V. Dutta Gyani, J. (Acting)— The petitioner by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges the order dated 30.10.95 issued by the District Magistrate, Bishnupur in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (3) of section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (for short 'the Act') and prays for issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus. 2. The grounds on which the order of detention is based are contained in Annexure A/4. The petitioner submitted his representation to the Chief Secretary of the State on 10.1L95 and by letter dated 22.11.95 issued by the Under Secretary, Home Department Annexure A/5 he was informed that his request for revocation of the detention order could not be acceeded to. 3. The, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised the following points : (1) that the petitioner's representation was never placed before the Advisory Board and no sitting of the Board was held within three weeks from the date of the detention order, thus contravening section 10 of the Act, (2) that the State Government while according its approval to the petitioner's detention vide order dated 10.11.95 Annexure A/6 failed to report the petitioner's detention to me Central Government together with the grounds of detention as contemplated under section 3 (5) of the Act, (3) that the detention order Annexure A/2 suffers from non application of mind, inasmuch as, the fact mat the petitioner was granted bail subject to condition that he would attend local police station on every Sunday as per Annexure A/1 to A/4, non consideration of these documents by the detaining authority vitiates the detention order as is revealed from the grounds of detention Annexure A/4, as supplied to the petitioner wherein in paragraph 11 (j) the date of the order, name of the Court and the number of case is left blank: It was on this basis that the learned counsel argued that the District Magistrate acted in a casual and mechanical way in passing the impugned order. The instances noted by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention, do not relate to public order or security of the State and may at best be said to be relating to law and order. 4. The instances noted by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention, do not relate to public order or security of the State and may at best be said to be relating to law and order. 4. The respondents in then-joint affidavit sworn by the Under Secretary, Home Department have while denying the alleged contravention has averred that the petitioner was a member of the outlawed organisation called 'Kanglei Yawon Kanna Lup (KYKL) and worked for the organisation in Nambol area as Second Leiutenant since November, 1994. He was arrested by the police along with 6 others after exchange of fire on 29.11.94 at their hideout in Kongkham village. One M 66 Automatic Rifle, one round seal United Liberation Front (UNLF), one line seal of District Commandar UNLF one line seal of Secretary Civil Affairs, UNLF, one line seal of Finance Secretary Military Council KYKL, one line seal of North East Commander, KYKL and one stamp pad were recovered and seized from his possession. So far as compliance of the inbuilt procedural safeguard as provided under the Act is concerned, the respondents in paragraph 6 have averred as follows: "6. That with reference to paragraph No.9 of the writ petition it is submitted that the representation dated 10.11.95 was received by the office of the SP Jail on 13:11.95 (11 and 12 November being second Saturday and Sunday respectively). The SP Jail forwarded the same by his letter dated 14.11.95 and the same was received by the Secretariate on the same day at the late hour and the matter immediately processed and die representation was rejected on 21.11.95 and the detenu was communicated the same by a letter dated 22.11.95 and the detenu received the same on 23.11.95. The time taken by the State Government to disposing the representation is only 5 day as the day on which the representation was received i.e. 14.11.95 is excluded, 19.11.95 was Sunday and 21.11.95 was the day on which the matter was disposed of after due consideration of the entire records and materials available. Further a copy of the representation alongwith a copy of detention order dated 31.10.95, copy of the report of DM/Bishnupur, copy of the grounds of detention and copy of the Government order approving the detention order by a letter dated: 16th November, 1995. Further a copy of the representation alongwith a copy of detention order dated 31.10.95, copy of the report of DM/Bishnupur, copy of the grounds of detention and copy of the Government order approving the detention order by a letter dated: 16th November, 1995. The Advisory Board held on 24.11.95 and 25.11.95 clearly mention the representation of the detenu and he was also heard in person. The opinion of the Board was informed to him vide Government order No. 17 (l)/43/ 9541 dated 14.12.95. Therefore, the allegation of the petitioner is devoid of truth and baseless." 5. Meeting the grounds, as raised by the petitioner about non reporting his detention to the Central Government, the respondents have averred as follows: "That with reference to paragraph Nos.10 and 11 of the writ petition it is submitted that the Central Government has been informed of the detention, ground of detention and approval order vide letter No. 17 (l)/43/95-H dated 16.11.95 when the State Government preferred the case of the detenu to the Advisory Board." 6. It is of course true that the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit dated 3rd July, 1996 has denied the allegations of being a member of the outlawed organisation KYKL and the recovery of weapons as alleged from his possession on 29.11.94 after exchange of fire. It is not the forum for going into the truth or veracity of the allegations. What this Court primarily concerned is the relevancy and sufficiency of grounds for sustaining the order of detention. 7. Now coming to the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the first point raised relates to non application of mind and omission to consider the relevant and materially vital facts by the detaining authority. Placing reliance on the judgment as reported in Ayya vs. State of UP, AIR 1989 SC 364 and Asha Devi vs. K. Shivraj, AIR 1979 SC 447 , learned counsel urged that the substantive satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority in passing the impugned detention order on account of non consideration of a vital fact, namely, the detenu being released on bail subject to condition that he would attend the police station every week, vitiates the requisite satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority, thus rendering the detention order illegal. It was contended by the learned counsel that if the State was so keen and thought that the detenu did not deserve bail, ought to have opposed the grant of bail instead of resorting to preventive detention order. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on Shanti Agarwal vs. State of UP, AIR 1988 SC 596 and Raraesh Yadav vs. Etah, AIR 1986 SC 315 . 8. Learned Govt Advocate appearing for the respondent State, on the other hand, maintained that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is well founded on material grounds as supplied to the detenu. The considerations that weigh with the Court in the matter of grant of bail, are different. Referring to the grounds of detention altogether different, the detaining authority in his affidavit, paragraph 5 and 6 clearly stated: "(5) The detention order was passed after careful examination of all the materials including documents as clearly stated above. (6) The detention order was passed against the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of the Public Order, in the event of his release from custody. As a practice, the Hon'ble High Court and Court of Sessions and Judicial Magistrate usually granted bail to the accused persons in case of completion of investigation on the ground that he is not likely to abscond and temper PWs and also in case of non completion of investigation within stipulated period under section 167 CrPC. Therefore, the detention order was passed by the DM." Referring to the grounds of detention, learned Govt Advocate pointed out that it is not a case where the detaining authority was unmindful or oblivious of the bail. Paragraph 8 of the grounds of detention filed as Annexure 4 to the petition reads as follows : "That, you are released on bail by the Court in connection with FIR No. 111(12) NBL PS under section 121/121-A/37IPC,25(I-B)AAct, 13UA(P) Act,3(2) (II) and 5 IDA (P) Act on 3.6.95. However you were arrested on 5.6.95 in connection with FIR No.175 (II) 93 Bishnupur PS 121/121-A/392 IPC, 25 (i) (a) Act and 13 UA (P) Act and remanded to judicial custody on the same day and released on bail by the Court on 16.10.95 in connection with FIR No. 175- (II) 93 Bishnupur PS on 17.10.95. However you were arrested on 5.6.95 in connection with FIR No.175 (II) 93 Bishnupur PS 121/121-A/392 IPC, 25 (i) (a) Act and 13 UA (P) Act and remanded to judicial custody on the same day and released on bail by the Court on 16.10.95 in connection with FIR No. 175- (II) 93 Bishnupur PS on 17.10.95. You were arrested again from old Lambulance Imphal in connection with FIR No.49 (5) 94 Nambol PS under section 121/121-A/302/34IPC,25(I-A) : A Act and 13 UA (P) Act and remanded to judicial custody on 18.10.95 and still in jail." Further the detaining authority in paragraph 10 of the grounds of detention has noted: "That in view of the prejudicial activities in the proximate past it can reasonably be anticipated that you would continue to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order in case you be released on bail. Hence an active measure to prevent you from committing further prejudicial activities is therefore, immediately called for." (emphasis supplied) The-propositions laid down in the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel are not disputed. 9. It is essentially a question of facts. Whether grant of bail to the detenu in some of the cases that he was facing and lieklihood of his being released on bail in others, was present to the mind of the detaining authority while passing the impugned detention order, Annexure 2 and it is amply borne out from the grounds of detention that the detaining authority was not mindful of this fact while passing the impugned order. 10. The above argument is essentially based on the ground that in paragraph 11 (v) of the grounds of detention Annexure 4, the detaining authority while making a reference to the release order on bail, has not mentioned the date of order and the Misc case number in which the bail order was passed is left blank, but the FIR No. 175 (11)/93 BPR PS and the nature of offence under section 121/121A/392IPC, 25 (i) (a) Arms Act and section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act has been given. Now what has been contended is that the blank space left is clearly indicates that the bail order was not before the detaining authority. Otherwise, the detaining authority would not have omitted to mention the case number and the date of the order. 11. Now what has been contended is that the blank space left is clearly indicates that the bail order was not before the detaining authority. Otherwise, the detaining authority would not have omitted to mention the case number and the date of the order. 11. What is a vital fact ? the grant of bail or its date and the case number in which it was granted. The FIR number as given is distinctly referable to the case in which bail was granted. Paragraph 11 read as follows: "Copies of the following documents which form the basis of the grounds for your detention are enclosed herewith for your reference at (J) is mentioned in the above document." It is significant to note that it is not the petitioner's grievance that the document has not been supplied to him. The document is supplied but while preparing the list there is an omission in the date and number of case. Even such omissions should not be there. The detaining authority must see for himself that no such blank spaces are left, the grounds as it gives rise to unnecessary argument although the omission is apparently innocuous and inadvertant, and the detenu, who has in fact been supplied with a copy of the document which is nothing but his own bail order, cannot make any capital out of the said omission. 12. Taking the worst situation that the basis order itself was not placed before the detaining authority although the facts as established do not warrant any such presumption, in Noor Salman Makani vs. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 575 , it was urged that bail order imposing stringent conditions was not placed before the authority the Supreme Court said that whether a particular document is vital or not again is an issue which depends on the facts in each case. The detention order itself was passed when the detenu was in jail and the detaining authority noted mis fact and being satisfied that there was every possibility of his being released on bail, passed the detention order. If subsequently the detenu is released on bail even subject to certain conditions that does not bring about any material change. On the other hand, released on bail is a stronger ground showing that the detenu who is not in custody is likely to indulge in the prejudicial activities again. If subsequently the detenu is released on bail even subject to certain conditions that does not bring about any material change. On the other hand, released on bail is a stronger ground showing that the detenu who is not in custody is likely to indulge in the prejudicial activities again. The conditions imposed would show that the detenu could move about freely in the vast area of the city and therefore this order of release on bail with conditions cannot be said to be a vital document. 13. In Kishore Stikan Raj Jain vs. State of Rajasthan, 1995 SCO (Crl) 847, it has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that the fact that the detaining authority was not aware of the subsequent modification made in the bail order would not vitiate the detention order. In Abdul Rahman vs. State of Maharashtra, 1996 SCC (Crl) 83, the detaining authority having a reasonable suspicion, that the detenu if continued on bail, would renew or was likely to renew his old contracts in smuggling of heroin, and incidentally made a reference to violation of conditions of bail order, which was factually incorrect, the Supreme Court held that since it was not a ground on which the order of detention was based, the detention order was not rendered invalid in the circumstances of the case. 14. The omission as pointed out and highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not make out a case of non application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. The criticism made must therefore be rejected both on facts as well as in law. 15. Coming to the next ground of attack, it was submitted by the learned counsel that the representation made by the petitioner was not placed before the Advisory Board as contemplated by section 10 of the Act. Therefore, continued detention was illegal. 16. The Board held its sitting on 24.1L95 and 25.11.95. The State Government rejected petitioner's representation on 21.11.95. The petitioner submitted his representation on 10.11.95. Section 10 of the Act enjoins the State Govt to place the grounds of detention and the representation if any, as made by the detenu within three weeks from the date of the order of detention which in the instant case was passed on 31.10.95. The State Government rejected petitioner's representation on 21.11.95. The petitioner submitted his representation on 10.11.95. Section 10 of the Act enjoins the State Govt to place the grounds of detention and the representation if any, as made by the detenu within three weeks from the date of the order of detention which in the instant case was passed on 31.10.95. The argument as advanced is based on the premise that till 21st November the representation was with the State Govt, when it was rejected. Therefore, it could not have been placed before the Board within time. To satisfy ourselves, we have gone through the record. A copy of the representation was in fact sent to the Board on as is evident from Memo dated. The argument is purely presumptive on facts. Reliance has been placed on a judgment of this Court delivered on 21.3.96 in Civil Rule No.2 of 1996 (Imphal Bench). This judgment is based on Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh vs. BK Jha, (1987) 2 SCC 22 . With a view to make the larger position clear, State of Rajasthan vs. Shamsher Singh, AIR 1985 SC 1082 , may also be referred to, which holds that while making of the reference to the Advisory Board under section 10 of the NS Act and forwarding of the grounds of detention of it are mandatory, the requirement of placing before it the representation is conditional upon it having been made and receipt thereof by the appropriate Government. It is, however, obligatory for the appropriate Government to forward the representation, when received, to the Board without delay. On the facts in the case at hand, it cannot be said that there was any delay in placing the representation before the Board, violating section 10 of the Act 17. The other ground as raised, relates to non compliance of section 3 (5) of the Act. The petitioner has averred: "The State Government has not reported the fact of detention of the petitioner with the ground of detention to the Central Govt within a period of seven days from the date of approval of the detention order, and as such, section 3 (5) of the said Act has been violated and the detention order stands vitiated." 18. Denying the allegation, the respondents have stated the Central Govt was informed of the approval of the detention order on 16.11.95. Denying the allegation, the respondents have stated the Central Govt was informed of the approval of the detention order on 16.11.95. Sub-section [4) of section 3 provides for a maximum of twelve days time for according its approval to an order of detention passed by a District Magistrate, and seven days to report the fact to the Central Govt under section 3 (5) of the Act. In the instant case, it was reported to the Central Govt on 16.11.95, Thus, there is no delay nor any breach of section 3 (5) of the Act as alleged by the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a. judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in Sher Mahammed vs. State of WB, AIR 1975 SC 2049 . There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down. No infringement of section 3 (5) is made out of facts. 19. Placing reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in Kamalesh Kumar vs. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 51 , it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner mat no opportunity was given to the petitioner to make representation to the detaining authority. In Kamalesh Knmar's case the Supreme Court considered section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act and section 12 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, which provides that an order made by the officer specially empowered by the State Government can be revoked by the State Government as well as by the Central Government and an order made by the officer specially empowered by the Central Government can be revoked by the Central Government and as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court, confirment of this power on the State and Central Govt does not detract from the power that is available to the authority that has made the Order of detention to revoke it. The power of revocation conferred on the Central and the State Government under clause (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act and section 12 of the PIT NDPS Act is in addition to the power of revocation that is available to the authority that has passed the order of detention. The power of revocation conferred on the Central and the State Government under clause (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act and section 12 of the PIT NDPS Act is in addition to the power of revocation that is available to the authority that has passed the order of detention. It was for this reason that the Supreme Court held that failure on the part of such officer to consider the representation results in denial of the right conferred on the person detained to make a representation against the order of detention. This right of the detenu is in addition to his right to make the representation to the State Government and the Central Government and to have the same duly considered. This right to make a representation necessarily implies that the person detained must be informed of his right to make a representation to the authority that has made the order of detention at the time when he is served with the grounds of detention so as to enable him to make such a representation and the failure to do so results in denial of the right of the person detained to make a representation. 20. The impugned order of detention has been passed by the District Magistrate in exercise of his powers under section 3 (3) of the National Security Act, 1980, which requires approval of the State Government under section 3 (4) of the Act. On a comparative reading of section 3 and section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act and section 3 and 12 of the PIT NDPS Act along with sections 3 and 4 of the National Security Act, it would be seen that no such power of revocation is conferred on the officer passing the detention order under section 3 (3) of the National Security Act. Therefore, Kamalesh Ku mar's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel is not attracted to the present case, and admittedly the petitioner was informed by the detaining authority of his right to make a representation tome State Government as well as the Central Government as is evident from Annexure 4 the grounds of detention. 21. Therefore, Kamalesh Ku mar's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel is not attracted to the present case, and admittedly the petitioner was informed by the detaining authority of his right to make a representation tome State Government as well as the Central Government as is evident from Annexure 4 the grounds of detention. 21. Referring to a judgment of this Court dated 22.5.96 delivered in Civil Rule (HC) No.7 of 19% (Samom Ongbi Tampakleima Devi vs. State of Manipur), it was argued that natural justice demand assigning of reasons for rejection of representation may be by a detenu. While it cannot be disputed that procedural fairness and reasonableness is an itegral part of Article 19 of the Constitution and the principle of natural justice do come into play in considering reasonableness of a restriction where Article 19 is applicable, but as has been pointed out by the Supreme,Court in Hardhan Saha vs. State of WB, AIR 1974 SC 2154 , elaborate rules of natural justice are excluded eithet expressedly or by necessary implication where procedural provisions are made in the statute. If a statutory provision excludes application of any principle of natural justice, the Courts do not ignore the legislative mandate. Paragraphs 29,30,31,32 and 33 of Hardhan Sana's case (supra) clearly bring out the extent of applicability of the principles of natural justice in case of preventive detention. In Tushar Govindji Shah vs. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 511 , it has been held that a detention order is not vitiated on ground of violation of natural justice. Hardhan Saha's case (supra) has been relied upon and followed in several other subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, the latest being Naval Shankar Ishwarlal Dave vs. State of Gujrat, 1993 Suppl (3) SCC 754. The judgment of this Court as relied upon by the learned counsel, does not take into account Hardhan Sana's case. While the inbuilt procedural safeguard provided in the Act must be scrupulously followed from stage to stage by the authorities and the Government, there is nothing in the opinion of section 8 of the Act which povides for affording the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention to the appropriate Government to assign reasons for rejection of the representation. The procedural safeguard as provided under the law have been fully complied with by the respondents. The procedural safeguard as provided under the law have been fully complied with by the respondents. In view of the foregoing discussion, this petition fails. It is accordingly dismissed. We make no order as to cost.