of the plaint in T. S. No. 28 of 1996 and a copy of the Misc. Case No. 12/96, filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Khurda to indicate that the learned Civil Judge in the aforesaid misc. case by order dated 6-4-1996 had directed for maintenance of status quo in respect of the suit land situated on plot No. 345 measuring Ac. O. 052 decimals. The plaintiff in the civil suit is the minor son of the informant who has challenged the validity of the sale deed. It was also brought to the notice of the Court below that a proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P. C. was also instituted in the Court of the Executive Magistrate, Khurda. As the order reveals, the learned Magistrate after discussing the allegations in the F. I. R. the forwarding report came to hold that a dispute between the parties had the genesis in the suit land. The Magistrate opined that the allegations against the petitioners were grave and conditions were to be imposed to prevent the commission of similar types of offences. He relied on 437 (3) of the Code and was of the view that the accused persons should be restrained from entering upon the disputed land for prevention of similar types of offences, and the same was also necessary for protection of the informant. On the basis of such conclusion, he released the petitioners on bail of Rs. He relied on 437 (3) of the Code and was of the view that the accused persons should be restrained from entering upon the disputed land for prevention of similar types of offences, and the same was also necessary for protection of the informant. On the basis of such conclusion, he released the petitioners on bail of Rs. 5,000/- with one surety each for the like amount with the following conditions :-" (1) that they shall not enter into the disputed land premises during bailed out period, and (2) Shall not indulge themselves in similar type of offences during the pendency of this case. "he further directed the condition of bail be intimated to the O. I. C. Banpur P. S. for compliance and report. The grievance of the present petitioners is with regard to the imposition of condition No. 1. ( 3 ) SRI R. K. Naik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that the learned Magistrate has misconstrued the provision enumerated under Section 437 (3) of the Code and has imposed injustifiable conditions. He has strenuously urged that the Court below was aware of the civil litigation, and once the Civil Court has passed an order of status quo, the Magistrate should not have imposed a condition which in effect amounted to passing an order of injunction. Reliance by the Magistrate on the undertaking of the petitioners that they would abide by any condition, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits, is absolutely a misconception inasmuch as the Court is required to impose conditions which are reasonable, justifiable, as well as permissible in law. To substantiate his submission, he has placed reliance on the decisions reported in the cases of the State v. Parag Ram Chawla, reported in 1984 Cri LJ 1712 (Delhi); Shaik Layak v. The State, reported in 1981 Cri LJ 954 (Andh Pra) Kamala Pandey v. The King repoted in AIR 1949 Cal 582 : (1949 (SC) Cri LJ 1009) and Ram Rath Sharma v. Khalil Khan, reported in (1987) 3 Crimes 706 : (1988 All LJ 105 ). ( 4 ) CONTROVERTING the submissions of Sri Naik, the learned Addl. Standing Counsel, Sri Sangram Das, has submitted that the power conferred on the Magistrate under Section 437 (3) is all prevasive and imposition of restriction thereon would effect effective adjudication of Criminal Justice. ( 4 ) CONTROVERTING the submissions of Sri Naik, the learned Addl. Standing Counsel, Sri Sangram Das, has submitted that the power conferred on the Magistrate under Section 437 (3) is all prevasive and imposition of restriction thereon would effect effective adjudication of Criminal Justice. He has canvassed with vehemence that detailed reasons have been given by the learned Magistrate while imposing this condition and the basis being the forwarding report, that should not be interfered with in exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court is imposition of a condition of the present nature is neither perverse nor impermissible. It is also his submission that sub-Section (3) (b) and (c) of Section 439 have to be given a broad and purposive meaning and interpretation, so that a trying Magistrate can have control over the accused persons and can smoothly regulate the proceeding. ( 5 ) TO appreciate the rival conditions, it is appropriate to re-produce Section 437 (3), Cr. P. C. which reads as follows :-"437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence - (1) and (2) xx xx xx xx (3) When a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on bail under sub-Section (1), the Court may impose any condition which the Court considers necessary - (a) in order to ensure that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter, or (b) in order to ensure that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused or of the commission of which he is suspected, or (c) otherwise in the interest of justice. "as the aforesaid provision stipulates, the Magistrate can impose conditions under certain circumstances with a definite purpose. Conditions are imposed to secure the attendance of the accused who has been granted bail to see that the accused who is set at liberty by the order of the Court does not abuse the same and does not indulge in similar types of offences and if the facts and circumstances, in the interest of justice, so warrant. Conditions are imposed to secure the attendance of the accused who has been granted bail to see that the accused who is set at liberty by the order of the Court does not abuse the same and does not indulge in similar types of offences and if the facts and circumstances, in the interest of justice, so warrant. While the power has been conferred to impose these conditions for the purpose indicated above, the Court has to maintain a balance between the personal liberty of the accused and his availability for the purpose of investigation and trial. Imposition of onerous conditions are not appreciated. While imposing conditions, the Court must keep in mind the purpose of bail, the principal aim of it and the social design which is the main architect for introduction of the concept of bail. Human history records that the concept of bail has been prevalent from the days of Kautilya when provisions were made to avoid pretrial detention. The apex Court in the case of Kamalapathi Trivedi v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1979 SC 777 : (1979 Cri LJ 679) has held that the concept of bail is evolved for effecting a synthesis of the two basic concepts of human value, namely, the right of an accused to enjoy his personal freedom and the public interest on which a person release is conditioned on the surety to produce the accused persons in Court to stand the trial. Its purpose is also for removal of restricted and punitive consequences of a pre-trial detention. The apex Court showed its concern for pre-trial detention, and the whole ethos changed when Justice Krishna Iyyer, ushered in a new concept 'bail not Jail'. Again in the case of Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1360 : (1979 Cri LJ 1036) expressed its anguish over the concept of security in the prevalent bail system. Time and again High Courts as well as the apex Court have laid emphasis for imposition of reasonable conditions at the time of grant of bail. Time and again High Courts as well as the apex Court have laid emphasis for imposition of reasonable conditions at the time of grant of bail. In the case of Shaik Layak v. The State (1981 Cri LJ 954) (Andh Pra) (supra) the Andhra Pradesh High Court observed that an essential requirement in the imposition of any condition is that it should result any minimum interference with personal liberty of the accused and the rights of police to investigate into the case. ( 6 ) IN the case of Ram Nath Sharma v. Khalil Khan reported in 1988 All LJ 105, his Lordship took exception to the condition imposed by the Court granting bail by directing the accused to hand over charge of his office within ten days as this condition was regarded as a bargain not permissible within the ambit and sweep of Section 437 (3) of the Code. I may profitably quote a passage from the aforesaid judgement (at pp. 107-108 of All LJ) :-"grant of bail is not like a commodity to be bargained about by the Court with the accused. It is clearly beyond the competence of the Courts to indulge in such bargaining while granting bail to the accused. The accused cannot be subjected to any condition other than that contemplated in S. 437 (3), Cr. P. C. The Courts must refrain from contracting a bargain with the accused while granting bail. A duty is a cast upon Courts to ensure that the condition imposed on the accused is in consonance with the intendment and provisions of S. 437, Cr. P. C. ( 7 ) ONE may as well travel in a time machine four decades back. In the case of Kamala Pandey v. The King 1949 Cal 582 : (1949 (50) Cri LJ 1009 ). While dealing with the condition imposed by a Sessions Judge that the accused should not leave Midnapore, Chief Justice Harris expressed his anguish in the following manner :-"3. As I have said, the condition imposed though on the face of it an innocent one, really makes it impossible for the petitioner to comply with it. In cases of this sort the Sessions Judge should make up his mind whether he is going to grant bail or reject it. As I have said, the condition imposed though on the face of it an innocent one, really makes it impossible for the petitioner to comply with it. In cases of this sort the Sessions Judge should make up his mind whether he is going to grant bail or reject it. Granting bail with a condition such as this which no person can possibly comply with it, as I have said, tantamount to refusing the bail and in such cases the Sessions Judge should refuse this sort of condition. " ( 8 ) IMPOSITION of conditions is within the jurisdiction of the Court granting bail. The power conferred under Section 437 (3) Cr. P. C. might connote reposition of power of wide amplitude but the said power or discretion has to be regulated and guided by absolute judicial restraint and not by humour or fancy. The Court has to take into consideration the paramount importance of liberty and the curtailment or deprivation thereof. The apex Court while dealing with the principle of judicial discretion in the case of Gurbaksh Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 : (1980 Cri LJ 1125), expressed as under :"every kind of judicial discretion whatever may be the nature of the matter in regard to which it is required to be exercised has to be used with due care and caution. In fact, on averments on the context in which the discretion is required to be exercised and of the reasonable consequences of its use is the hall-mark of a prudent exercise of judicial discretion. " ( 9 ) THIS Court in the case of Gurmat Singh v. The State, reported in (1986) 1 OLR 229 did not appreciate the fixing up heavy sum in the bail bond and thought it appropriate to reduce. The concept of local surety was also modified relying on the ratio of the decision rendered in the case of Moti Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1594 : (1978 Cri LJ 1703 ). The concept of local surety was also modified relying on the ratio of the decision rendered in the case of Moti Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1594 : (1978 Cri LJ 1703 ). ( 10 ) THE Karnataka High Court in the case of Afsar Khan v. State by Girinagar Police, Bangalore, reported in 1992 Cri LJ 1676 held as follows (Paras 7 and 8) :"while granting bail, insisting on good behaviour or prompt attendance, executing personal bond further to safeguard his good behaviour and personal attendance may be supported by insisting upon additional sureties as the Court deems fit. But insisting upon local sureties or cash security is incorrect and indirectly results in denial of bail granted earlier. A reading of the entire Chapter which deals with the provisions relating to bail, does not say that when a person is released on bail, the Court can also insist upon him to give cash security. While the Court exercises its discretion whether it is under Secs. 437 or 438 or 439, it shall exercise the same properly and not in an arbitrary manner. The discretion exercised shall appear a just and reasonable one. It is true that no norms are prescribed to exercise the discretion. Merely because norms are not prescribed for the Court to exercise discretion under Secs. 437, 438 or 439 that does not mean the discretion shall be left to the whims of the Court. Guiding principle shall be with sound reasoning and in no way opposed to any other law. While administering justice, it is the duty of the Court to see that any order to be passed or conditions to be imposed shall always be in the interest of both the accused and the State. The conditions shall not be capricious. On the other hand, it shall be in the aid of giving effect to the very object behind the discretion. "i may further refer to the decision rendered in the case of keshab Narayan Banerjee v. The State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1666 : (1985 Cri LJ 1857), wherein the apex Court held that the condition imposed for furnishing security of 1 lakh in cash or in fixed deposit in any Nationalised Bank by the High Court was excessively onerous and virtually amounted to denial of bail. This Court in the case of Paradesi Patra v. State of Orissa, (1993) 6 OCR 594 also expressed the view that it cannot be said that the Magistrate or Court, as case may be, has no jurisdiction at all to require a person to furnish cash security but the imposition of the condition is breach and oppressive. ( 11 ) TRUE it is, the trying Magistrate has to regulate attendance of the accused in Court. It is within this jurisdiction to impose conditions but the condition which are to be imposed must have reference either to the requirement of uninterested investigation of trial of offence alleged or be intended to prevent a recurrence of the incident said to be the subject matter of investigation. This is the view of the Delhi High Court as finds place in the case of. The State v. Paras Ram Chawla, reported in 1984 Cri LJ 1712. From the analysis of the ratio of the aforesaid decisions and reading of the provision in proper perspective, it is quite clear that conditions imposed must have nexus with the investigation or intending to prevent a recurrence of the same offence as alleged. The conditions cannot be dehors the factual matrix, and they cannot be imposed by extending the concept of provision. They cannot be taken recourse to usurp jurisdiction which the Court does not possess. Conditions cannot be passed, being presumptuous and speculative, they have to have rational basis having the regard the factual cenario and on consideration of the parameters of law and the concept of bail as a whole. The words 'any condition' used in the provision or the words mentioned 'any condition' in an application for bail should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a Court of Law to impose any condition that no chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts and permissible in the circumstances and effective in the pragmatic sense and would not defeat the order of grant of bail. ( 12 ) IN the instant case, the learned Magistrate has been swayed away with the concept of preventive measure. Concern of a Court to prevent crime of similar nature has to be appreciated but such concern must remain within the domain of judicial restraint, property and circumscribed by the yardstick of law. ( 12 ) IN the instant case, the learned Magistrate has been swayed away with the concept of preventive measure. Concern of a Court to prevent crime of similar nature has to be appreciated but such concern must remain within the domain of judicial restraint, property and circumscribed by the yardstick of law. The learned Magistrate was aware of the pendency of the civil suit and was conscious of the order of status quo. When the matter is sub judice before the Civil Court and the parties have obtained an order of status quo a prohibitory order passed by the learned Magistrate, runs contrary to the order of the Civil Court. However, preventive measures are not to be taken while passing an order which in effect amounts to an order of injunction in a case of this nature. True it is, it cannot be said in absolute terms that the Court while granting bail cannot impose conditions of restraint but that has to be done in the factual background, the circumstances of the case, the peculiarity of the surrounding involved the antecedents of the parties, the nature of the dispute, the effect it would have in public life and such other ancillary and incidental factors. I also find the learned Magistrate has taken note of the averments in the bail petition that the petitioners are ready and willing to abide by any condition. As indicated earlier any condition has to be a rational condition and within the parameters of law. Though an accused prays for bail he is not at the mercy of the Court. Courts are to function according to law and dispense justice which has to be tampered with compassion and mercy. But that does not necessarily mean that an accused has to be at the mercy of the Court to bind himself by the averment he makes in an application for bail and the Court would assume the role to bargain to impose any condition. ( 13 ) IN view of the analysis made above. I am of the considered view that the condition No. 1 imposed by the learned Magistrate is unsustainable and I accordingly quash the said condition. All other conditions remain operative. The Criminal Misc. Case is accordingly allowed. Petition allowed. .