JUDGMENT : D.M. Patnaik, J. - This second appeal is against the confirming judgments of the Courts below dismissing the plaintiff's suit for declaration of his tenancy right and possession in respect of the suit premises. Despite lot of litigations between the parties since 1946. the real title holders nor their transferees have enjoyed the property till now. The present suit is also connected so far as it relates to possession of the premises in question. Considering that a long prelude about the background of the case would burden the Judgment with details which are felt unnecessary for disposal of the second appeal, t proceed to give only the relevant fact of the case as follows: 2. To start with, the second appeal has been admitted on two grounds as detailed below : (i) Whether in view of the finding of the Court in the previous execution proceeding that the plaintiff is not a tenant in respect of the premises in question, the same shall be barred by the principles of res judicata in the present suit; and (ii) Whether, non-consideration of the admission of contesting defendant in the earlier title suit No. 57 of 1964 admitting the tenancy of the plaintiff and non-consideration of rent receipts proving such tenancy have affected the judgments of the Courts below. Plaintiff's case shortly speaking is, his father was a monthly tenant for Rs. 9/- under the original owner Gopinath Sahu, father of pro forma defendant No. 8 since 1942. It is the admitted case of the parties that one Shivji Warjung, father of defendants 1 to 7 ultimately became the title holder of the premises in question pursuant to a decree for specific performance of contract passed in First Appeal No. 27 of 1950 by this Court. The first appeal was disposed of on 19-4-1956 and said Shivji Warjung took possession of the house in an execution proceeding. On 20-5-1950 while the first appeal was pending before this Court, defendant No. 8 transferred the premises in question by a registered sale deed in favour of .Kunja Behera. Since Kunja Behera was a lispondence purchaser, in the first appeal that was disposed on 19-5-1955, the Court ignored the case of Kunja from consideration. Shivji Warjung filed Execution Case No. 9 of 1986 and took possession. Since Kunja Behera was a lispondence purchaser, in the first appeal that was disposed on 19-5-1955, the Court ignored the case of Kunja from consideration. Shivji Warjung filed Execution Case No. 9 of 1986 and took possession. Since Kunja claimed his title to the property by virtue of the sale deed in his favour and also claimed and/or threatened possession of Shivji, the latter filed title suit No. 57 of 1964 against Kunja and after him, his widow Kuma contested the suit. It is the plaintiff's further case that although he continued to be a tenant from the time of Gopinath and after him under Shivji Warjung and also after the death of the latter under his son defendant No. 1 and was in possession of the premises in question, he was not impleaded as a party in the suit. The said suit was decreed against Kuma Bewa and ultimately the decree was confirmed both in Title Appeal No. 131 of 1975 and further confirmed by this Court in Second Appeal No. 1 of 1978. Shivji Warjung died in the year 1979. Since on 8-6-1966 during the pendency of this litigation Shivji transferred the premises in question by registered gift deed in favour of defendant No. 1, the latter alongwith other legal heirs filed Execution Case No. 71 of 1985 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. Cuttack for execution of the decree. Since, the plaintiff claimed to be continuing as a tenant, he filed a petition under Order 21, Rule 35. CPC praying that the decrea-holder should be given symbolical possession. This prayer was rejected with a finding that the petitioner failed to prove his tenancy under the landlords. In Civil Revision No. 92 of 1988 this Court by judgment dated 5-4-1988 he d that a finding with regard to the status of a party in the proceeding under Order 21. Rule 36, CPC is not final and, therefore, this Court observed that the plaintiff if so advised may establish his tenancy right in a separate suit. This is how the plaintiff filed the present suit which has been dismissed by both the Courts below and hence the second appeal. Defendant No. 8 is the main contestant and filed written statement claiming title in respect of the premises in question on the basis of the registered sale deed dated 4-1-1990 by defendant No. 1 for consideration of Rs. 1,50,000/-. Defendant No. 8 is the main contestant and filed written statement claiming title in respect of the premises in question on the basis of the registered sale deed dated 4-1-1990 by defendant No. 1 for consideration of Rs. 1,50,000/-. He denied the claim of the tenancy by the plaintiff at any time. Statutory bar under the provisions of Section 11 and 47, CPC and the suit being hit by the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act were also pleaded in the written statement. In regard to the finding of this Court that the status of a tenant in a proceeding under Order 21, Rule 36, CPC is not barred by the principles of res judicata was also countered by stating the same to be an obiter and, therefore, not binding on the parties. 3. so far as the first substantial question of law that the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata is concerned, Mr, Ghose, learned counsel for the appellant while relying on the decision resorted in ASH 1989 SC 2240. Pandurange Ramachandra Mandik v. Smt. Santobal Ramachandra, submitted that the present suit would not be barred by principles of res judicata. Mr. S. K Dash, learned counsel for respondent No. 8 on the ether hand, submitted that the case referred to by the 'earned counsel for the appellant was wholly inapplicable to the present case both on facts as well as on point of law. I have gone through the above decision and I would agree with the contention of Mr, Dash that the decision does not help to sustain the contention of Mr. Ghose since the Court held that there was absence of details of the proceeding i. e. whether it was in the nature of a suit or a summary proceeding. It was further held that it was specifically not known as to what was the point urged and decided. However, I have no quarrel over the proposition laid down in regard to the principle of res judicata in the above case. 4. I may appropriately point out the decision of the apex Court in the case of Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vs. However, I have no quarrel over the proposition laid down in regard to the principle of res judicata in the above case. 4. I may appropriately point out the decision of the apex Court in the case of Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vs. State of Bombay (Now Gujarat), wherein the majority view laid down that the provision of Section 11, CPC are not exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit and on the general principle of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It was further held that the nature of the former proceeding is immaterial'. In the case before the Supreme Court the matter in controversy was finally decided in a writ application and, therefore, the same was held to be barred by principle of res judicata in a subsequent suit. The above decision was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramachandra Mohapatra v. Santhilata Choudhury and Ors. : AIR 1971 Ori. 57 . This decision was perhaps not brought to the notice of the Single Bench of this Court which decided the above Civil Revision, Therefore, the findings of the Courts below that the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata are found to be correct and they are affirmed. 5. I may take up the second point i. e. the admission with regard to the tenancy. Mr. Ghose put much stress on the admission of Veljee Shivjee, son of Shivji Warjung with regard to the tenancy of the plaintiff. Attention of this Court was drawn to paragraph 16 of the evidence of Veljee Shivji (Ext. 13) in T. S. No. 57 of 1964 in which the said witness stated as follows : "...The police did not arrest Madan Behera (again says). Tables, chairs, benches, utensils etc. removed from the eastern room. Nanda Behera's Pan shop was in the western room. The things of Pan shop were also got removed. 13) in T. S. No. 57 of 1964 in which the said witness stated as follows : "...The police did not arrest Madan Behera (again says). Tables, chairs, benches, utensils etc. removed from the eastern room. Nanda Behera's Pan shop was in the western room. The things of Pan shop were also got removed. Nanda Behera entered into a separate agreement with us and again reinstalled his Pan shop in that room." In para 17 he stated : "The western room had its roof collapsed. So Nanda Behera held his Pan shop on adjoining verandah. That portion of the verandah had been enclosed. The roof of the western room is still open : the whole roof of this room is still open till now from the date of delivery of possession. Nanda Behera might have kept his things in that room. I cannot say if he or anyone else kept anything in the said western room. Since taking possession I have gone inside them for about 6 times." 6. Mr. Ghose submitted that the evidence of this witness that Nanda Behera entered into a separate agreement with defendant Shivjee Warjung and he reinstalled his Pan shop in that room amounts to his admission about the tenancy of said Nanda Behera under Shivjee Warjung. It is well-settled that admissions are substantive evidence and can be used against the maker even though he is not examined as a witness in a later suit. But it is also equally well-settled that they are not the conclusive proof of the facts admitted. Such admission should be clear and free from any ambiguity, in the case at hand, PW 6 was the son of Shivjee Warjung and, therefore whatever he stated could not have been utilised against his father Shivjee Warjung in the matter of such tenancy since at the relevant time i.e. on 4-7-1975 Shivji Warjung was alive. The agreement of which PW 6 stated to have been entered into with Nanda Behera is not forthcoming. It is not known whether it was an oral agreement or a written one. It is also not known whether that agreement was with regard to the continuance of said Nanda Behera as a tenant in the suit premises or it was a mere permission to occupy the premises. A tenancy is created only by an agreement. It is not known whether it was an oral agreement or a written one. It is also not known whether that agreement was with regard to the continuance of said Nanda Behera as a tenant in the suit premises or it was a mere permission to occupy the premises. A tenancy is created only by an agreement. The statement rather proves that the things in the Pan shop of Nanda Behera were all removed obviously meaning that he was removed from the premises in question. Accepting Mr. Ghose's contention that this amounted to be an admission, the same can be accepted only to the extent that Nanda Behera was allowed to install his Pan shop in that room. This itself would not prove the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant without any other satisfactory material creating such tenancy in favour of said Nanda Behera. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Ghose that this amounted to admission and hence is binding on defendant No. 1 cannot be accepted. 7. Once I have held that the present suit is barred by principles of res judicata because of it having reached 'the finality in the execution proceeding as observed earlier, the question of going into further merit in this case to prove tenancy right and payment of rent etc. would be a mere academic one. However, I have gone through the series of rent receipts exhibited in the case. The learned lower appellate Court in para 13 of the judgment has held the rent receipts (Ext. 1 series) to have not been proved because of the fact that PW 1 was not acquainted with the signature of Sivjee Warjung, merely because he had only on one occasion purchased a radio from Shivjee Warjung. This reasoning of the learned lower appellate Court cannot be said to be wholly unacceptable or perverse. 8. So far as rent receipts under Ext. 2 series are concerned, it has been rightly held by the learned lower appellate Court that the rent at the rate of Rs. 9/- was paid to Natabar Sahu by Nanda Sahu. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff through Ext. 2 series has been able to prove that he was a tenant under Shivjee. That apart, the Courts below considered the rent receipts. 9/- was paid to Natabar Sahu by Nanda Sahu. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff through Ext. 2 series has been able to prove that he was a tenant under Shivjee. That apart, the Courts below considered the rent receipts. Once the concurrent finding is that the tenancy has not been proved, the Court would not normally interfere with a concurrent finding. No other substantial question of law having been urged, this appeal fails and, therefore, is dismissed with cost of Rs. 1,000/- (rupees one thousand) to be paid to respondent No. 8 for litigation expenses before this Court. Final Result : Dismissed