H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is defendants' civil revision from the judgment and order dated January 17, 1995 in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2 of 1995 delivered by Sri M. S. Rajendra Prasad, District Judge, Karwar dismissing the defendants' appeal and confirming the judgment and order dated 22nd December, 1994 delivered by Sri S. Mariyappa Civil Judge, Karwar allowing the plaintiffs' application filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with sections 94 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Shivaram and Others v Ganapathi and Others , restraining the defendant, their men, agents and servants from interfering with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their rights and benefits as archakas of sri Vinayak Dev Temple, Idagunji in Honnavar taluk and directing them not to interfere with the plaintiffs' right to offer pooja, viniyogas, performance of ganahoma, vratas and other rituals as per tradition and customs of the temple as well as restrain them from employing the services of any other person/priest to perform the above functions or duties till the disposal of the suit. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief are - that the plaintiffs-present opposite party/respondent filed the suit for decree of declaration declaring the plaintiffs i. e. , the present respondents to be the hereditary archakas of Sri Vinayak Dev Temple in Idagunji. The plaintiffs further claimed the relief that the said right of hereditary archakas is in the nature of property carrying emoluments as they are in consonance with the legal character to officiate as upadivant priests. Plaintiffs further claim that the legal character of the priest, referred to in relief 'a' as based on upadhi rights, is in the nature of property in favour of the plaintiff-respondents and defendants have no right to terminate the said archaka upadis of plaintiff or their customary right of priesthood. The plaintiffs have claimed a declaration or a declaratory decree to the effect that the order of termination issued by the defendants on 21-9-1994 is illegal, void and contrary to the principles of natural justice. The plaintiff claimed the decree for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the rights of the plaintiff in performing their duties as archaka and for incidental reliefs. As per the plaint allegations, the plaintiffs claim themselves to be the priests-archakas of the temple in question viz. , Sri mahaganapathi Vinayak Temple of Idagunji. The plaintiff claimed the decree for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the rights of the plaintiff in performing their duties as archaka and for incidental reliefs. As per the plaint allegations, the plaintiffs claim themselves to be the priests-archakas of the temple in question viz. , Sri mahaganapathi Vinayak Temple of Idagunji. The plaintiffs allege that since the installation of the deity, the plaintiffs have been acting as archakas of the deity institution and also the purohit of devotees seeking divine grace and blessings by conduction of seva, vratas, homa and other rituals. The plaintiffs' case is that the plaintiffs and their ancestors have been officiating and acting as the manager and priest of the temple and that after the advent of the Bombay Endowment Act the trustees were got appointed and among the trustees one used to be the member of the family of the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that till the end of last century from the original consecration the plaintiffs family has been acting in dual capacities i. e. , as archaka-purohits on the spiritual side and custodian managers on the temporal side and officiated as shebaits. The plaintiffs allege that the branches of plaintiff 1 on one side and plaintiffs 2 and 3 on the other have made arrangement of sharing their duties called poojapali and in accordance with that arrangement plaintiff 1's branch gets six months while plaintiffs 2 and 3 enjoy the poojapali for another six months. They have stated that the right to officiate as archakas under upadi with emoluments attached to it corresponds and commensurates with the vritti of purohit acting as a link between devotee and deity soliciting its grace and blessings. The plaintiffs further alleged that ancestors of plaintiff were not appointed by an authority and when the first consecration took place there were no trustees. According to the plaintiffs' case, trustees or every manager of the properties of the trust undertakes to keep sanctity and decorum of the temple which comes within the ambit of management of the properties. The plaintiffs further alleged that the manager of the endowment cannot arrogate to himself the power of removing a hereditary archaka having proprietory nature of right. The archaka could only be removed after filing a suit and after obtaining a decree from the court. The plaintiffs further alleged that the manager of the endowment cannot arrogate to himself the power of removing a hereditary archaka having proprietory nature of right. The archaka could only be removed after filing a suit and after obtaining a decree from the court. The plaintiffs/respondent-opposite parties asserted that plaintiffs have been holding the office of archakas and poojariship in their own right and not at the pleasures of the defendant. The plaintiffs further allege that the defendants had no power to dismiss or remove or terminate the plaintiffs from the office of archakas. The plaintiffs further allege that the expression administration of management endowment does not carry within the scope the power to dismiss the archakas. Alternatively the plaintiffs have asserted that if the defendants have any power to dismiss or terminate the archakaship that could never be done without following the principles of natural justice and without issuing show-cause notice and framing of charges and without conducting the enquiry by an impartial agency. The plaintiff has maintained that the emoluments of upadi vritti consisted of tastik which fetch Rs. 737- (39-6-0 and 33-10-0) per year to two families. The plaintiff used to get half share in phalavali and whole of the padiakki received by the endowment. Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to get one anna in a rupee worth of panchakajjaya pooja performed at the request of devotees. Giving of dakshina depended upon the volition of the devotees. 'the plaintiffs case is that prior to 1950 the priests themselves used to collect dakshina for panchakajjaya naivedya in addition to half coconut and the coconuts offered thereafter, trustees undertook to supply panchakajjaya and to collect the value from the devotees and the share in offering one anna was per one rupees were shown separately in the accounts of the priests and given to them. The plaintiffs' case is that the defen- dants acquiesced with the plaintiffs right which has been in the nature of property. Plaintiffs asserted that archakaship is not a job or vocation but a hereditary religious office which archakas has to discharge ungrudgingly. They stated that the religious office of archakas and the act of officiating over that office has been a vritti with the emoluments attached to it, and its nature is of that heritable and partible property which carried the status of legal character. They stated that the religious office of archakas and the act of officiating over that office has been a vritti with the emoluments attached to it, and its nature is of that heritable and partible property which carried the status of legal character. The plaintiffs case has been that the emoluments received by the archakas is not the income of the temple, instead they are part of their return for officiating as priest. The plaintiffs allege that when archakas objected to the niyamavali of the trustees, so the trustees developed the hos- tility against the archakas and thereafter the issue became a matter of prestige. The plaintiffs mentioned in their plaint that in August 1975 the trustees decided to implement their own unilateral niyamavali and as per the same they alleged to have fixed certain cess for pooja and viniyogas includes all dakshinas payable to archakas which was against the custom and concept of archakaship. The plaintiffs case is that the emoluments received by the archakas represented not only the property returns but they represented the emoluments of purohit vritti as well and officiating priest is entitled to receive the emoluments. The plaintiff further alleges that plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the an- cestors of plaintiff 3 filed a suit in the Court of Munsiff, Hon- navar as Original Suit No. 17 of 1976 for a decree of permanent injunction against trustees and for accounts of emoluments and other articles received from devotees directly and also for recovery of amount collected by them in that regard. The plain- tiffs also prayed for a direction to the effect that the trustees should not distribute the emoluments to others who were uncon- nected with archakaupadi. The aforesaid Original Suit No. 17 of 1976 was dismissed for default on 26th May, 1988 and according to the plaintiff the application filed for restoration under Order 9, Rule 9, C. P. C. and simultaneously the plaintiff also filed an appeal against the order of dismissal. According to the plaintiffs case the suit was restored by the Appellate Court and the suit having been restored in an appeal by the Appellate Court, the miscellaneous application for restoration was closed. According to the plaintiffs case the suit was restored by the Appellate Court and the suit having been restored in an appeal by the Appellate Court, the miscellaneous application for restoration was closed. The trus- tees according to the plaintiff, preferred the appeal before this court i. e. , the High Court as Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 11 of 1989 against the judgment of the first Appellate Court and the high Court allowed the said appeal with a direction that plain- tiffs were at liberty to pursue their application which they had filed earlier under Order 9, Rule 9. The plaintiffs case is that earlier application was closed which was numbered as 5 of 1988. So to reopen that earlier application, the plaintiffs filed another application which was numbered as Miscellaneous Case No. 6 of 1989. The plaintiffs further alleged that Miscellaneous Applica- tion No. 5 of 1988 came to be dismissed on the ground that there was no justification for plaintiffs to remain absent when the case i. e. , Suit No. 17 of 1989 was fixed for hearing. According to the plaintiffs they challenged the order of the Munsiff rejecting order 9, Rule 9 application. The plaintiffs case is that after the dismissal of application for restoration, the trustees did develop an intention to eliminate the plaintiff from archakaship itself and to bring in their own henchmen. The plaintiffs case is that the plaintiffs have been served with a notice on 21-9-1994 allegedly terminating the services of the plaintiffs from archakaship. It is alleged that the plaintiff and their people were harassing the administrative staff etc. , and that they were not performing their duties as required. Many other allegations were also made therein like that. Plaintiffs case is that on 28-9-1994 a defamatory publication was published in Samyuktha Karnataka daily by defendant 1 suggesting that plaintiff were misappropriating the amounts sent to them by devotees for the purpose of seva and according to plaintiff this allegation was a new one and has been absent in the notice of termination. The plaintiffs allege the termination of the plaintiffs has been made with mala fide intention of the defendants, to deprive the plaintiffs of their right by hook or by crook. The plaintiffs further alleged that at no point of time plaintiffs ever indulged in any type of illegal and undesirable activities that has been ascribed to them. The plaintiffs allege the termination of the plaintiffs has been made with mala fide intention of the defendants, to deprive the plaintiffs of their right by hook or by crook. The plaintiffs further alleged that at no point of time plaintiffs ever indulged in any type of illegal and undesirable activities that has been ascribed to them. They claim that they were never deficient in their performance of the duties and all the acts and omission and commission are cooked up ones. Plaintiffs further alleged that at no point of time they were appraised of the so-called deficiencies nor were they called to answer the said allegations which have been levelled against them in the notice. The plaintiffs case is that the termination order had been made unilaterally and it has brought about almost a catastrophe in the lives of the archaka families and their services could not be done away with or terminated with such allegations without giving them due reasonable and proper opportunity. The plaintiffs claim that as the act of the defendants had cast clouds on the lives of the plaintiff and as the act of termination or doing away of the plaintiffs from the archakashipupadi of the temple has been in violation of principles of natural justice and has got tendency to deprive them of their life honour in society and of their hereditary right of office and property in that sense so they were filing the suit. The plaintiffs asserted that they were continuing to perform their respective poojas and viniyogas as per their respective turns in spite of termination order passed and issued by defendants and that plaintiffs apprehend that defendants may take recourse to other coercive methods of interfering with or of preventing the plaintiffs from exercising their right above. So the plaintiffs have been compelled to take recourse to file suit of nature of suit for declaration of their rights and for injunction as cause of action had arisen and the plaintiffs filed the suit for the reliefs mentioned above. ( 3 ) ALONG with the plaint allegations, the plaintiff-respondents filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. read with Sections 94 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure along with an affidavit thereto. To that application dated 5-10-1994, defendant 1 filed objection statement. ( 3 ) ALONG with the plaint allegations, the plaintiff-respondents filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. read with Sections 94 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure along with an affidavit thereto. To that application dated 5-10-1994, defendant 1 filed objection statement. The affidavit to their application shows that the plaintiffs have verified the contents of paras 1 and 2 of the plaint as annexure thereto to be true to his knowledge, information and belief. In the affidavit it has been stated that the plaintiffs had been performing the rights and duties attached to the office of archakaupadi in Vinayak Dev temple and the trustees by their notice dated 21-9-1994 terminated the plaintiffs archakaship unauthorisedly, illegally and against principles of natural justice. It is further been asserted in the affidavit that if termination is allowed to have its effect, it will destroy the plaintiffs right of archakaship. The plaintiffs will be rendered helpless and will be deprived of their right to perform the pooja and viniyogas in the temple as well as will be deprived of their source of livelihood on one hand and on the other it will result in total chaos and harassment to the devotees. The plaintiffs recited that they hope to succeed in the suit and the trustees are trying to implement their termination order by bringing priests from outside and making them to do parallel things in the worship of deity and if they are allowed to continue in their acts of omission and commission in this regard preventing the plaintiffs from performing their obligations as priests, it would be causing irreparable loss and damage so the application under Order 39, Rule 1, C. P. C. On the contrary, in the objection statement the defendant 1 has taken the plea to the effect that plaintiffs have not come with clean hands and have suppressed material facts relating to the management of temple trust, services, rendered, public complaints, breach of peace and also other litigations disposed of and also pending in the Criminal Court and in Civil Courts and as such they are not entitled to any discretionary relief of the nature of temporary injunction of the like. The defendant had taken a plea in their objection statement dated 7-10-1994 that no prima facie case has been made out nor the balance of convenience lies in plaintiffs favour on the date of the institution of the suit and if temporary injunction order is granted, the order may create law and order situation problem and at this stage may affect the entire public trust and interest of public at large. The granting of interim relief as claimed in the present case, the defendant alleged will have the effect of granting the final and full relief as claimed in the suit, and the interest of public trust will be jeopardized. The defendants further alleged in their affidavit that trustee's personal interest is not involved but the very fact involved is the interest of public temple trust Sri Vinayak Dev the affairs of which are fully managed by for all purposes by the trust committee and so temple trust committee will be responsible for that and for acts of omission and commission of archakas and other people will hold the trust and trustees to be responsible and not the archakas other servants of public trust. That as such granting of any order as claimed as interim order which is in the nature of final order has tendency to cause adversely to temple and temple trust as well to devotees. In paragraph 5 the defendant alleged that it is nowhere noted that archakas have right in a temple or temple property. The plaintiffs are not entitled to injunction in respect of matters in the temple. That the trust in question is registered in Public Trust Register as vinayak Dev in Idagunji and all properties of the temple vest in the trust and all its affairs are governed by Bombay Public Trust act. The defendant pleaded in their objection that if the plaintiff wanted to agitate their right, the remedy of the plaintiff was to agitate the matter either before the Charity Commissioner, belgaum or in District Court, Karwar but so far as the Trial court has been concerned, it has been alleged it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and so it was mentioned in the application that the prayer for temporary injunction was not entertainable for want of jurisdiction. It was further alleged that there were many complaints which were received by the temple trust from the public against the plaintiffs' right from 1975 and when too many complaints were received in writing, temple trust started appointing priests to do pooja and viniyogas in the temple. That having felt aggrieved the plaintiff filed a suit claiming hereditary right and right to pooja viniyogas as archaka and claimed emoluments and accounts thereof in the Court of Munsiff, honnavar, numbered as Original Suit No. 17 of 1976 which was dismissed by the Munsiff. In their suit no interim relief was sought. It was also stated that after dismissal of the suit a regular Appeal No. 44 of 1988 was filed and the matter had gone up to the High Court and ultimately the matter was agitated by Miscellaneous Appeal No. 5 of 1988. It was rejected finally on 17-9-1994. According to the defendant, plaintiff also filed Original Suit No. 344 of 1989 against other employees who were appointed to perform some part of pooja and viniyogas and sought temporary injunction against them. That also came to be finally rejected on 13-7-1990 from which the plaintiffs filed Miscellaneous appeal No. 30 of 1990 which is pending. The defendants asserted that the temple committee had no other alternative or option but to take an extreme step for terminating the services of archakas i. e. , the plaintiff and trust committee finally took the decision in the best interest of the temple or the public trust by its resolution dated 20-9-1994 and in pursuance thereof the services of the plaintiffs were legally and lawfully terminated with effect from 21-9-1994. The defendants allege, trustees felt no confidence in the plaintiffs for the valid reasons and ultimately terminated the service as mentioned above and it was the order of termination simpliciter, and there was no question of issuing any show-cause notice as the plaintiffs did not improve themselves for years together in spite being cautioned and defendants did not have any option except terminating the plaintiffs service by simple notice of termination and they were terminated accordingly. The power to terminate did vest in the trustees. The plaintiffs have asserted that Umesh Gajanan Bhat well qualified archaka had been appointed by the trustees and he has been discharging duties of archaka from September 24, 1994. This fact was duly published and entire community devotees expressed satisfaction. The power to terminate did vest in the trustees. The plaintiffs have asserted that Umesh Gajanan Bhat well qualified archaka had been appointed by the trustees and he has been discharging duties of archaka from September 24, 1994. This fact was duly published and entire community devotees expressed satisfaction. As devotees the plaintiffs are allowed to worship Lord Vinayak as any section of public is allowed to worship Sri Vinayak Dev. The arrangements made by the plaintiff and family of the plaintiff are in no way binding on the temple trust. The defendants asserted that plaintiffs were not working as archakas of the temple trust since after termination of service and the question of considering the grant of relief of temporary injunction does not arise. The defendants further submitted that if any temporary injunction order is granted to retain the plaintiffs, that may cause difficulties for the plaintiffs to manage the day to day affairs of the trust. That the plaintiffs and their family members were taking the law in their own hands and that they are always disturbing the peace and sanctity of the temple. That if the application for interim order is rejected, no prejudice will be caused to the plaintiffs. On the contrary, the temple trust will be affected if the application is allowed and thereby entire public will be put to inconvenience. With these allegations defendants (revision applicants) asserted that the application for temporary injunction deserves to be dismissed. ( 4 ) THE learned Civil Judge allowed the application for temporary injunction. The learned Civil Judge observed "no doubt even though the plaintiffs have established their right as archakas in the temple, in my opinion they are subject to supervisory and temporal part of act of trust for smooth management of the temple and the temple trust has got such power even though such a thing is not contemplated under bombay Public Trust Act. In other words, the trust is having powers of supervision, management including archaka and other office bearers in the interest of trust deity and the public at large i. e. , devotees. But at the same time it observed "what I feel is both the persons are expected to act within limits". In other words, the trust is having powers of supervision, management including archaka and other office bearers in the interest of trust deity and the public at large i. e. , devotees. But at the same time it observed "what I feel is both the persons are expected to act within limits". The Court has further held that the grounds on which the services of plaintiffs have been terminated by the defendants at the first instance as to the grievance against plaintiffs stating that plaintiffs are not doing pooja properly as required under the religious rules and customs. There are no materials placed before the Court by the defendants, whether these defendants are qualified to become priests or archakas and whether they are qualified in vedashastras, or whether the plaintiffs are not doing the pooja and vedashastras. He further observed that the complaint made by the devotees about the archaka is of no consequence and could not be considered. Pending criminal proceedings, the copies of F. I. R. which have been filed is not the conclusive proof of allegation made therein. The Trial Court further observed that the defendants have not produced any documents about vedas and puranas according to which the plaintiffs are not doing poojas and further no document has been produced for having issued notice or warning to the plaintiff's. He has held that resolutions passed by the board of trustees i. e. , the defendants is of no consequence as there is no mention of giving any opportunity to concerned persons to put forward their objections and for also having heard them before confirming the matter. He also took the termination order is not speaking order, it is ambiguous on its face and it is nothing but causing injury with the property right of the plaintiff. The Court further observed that if at all the hereditary priest who has right to that. office is recognised by custom and who was using the emoluments attached to that office which is recognised as property right, if such an archaka is to be removed for his misconduct or misbehaviour or his omission to do poojas, seva as archaka, it could be by initiating due and proper legal proceedings in a Competent Court of law. Though institutions have got a right to remove such archakas, even on hereditary ones but by legal proceedings. Though institutions have got a right to remove such archakas, even on hereditary ones but by legal proceedings. It further held that Bombay Trust act is silent about the power of termination and the manner in which termination has to be done. No doubt, justice will be done by following the principles of natural justice and by giving sufficient opportunity. The Court observed the defendants have passed the dictatorial order of termination without giving them opportunity of being heard, to plaintiffs and they have failed to substantiate the contentions taken in the notice against the plaintiff, before the Court by producing sufficient materials in support of their contention, and so plaintiffs have prima facie case in their favour. Dealing with the balance of convenience the trial Court held that plaintiffs are dependent upon the properties and property rights for their livelihood as they have done the seva since many years. Really it is the plaintiffs who are going to be put much hardship and inconvenience as they are servants of the idol and not the servants of the trust, and the act of defendant is nothing but a cloud or screen in between plaintiffs and Ganapathi Deva. The Trial Court held that by restraining the defendants, allowing the plaintiffs from doing the seva of the deity, the plaintiffs are put to loss and inconvenience, and they have been deprived of enjoying the bondage and attachment they have been enjoying since the beginning. This is something which cannot be evaluated with money. The Court further observed that the trustees were behaving in dictatorial manner. With these observations, the Trial court granted the interim order. On an appeal having been filed, the lower Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. The lower Appellate court while dismissing the appeal observed that it is clear that plaintiffs have prima facie case as admittedly no enquiry had been held before issuing the notice. No opportunity was given to the plaintiff to have their say and the doctrine of audi alterem partem had not been complied with. That having regard to the fact that there has been no compliance with the principles of natural justice and in view of the fact that plaintiffs enjoyed the legal right to perform poojas etc. , the claim of the plaintiff for maintaining status quo as existed earlier to 20-9-1994 has to be maintained. That having regard to the fact that there has been no compliance with the principles of natural justice and in view of the fact that plaintiffs enjoyed the legal right to perform poojas etc. , the claim of the plaintiff for maintaining status quo as existed earlier to 20-9-1994 has to be maintained. In paragraph 15, the Court has observed that the order of termination has been passed within a few days of termination of original suit proceeding before the munsiff. It has to be seen whether termination or original proceedings and defendant's passing the resolution which has been impugned in the suit has nothing to do with, only at the full dressed trial. Till such period, the status quo between the parties has to be maintained. The specific case of the plaintiff is that they will suffer substantial loss and irreparable injury if the order of temporary injunction is not granted as prayed. For a hypothetical proposition if it is construed that the plaintiffs are not granted the order of temporary injunction as sought and the plaintiffs were to succeed ultimately in the suit, at that stage the court of law cannot put the clock back to its position in the guise of maintaining the status quo between the parties. In view of the material on record the lower Appellate Court observed, I am of the opinion that there are serious questions to be tried and status quo between the parties has to be maintained and if an order of temporary injunction has been granted as now prayed for and a situation which may not arises in my opinion, where the plaintiffs were to fail in the suit, the defendants would not loss anything. A submission was made by the learned Counsel for the appellant that during the course of argument that consequent upon the pronouncement of the order passed by the trustees against the plaintiff, the defendants have appointed new trustees as archakas and if injunction order is granted now as prayed, it would effect the services of new archakas and it causes problem to the trustees. It should be borne in mind that plaintiffs' as archakas have some legal rights and the same has been unjustly infringed by the defendants. It has also not disputed that plaintiffs are the archakas of the temple from quite sometime. It should be borne in mind that plaintiffs' as archakas have some legal rights and the same has been unjustly infringed by the defendants. It has also not disputed that plaintiffs are the archakas of the temple from quite sometime. Such being the case, just because the defendants have appointed new archakas, the same should not come in the way of Court exercising its equitable jurisdiction and grant order of temporary injunction. There is one of such a worthy case where Court of law has to exercise its equitable jurisdiction to maintain status quo between parties till disposal of the suit". Taking this view the Appellate Court further took the view that if the injunction is not granted, the plaintiffs may suffer irreparable injury which cannot be compensated by pecuniary measures, and balance of convenience did lie in favour of the plaintiff. With these observations, the lower Appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants/trustees. ( 5 ) HAVING aggrieved from the order of the first Appellate Court dismissing the defendants' appeal, defendants have come up in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 6 ) I have heard Sri H. B. Datar, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri K. I. Bhat for the revision-petitioners and Sri B. P, holla, learned Senior Advocate and Sri Gopal Hegde for the opposite parties. The learned Counsel for the revisionists Sri 11. B. Datar, made the following submissions: that archakas are servants of the trust and their services could be terminated. The temple though is a public trust, it cannot be put at par nor could it be considered to be a statutory body, Corporation or industry or an institution to which principles of Industrial Disputes Act do apply. That the question of proper arrangement and due performance of pooja is a matter of arrangement by trustees and suit could be filed against trustees for proper administration under Section 50 of the bombay Trust Act after obtaining sanction of the Charity commissioner. The suit is bad for non-impleadment of the trust, as suit is for declaration that the plaintiffs are hereditary archakas and for injunction claiming offering made to the trust and the trust and trustees could be seriously affected, so, the suit is bad for non-impleadment of the trust and trustees. The suit is bad for non-impleadment of the trust, as suit is for declaration that the plaintiffs are hereditary archakas and for injunction claiming offering made to the trust and the trust and trustees could be seriously affected, so, the suit is bad for non-impleadment of the trust and trustees. ( 7 ) THE present suit is not maintainable under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short, 'code'), in view of dismissal of Original Suit No. 17 of 1976. That in view of the failure of plaintiffs in securing injunction in Original Suit No. 349 of 1989, similar relief cannot be claimed in the present suit. ( 8 ) SRI H. B. Datar, further submitted that the learned Court below had no jurisdiction to grant the relief of temporary injunction on 5-10-1994, in the manner and the way in which it had been granted as amounting to decreeing the whole claim which could only be done after the trial and decision on the merits of the suit and granting of relief as has been done under the guise of temporary injunction on 5-10-1994, in the manner and the way in which it had been granted as amounting to decreeing the whole claim which could only be done after the trial and decision on the merits of the suit. That granting of full relief as it has been done under the garb of temporary injunction order, is illegal and in excess of jurisdiction as it does not come within the four walls and the scope of temporary relief or injunction, the object of which is to maintain status quo as existing on the date of the suit. That the act of the Courts below in the present case, is nothing but the Courts (below) having acted illegally and in excess of their jurisdiction. Further, it has to be seen that once the service of the plaintiffs had been terminated on 21-9-1994, and the new poojaries had been appointed in their place, by interim order, the clock could not be set back until the suit was decided on merits after trying the issues involved in the suit and hearing the parties, by simple interim or temporary injunction order, as the object of interim order is to maintain status quo as on the date of suits. As such, the order impugned, even though affirmed by the Appellate court, suffers from jurisdictional error amounting to the Court's acting beyond jurisdiction and affirmance of that order by the appellate Court would not make or legalise the order which it had no jurisdiction to pass or which was beyond the purview and scope of granting of interlocutory orders. ( 9 ) LASTLY, Sri H. B. Datar, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that blanket order without putting the plaintiffs-respondents to terms and conditions with reference to their duties to maintain the decency and decent condition of temple and maintenance of law, order and pious religious atmosphere in temple and compensate any loss to the temple, the Court below acted illegally in granting the order of temporary injunction in terms tantamounting to decreeing the suit in toto. ( 10 ) THAT the above contentions made on be half of the defendants-petitioners have been hotly contested by and on behalf of the opposite parties by Sri B. P. Holla, the learned senior Counsel and by Sri Gopal Hegde, Counsel. It has been strenuously contended by the learned Counsels on behalf of the respondents-opposite parties that the scope of jurisdiction of this court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is very limited and that this Court should not interfere with the order impugned, in the civil revision, which has been affirmed by the appellate Court. It has further been contended by the learned counsels on behalf of the respondents-opposite parties that the office of the poojary or archaka is a hereditary office and the property and that the trustees or defendants could not remove or deprive the plaintiffs i. e. , opposite parties of their property. That archakaship is heritable and partiable and they cannot be removed, so long as they do perform their duties. That the defendants had no right to remove the plaintiffs from archakaship, if at all they had any such right, the defendants-revisionists acted illegally, arbitrarily and without following the principles of natural justice even. That a mere suit for injunction does not bar a suit lor declaration of title. That under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, the present suit would not be barred on the ground that Original Suit No. 17 of 1976, had been dismissed. That a mere suit for injunction does not bar a suit lor declaration of title. That under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, the present suit would not be barred on the ground that Original Suit No. 17 of 1976, had been dismissed. That the Court below could grant the injunction of the nature it did grant in order to do justice to the party, as there was a prinia facie case made out by the applicants, as discussed by the Courts below. That as the archakaship was the property of which plaintiffs-opposite parties could not be deprived of ordinarily and as the defendant acted arbitrarily and maliciously in terminating the plaintiffs-respondents services to the deity without giving them any opportunity of hearing, the relief of temporary injunction could be granted as order was illegal, null and void. That the defendants did not file any written statement, denying the plaintiffs' case upto the stage when the application for interim relief had been considered and disposed of and when the defendants had not denied the plaintiffs' claim, the Court below did rightly accept plaintiffs-applicants', i. e. , present respondents version and on the basis of matter on record it was legally justified to grant injunction as prayed. That there might have been some unwarranted observations made in the judgment by the Courts below, but those observations should not be made the basis for quashing or setting aside of the order impugned. That, sri B. P. Holla, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs had taken me through the records of the case in support of his contention to the effect that the plaintiffs had a right to perform the pooja from the time immemorial and it was hereditary right and right of a property and the plaintiffs-respondents could not be deprived of that right by the defendants as having been done or as has been admitted to have been done by the defendants. ( 11 ) SRI Gopal Hegde, learned Counsel for the respondents supported the contentions of Sri B. P. Holla and emphasised that firstly archakaship is not a service nor archakas are servants of defendants. It is hereditary right of property of plaintiffs as archakas. ( 11 ) SRI Gopal Hegde, learned Counsel for the respondents supported the contentions of Sri B. P. Holla and emphasised that firstly archakaship is not a service nor archakas are servants of defendants. It is hereditary right of property of plaintiffs as archakas. The Courts below have found prima facie case and balance of convenience in plaintiffs-respondents' favour and this court should not interfere with same even if finding is erroneods as jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115, C. P,c. is very limited and finding of fact recorded, by Courts below cannot be interfered with. ( 12 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions made by the learned Counsels for all the parties. There is no doubt that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Cude of Civil procedure, for short 'c. P. C. ', as amended up to date is limited and is circumscribed by the conditions prescribed or mentioned under Section 115, C. P. C. That the revisional jurisdiction though may be the part of general appellate jurisdiction of the High court, that is, the High Court, but its extent is not as wide as that of the appellate or of first Appellate Court. The revisional jurisdiction is limited to the question of jurisdiction, namely, illegal usurption of jurisdiction not vested or refusal to exercise the jurisdiction vested, or the Courts acting illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction vested and in the eases, where the order impugned amounts to a case decided, the order impugned results in or has tendency of causing irreparable loss or injury or resulting in failure of justice. The cases, where the Appellate Court wrongly assumes jurisdiction on the basis of its erroneous finding or view or decision on question of jurisdictional fact or on the basis of erroneous decision of jurisdictional fact, the Court illegally refused to exercise jurisdiction vested a case may be said to have arisen for exercise of revisional powers by the High Court provided the order impugned has a tendency to cause injustice or irreparable injury. See Ratilal Balabhai Nazar v Ranchhodbhai shankarbhai Patel and Another ; Keshardeo Chamria v Radha kissen Chamria and Others ; Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai ; Chaube Jagdish Prasad and q another v Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi ; Shri Chandrika Singh and Others v Raja Vishwanath Pratap Singh and Another ; Smt. Vrishendramani v K, Venugopal Rai ; K. Padma Bai v Anasuya r, Kabady and Others and A. P. Nagaraj v V. R. Krishna. ( 13 ) KEEPING the basic principles of law under Section 115 of the C. P. C. in view, I proceed to examine the case. ( 14 ) AS regards the scope of jurisdiction of the Court to grant the temporary injunction, it has to be kept in view regarding temporary injunction order or equitable relief, that where the court has jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction order, it is in order to maintain the status quo between the parties and if the order will aid the final relief that may be granted in the suit, court may order that injunction. ( 15 ) IT is also well-settled in the matter of granting the temporary injunction, the Court has to be satisfied about the existence of prima facie case and the balance of convenience and as to the question if the injunction granted by it will result in imminent irreparable injury to the party seeking injunction, it means that, if injury is not likely to be one that may be said to be an irreparable, but is one which can be compensated in terms of money, then the temporary injunction may not be granted. ( 16 ) THE question of balance of convenience is also an important question to be considered. Balance of convenience refers to convenience to both the parties, that is, the Court has to examine the question of balance of convenience on which side does it lie. ( 17 ) WHILE judging the question of prima facie case, the Court has only to consider whether there is a substantial question raised bona fide and which at first sight, requires to be investigated for decision and it is not to be confused with the prima facie title that may be involved in the suit. See Krishna moorthy J. v Bangalore Turf Club and Others and Nagarajs case, supra. See Krishna moorthy J. v Bangalore Turf Club and Others and Nagarajs case, supra. ( 18 ) IN the case of American Cyanamid Company v Ethicon limited , that principles in this regard have well been laid down. The following are the guidelines laid down:"the Court must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious and there is a serious question to be tried. (2) That the Court is not justified in embarking upon anything resembling a trial to evaluate the strength of the case on the either sides. (3) That there should be an undertaking by the plaintiff to pay damages to defendant for any loss sustained by him by reason of injunction and (4) That the cases where damages can provide adequate remedy, the injunction should not be granted unless the plaintiff moves an undertaking to pay the damages caused by loss sustained by the penal reason of injunction". ( 19 ) IN the case of Ravindra Singh v Rajasthan Finance Corporation, it had been laid down that the Courts are not justified in granting the interim injunction which practically amounts to decreeing the suit, as granting of such an injunction is beyond the purview of granting interlocutory orders. Their lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Gujarat bottling Company Limited and Others v Coca Cola Company and Others , has been pleased to laid down the basic principles in this regard as well in the following words:"the grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion by the Court. While, exercising the discretion, the Court applies the following rest: (i) Whether the plaintiff has aprima facie case. (ii) Whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff. (iii) Whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury, if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is allowed. (iv) The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when existence of the legal right assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged violation arc both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. Relief by way of an interlocutory is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved. Relief by way of an interlocutory is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection has however be weighed against the corresponding need to the dependent to be protected against the injury resulting from having been prevented from exercising his own legal right for which he could not be adequately compensated. The Court must weigh one need against another and determine whether balance of convenience lies (see Wander Limited and another v Antox India P. Ltd. ). In order to protect defendant, while granting an interlocutory injunction in his favour, the court can require the plaintiff to furnish an undertaking, so that defendant could be adequately compensated if uncertainty is resolved in his favour. . . . Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not at fault for bring about the state of things complained off and that he was not unfair or unequitable in his dealings. His conduct should be fair and honest". ( 20 ) APPLYING these principles when I examine this case, it appears un necessary for me to go into the merits or demerits of the contentions of the learned Counsels for both the parties, with reference to the question of title of the parties or of the plaintiffs, that is, with respect to the question if the archakaship or office of poojary or ardhaka is a hereditary office and property or not? this question is a contentious one and has to be decided while deciding the suits on merits by the Courts below. The learned courts below in my opinion, were not justified in going into the strength of title or the merits of the case in the sense that the office of archakaship is property or not at the stage of considering the application for interlocutory relief, i. e. , temporary injunction. The learned courts below in my opinion, were not justified in going into the strength of title or the merits of the case in the sense that the office of archakaship is property or not at the stage of considering the application for interlocutory relief, i. e. , temporary injunction. The findings recorded at this stage by the courts below in my opinion, should not deter nor be deemed to be binding as final on the Trial Court, while trying and deciding the suit on merits. No doubt, the question is one which requires proper decision and trial. The other question that even if the office of archakaship is an office and the archaka is the employee to serve the deity and even if it is taken to be within the power of management and administration to control his activity and even if it be taken for the moment without deciding this question that the defendants-trustees had a right to remove the poojary or the archaka for certain reasons or complaints whether the principles of fair play and rules of natural justice of hearing or of opportunity to show-cause against any charge levelled against archaka will be applicable or not have also got to be determined and decided by the Trial Court and whether it was open to the defendants to have terminated the services of the archakas simpliciter, particularly in the context of services of archakas having been terminated by the defendants. Whether that termination has been done legally or it suffers from illegality is again a question to be decided in the suit after defence has been put and evidence has been recorded in the course of trial, but no doubt in my opinion, the case involves substantial questions relating to title and right of the parties to be investigated including the question of validity of the defendants-petitioners' action in doing away or in terminating the services of the plaintiffs. ( 21 ) THE learned Trial Court appears to have been swayed with the plaintiffs' contention that order of termination had been passed against them, even if it was within the power of the defendants to terminate, without plaintiffs being given opportunity by the defendants of hearing and the trial Judge appears to have made certain remarks with reference to Somali and Rowanda and the African States which were not justified and were unwarranted and based on no material. The observations as to States of Somali and Rowanda, about which, it is alleged in the judgment that, there is no rule of law, are based on no material and as such are unwarranted remarks and were uncalled for keeping in view the amity of the nations. The question whether the principles of natural justice or the principles of law will apply to the present case, namely, the termination of plaintiffs from archakaship is another question which has to be determined in the course of the suit and secondly, whether any opportunity was given to the plaintiffs prior to their services being terminated is again a question of fact to be determined and decided in course of trial of the suit and no doubt, when there is a contentious question to be considered, it can beyond doubt be said that there may be a prima facie case. Any finding or decision recorded by the Court below on the subject will not deter the Court below in deciding the question on merits after defence, pleading and evidence are filed. But, there is no doubt, a prima facie case for trial exists. ( 22 ) EXISTENCE of mere prima facie case is not a fact simpliciter, on the existence of showing of which the temporary injunction order can be granted, but the question of balance of convenience as explained by the Supreme Court have to be considered by the courts below and when the Court has to consider that question, the Court had to keep in view the basic principles of law in that regard. That the object of interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiffs from these species of injury which may be called by court irreparable before the legal right is established upon trial, i. e. , the injury or likely injury is such that it cannot be compensated in terms of money or damages recoverable in action if uncertainty is resolved in favour of the plaintiffs in the trial and the need for such protection has to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendants to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights which could not be compensated and thus, court is required to weigh ones need against another and then determine where balance of convenience lies. ( 23 ) IN the present case, as per its facts, the services of the plaintiffs-respondents had been terminated by the order passed by the defendants vide termination order dated 21-9-1994. The suit in which the temporary injunction order had been passed giving rise to the appeal and the present revision, had been filed on 5/6-10-1994, and along with that an application-I. A. No. 1 under Order 39, Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Civil procedure Code (for short 'c. P. C. ') was moved. It has also to be taken note of that reliefs claimed including the declaration that the order of termination dated 21-9-1994, was void. The order of termination removing the plaintiffs had been passed on 21-9-1994, and was served on the plaintiffs on 22-9-1994. This position is admitted one. It is also stated in the statement of objections to LA. No. I moved before the Trial Court that after the termination of the service of the plaintiffs, the trusts' committee has already made alternative arrangements and appointed Sri Umesh Gajanan Bhat of Gokarn, well qualified archaka to work as archaka in the temple and he has been discharging the duties as archaka right from 29-9-1994. This fact has duly been published in all leading newspapers and the entire community of devotees expressed their satisfaction. However, plaintiffs are allowed to worship Lord Vinayak as other devotees. However, the plaintiffs are also allowed to worship Lord Vinayak as devotees as any section of public are allowed to worship Sri vinayak after observing certain rules and procedures temple trust. However, plaintiffs are allowed to worship Lord Vinayak as other devotees. However, the plaintiffs are also allowed to worship Lord Vinayak as devotees as any section of public are allowed to worship Sri vinayak after observing certain rules and procedures temple trust. Thus, it comes out that before the suit had been filed or injunction application had been moved, admittedly, the plaintiffs had been removed from the post of poojary or archakaship and new poojaries had been appointed on 21-9-1994 and 24-9-1994, respectively and were performing the sole duties attached to the office. ( 24 ) THE defendants' case has been as per statement of objections that there have been certain complaints against the plaintiffs, as the trust had been receiving complaints against the plaintiffs and plaintiffs' behaviour, the plaintiffs did not improve in spite of being cautioned so the defendants intended the action of termination of the poojaries, but there had at the plaintiffs-opposite parties' instance been various litigations as well earlier to that, namely, Original Suit No. 17 of 1976 and original Suit No. 349 of 1989. So, in these circumstances, the defendants had terminated the services as the defendants- trustees had lost confidence and the termination was termination simpliciter. No doubt, the plaintiffs were permitted to give and offer pooja like ordinary devotees, but as regards the office of poojary or archaka from that their services had been terminated or in other words, from the office of archakaship they had been removed and the new ones had been appointed in their place. No doubt, the plaintiffs were permitted to give and offer pooja like ordinary devotees, but as regards the office of poojary or archaka from that their services had been terminated or in other words, from the office of archakaship they had been removed and the new ones had been appointed in their place. When this is and has been the position in this case, until the order of termination was held to be illegal, null and void as claimed by the plaintiffs and was so declared or set aside or cancelled after the decision of suit on merits it was not open and was not within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court to pass such an order granting relief in full and in the nature of final relief as in the present case has been passed which amounted to granting of the main relief in the suit with the back date in the sense that is, with effect not from the date of the suit, but from the date of termination, particularly, when those questions had to be decided finally on merits as to whether the archakaship in respect of which plaintiffs were claiming the decree for declaration that it was their property right and they are entitled to have its possession or entitled to exercise it with all benefits thereunder. Really, it amounts to deciding of the suit on merit and recording the findings that the order of termination without jurisdiction is null and void as claimed by the plaintiffs without suit being tried and defendant being allowed to have trial. The granting of temporary injunction order after having expressed the view as if finally deciding the case, that plaintiffs were entitled to the archakaship as property rights or that the termination order was illegal and bad when the suit is yet to be tried, Court below usurped the jurisdiction which did not vest in it at the stage of considering the application for interlocutory relief or interlocutory injunction order. The purpose of interlocutory order as mentioned earlier is to maintain the status quo as it existed on the date of the suit and not to grant the final full and complete relief or relief of the final nature as claimed in the suit as it is beyond the purview and scope of jurisdiction of granting interlocutory relief. The purpose of interlocutory order as mentioned earlier is to maintain the status quo as it existed on the date of the suit and not to grant the final full and complete relief or relief of the final nature as claimed in the suit as it is beyond the purview and scope of jurisdiction of granting interlocutory relief. Here, the order impugned which has the effect of completely granting the relief as claimed in plaint is illegal and without jurisdiction as it goes beyond the purview or scope of interim relief. See Ravindra singh's case, supra; State of Rajasthan and Others v Mis. Swaika Properties and Another ; Bank of Maharashtra v Race shipping and Transport Company Private Limited and another ; Jitendra Nath Biswas v M/s. Empire of India and ceylone Tea Company and Another and P. R. Sinha v Indra krishna. ( 25 ) FURTHER, the Court below committed the jurisdictional error, while deciding the question of balance of convenience in the sense that they have approached that question on the assumption and presumption that archakaship has been the property right of the plaintiffs as per observations made by the trial Court as under:"i am further of the opinion that the defendants have exceeded their power of trusteeship under such circumstances when property right of the plaintiffs has been injured and damaged. They have got every right to approach the Court as well as when it made observations at page 74, "that looking at the matter from any angle, it is a question of life and death and of injury to a property right on one hand and the prestige and a matter of ego and grudge by persons having dictatorial nature on the other". Thus, the finding which has been recorded on the balance of convenience to the effect that if injunction is not granted, plaintiffs will suffer greater loss, Court has started on an assumption and presumption that the archakaship or the office of poojary which plaintiffs were claiming has been an established right of theirs. This was an illegal and irrelevant consideration as the question whether archakaship is a property or property right did it belong to the plaintiffs (applicants in application under order 39, Rule 1 application-respondents has been and is a question to be decided in the suit after trial of suit on merits". This was an illegal and irrelevant consideration as the question whether archakaship is a property or property right did it belong to the plaintiffs (applicants in application under order 39, Rule 1 application-respondents has been and is a question to be decided in the suit after trial of suit on merits". ( 26 ) THE learned trial Judge as well as the appellate Judge do not appear to have applied their minds to the question arising from the allegations made in paragraphs 5 and 6, particularly no. 1 that plaintiffs on the date of the suit and thereafter, had not been working in the temple as archakas and secondly, whether any order passed in favour of the plaintiffs would be in the interest of the trust and the temple and in the interest of the day to day management of the trust. In paragraph 6, it has been asserted that if LA. is considered at this stage and any orders passed in favour of the plaintiffs, the interests of the trust will be largely affected and it would be very difficult for the trustees to manage the day to day affairs of the trust. It may be further noted that plaintiffs and their family members are taking the law in their hands and always disturbing the peace and sanctity of the temple, moreover, they are trying to run a parallel trust by taking undue advantage of the position as archakaships. ( 27 ) IT has also been asserted in para 7 that temple trust will be affected and the entire public may be put to great jeopardy which comes as devotees to the temple. This aspect of the matter has not been given consideration as appears from the perusal of the judgments of the Courts below, while judging the question of balance of convenience. This is nothing, but an illegality in exercising jurisdiction of the Court while deciding the balance of convenience. This aspect of the matter has not been given consideration as appears from the perusal of the judgments of the Courts below, while judging the question of balance of convenience. This is nothing, but an illegality in exercising jurisdiction of the Court while deciding the balance of convenience. The "monetary" loss if any to the plaintiffs that could have been compensated by damages or by award of damages or by a direction that though plaintiffs, as alleged by the defendants may come and offer pooja as devotees, but so far as their earnings and livelihood from the temple is concerned, the learned Trial Court should have considered that matter in the light of the facts and circumstances to obviate the difficulties if any were arising to obviate the loss, passed necessary direction for payment of some money in the form of salary etc. , during the pendency of suit subject to the condition of its being reimbursed if service or duty are not taken from plaintiffs and their suit finally fails. ( 28 ) THE learned Court below also ignored the fact that as regards the link between the deity and the plaintiffs was concerned, there was no such need as the plaintiffs were allowed to come to temple and offer pooja or worship, as the devotees without interfering with the management of the temple. Thus it appears that, the Court below while granting the temporary injunction did not apply its mind to this material aspects of the case particularly relating to the management and day to day affairs of the trusts by trustees have to be run smoothly and could they be carried on smoothly in the circumstances of the case, particularly when plaintiff was fastened over trustees without decision of the case on merits and why the monetary loss alleged could not be compensated. Here, the Court had not to see or consider the personal loss of the defendants, but had to see question of loss or injury to temple trust, or the question of inconvenience or trouble to trustees in the matters relating to the management and supervision of day to day affairs of the temple and in that context, it had to consider the question of balance of convenience. This has not been done. This has not been done. As such in my opinion, the Courts below apart from committing the jurisdictional error in granting the full relief which, was claimed under the suit and could be granted after full trial and decision of suit on merits by way of granting temporary injunction without trial of the suit on merit, and acted illegally when it considered the question of inconvenience and recorded finding thereon on the basis of wrong assumptions as to rights of the plaintiff which had yet to be determined after trial on merits in the suit as well as on the basis of non-consideration of material question. ( 29 ) IN this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case for interference under Section 115 of the C. P. C. The orders impugned as such deserve to be set aside and matter requires to be sent back. ( 30 ) IN the result, the civil revision petition is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside and the matter is hereby remanded back to the Court below (Trial Court) to decide the matter afresh keeping in view the law laid down and the observations made above and it will also be open to the Court below to consider the question of imposing necessary conditions in the light of the law referred above, in the interest of the temple trust and the Lord and the management of affairs thereof as well, while deciding the question of balance of convenience and of granting or non-granting of the interim order as prayed. Cost of the revision are to be borne by parties. --- *** --- .