JUDGMENT A.R. Tiwari, J. 1. The aforesaid two appeals are connected matters as they arise out of the same judgment and decree dated 15.6.1982 rendered by the District Judge, Indore in C.O.S. No. 11-A of 1974. The suit was filed for recovery of damages quantified at Rs. 87,00,000-00 and for perpetual injunction by the appellants-plaintiffs of First Appeal No. 69 of 1982. The Trial Court on evaluation of the evidence passed the decree only for Rs. 7,500-00 in favour of appellant No. 2 (Deokumarsingh Kasliwal); No. 3 (Ajitkumarsingh Kasliwal); and No. 4 (Pradeepkumar - singh Kasliwal) in equal proportion. The remaining part of the suit was dismissed. Against the part of the decree dismissing the suit, the appellant-plaintiffs filed First Appeal No. 69 of 1982; whereas the defendants filed First Appeal No. 59 of 1982 against the part of the decree fixing the liability of Rs. 7,500-00 as noted above. 2. This twenty-two year's old litigation, resting on the linchpin of alienation of JUNA RAJWADA, Indore by Usha Trust to M/s R.B. Onkarji Kasturchand (Plaintiff-appellant No. 1) vide sale-deed dated 19.8.1974 (Ex. P/1) on apparent consideration of 15 lakhs, prone to bruise the sentiments of residents and fraught to cause annoyance, services as a reminder of what Apex Court observed on 15.4.1988 in Criminal Misc. Petition No. 260 of 1988 (P.N. Duda v/s. P. Shiv Shankar and others) that "Justice cries in silence for long, far too long. The procedural wrangle is eroding the faith in our justice system". 3. And as the theme is of libel, it is apt to remember the observations of Justice Brennan of U. S. Supreme Court in New Yorks Times Co. v/s L.B. Sullivan (1964) 376 U. S. 254 that it is a prized privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good tests, on all public institutions and this opportunity should be afforded for vigorous advocacy no less than abstract discussion and to recall the mighty words of Lord Denning in Regina v/s Commissioner of Police (1968) 2 WLR 1204 that "we do not fear critism, not do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech it self". 4. In focus of prized privilege and freedom of critcism, we turn to factual matrix. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech it self". 4. In focus of prized privilege and freedom of critcism, we turn to factual matrix. Tersely stated facts of the case are that respondent No. 1 is Managing Director of M/s Associated Printers and Publishers (Private) Limited and the aforesaid concern carried on the business of Publication of daily newspaper called on the business of publication of daily news-papers called INDORE SAMACHAR". Respondent No. 3 printed the aforesaid news-paper daily at Indore. The appellant (plaintiffs) owned and possessed the property known as "JUNA RAW ADA" Indore in the name and style of 'M/s R. B. Onkarji Kasturchandji Properties; (Appellant No. 1). They purchased the aforesaide JUNA RAJWADA PALACE from the Trustees of the private trust known as 'Princess Usha Trust' by a registered sale-deed. Respondents mounted a virulent and systematic campaign against the appellants which constituted defamation into he eye of law through their news-paper "INDORE SAMACHAR" from 19.8.1974 onwards with the object of lower the appellants in the estimation of right thinking members of society. The publications tended to bring the appellants into hatred contempt or ridicule. The imputations were to the effect that the appellants paid unaccounted or black money in the transaction of purchase of the aforesaid property. The appellants are well known residents of Indore. On the ground of aforesaid publications, branded as defamatory, appellants filed the suit to obtain compensation. The respondents traversed the allegations and took the defence of umbrella, deeming it protective of freedom of speech. They averred that they did not intend to defame the appellants but attempted to join with the feelings of several other residents of Indore to raise voice against the transaction in public interest. They took the stand that the suit was false and fravolous and filed with the sole object of harassing and terrorising them. They, therefore, claimed dismissal of the suit with compensatory cost of Rs. 1,50,000-00. On pleadings of the parties, the Court below framed as many as 32 issues. The parties led evidence. On evaluation of the evidence, the trial Court dismissed the suit in major part and passed the decree of Rs. 7,500-00 only in favour of three appellants, as noted above. 1,50,000-00. On pleadings of the parties, the Court below framed as many as 32 issues. The parties led evidence. On evaluation of the evidence, the trial Court dismissed the suit in major part and passed the decree of Rs. 7,500-00 only in favour of three appellants, as noted above. This judgment and decree dissatisfied both the sides, as a result of which both the sides filed the appeals as particularised above under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. We have heard Shri S.C. Bagdiya, learned counsel for the appellants in First Appeal No. 69 of 1982 and for respondents in connected First Appeal No. 59 of 1982; and Shri Z.A. Khan, learned counsel for the respondents of First Appeal No. 69 of 1982 and for appellants of First Appeal No. 59 of 1982. 6. To begin at the beginning, we focus attention on legal position. In Dixon V. Holden (1869) LR 7 Eg 488, it is held that a man's reputation is his property and possibly more valuable than any other form of property. Odger sayd in his introduction to his book on defamation that "No man may disparage or destroy the reputation of another. Every man has a right to have his good name maintained unimpaired, this right is a jusinrem, a right absolute and good against all the world words which produce, in any given case, appreciable injury to the reputation of another, are called defamatory and defamatory words, if false, are actionable". In Miller V. Shomp Son (1874 LR 9 CP 118), attempt is made to define defamation as exposing a person to contempt, redicule or public hatred or to prejudice him in the way of office, profession or trade. Faulks Committee in England in 1975 opined that "Defamation shall consist of publication to a third party of matter which in all the circumstances would be likely to affect a person in the estimation of reasonable people generally". Some of the principal defences to an action for defamation are justification (i.e. the words are true) fair comment, absolute or qualified privilege etc. Public interest also protects the person from liability for defamatory statements even on his failure to prove the verity or periphery of fair comment. 7. In general, there are four essentials of the tort of defamation, namely :- (i) There must be a defamatory statement. Public interest also protects the person from liability for defamatory statements even on his failure to prove the verity or periphery of fair comment. 7. In general, there are four essentials of the tort of defamation, namely :- (i) There must be a defamatory statement. (ii) The defamatory statement must be understood by right thinking or reasonable minded persons as referring to the plaintiff. (iii) There must be publication of the defamatory statement that is to say, it must be communicated to some person other than the plaintiff himself. (iv) In case of slander, either there must be proof of special damage or the slander must come within the serious classes of cases in which it is actionable perse. 8. These essentials are highlighted in Jones V. Jones (1916) 2 AC 481 at page 500. In Cholla Subrayadu V. Darbha Krihsna Rao (1968) ALT 101, it is stated that to constitute defamation, consisting of libel or slander, the plaintiff is reguired to prove that - (a) The words or the acts are published maliciously. (b) They are defamatory. (c) They have reference to the plaintiff. 9. Defamation can be committed in two ways, viz. (i) by speech or (ii) by writing and its equivalent modes. The English common law describes the former as "slander" and the latter as "libel". Defamation is thus a genus of which slander and libel are two species. Libel is actionable perse without proof of damage. 10. The present case rests on the linchpin of allegation of libel. 11. Intention of the person, charged with the act of libel, is, as held in 1995 (2) VIBHA 223 (Babulal v/s. Smt. Saroj and others) is a relevant factor. The other aspect to see is whether the act, as held in (1936) 2 All ER 1237 (Sim V Stretch) and 1969 M.P.L.J. 805 (Ramakant v/s Devilal Sharma and another) tended to lower the plaintiff in estimation or right thinking members of society. 12. After noticing legal position, the stage is set to focus attention on factual features. In the case on hand seven factors emerged :- (a) In alleged publications in News Paper repeatedly, all the plaintiffs were not named. (b) The defendants are not shown to have publised the offending items maliciously. 12. After noticing legal position, the stage is set to focus attention on factual features. In the case on hand seven factors emerged :- (a) In alleged publications in News Paper repeatedly, all the plaintiffs were not named. (b) The defendants are not shown to have publised the offending items maliciously. (c) The issue (sale of famous Rajwada) was of public interest and evoked agitation, public demonstrations, protest, publications by persons other than defendants of the extent that "Rajwada Bachao Samiti" was constituted. (d)defendant, printed and publisher of News paper, occupied response role of Mayor (twice at Indoere) MLA, Minister and responsible citizen and deemed it to be his duty to write in public interest. (e) There was general belief that apparent consideration in the sale-deed was considerably less than the fair market value in that there was murmur or whisper of 29 lakhs, 50 lakhs and report of expert estimating it to be of 71 lakhs and offer of higher amount by other bodies. (f) The defendant, through his News Paper, echoed the feelings of residents of lndore. (g) After sale, the property was acquisitioned by the State Government. 13. Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India contains that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. The law imposes reasonable restrictions, in terms of Article 19 (2), to avoid inter alia defamation. Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code provides that :- 499. Defamation. - Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person. Explanation 4 contains that :- Explanation 4. - No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers that credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful. 14. 14. The appellants-plaintiffs were required to show that "imputation", appearing in News paper as news item or cartoons and as editorial, lowered their moral or intellectual character in the estimation of others in the light of the defence that "intention" was to protest in public interest and was not to defame and damage the image. In Babulal's Case (Supra) this Court held that :- Though it is also true that press is required to be vigilant in matters of public importance and freedom of speech guaranteed under constitution gives further right to the press to make a fair criticism to draw the attention of the people including the Judges and lawyers. It is ultimately the intention which is more material in such cases. (Underlining ours) 15. We march on the evidential part to appreciate the issue. PW-1 Harishanker is the Secretary of Princess Usha Trust, the seller of the property in question. He deposed about sale transaction on consideration of fifteen lakhs to discharge liability of Estate Duty. P/9 is the valuation report dated 5.2.1966. P/10 is also the report dated 15.3.1967. PW-2 Ajit Kumar Singh Kasliwal (Plaintiff No. 3) stated that no unaccounted money or Black money was paid (Para 4). News in Indore Samachar was published on 20.8.1974 (Ex. P/20). This was followed by Exs. P/21, P/22, P/23, P/24, P/25, P/26, P/27, P/28, P/29, P/30, P/31, P/32, P/33, P/34, P/35, P/36, P/37, and P/38. Ex. P.38 contained the news of reference of the matter to CBI and Income Tax Department. Public agitation yielded threat to life (Para 24). Government acquired Rajwada on consideration of Rs. 19, 66, 500-00 (Para 27) and Indore Textile Mill, Ujjain (Para 25). Government occupied 60000 sq. feet on rent-free basis and did not pay compensation on acquisition of Rajwada in regard to this portion for which suit for damages is filed (Para 26). PW-3 Satish Malhotra (Trustee) proved sale deed, Ex. P/1, and consideration as documented in it (Para 3). He stated that he did not receive any undisclosed or black money. Usha Devi wife of PW-3 also denied receipt of any undisclosed or black money (Para 2). Shri Chilley, senior counsel and another trustee, did not sign Ex. P/1 (Para 5). Usha Devi stated that "I do not know whether any effort was made by the trust or not to ascertain the market value of Rajwada in 1974" (Para 4). Usha Devi wife of PW-3 also denied receipt of any undisclosed or black money (Para 2). Shri Chilley, senior counsel and another trustee, did not sign Ex. P/1 (Para 5). Usha Devi stated that "I do not know whether any effort was made by the trust or not to ascertain the market value of Rajwada in 1974" (Para 4). DW-1 Suresh Seth answered the question of price as under (Para 16):- In answer to another question, he stated in para 25 as under:- He also stated that :- DW-2 Balarao Ingle, Journalist, stated that on the date of sale, price of Rajwada should be in the vicinity of 2/3 crores, DW-3 Vishwanath Apte, property valuer, proved his report Ex. C-1 dated 25.9.1974 showing price on 19.8.1974, date of sale (Ex. P/1) as Rs. 71/- lakhs on grounds detailed therein. In cross-examination, price, as reported, is not challenged. This will then be treated as accepted. In A.I.R. 1961 Cal 359 (A.E.G. Carapiet v/s. A.Y. Derderian), it is ruled that :- The law is clear on the subject. Wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. It is wrong to think that this is merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It serves to prevent surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual case that is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. It has been stated on high authority of the House of Lords that this much a counsel is bound to do when cross-examining that he must put to each of his opponent's witnesses in turn, so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness or in which that witness had any share. If he asks no question with regard to this, then he must be taken to accept the plaintiff's account in its entirety. 16. The trial Court held that publications, fulcrum of the suit, are defamatory per se (Para 39) but are referable only to plaintiffs No. 2, 3 and 4 (Para 42). If he asks no question with regard to this, then he must be taken to accept the plaintiff's account in its entirety. 16. The trial Court held that publications, fulcrum of the suit, are defamatory per se (Para 39) but are referable only to plaintiffs No. 2, 3 and 4 (Para 42). The Court also held that there was no material to infer use of undisclosed or black money, Ex. C-1 is belittled in view of valuation reports, Exs. P/10, P/11 'and P/12: Decree of Rs. 7,500-00 is passed in favour of plaintiffs No. 2, 3, and 4 with proportionate costs. In so doing the, we notice that the Court has not cared to focus proper attention on factors as chronicled below :- (a) Impeccant conduct exhibiting no intention to defame. (b) Position of public interest as a Journalist. (c) Publication in several other news papers and protest by public (Exs. D/4, D/5, D/6) and Representation (Ex. D/16). (d) Failure to impugn valuation contained in Ex. C-1 through cross-examination. (e) Purpose and public injury in the face of nature of the property in question. (f) Acquisition by the Government. 17. The above noted factors received precious little attention and the evidenced by the plaintiffs fell short to dispel the 'cloud of suspicion' in matter of level of price. Plaint also does not spell in emphatic terms that apparent price was "correct price". Point, protest and publication, all in public interest, led to acquisition. 18. It is not to reproduce Section 269-C (1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, now operated with Circular No. 455 dated 16.5.1986, although acquisition is under L.A. Act, :- 269-C. Immovable property in respect of which proceedings for acquisition may be taken. Point, protest and publication, all in public interest, led to acquisition. 18. It is not to reproduce Section 269-C (1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, now operated with Circular No. 455 dated 16.5.1986, although acquisition is under L.A. Act, :- 269-C. Immovable property in respect of which proceedings for acquisition may be taken. - (1) Where the competent authority has reason to believe that any immovable property of a fair market value exceeding one hundred thousand rupees has been transferred by a person (hereafter In this Chapter referred to as the transferor to another person) hereafter in this Chapter referred to as the transferee for an apparent consideration which is less than the fair market value of the property and that the consideration for such transfer as agreed to between the parties has not been duty stated in the instrument of transfer with the object of- (a) facilitating the reduction or evasion of the liability of the transferor to pay tax under this Act in respect of any income arising from the transfer; or (b) facilitating the concealment of any income or any income or any moneys or other assets which have not been which ought to be disclosed by the transferee for the purpose of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or this Act or the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957), the competent authority may, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, initiate proceedings for the acquisition of such property under this Chapter. 19. Fair comment is good defence when shown to rest on true facts. 1971 M.P.L.J. 23 N (Abdul Gani v/s Chhaikodi) is pertinent. In the case on hand, malice is absent but public interest is present. We are left guessing as to why suitors did not exhibit courage to cause publication of 'their side of the Story' with caution to opponents to halt and as to why they deemed it fit to continue the suit despite acquisition impliedly proclaiming that "all was not well" with transaction of sale under impediment ? In such matters, silence is not gold and protestors cannot be lugged into litigation or lynched under the umbrella of law. 20. Defendants 'criticised' the attempt at alienation of 'Rajwada' for public benefit, not for personal gain. In such matters, silence is not gold and protestors cannot be lugged into litigation or lynched under the umbrella of law. 20. Defendants 'criticised' the attempt at alienation of 'Rajwada' for public benefit, not for personal gain. Matthew Arnold no Essays in criticism, observed that-"Criticism is a disinterested endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world". Pope in Essay in criticism voiced that :- This hard to say if greater want of skill Appears in writing or in judging ill. 21. The defendants were not alone in holding that transaction was tainted. If many saw reason to believe that deal was accomplished by unaccounted money in the face of level of price as was being whispered, why search in vain the element of defamation ? Was it a case of defamation or defraud ? 22. Tennyson 'In Memoriam, spoke of doubt thus - There lives more faith in honest doubt. Believe me, than in half the creeds. To us, defendants, like many others, had "faith in honest doubt" and had intended to mortalize the matter and not to defame the purchasers. There is no visibility of 'mensrea'. We thus sustain dismissal and turn to part decree of liability. 23. The decree of Rs. 7,500-00 on 'per se' basis, is passed in favour of Deokumarsingh Kasliwal (Plaintiff No. 2). Ajitkumarsingh Kasliwal (Plaintiff No. 3) and Pradeepkumarsingh Kasliwal (plaintiff No. 4), father and his two sons. We notice that plaintiffs No. 2 and 4 did not even enter the witness box and plaintiff No. 3 deposed as under :- 24. Despite para No. 9 of the plaint, the plaintiffs answered no questions in stated atmosphere and failed to tear up the" tenebrosity associated with esoteric transaction. After all, if many believed it as 'wrong' then why single out the defendants for action and reaction ? Law has no such role to play. 25. In our view, the defendants, while discharging duties of journalism-, did not aim to malion the buyers or sellers but sought to impeach the transaction. They were unable to digest that moumental Rajwada could be priced at meagre sum of Rs. 15 lakhs. They, therefore, bonafide conjectured that in reality the 'consideration' was far in excess of ostensible price and logically imagined that 'unaccounted i.e. black money' is involved. They were unable to digest that moumental Rajwada could be priced at meagre sum of Rs. 15 lakhs. They, therefore, bonafide conjectured that in reality the 'consideration' was far in excess of ostensible price and logically imagined that 'unaccounted i.e. black money' is involved. Such an allegation is easy to make but difficult to prove by direct evidence. Yet three factors fed such an imagination :- (i) Many were reluctant to believe the genuineness of consideration as documented, (ii) Agitation and demonstration in protest manifested the strong pos-ability of underhand arrangement and objectors, prodigious in number, orchestrated the dissent, (iii) Government eventually acquisitions the property to palliate the point, though under L.A. Act and not under I.T. Act. 26. The defendants via impeccant conduct desired to achieve impedance and in that surge of an urge impeached the transaction in "public interest" as assumed as "right" measure. Abrahim Lincoln in famous speech of 1865 spoke thus - With malice towards none, with charity for all, we must strive to do the right in the light given to us to determine that right. We think that silence is not really an option when things seen to be ill done and have the potential to precipitate public injury. How is it that the Trust in need to pay estate duy exhibited preparedness to dispose of the property for Rs. 15 lakhs only when valuation report puts it to level of about five times. Day is done when public would accept all this lying low. General belief feeds the impression that correct consideration is at times not shown to reduce even tax liability. 27. May be, plaintiffs did not give and sellers (PW -2, PW-3 and Usha Devi) did not take any unaccounted, undisclosed or black money in the transaction and become target of 'suspicion' and victim' of public wrath but what is sure is that the defendants did not intend to malign or defame them and simply discharged (heir obligations towards public in public interest against public injury. And when the Government itself acquired the property without opposition from purchasers the matter deserved to be laid to rest. By this judgment, we correct the error of the trial Court and grant 'tranguility' to both the sides. And when the Government itself acquired the property without opposition from purchasers the matter deserved to be laid to rest. By this judgment, we correct the error of the trial Court and grant 'tranguility' to both the sides. Parties to transaction of monument or place of object of artistic or historic interest, needing to be protected (Article 49 of the Constitution of India), like ceaser's wife must he above suspicion. This is the time when there has to be greater transparence and quality to stand test of public scrutiny. Purity is the best shield for security. That ought to be the role and goal. Black money and black guard must be bulldozed to an extent that even chevy should be chopped. There is growing need to missile of morality. After all the property in question bears the name as 'Rajwada', which once belonged to erstwhile ruler of Holker State. It is Wada of Raj and alienation was required to be transparent. Soon after suspicious sale, it did go to Raj i.e. State in public interest. 28. In this backdrop, we are satisfied that the material did not tend to lower moral or intellectual character in the estimation of others and that the matter neatly came under Explanation 4, noted above, and did not have the potential to harm the reputation in the face of 'public interest' and 'public protest'. 'Right' and 'wrong' have to be understood and unveiled in the context of a particular point and pose. Lord Wilberforce explained in the Couriet Case (1978) AC 435 in referring to Dyson v. Attorney General (1912) 1 Ch 158 :- A right is none the less a right or a wrong any the less a wrong, because millions of people have a smilier right or may suffer a similar wrong. 29. In tussel between 'right' and 'wrong' we see that reputation of the plaintiffs suffered no bruise in effort to sing chorus in public interest and as such suit, based on right, turns out to be wrong. Remedy, if any, was counter publication. Suspicion was required to be removed. That was not done. And one might as well say that it could not be done. 30. So, there was no counter publication and no effort to scoff 'suspicion' which had gathered momentum. Remedy, if any, was counter publication. Suspicion was required to be removed. That was not done. And one might as well say that it could not be done. 30. So, there was no counter publication and no effort to scoff 'suspicion' which had gathered momentum. In this background, if defendants, or others for that matter, saw the vision in public interest and screamed voice against assumed public injury, then where was the scope to infer intention to harm the actors in the episode or situation to attribute the screamers with knowledge or reason to believe that their protest, categorised as imputation, was poised to harm ? This then makes to Ingredients of Section 499 IPC non-existent and spins no cause for action under civil law as well. 31. The Counsel for the appellants, however, strenuously submitted that as many as 18 publications, marked as P/20 to 37, of which P/21, 23, 25, 26 and 28 are in the shape of cartoons, and P/23 is editorial, were made by the defendants to harm the reputation on unverified allegation of use of black money in the aforesaid transaction but was unable to throw the light in regard to the impact of the element of public good and public demonstration and to the estimation of Rs. 87 lakhs as quantum of damages. Likewise, we are unable to understand as to how the trial Court awarded sum of Rs. 7, 500-00. In a democratic set up, transactions concerning of affecting public, should avoid cheating and some beating. Plaintiffs, considering themselves right, and wronged, should have then explained the entire thing to the public properly rather than slipping under the umbrella of litigation. There is not much scope to verify the question of black money. 32. We have given anxious consideration to the point and projection and find that the trial Court erred in passing the decree of even Rs. 7,500-00 on conjectural course and failed to see the subtle difference between individual interest and general good. In this context the publications arc not held libelious but precautionary. The 'protest' was to the State and the State in turn heard it and acquisitioned the property in question. In this situation, where is the question of intent to defame or harm the reputation ? We notice that there is no case of pscudoblepsis or pyaemia. 33. In this context the publications arc not held libelious but precautionary. The 'protest' was to the State and the State in turn heard it and acquisitioned the property in question. In this situation, where is the question of intent to defame or harm the reputation ? We notice that there is no case of pscudoblepsis or pyaemia. 33. In the ultimate analysis we thus reach the stage of saying omega. We do so in the undernoted terms :- (a) First Appeal No. 69 of 1982 is dismissed. (b) First Appeal No. 59 of 1982 is allowed. In the result judgment and decree, dismissing the suit to the extent of Rs. 86,92,500 are affirmed and that part saddling liability to the extent of Rs. 7,500/- are set-aside subject to direction about costs as noted below. Consequently, Suit No. 11-A of 1974 is dismissed in its entirety. As regards costs, we, in view of the nature, facts and circumstances of the case, hold that parties should be left to bear their own costs of the suit and both these appeals. Accordingly, we direct the parties to bear their own costs as incurred. Counsel fee for each side may, however, be taxed in the decree as per schedule, if certified. 34. Decrees be drawn up accordingly. 35. This judgment may be retained in the records of First Appeal No. 69 of 1982 and its copy be placed in the records of the connected First Appeal No. 59 of 1982.