B. PANIGRAHI. J. ( 1 ) -THIS is an application Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the Judgment and/or Order dated 22nd March, 1988 passed by the Learned Chief Judge, Small Causes Court at Calcutta, in Rent Appeal No. 5/87 reversing the Judgment and/or Order dated 15th January, 1987 passed by the Learned Rent Controller, in Rent Control Case No. 7/1977. The facts of the case leading to this application are as follows:- ( 2 ) THAT the opposite party No. 1 filed an application under section 31 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 before the Learned Rent Controller, inter alia, praying for imposition of fine upon the petitioners and for a direction against them for restoration of immediate supply of filtered water to the tenanted premises of the opposite party No. 1. The landlord of the premises was arrayed as opposite party No. 4 and these petitioners as opposite parties 1 to 3 before the Rent Controller. ( 3 ) THE opposite party No. 1 is a monthly tenant under the opposite party No. 2 of this application. The petitioners are also the other tenant of the opposite party No. 2. When the opposite party No. 1 took the tenancy there was supply of filtered water of the Corporation through a branch pipe connected front the main pipe for supply of filtered water by a 't' connection and the said main pipe passes through the common passage of the premises occupied by him and the petitioners. It is alleged by the apposite party No. 1 that on or about 18th September, 1976 the petitioners with the help of some unknown plumbers disconnected the said branch pipe leading to the portion of the opposite party front the 't' point and blocked the flow of filtered water to his portion by putting a plug at the said 't' opening as a result of which the entire supply was abruptly stopped. Thus, he lodged the complaint against the petitioners in the local police station, but, somehow or other the supply was restored by them. Again, on 18th October, 1976 the petitioners at about 5,30 P. M. disconnected the said branch pipe from the said "t" connection and inserted a plug on the 't' opening and as result the water supply was totally blocked. Again, on 18th October, 1976 the petitioners at about 5,30 P. M. disconnected the said branch pipe from the said "t" connection and inserted a plug on the 't' opening and as result the water supply was totally blocked. ( 4 ) THE petitioners appeared before the Rent Controller and filed their written objection, infer alia, stated that the material allegations were totally unfounded and false. It was, however claimed by them that the opposite party No. 1 in collusion with the opposite party No. 2 had filed this present case out of previous animosity. If at all the water supply was intercepted it must be al the instance of the opposite party No. 2, and, therefore the petitioners are not responsible for such non-supply of water. The learned Rent Controller was, therefore, not inclined to hold the petitioners guilty for non-supply of waters and, accordingly, dismissed the application filed by the opposite party No. 1. Against the aforementioned Judgment the opposite parties preferred an appeal before the City Civil Court and the appellate Court, had, however, disagreed with the observation of the Rent Controller held the petitioners guilty. ( 5 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, has strongly urged that the appellant authority has gone wrong by holding the petitioners responsible for the disruption of water supply. He has maintained that the petitioner No. 3 is a Professor and it is quite unlikely that he would go to the spot and conduct such act thereby the water supply would be disrupted causing inconvenience to the opposite party No. 1. ( 6 ) IN the application as well as in evidence of the opposite party No. 1, live incidents had been narrated, i. e. on 18th September, 1976 when the petitioners allegedly disrupted the water supply. The opposite party No. l is said to have gone to the police station and lodged a report and after such information having been lodged the petitioners again is said to have restored the supply and, therefore, the opposite party No. l received the water supply as usual. The petitioners for the second time i. e. on 18th October, 1976 had again allegedly caused the disruption of supply of water by pluging the 't' end of the supply line. In the result the supply of water was altogether stopped. Mr. The petitioners for the second time i. e. on 18th October, 1976 had again allegedly caused the disruption of supply of water by pluging the 't' end of the supply line. In the result the supply of water was altogether stopped. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has invited my attention that at least from the evidence of P. W. 1 nothing could spell out that he was present on both the occasions when the petitioners had allegedly stopped the supply of water at the 't' end pipe line. He has claimed in his evidence that die incident had taken place on 19. 10. 76 when he was present. But in his application the date of incident has been described to be 18. 10. 76. The proceeding being quashi criminal in nature slight doubt in the mind of the court could entire to the benefit of the petitioners. In support of his submission he has relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1953 Calcutta, page 86 (Pulin Krishna Paul v. Sishupati Chakraborty and Ors.)"it does not appear that in this case the proceeding in the criminal court related to the very same fact and period of time as the proceedings before the Rent Controller. In fact it seems clear from the facts that the proceedings in the criminal court related to same period after the proceedings before the Rent Controller had concluded. In such a case quite clearly the criminal court could proceed. Whether section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to a case of this kind is, I think not material because the constitution makes two punishments impossible. It is to be observed that the words 'prosecution and 'offence' as used to the Constitution are not defined and they must be given their ordinary meaning. Going to the Rent Controller and asking him to fine a man for an act is really a prosecution of that man and the act is an offence against the statute and is a criminal offence because it is punishable by a fine which is a punishment of a criminal nature. " ( 7 ) IT is further contended by the petitioners that while considering the provisions of section 31 of the Tenancy Protection Act, it does not require any wider interpretation to the word 'whoever'. " ( 7 ) IT is further contended by the petitioners that while considering the provisions of section 31 of the Tenancy Protection Act, it does not require any wider interpretation to the word 'whoever'. The provision of the Act is meant for resolving any dispute between the land lord and tenant and thereby the claim of the third party with regard to the infraction, commission or omission cannot be brought within the mischief of the section. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party No. l Mr. Narayan Das has stated that such narrow interpretation as suggested by Mr. Roy Chowdhury is not permissible in law in as much as the word 'whosoever' refers to any third party who intentionally causes mischief or interferes with right of the tenant can be brought within purview of section 31 of the Act. In such background, when there is no ambiguity, it need not confine only to the landlord and tenant but it also embraces the third party. ( 9 ) MR. Sumit Deb, the learned Advocate appearing for the landlord-opposite party No. 2 urged with strong intensity of conviction that while considering an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India this Court should not exercise the power of appellate court and even there may be some apparent errors on the fact of record those cannot be corrected by exercise of the power of superintendence. The appellate court having already arrived at the conclusion holding the petitioners guilty, there is no further scope to interfere with such findings. ( 10 ) THE ambit and scope of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 is to provide for the regulation of certain incidents of tenancy of the premises in Calcutta and some other areas in West Bengal. It is necessary to quote section 31 of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act (herein after be referred to as Act) while appreciating the contention of the petitioners. "31. Penalty for disturbances of easements, etc. It is necessary to quote section 31 of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act (herein after be referred to as Act) while appreciating the contention of the petitioners. "31. Penalty for disturbances of easements, etc. Whoever, without the previous written consent of the Controller or, save for the purpose of effecting repairs or complying with any municipal requisition, wilfully disturbs any easement annexed to such premises, or removes, destroys or renders unserviceable anything provided for permanent use therewith, or interferes with any supply or service comprised in the tenancy of such premises shall, on the complaint of the party aggrieved, be liable on the first occasion, to a fine which may extend to (one thousand) rupees, and on a second or subsequent occasion in regard to the same or any other premises to a fine which may extend to (two thousand) rupees, to be imposed, after inquiry by the controller and the controller may order immediate restoration of any supply or service which has been interfered with. "whether the provision of section 31 only relates to the landlord and tenant or even to an outsider has to be carefully considered in this case. The word 'whoever' makes unqualified reference to any person. It need not confine only to the landlord and the tenant, even other persons if they wilfully disturb any easementary right annexed to such premises or interfers with any supply or service comprised in the tenancy of such premises shall be liable to pay fine of Rs. 2000/- in case the rent controller holds them guilty. The argument advanced by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the provision must relate to the landlord and tenant does not appear to be correct interpretation Inasmuch as the word used in the provision does not lead to any room for doubt that 'whoever' interfers with the right of the tenancy with any supply or service shall be liable to fine. When the legislature in clear, lucid and unambiguous term has used the word 'whosoever' it need not refer only to landlord and tenant. On a careful reading of the provision of the Act, the use of the word 'whoever' is incorporated only in sections 30 and 31 which are penal in nature. When the legislature in clear, lucid and unambiguous term has used the word 'whosoever' it need not refer only to landlord and tenant. On a careful reading of the provision of the Act, the use of the word 'whoever' is incorporated only in sections 30 and 31 which are penal in nature. Therefore, from such expression it becomes implicit that 'whoever' interfere with the right of the tenant with regard to the service and other amenities provided to the tenancy shall be liable to punishment of fine. It might be true that in respect of other provisions of the Act the dispute relates to the landlord or tenant but when the legislature has specifically authorised a tenant to proceed against any person who interfers with the service privilage attached to the tenancy, such right cannot be stifled away by adopting such narrow interpretation. On privious occasion the interpretation of the word 'whoever' was considered in a judgment reported in 84 CWN page 451, M. K. Mukherjee, J. (as his then was) and was held as follows:"9. Mr. Ghosal next submitted that a complaint under section 31 of the Act can lie against the landlord only and not against any other person as the Act was brought on the statute book to regulate the relationship between the landlord and tenant only. While primarily the object of the statute is to protect the interest of the tenant vis-a-vis the landlord some of the provisions of the Act seek to protect the rights arid privileges of a person, qua tenant, against the landlord or any other person who may intrude upon such rights and privileges. A cursory glance of the different provisions of the statute appearing in Chapter VII of the Act, which includes section 31 will make the position abundantly clear. Section 31 envisages that 'whoever' violates the provisions thereof will be liable and does not confine the liability to the landlord alone. I am therefore unable to hold that section 31 does not provide for lodging a complaint against any person other than the landlord. " ( 11 ) WHERE the language is plain an admits of one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. I am therefore unable to hold that section 31 does not provide for lodging a complaint against any person other than the landlord. " ( 11 ) WHERE the language is plain an admits of one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The expression, by use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to commonsense the result may be. Petitioners took a stand that the aforementioned judgment cited above may be treated as perincurium but, I do not find any substance in the said submission. From the language of the statute when it leaves no ambiguity, the word 'whoever' may relate to outsiders or intruders who have unauthorisedly interferred with the right of the tenants. ( 12 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury cited a decision reported in 67 CWN at page 977 in the case of Suraya Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Bimalendu Nath Sarkar but I find the aforementioned judgment was on a different aspects which has hardly any bearing to the present case. Similarly, the decision reported in AIR 1980 SC page 161 in the case of Kewal Singh v. Mr. Lajwanti also has no application. ( 13 ) DURING the pendency of this application it is stated that the petitioner No. 1 Bijan Behad Bose, was dead. Since the tenant-opposite party had filed the complaint against the petitioner No. l making personal allegations and the petitioner No. 1 having been dead during the pendency of the revisional application, the further proceeding against him is not maintainable. Accordingly, the application filed by the opposite party-tenant against the petitioner No. 1 is held to be not maintainable in law after his death. It is, of course, true that in a case concerning an offence under section 31 of the Act, on the death of a complainant his legal representatives may be substituted and the complaint may proceed but in this case after the death of the delinquant, his legal representatives have no liability for acts done by him. Accordingly, the petitioner No. l is expunged from the aforesaid proceeding. Accordingly, the petitioner No. l is expunged from the aforesaid proceeding. ( 14 ) IT is already held in the case of Kalabati Devi v. K. K. Kutty (81 CAN page 1032) that the proceeding initiated under section 31 of the Act is in the nature of the criminal proceeding and offender may be visited with punishment of fine in case he is held guilty. Therefore, the merits of the case is to be examined on the basis that it is a criminal proceeding and it is to he examined how far the opposite party-tenant has been able to bring home an offence against the petitioners. It is stated in the complaint that on 18. 10. 76 at about 5. 30 p. m. the petitioners disconnected the branch pipe from the 't' end connection and put a plug on the 't' opening as a result there was total disruption of water supply. It is further stated that about one month prior to this incident the petitioners with the help of some unknown plumber disconnected the said branch pipe which was connected to the house of the opposite party No. 1 and blocked the flow of filtered water by putting a plug at the said 't' opening. But, however, at the intervention of the police the supply of water was again restored to the opposite party's tenanted premises. In this case, the learned Rent Controller has on consideration of the evidence had exonerated the petitioners. But however, the appellate court having disagreed with the findings held these petitioners liable for the act complaint by the opposite party tenant. From the statement embodied in the appellate court's order it appears that P. W. 1 Brji Mohan Arora had testified that on 18. 9. 76 on his return around 8 p. m. learned from the members of his family that there was trouble over the supply of water. There was a C. D. entry at the P. S. and thereafter the pipe line and the water supply was restored. Again on 19. 10. 76 at about 5/5. 30 p. m. the supply of water to his tenancy was abruptly stopped. In the complaint he has stated that on 18. 10. 76 the petitioners had allegedly stopped the supply of water but from the evidence of the complaint, it appears that on 19. 10. Again on 19. 10. 76 at about 5/5. 30 p. m. the supply of water to his tenancy was abruptly stopped. In the complaint he has stated that on 18. 10. 76 the petitioners had allegedly stopped the supply of water but from the evidence of the complaint, it appears that on 19. 10. 76 the petitioners had intercepted with the supply of water and caused blockage to the 't' end. Therefore, from the aforesaid two contradictory statements it does not appear as to on which date in fact the incident had taken place. From the further statement in cross-examination, it appears that he had not Seen the petitioners' act to digging the pipe line but they simply stood there when the work was done. From this no inferance could be drawn that they participated in disconnecting the water supply. P. W. 2 Sudhanshu Kr. Manna in the Chief-examination had narrated that the petitioner Bijon was holding a pipe and his brother Shyamal obstructing the flow of water by using socket to the opposite party No. 1's tenancy premises. But P. W. 1 did not narrate that Bijon Babu was holding a pipe and Shyamal obstructiong the flow of water therefore this witness appears to be more enthusiastic and exaggerated the incident. In the above premises, the inconsistancy, prevaricating and embellished evidence of P. W. 2 can not be accepted. Similarly, on perusal of this testimony P. W. 3 it appears also, he has presented a different version. Accordingly, his testimony also does not help the tenant/opposite party to bring home the charge to the petitioners. The appellate court in its order has however, not discussed regarding the individual culpability of the petitioners 1 and 2. ( 15 ) MR. Das, the learned counsel has invited my attention that once he appellate court on further appraisal of the evidence of the tenant/opposite party has held these petitioner guilty, it was not open again to his court to revaluate the evidence of those witnesses. But I found the learned appellate court has not considered this evidence to its proper perspective and, further, hastily reached at the conclusion holding the petitioners guilty. Since the evidence of the witness is to be examined like in a criminal case the truth has to be sifted from falsehood. But I found the learned appellate court has not considered this evidence to its proper perspective and, further, hastily reached at the conclusion holding the petitioners guilty. Since the evidence of the witness is to be examined like in a criminal case the truth has to be sifted from falsehood. ( 16 ) THIS court has passed an order on 31st May 1988 that the water supply to tenanted premises would be restored in presence of a special officer but. It is submitted that due to the non-cooperation by the tenant/opposite party that order could not be implemented. It is, none-the-less true the tenant/opposite party, is entitled to free /flow of water and any obstruction from any quarter cannot be countenanced. but in this case the tenant/opposite party has signally failed to bring home the culpability against the petitioners. Accordingly, they are let of from the charge. The opposite party tenant shall be entitled to restoration of water supply to his premises and for such restoration whatever expenditure is necessary shall be borne by the petitioners, opposite party tenant and landlord equally. The Rent Controller is directed to depute the inspector in whose presence the water supply shall be restored to the tenancy premises of the opposite party. If any attempt to stultify or make this order otiose is made while restoring water supply by any party, he/they shall be dealt with appropriately. ( 17 ) ACCORDINGLY, the application under Article 227 succeeds and the learned appellate court's order dated 22nd March. 1988 in appeal case No. 6/87 is get aside and that rent Controller's order is restored. Petition succeeds