JUDGMENT This is an application by PWH Analgen & Systeme GMBH and Ors. (referred to as PWH) to stay a suit filed by Damodar Ropeways &. Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. (referred to as Damodar). The application has been filed under section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961( referred to as the 1961 Act). 2. The suit which is sought to be stayed was instituted by Damodar against PWH, the United Bank of India, Berliner Bank and Buckau Wolf India Ltd. The case of Damodar briefly stated is that it had entered into an agreement with PWH (referred to as the Consortium Agreement) by which it was inter alia agreed that Damodar would, as a partner of PWH, supply goods to fulfill a contract between PWH and a Japanese Company, Hazama-Gumi Ltd. Hazama had entered into a contract with PWH to set up a ropeway at Udaipur in Nepal. PWH was to provide guarantees in favour of Hazama relating to its contract with Hazama. In the consortium agreement Hazama has been referred to as the customer. Under the consortium agreement specified portions of the work awarded by Hazama to PWH was divided between Damador and PWH. The liability of• the parties to the consortium agreement was to be calculated on the basis of each party's portion of the contract value. Damodar was required to provide counter guarantees in favour of PWH in proportion to its respective portion of the contract value. Such counter guarantees were required to be furnished by a bank in the Federal Republic of Germany in proportion of the bonds or guarantees provided by PWH in favour of Hazama. Clause 45 of the Consortium Agreement provided : "45. Enclosures 45.1 The following enclosures are an integral part of this Consortium Agreement : 1. Contract between the Customer and PWH (Appendix 1) 2. Damodar's portion of the Tender/Contract Price and terms of payment (Appendix II) 3. Damodar's Scope of Supplies for Design, Fabrication, Civil Construction, Erection and Commissioning Works, Provision of Personnel and Services with Limits, Interfaces and Co-ordination Data (Appendix III) 4. Internal Time Schedule (Appendix IV) 45.2 If there is any contradiction between this document and any other contract document, the documents shall have precedence in the following sequence : 1. The Contract and all Contract Documents between the Customer and PWH (Appendix 1) 2. The Consortium Agreement between PWH and Damodar. 3. Internal Time Schedule (Appendix IV) 45.2 If there is any contradiction between this document and any other contract document, the documents shall have precedence in the following sequence : 1. The Contract and all Contract Documents between the Customer and PWH (Appendix 1) 2. The Consortium Agreement between PWH and Damodar. 3. Appendix II and III to the Consortium Agreement. 45.3 The relevant enclosures hereto shall be kept up-to-date, and amendments thereof shall be executed by the parties as a result of agreed amendments to the Contract or agreed internal rearrangements within the Consortium." 3. The contract between Hazama and PWH was not in force when the Consortium Agreement was entered into between PWH and Damodar. It was agreed between the parties under clause 46 that the Consortium agreement would come into force upon signing of the agreement by PWH and Damodar; Secondly, by Damodar submitting to PWH a commitment letter by their bank by which the bank was required to confirm that it would establish through a bank in the Federal Republic of Germany the required bank guarantee to be provided by Damodar under the agreement and the contract in favour of PWH; and thirdly, the signing and coming into force of the contract between PWH and Hazama. The consortium agreement was signed by the parties on 12th October 1989 in Germany. 4. Subsequent to the signing of the consortium agreement the agreement between PWH and Hazama came into force. Three guarantees were executed by the Berliner Bank in favour of PWH. The first is an advance payment guarantee No. G 2.203. This guarantee records that Hazama had advanced monies to PWH. A portion of such advance payment was given by PWH to Damodar being 10% of the supply to be effected by Damodar according to Appendix 11 to the Consortium Agreement. Berliner Bank irrecovably and unconditionally undertook to pay the amount so advanced against receipt of PWH's first written demand stating that PWH had been called upon to pay under its guarantee to Hazama and that the amount claimed by PWH represented the share of Damodar. Berliner Bank irrecovably and unconditionally undertook to pay the amount so advanced against receipt of PWH's first written demand stating that PWH had been called upon to pay under its guarantee to Hazama and that the amount claimed by PWH represented the share of Damodar. The Guarantee further provided that just as the advance payment guarantee executed by PWH's banker in favour of Hazama would stand reduced in proportion to the payments received by Hazama, the guarantee given by Berliner Bank would stand also reduced in so far as the reduction included a portion attributable to the share of Damodar. Such reduction would be on the basis of the advice received by Berliner Bank from PWH. 5. A second advance payment guarantee which was executed by Berliner Bank in favour of PWH was also an advance payment guarantee. The number was G 2206. Except for the amount guaranteed the terms and conditions of the second guarantee are substantially identical with the first. 6. A third guarantee was executed by Berliner Bank in favour of PWH. This was a performance guarantee and is guarantee no. G 2.025. 7. The performance guarantee reads as follows: "We hereby issue this letter of Guarantee upto an aggregate amount of DM 505, 157.00 (Deutsche Mark Five hundred and five thousand one hundred and fifty seven) plus NR 2.865.717,00 (Napalese Rupees Two Million Eight hundred and sixty five thousand seven hundred and seventeen) being ten percent (10%) of the contract price only in your favour as performance bond given in respect of the contract agreement dated 12th October, 1989 (hereinafter called "the contract") entered into by and between you and Messrs Damodar Ropeways & Construction Co. Ltd., Calcutta 700 001 India (hereinafter called "The contractor") for their portion of supplies and services for design, construction and completion on a full turn key basis of a Ropeway between the limestone quarry and the plant site for an 800 Tones per day Cement Plant Project in Jaljale, Udaipur District, Nepal. We guarantee to pay immediately to you without recourse, upon receipt of your written statement certifying that the contractor is in breach of the contract and has failed to remedy the breach within a reasonable period after receiving written notice from you requiring him so to do. We guarantee to pay immediately to you without recourse, upon receipt of your written statement certifying that the contractor is in breach of the contract and has failed to remedy the breach within a reasonable period after receiving written notice from you requiring him so to do. The notice shall state the intention to claim under the performance bond, the amount claimed the breach relied upon, and that the condition stipulated under para 3 below is existing. This performance quarantee cannot be invoked unless the performance quarantee of the prime contractor is invoked by your buyer due to reasons attributed to the scope of work of contractor. The Clause under para 3 hereinabove will not be applicable and you will be able to encash the guarantee without the encashment of your bank guarantee by your buyer in following conditions and situation: (A) You and the Contractor have agreed in writing that the amount demanded is payable to you and the amount has not been paid within 42 days thereafter, or (8) The contractor has gone into liquidation or is bankrupt; (C) The contractor abandons the Contract. (D) Ownership of the contractor is changed or rearrangement of the contractor is done whereby new company and/or new rearrangement do not agree to proceed with the contract and abandons the contract. (E) The contractor fails to supply any part/component and carry out works at site within reasonable time after receiving written notice from you then you can procure such part/component from elsewhere and/or carry out works at site and claim under the guarantee on submitting copy of order placed on 3rd party for supply of such part/component and/or for carrying out works at site in case the same is done by you then on submission of details of cost incurred. No other proof shall be required. Your decision regarding such value of the order or expenses incurred on such supply/or executing works at site as the case may be shall be binding on the bank. If any dispute is to be raised by contractor regarding your such expenses incurred shall be separately settled after payment under this guarantee in terms of the contract between you and contractor. If any dispute is to be raised by contractor regarding your such expenses incurred shall be separately settled after payment under this guarantee in terms of the contract between you and contractor. (F) The contractor fails to replace any part/component or carry of It rectification work which is found defective within reasonable time after receiving written notice elsewhere and/or carry out rectification as may be necessary and claim under the guaranted on submitting copy of the order placed on 3rd party or such replacement and/or rectification in case the work is carried cut by you then on submission of details of cost incurred. No other proof shall be required. Your decision regarding such value of the order or expenses incurred on rectification and replacement as the case may be shall be binding on the bank. If any dispute is to be raised by contractor regarding your such expenses incurred shall be separately settled after payment under this guarantee in terms of the contract between you and contractor. (G) You can encash the guarantee and claim money in any other situation not mentioned in para 4(A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) provided you can produce before the Guarantor details of the claim with your certificate that claim has arisen as a direct result of deficiency on the part of contractor and contractor has failed to remedy the breach/ deficiency within a reasonable period after receiving written notice from you. In every case you shall when making the claim, send a copy to the contractor. This letter of guarantee shall come into force upon execution thereof by us and shall continue in force until expiry of the defects liability period under the contract, i.e, 30th November, 1993. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained liability of the bank under this guarantee is restricted to DM 505.157.-and NRS 2.865.717.00 (Nepalese Rupees Two Million Eight hundred and sixty five thousands seven hundred and seventeen). The guarantee shall remain in force until 30th November, 1993 unless the guarantee is renewed or claim is preferred against the bank within the said date i.e, 30.11.1993 all your rights under this guarantee shall cease and the bank shall be released and discharged from all liabilities under this guarantee, whereof the undersigned have caused this guarantee to be executed and delivered by its authorised representative the day above written." 8. The Bank Guarantees given by Berliner Bank in favour of PWH were counter guaranteed by the United Bank of India. 9. According to the plaint, the performance guarantee issued by Berliner Bank was a conditional one. 10. Damodar has admitted the receipt of the amount of mobilisation advance and has claimed that the entire amount was utilised for procurement of raw materials and fabrication of items to be supplied and works to be carried out by Damodar. It is also claimed that PWH has recovered a substantial amount from the mobilisation advance from the running bills submitted by Damodar in respect of Guarantee No. G.2.203. As far as Guarantee bearing G.2.206 is concerned, according to Damodar the amount related to advances for field work. It is claimed by Damodar that PWH reduced the field work and as such the Bank Guarantee bearing no. G.2.206 was liable to be discharged. 11. Damodar has also alleged various defaults on the part of PWH and also various reasons why Damodar could not complete the civil work assigned to it under the Consortium Agreement. It is also alleged that on 4.9.91 it was agreed between Damodar and PWH that the balance of the civil work which was to be carried out by Damodar would be completed by Hazama. Damodar's allegation in the plaint is also that because of various defaults on the part of PWH supplies of materials which were to have been made by Damodar under the Consortium Agreement could not be effected. It is not necessary to go into the details of the allegations by Damodar. Suffice it to say that by a notice dated 30.9.92 PWH called upon Damodar to hand over the complete and correct documentation in accordance with the list appended to their letter dated 18.8.92 by 9th October 1992 failing which PWH would resort to action contained in Clauses 14(3) and 34 of the Consortium Agreement. On 12.10.92 PWH suspended further work by Damodar under the aforesaid clauses and sought to take over all other work to be carried out by Damodar. It is Dmodar's case that there were subsequent negotiations between the parties and Hazama pursuant to which Damodar despatched further materials. The grievance of Damodar is that although the materials were received by PWH full payment was not made in respect of such supplies. It is Dmodar's case that there were subsequent negotiations between the parties and Hazama pursuant to which Damodar despatched further materials. The grievance of Damodar is that although the materials were received by PWH full payment was not made in respect of such supplies. According to Damodar, PWH had belatedly made purported complaints regarding the materials supplied by Damodar Damodar has alleged that PWH sought to place orders on Backau Wolf India Ltd (BWIL), a company which is under common management with PWH for supply of the goods which Damodar was to supply. Damodar has challenged the notices dated 30.9.92 and 12.10.92 by claiming that they were not in terms of the Consortium Agreement. 12. In para 106 of the plaint Damodar has claimed that PWH had acted fraudulently. Particulars of such alleged fraudulent conduct have been given in 12 sub-paragraphs thereunder. 13. In para 107 of the plaint, Damodar has stated that by reason of the fraud as pleaded in para 107 perpetrated by PWH, special equity demanded that PWH is not entitled to invoke the Bank Guarantee in any manner whatsoever. 14. Paragraphs 110, 112 and 113 of the plaint read as under: 'wherein PWH is referred to as the defendant No, 1, the United Bank of India as the defendant no. 2 and Berliner Bank as the defendant no. 3'. "110.The defendant no. 1 has invaded and is threatening to invade the right, title and interest of the plaintiff vis-a-vis the said consortium agreement and also its right vis-a-vis the said Bank Guarantee and the aforesaid invasion is such that compensation money would not afford adequate relief to the plaintiff. There exists no standard for ascertaining the actual loss and damages suffered or likely to be suffered by reason of such invasion. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to a perpetual injunction as prayed for herein and such injunction is also necessary to avoid multiplicity of proceeding. 112. The defendant no. 2 and 3 are obliged and bound to act strictly in accordance with the said bank guarantee and the counter guarantee. Each of the said defendants had has a duty and obligation towards the plaintiff not to permit the defendant no. 112. The defendant no. 2 and 3 are obliged and bound to act strictly in accordance with the said bank guarantee and the counter guarantee. Each of the said defendants had has a duty and obligation towards the plaintiff not to permit the defendant no. 1 to invoke the said bank guarantee or any part or portion thereof on account of costs,' charges and expenses for any item pertaining to• the said ropeway without first being satisfied that a reasonable notice had been given by the defendant no. 1 to the plaintiff. No such reasonable notice having been given as aforesaid and the defendant no. 1 having repudiated the said consortium agreement in the manner as aforesaid. The defendant no. 2 and 3. are bound and obliged not to honour any demand of the defendant no. 1 under the said Bank Guarantee. 113. The defendant no. 1 having threatened wrongfully to invoke the said bank guarantee without giving a reasonable notice as contemplated therein it is likely that the said bank guarantee and the defendants no. 2 and 3 in breach of their obligations towards the plaintiff would honour such illegal demand. By such act, the defendants nos. 2 and 3 are likely to invade the plaintiffs proprietory right in the said Bank Guarantee for which no compensation in money would afford any relief to the plaintiff. In any event quantification of loss and damages likely to be suffered for such invasion is incapable of being ascertained in money. In the premises the plaintiff is also entitled to permanent injunction as against the defendant nos. 2 and 3 and such injunction is also necessary to avoid multiplicity of proceedings." 15. On the basis of the aforesaid pleading Damodar has claimed monetary relief against PWH in prayer (a), (b) and (c) to the plant. Damodar has also challenged the Notice of Termination dated 30.09.92 in prayers (d) to (g) of the plaint. The remaining prayers are: (h) Declaration that the defendants nos. 2 and 3 are bound and obliged and duty bound to the plaintiff not to permit the defendants no.1 to invoke the said bank guarantee, being annexure "C" hereto, without the defendant no. The remaining prayers are: (h) Declaration that the defendants nos. 2 and 3 are bound and obliged and duty bound to the plaintiff not to permit the defendants no.1 to invoke the said bank guarantee, being annexure "C" hereto, without the defendant no. 1 first having given a reasonable notice to the plaintiff as provided for in the said Bank guarantee and that no such reasonable notice having been given by the defendant no.1 neither the said guarantee, nor the said counter guarantee is at all invocable at the instance of the defendant no. 1. (i) Defendant no. 1 be directed to submit the bank guarantee no. G.2.206 for Rs. 28 Lacs in Nepal currency, so that the same may be adjudged void and cancelled and is discharged. (j) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant no. 1, its servants and agents, from invoking or claiming or receiving any payment under Bank Guarantee no. G.2.203 and No. G.2.206 and G.2.205 furnished by defendant no. 3. (k) Perpetual injunction restraining defendant no. 1 and 3 from invoking or claiming or receiving any payment under the counter-Bank Guarantee No. MG-40/90, MG/42/90 & No. MG/43/90 given by defendant no. 2 and restraining the defendant no. 2 from repearing and payment thereunder. (l) Delivery up and cancellation of Bank guarantees nos. G.2. 203, G.2. 206 and G.2. 205 furnished by the defendant no. 3 and counter Bank Guarantee Nos. MG-43/90, MG-40/90 and MG-42/90 furnished by the defendant no. 2. (m) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant no. 1 from claiming any amount from the plaintiff in respect of orders for supply of articles in respect of the orders placed or if any order placed upon the defendant no. 4 in respect of the Articles in connection with the Ropeway at Udaipur, Nepal. (n) Declaration that special equity enjoins the defendants nos. 2 and 3 not to permit the defendant no. 1 to invoke the said bank guarantees for the defendant no. 1 having committed fraud in the manner as indicated inter alia in paragraph 106 above." 16. Summons were issued for service on PWH on 15th March 1993. Service was effected on PWH on 15th September 1993. After filing of the suit Damodar filed an application for an injunction restraining the encashment of the bank guarantees. An ad-interim order was passed which was subsequently made absolute. Summons were issued for service on PWH on 15th March 1993. Service was effected on PWH on 15th September 1993. After filing of the suit Damodar filed an application for an injunction restraining the encashment of the bank guarantees. An ad-interim order was passed which was subsequently made absolute. The Berliner Bank has since made an application for vacating the interim order. In addition, Damodar has made an application for addition of Hazama as a party defendant. Both the applications are pending. 17. This application was taken out in November 1993 by PWH. It is claimed by PWH that the claim of Damodar arose out of and/or in connection with the Consortium Agreement. It is claimed that the Consortium Agreement contained an Arbitration clause (Clause 43) which covered all the disputes in the plaint. It is submitted by PWH that the arbitration clause was of the widest amplitude and that since both India and the Federal Republic of Germany were covered by the 1961 Act, the Court was bound under the mandatory provisions of s. 3 of the 1961 Act to stay the suit. 18. An interim order was passed on PWH's application on 17th November 1993 to the effect that the suit should not be transferred to the list of undefended suits. This interim order is still continuing. By reason of the business of the Court the application appeared before several Learned Judges but could not be heard or disposed of. By the time the application was taken up by me, the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 had come into force on 25th January 1996. 19. Damodar has submitted that the Ordinance having repealed the 1961 Act the application of PWH under the 1961 Act was no longer maintainable. On the merits it has been submitted that the arbitration clause in the Consortium Agreement had been superseded by the Arbitration clause in the contract between Hazama and PWH. Reliance has been placed on Clause 45.2 of the Consortium Agreement in support of this contention. It is submitted therefore, that the Arbitration clause on the basis of which PWH's application has been made is inoperative and no stay could be granted on the basis thereof. Reliance has been placed on Clause 45.2 of the Consortium Agreement in support of this contention. It is submitted therefore, that the Arbitration clause on the basis of which PWH's application has been made is inoperative and no stay could be granted on the basis thereof. Alternatively, it has been submitted that the arbitration clause was void for uncertainty because of the contradiction between the venue, the applicable law and the applicable rules of arbitration in the arbitration clause contained in the Consortium Agreement and the arbitration clause contained in the contract between PWH and Hazama. It is also submitted that in any event, the arbitration clause in the Consortium Agreement was ambiguous and uncertain. It is also contained that the disputes as to the payability of months under the bank guarantees were not covered by the arbitration clause. It is contended that bank guarantees were independent contracts and not covered by the clause in the parent contract pursuant to which bank guarantees may have been furnished. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Hindusthan Paper Corporation Ltd. vs. Kenei/house Angami: 1990 (1) CL T 200. It is argued' that the whole of the suit could not therefore be stayed and prayers (h) to (n) quoted above were not covered by clause 43 of the Consortium Agreement. Finally it is submitted that the petition of PWH did not specify the disputes which were to be referred to arbitration and that unless disputes were specified the Court could not decide whether the disputes were covered by the arbitration agreement between the parties. In the course of hearing Damodar had sought to contend that the arbitration agreement was not covered by the 1961 Act as it was not a commercial agreement. This point was expressly given a go by in the written notes of argument submitted by Damodar. 20. Berliner Bank and UBI have supported PWH. Berliner Bank has stated in its affidavit that it has, pursuant to an invocation by PWH, made payment under the guarantees to PWH. 21. Before deciding the arguments of the parties on merits the submission of Damodar relating to the continued maintainability of the application by virtue of the repeal of the 1961 Act by the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Ordinance) is considered. 22. 21. Before deciding the arguments of the parties on merits the submission of Damodar relating to the continued maintainability of the application by virtue of the repeal of the 1961 Act by the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Ordinance) is considered. 22. Prior to the Ordinance, separate statutory provisions dealt with domestic and international commercial arbitrations. As far as international commercial arbitrations were concerned the Indian Government having ratifies the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clause 1923 (hereafter referred to as the Geneva Convention) and the International Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Award, 1927 enacted the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937. This applied to international commercial arbitrations resulting in awards after 28th July, 1924. It was subsequently felt that the Geneva convention was defective and did not further speedy settlement of disputes. The International Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards was adopted at New York (hereafter referred to as the New York Convention) on 10th June, 1958. This was ratified by the Government of India which then enacted the Foreign Awards (Recognition & Enforcement) Act, 1961 to give effect to the New York convention. This dealt with foreign awards made on or after 11th October, 1960 All other arbitrations were covered by the Arbitration Act, 1940. These three statutes held the field of arbitration law in India till January 1996 when all three statutes were repealed by the Ordinance. 23. The 1996 Ordinance in its statement of objects and reasons states inter alia that it sought to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration, enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and to define the law relating to conciliation, taking into account the model Law and Rules adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 24. The Ordinance is divided into four parts. Part I deals with domestic arbitration; Part II deals with enforcement of foreign awards, Part III deals with conciliation and Part IV contains supplementary provisions including the repealing section. Part II has two chapters: Chapter 1 deals with the New York Convention Awards (earlier covered by the 1961 Act) and Chapter 2 deals with the Geneva Convention Awards (earlier dealt with by the 1937 Act). Part II has two chapters: Chapter 1 deals with the New York Convention Awards (earlier covered by the 1961 Act) and Chapter 2 deals with the Geneva Convention Awards (earlier dealt with by the 1937 Act). For the purposes of this application 1 am concerned basically with Part II Chapter 1 and the effect of its provisions in the light of the repeal of 1961 Act. 25. Section 85 of the Ordinance by which the 1937 Act, the Arbitration Act of 1940 and the 1961 Act were repealed, provides: "(2) Notwithstanding such repeal,- (a) the provisions of the said enactments shall apply in relation to arbitration to arbitral proceedings which commenced before this Ordinance came into force unless otherwise agreed by the parties but this Ordinance shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after this Ordinance comes into force; (b) all rules made and notifications published, under the said enactments shall, to the extent to which they are not repugnant to this Act, be deemed respectively to have been made or issued under this Ordinance." 26. In my opinion the application has not ceased to be maintainable by reason of the coming into force of the Ordinance. This is because of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act which in so far as it is material reads: "6. Effect of repeal.- Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a) ******************************* (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) ******************************* (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." 27. In other words, the right to apply for enforcement of an arbitration agreement and legal proceedings initiated in exercise of the right under repealed Act are preserved unless a different intention appears in the repealing Act. In other words, the right to apply for enforcement of an arbitration agreement and legal proceedings initiated in exercise of the right under repealed Act are preserved unless a different intention appears in the repealing Act. The question therefore is whether there is anything in the Ordinance which would evidence such a different intention. According to Damodar such a different intention would appear from the wording of s. 85, which is confined to saving only pending arbitral proceedings. It is argued that by deliberately limiting the saving clause the intention of the legislature was clear namely, that pending legal proceedings were not saved. 28. The effect of a repealing Act on the repealed enactment cannot be decided only with reference to the savings clause of the repealing Act. The matter will have to be resolved by considering the language of the repealing statute and not the repealing section alone. There must be something in the language of Chapter 1 of Part II of the Ordinance which would be directly and expressly contradictory to the 1961 enactment to indicate a contrary intention. Whatever is not contradicted by the New Act, survives. The question is not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether the new Act manifests an intention to destroy the old rights and liabilities [See Baliah vs. Rangachari: AIR 1969 SC 701 , 705; Brihan Maharastra Sugar Syndicate Limited vs. Janardhan Ramachandra Kulkarni: AIR 1960 SC 794 and Jayantilal Amritlal vs. Union of India , AI R 1971 SC 1197]. That the saving clause does not expressly refer to pending proceedings under the repealed enactment cannot by itself indicate that the intention was not to save such pending legal proceedings [See Tiwari Kanhaiyalal vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1975 SC 902 para 7; Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Surajmal Nagarmal , ITR 141 Cal (DB)]. 29. Shayabuddinsab vs. Adag Betgeri Municipal Borough & Ors, AIR 1995 SC 314 which has been cited on behalf of Dmodar supports the aforesaid statement of law. The issue in that case was whether the Bombay Municipal Borough (Amendment) Act, 1954 affected litigation pending under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 which was repealed. It was argued before the Supreme Court that unless there were express terms affecting pending litigation the subsequent enactment did not affect pending litigation. The issue in that case was whether the Bombay Municipal Borough (Amendment) Act, 1954 affected litigation pending under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 which was repealed. It was argued before the Supreme Court that unless there were express terms affecting pending litigation the subsequent enactment did not affect pending litigation. The Supreme Court considered the provisions of the Amendment Act and held that the Amendment Act had expressly cured the illegality or irregularity which had been challenged under the previous Act. It was in these circumstances, that the Supreme Court held that the pending litigation did not survive after the Amendment Act had come into force. 30. The second decision cited on behalf of Damodar was Mohanlal Jain vs. Sawai Man Singhji : AIR 1962 SC 73 . In that case a suit was filed for recovery of the price of the goods supplied to the Ex-Ruler of Jaipur. Subsequent to the filing of the suit s. 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure was introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1951. Section 87B extended the provisions of s. 86 of the Code (which debarred the suing of a Ruler except with the consent of the Central Government) to an Ex-Ruler. The Supreme Court held that despite the fact that s. 87B was enacted after the filing of the suit, the word "Sued" referred not only to initiation but also continuance of actions. It was therefore held that s. 87B applied to the pending suit and that no consent having been obtained the suit could not be proceeded with against the Ex-Ruler. 31. In both the cases cited the provisions of the subsequent enactment were clearly contrary to the language of the earlier repealed enactment. 32. To sum up: the express language of the saving clause by itself does not determine whether the general rule under s. 6 of the General Clauses Act will save pending litigation or not. All the provisions of the repealing Act will have to be considered to see whether the earlier right was intended to be and was in fact destroyed. 33. In the light of this, the issue is whether the right under s. 3 of the 1961 Act to compel a party who has instituted legal proceedings to abide by an agreement covered by the New York Convention has been destroyed by the Ordinance? 33. In the light of this, the issue is whether the right under s. 3 of the 1961 Act to compel a party who has instituted legal proceedings to abide by an agreement covered by the New York Convention has been destroyed by the Ordinance? I am unable to read the provisions of the Ordinance as evidencing such a different intention. 34. Despite repealing the 1961 Act, Chapter I Part II of the Ordinance has substantially re-enacted the provisions thereof with some modifications. Thus s. 44 of the Ordinance materially re-enacts s. 2 of the 1961 Act; S. 45 replaces s. 3; s. 46 replaces s. 4; s. 47 replaces s. 2; s. 48 replaces s. 6; and s. 51 replaces s. 9(a) of the 1961 Act. Section 50 which deals with appeals is a new section in respect of which there was no corresponding provision in the 1961 Act. 35. The application of PWH is under s. 3 of the 1961 Act. This read : "3. Stay of proceedings in respect of matters to be referred to arbitration.- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940 or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if any party to an agreement to which Article II of the Convention set forth in the Schedule applies, or any person claiming through or under him commences any legal proceedings in any court against any other party to the agreement or any person claiming through or under him in respect of any matter agreed to be referred to arbitration in such agreement, any party to such legal proceedings may, at any time after appearance and before filing a written statement or taking any other step in the proceedings, apply to the court to stay the proceeding and the court, unless satisfied that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed or that there is not, in fact, any dispute between the parties with regard to the matter agreed to be referred, shall make an order staying the proceedings." Section 45 of the Ordinance reads : "45. Power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration. Power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration. Notwithstanding anything contained in Part I or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), a judicial authority, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement referred to in section 44, at the request of one of the parties or any person claiming through or under him, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." 36. The differences between s. 45 of the Ordinance and s. 3 of the 1961 Act, apart from inconsequential changes of phraseology are two fold. (I) Under the 1961 Act an application under s. 3 could be made to a Court before which a legal proceeding was pending at any time after appearance and before filing a written statement or taking any other step in the proceeding. Under s. 45 of the Ordinance there does not appear to be any such time limit placed on the making of an application. (if) The second major difference relates to the nature of the power to be exercised by the Court before which the application is made. Under s. 3 the power of the Court to make an order staying the legal proceedings pending before it. Under s. 45 of the Ordinance the Court is required to refer the parties to arbitration. 37. Apart from these two differences the substance of the two sections is similar: namely (i) an application may be made by one of the parties to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him; (ii) the arbitration agreement must be one to which the New York Convention applies; (iii) a proceeding must be pending before a Court ; (iv) the legal proceedings must be in respect of a matter agreed to be referred; and (v) unless the agreement is found null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, the Court is bound to exercise its powers under the section. 38. By including substantially similar provisions in s. 45 of the Ordinance it is clear that it was not the intention to destroy the right of a petitioner under s. 3 of the 1961 Act at all. If anything, the Ordinance has strengthened the right. 38. By including substantially similar provisions in s. 45 of the Ordinance it is clear that it was not the intention to destroy the right of a petitioner under s. 3 of the 1961 Act at all. If anything, the Ordinance has strengthened the right. There being no 'different intention' in the Ordinance within the meaning of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, I hold that PWH's application under s. 3 of the 1961 Act is still maintainable. 39. This being so, the Court is bound to stay the suit provided the following six conditions are fulfilled : "(I) there must be an agreement to which Article II of the Convention set forth in the Schedule applies. (ii) a party to that agreement must commence legal proceedings against another party thereto. (iii) the legal proceedings must be "in respect of any matter agreed to be referred to arbitration" in such agreement. (iv) the application for stay must be made before filing the written statement or taking any other step in the legal proceedings. (v) the Court has to be satisfied that the agreement is valid, operative and capable of being performed; this relates to the satisfaction about the 'existence and validity' of the arbitration agreement. (w) the Court has to be satisfied that there are disputes between the parties with regard to the matters agreed to be referred; this relates to effect (scope) of the arbitration agreement touching the issue of arbitrability of the claims. [See Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. vs. General Electric Company: AIR 1985 SC 1156 ] 40. The arbitration clause on which reliance has been placed by PWH reads : "43. Disputes 43.1. All disputes arising in connection with this Consortium Agreement shall be finally settled by arbitration under the Rules of UNCITRAL/ three arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules. 43.2. The language of the proceedings, documentation and the award will be English. 43.3. The arbitration proceedings shall take place in Geneva, Switzerland. 43.4. This Consortium Agreement shall be governed in its entirety by the substantial laws of Switzerland, except for the Law on General Terms of Business and the Uniform International Sales Act." 41. There is no dispute that the New York Convention is applicable as PWH is a company incorporated under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany and Damodar is a company incorporated under the laws of India. There is no dispute that the New York Convention is applicable as PWH is a company incorporated under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany and Damodar is a company incorporated under the laws of India. Both India and the Federal Republic of Germany as well as Switzerland (where the arbitration is to be held) are signatories to or have ratified the New York Convention. The application of PWH is thus maintainable under s. 3 of the 1961 Act. 42. There is also no dispute that both Damodar and PWH are parties to the arbitration agreement and Damodar has filed a suit against PWH. The second condition enumerated in Renusagar's case is therefore also fulfilled. 43. The third, fifth and sixth conditions are discussed together. Section 3 says that it will apply when legal proceedings are initiated "in respect of any matter agreed to be referred". In Renusagar Power Company Limited vs. General Electric Company : AIR 1985 SC 1156 it was said with reference to s. 3 of the 1961 Act as follows: "..... It is obvious that since the Act is calculated and designed to subserve the cause of facilitating international trade and promotion thereof by providing for speedy settlement of disputes arising in such trade through arbitration, any expression or phrase occurring therein should receive, consisting with its literal and grammatical sense, a liberal construction ........" 44. The words used in the arbitration clause, namely "all disputes in connection with" the consortium agreement have also the widest possible content. In my view having regard to this the subject matter of the suit as well as the grounds raised by Damodar to resist the stay of the suit including the question of the survival of the arbitration clause are covered by the agreement. 45. I can do no better than to quote extracts from Renusagar's case as supporting this proposition : "Now the submission is that the phrase 'in respect of any matter agreed to• be referred to the arbitration occurring in s. 3 should be construed as covering only the disputes or claims on merits which have been referred to the arbitrators and since Renusagar's suit merely raises the issue of arbitrability of those claims the suit cannot be said to be in respect of any matter agreed to be referred to arbitration; .................. there is nothing in the section which warrants the placing of such narrow construction on the relevant phrase. What matters are agreed to be referred to arbitration will depend upon what language is employed by the parties to the arbitration agreement and ...... there is nothing in law or equity which prevents the parties from referring even the questions of existence, validity or effect (scope) of the arbitration agreement itself to the arbitrators ................Secondly the scheme of Ss. 3 and 7 of the Foreign Awards Act, as discussed earlier, clearly suggests that the relevant phrase would include even question of existence, validity and effect (scope) of the arbitration agreement." "........ The decisions of the Court of Appeal in Chancery in willesford vs. Watson (1873-8) Ch. App 473 (Supra) which decision has been annotated and digested in Russel on Arbitration (20th Edn.) - is a clear authority for the proposition that where the arbitration clause was very widely worded so as to include within its scope any dispute 'touching the construction of' the contract which contained the arbitration clause, the Court would not decide but would leave it to the arbitrator to decide the question whether the matter in dispute between the parties fell within the arbitration agreement. In fact, the Court of Appeal in that case repelled every endeavour on the part of the appellants to require the Court to do the very thing which lay within the competence of the arbitrators-blat is to say, to look into the whole matter, to construe the instrument and to decide whether the thing complained of was inside or outside the agreement, and directed the parties to go to arbitration by staying the suit............ 46. Thus the question whether the arbitration agreement has in fact been superseded as claimed by Damodar is also covered by the arbitration clause (Afliance Jute Mills vs. Lalchand Dharamchand AIR 1978 Cal 19 , para 16 and 20. This case was noted without disapproval in Renusagar's case). 47. Even otherwise, I an unable to hold either that the agreement has been superseded by the arbitration clause in the contract between Hazama and PWH or that the arbitration agreement is invalid, inoperative or incapable of being performed. There is nothing to show this. 48. The onus of proving such supersession is on Damodar. But this was not the case of Damodar in its plaint. There is nothing to show this. 48. The onus of proving such supersession is on Damodar. But this was not the case of Damodar in its plaint. No where in the plaint has it been stated that the arbitration agreement has been superseded and that case cannot be made out now. On the other hand in para 114 of the plaint Damodar has said that : "The said consortium agreement contains an arbitration clause. The defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are not parties to the said consortium agreement. In any event no submission has yet been made pursuant to the said arbitration clause. Therefore there is no impediment in instituting this suit. 49. Secondly clause 45 of the consortium agreement quoted above provides that only if there is a contradiction between the consortium agreement and inter alia the contract between PWH and Hazama, the provisions of the contract would have precedence. Thus the pre-condition to the applicability of the contract is the contradiction between the provisions of the contract and the provisions of the consortium agreement. The arbitration clause in the contract applies to disputes between PWH and Hazama and not to disputes between PWH and Damodar inter se. There is as such no contradiction between the two clauses and the question of the arbitration agreement between PWH and Damodar being superseded by the arbitration agreement between PWH and Hazama does not arise: The two arbitration agreements operate in different fields. The difference in the venues, laws and rules of arbitration mentioned in the two agreements are therefore immaterial. 50. The arbitration clause in the consortium agreement is clear. Damodar's submission about which law of general terms of business would be applicable is incomprehensible. It is not Damodar's case that there is no "Law on General Terms of Business" in Switzerland as quoted in 43.4 of the consortium agreement. Article 33 of the UNCITRAL Rules which have been' referred to in 43.1 of the arbitration clause reads : "Article 33.1 The arbitral tribunal shall apply the law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which is considered applicable. 2. Failing such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which is considered applicable. 2. The arbitral tribunal shall decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono only if the parties have expressly authorised the arbitral tribunal to do so and if the law applicable to the arbitral procedure permits such arbitration. 3. In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction." 51. In this case the parties have sought to designate the law of Switzerland as the law applicable to the substance of the dispute. Assuming that Damodar is correct that such designation is void for uncertainity, clause 43.1 of the consortium agreement read with Article 33.1 of the UNCITRAL Rules give jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal to apply the law determined by the conflict of laws and rules which it considers applicable. It is noteworthy that the disputes under the consortium agreement are required to be settled under the rules of UNCITRAL, the very same rules on which 1996 Ordinance has been modelled. 52. Damodar has also sought to result the application of PWH on the ground that the petition of PWH on the ground that the petition of PWH for stay of the suit does not indicate the dispute between the parties. Neither s. 3 of the 1961, Act nor s. 45 of the 1996 Ordinance prescribe any particular form for an application under these sections. The decision of a Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in Villayati Ram vs. Union of India: AIR 1981 Del 313 relied on by Damodar is a case on s. 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The proceeding under s. 20 is an original proceeding and is required to be numbered and registered as a suit. An application under s. 20 of the 1940 Act is made before the institution of a suit. Therefore there is no material before the Court to come to the conclusion whether a difference has arisen with regard to matters covered by arbitration agreement except the application under s. 20 itself. In this case the plaint itself sufficiently discloses the nature of the disputes between the parties. Therefore there is no material before the Court to come to the conclusion whether a difference has arisen with regard to matters covered by arbitration agreement except the application under s. 20 itself. In this case the plaint itself sufficiently discloses the nature of the disputes between the parties. Furthermore, the onus is on Damodar to show that the arbitration agreement does not cover the disputes raised. 53. The final submission of Damodar in this connection is that the plaint raises disputes relating to payability of the monies under bank guarantees which are not covered by the arbitration agreement. In my opinion it is ,not open to Damodar to plead that the bank guarantees are independent contracts. The stand of Damodar is a "Heads-I-win-tails-you-lose" submission. If the guarantees are independent contracts as claimed, then Damodar's suit in respect thereof cannot be sustained. Damodar itself has not treated the bank guarantees as independent contracts. If it had, 1t could not have claimed and obtained an injunction restraining the encashment thereof in this suit. 54. It is true that Damodar is not a party to the agreement between the banks and its beneficiaries and the general rule is that encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee cannot be referred to arbitration because it is an independent contract between the bank and the• beneficiary [See Hindusthan Paper Corporation vs. Kineilhouse (1990)i CLT 900]. 55. But the Court is limited for the purpose of this application to the allegations in the plaint. The test is whether according to the plaint recourse must be had to the consortium agreement for determining Damodar's case against the Banks. The case in the plaint is that the bank guarantees were conditional and were meant to be modified/ governed by the terms in the consortium agreement Damodar has challenged the enforcement of the bank guarantees on the basis of fraud committed by PWH in the performance of its obligation under the consortium agreement. The claim in the plaint is on the basis that the encashment of bank guarantees is "directly, closely and inextricably connected with the terms and conditions of the consortium agreement, the payment to be made thereunder and the branches thereof". In such circumstances it must be held that the dispute relating to the payability under the bank guarantees is a dispute in connection with the consortium agreement and so covered by the arbitration clause. 56. In such circumstances it must be held that the dispute relating to the payability under the bank guarantees is a dispute in connection with the consortium agreement and so covered by the arbitration clause. 56. The fact that PWH may have committed fraud does not justify the Court in refusing stay under s. 3 of the 1961 Act. Even when there is evidence of lack of bona fides, the Court is compelled by virtue of the mandatory provisions of the section to refer the disputes to arbitration. Section1 of the Arbitration Act, 1975 in Britain is identical with s. 3 of the 1961 Act. The Court of Appeal in the case of Associated Bulk Carriers Ltd. vs. Koch Shipping Inc (The Fuohsan Maru) [1978] Vol. 1 llR 24, 33 held that despite the obvious temptation to decide the question in favour of the wholly meritorious plaintiffs against defendants who have less than no merits, it was quite impossible to do so because of the mandatory nature of the provisions of the section. 57. It is of no consequence that UBI and Berliner Bank are not parties to the arbitration agreement. Section 3 is not limited to parties to the agreement (See Union of India vs. Owners of Vessel Hoegh Orchid: AIR 1983 Guj 834). 58. The decision of R. M. Investment & Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Boeing Co. & Anr.: AIR 1994 SC 1136 is also authority for proposition that merely because there are other parties to the proceedings this does not absolve the Court of its duty to stay the suit under s. 3. 59. The matter must in any event be taken to have been concluded finally by the decision in Svenska Handelsbanken vs. Indian Charge Chrome Limited: 1994) 2 SCC 155. In that case Indian Charge Chrome Limited (ICCI) obtained supplies from 3 foreign concerns to set up a power plant. The agreements with foreign suppliers contained an arbitration clause. ICCI had obtained finance from diverse foreign banks to set up the power plant. The credit agreements between ICCL and foreign bankers also contained arbitration clauses whereby it was inter alia agreed that disputes arising from agreements would be settled by arbitration in Stockholm under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. 60. ICCI had obtained finance from diverse foreign banks to set up the power plant. The credit agreements between ICCL and foreign bankers also contained arbitration clauses whereby it was inter alia agreed that disputes arising from agreements would be settled by arbitration in Stockholm under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. 60. ICCI took over the plant from the suppliers and authorised the foreign bank to disburse the balance payment to the suppliers. Subsequently ICCI filed a suit against the suppliers (the defendant Nos. 1 to 3), the foreign bankers (the defendant Nos. 4 to 11), the Industrial Development Bank of India (the defendant No. 12) and Indian Metal Ferro Alloys Ltd. (the defendant No. 13), who had guaranteed the repayment of the loan to the banks. ICCI claimed reliefs, inter alia, in respect of the guarantees obtained from IDBI and IMFA by the foreign suppliers and foreign banks. A decree for perpetual injunction was prayed for restraining IDBI and IMFA from making any payment under the guarantees to any of the foreign banks. A decree for perpetual injunction was also prayed against the foreign bankers from recalling the loan. 61. Separate applications were filed under s. 3 of the 1961 Act by the foreign suppliers and the foreign banks. The Trial Court dismissed the applications. The High Court upheld the decision. The foreign suppliers and the foreign banks appealed. In the appeal by the foreign banks before the Supreme Court it was inter alia, contended that there were separate inconsistent arbitration agreements (1) between ICCI and the foreign suppliers; and (2) ICCI and the foreign banks. The High Court was of the view that although the separate arbitration agreements were valid and capable of being performed by themselves, they had become inoperative because the plaint did not make severable allegations against the foreign defendants, who were parties to different contracts with different arbitration agreements and as such all the arbitration clauses had become inoperative. 62. The Supreme Court found the reasoning "strained and totally erroneous". The Supreme Court also found that the High Court's view amounted to disregarding the mandatory provisions of •s. 3 of 1961 Act. 62. The Supreme Court found the reasoning "strained and totally erroneous". The Supreme Court also found that the High Court's view amounted to disregarding the mandatory provisions of •s. 3 of 1961 Act. The Supreme Court held: "The plaintiff by merely entering into other contract with different parties cannot prejudice or defeat the rights of the different party under the different contract, particularly when the right to foreign arbitration has been provided by Parliament as an indefeasible right in which the Court, does not have any kind of discretion The arbitration is contemplated as per s. 3 of the Foreign Awards Act. The plaintiff by filing a plaint, cannot make the arbitration clause invalid or inoperative. Therefore, the finding of the High Court that the arbitration agreements have become inoperative and incapable of being performed or invalid is erroneous in law, and therefore, must be set aside." 63. The Supreme Court took up the application for stay filed by the foreign banks. It found that the conditions envisaged for the applicability of s. 3 of the 1961 Act had been fully complied with. The Supreme Court, accordingly, directed stay of the entire suit filed by ICCI under those provisions. The submission of ICCI that the arbitration clause contained in the agreement with the suppliers was different and was governed by the Arbitration Act, 1940 was rejected by the Supreme Court which said: "However, the question whether s. 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 or s. 3 of the Foreign Awards Act will govern the applications filed on behalf of defendants 1 to 3 is concerned, need not detain us, inasmuch as we have already held that the suit filed by the plaintiff, as such, is liable to be stayed in view of the applications for stay filed by the lenders i.e. defendant No. 4 and defendants 5 to 11 and, therefore, we leave this question open. The result is that the appeals filled on behalf of defendant 4 and defendants 5 to 11 are accepted; the impugned order of the High Court dated June 17, 1993 and of the trial court dated June 23, 1992 are set aside and the suit is directed to be stayed as contemplated by s. 3 of the Foreign Awards Act. The result is that the appeals filled on behalf of defendant 4 and defendants 5 to 11 are accepted; the impugned order of the High Court dated June 17, 1993 and of the trial court dated June 23, 1992 are set aside and the suit is directed to be stayed as contemplated by s. 3 of the Foreign Awards Act. The orders of the Trial Court on the application for stay filed on behalf of the defendants 1 to 3 are also set aside but in view of our orders on the application filed on beh31f of the lenders, no separate orders are being passed on the application for stay filed on behalf of the defendants 1 to 3. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of the present proceedings." 64. The entire suit was stayed despite the fact that out of 12 defendants only 6 were parties to the arbitration agreement and also despite the fact that there were distinct claims in respect of the guarantees against IMFA and IDBI. 65. No meaningful distinction can be drawn between the case before the Supreme Court and the one before me. 66. I therefore hold that the suit in its entirety is in respect of matters agreed to be referred to arbitration, that the disputes between the parties are with regard to matters agreed to be referred and that the arbitration agreement in the consortium agreement is valid, operative and capable of being performed. 67. The fourth condition prescribed in Renusagar's case is fulfilled also as the application by PWH was made before it has filed its written statement or taken any step in the proceeding. 68. All six conditions being fulfilled the Court is bound to stay the suit under s. 3 of the 1961 Act. As said in Renusagar's case: "The section uses the mandatory expression "shall" and makes it obligatory upon the Court to pass the order staying the legal proceedings commenced by a party to the agreement if the conditions specified therein are fulfilled." 69. The application is accordingly allowed. There will be orders in terms of prayer (a) and (b). 70. This order will not affect the pending appeal already preferred by Damodar Ropeways & Construction Company Private Limited from allowing the application of Berliner Bank. 71. Stay prayed for is refused. 72. The application is accordingly allowed. There will be orders in terms of prayer (a) and (b). 70. This order will not affect the pending appeal already preferred by Damodar Ropeways & Construction Company Private Limited from allowing the application of Berliner Bank. 71. Stay prayed for is refused. 72. Let a xerox copy of this judgement duly signed by the Assistant Registrar of this Court given to the parties upon their usual undertaking to apply for the certified copy of the judgement and on payment of usual charges. Application allowed.