The petitioner has moved this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,1950 challenging an order dated 26th May, 1989 whereby the disciplinary authorities had passed an order in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 16 of the CCS (CC&A) Rules 1965 the undersigned awards to SI HL Sutradhar and ASI Kabul Singh, the penalty of reduction to the lowest stage in the time scale of pay Rs.l640-60-2600-EB-75-2900 PM and Rs. 1320-30- 1560-EB-40/ 2040 PM respectively for a period of 5 years with immediate effect. They will' not earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction. 2. The petitioner has challenged the said order before this Court raising several grounds, firstly, there was no prior initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner by a competent authority as provided under the provisions of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 relating to central civil services which have been made admittedly applicable in the case of the petitioner. According to the petitioner nobody subordinate to the appointing authority is authorised to issue notice to the petitioner for the purposes of taking disciplinary action and for the said purpose and in support of his above contention Mr.Das relies oh the Division Bench decision of this Court as reported in AIR 1969 Assam 1 (Manihar Singh vs. Superintendent of Police, United Khasi Jaintia Hills, Shillong) wherein it has been held as follows : "The framing of charges, the holding of an enquiry into them, the suspension of the civil servant during the enquiry, the notice to show cause, are all steps in the exercise of the disciplinary powers. All these steps are required to be taken by the disciplinary authority and not by a delegate of that authority. In the absence of a statutory provision permitting expressly or impliedly delegation of disciplinary powers, an authority other than the disciplinary authority has clearly no power to frame, on its own initiative, charges against a civil servant and hold an enquiry into .them." 3. The second limb of Mr. Das's argument is that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is a major falling under Rule 11 (v) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Such penalty cannot be imposed by any person other than the appointing authority. For this purpose Mr. Das relies on Rule 12 sub-rule (4) (a) which reads as follows : "12. Das's argument is that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is a major falling under Rule 11 (v) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Such penalty cannot be imposed by any person other than the appointing authority. For this purpose Mr. Das relies on Rule 12 sub-rule (4) (a) which reads as follows : "12. (4) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained this rule; (1) except where the penalty specified in clause (v) or clause (vi) of Rule 11 is imposed by the Comptroller and Auditor General on a member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service, no penalty specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of that rule shall be imposed by any authority subordinate to the appointing authority." 4. Lastly, Mr. Das argues that the order passed by the Assistant Inspector General of Police on 26th May, 1988 was in violation of the rights conferred on the petitioner under Article 311 of the Constitution of India,1950. Mr. Das submits that no reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges was given to the petitioner. As such, the entire order is vitiated and the same should he quashed and/or set aside 5. Mr. Sharma in reply to the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Das has drawn my attention to Rule 15 (1) and (2) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 which reads as follows : "15. (1) The disciplinary authority, if it is not itself inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 14 as far as may be. (2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the ) inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose." 6. On the basis of the aforesaid provisions of the Rules Mr. Sharma submits that after an inquiry is made by the Inquiry Officer the only requirement under the law is to set out the reasons of disagreement by the disciplinary authority < and no question of giving any further opportunity to the petitioner of hearing arises. On the basis of the aforesaid provisions of the Rules Mr. Sharma submits that after an inquiry is made by the Inquiry Officer the only requirement under the law is to set out the reasons of disagreement by the disciplinary authority < and no question of giving any further opportunity to the petitioner of hearing arises. The hearing has already been given to the petitioner for the charges levelled against him by the Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority only reappreciates the evidence which come up before the Inquiry Officer and on the basis of the same either agrees or disagrees with the said inquiry. No further opportunity is required to be given in the instant case. According to Mr. Sharma the delinquent was given sufficient opportunity before the Inquiry Officer to produce documents and records and make his submissions before the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer after holding a full and fair inquiry submitted its report to the disciplinary authority who, "however, disagreed with the finding of the Inquiry Officer and imposed the penalty as stated hereinabove. In such an event recording the reasons for disagreement nothing more is required. The third argument of Mr. Sharma is that under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules head of office is the appropriate authority to pass an order of reduction in pay and for this purpose Mr. Sharma draws my attention to Schedule to Part III of Central Civil Services, Class III wherein it has been stated that Head of office or other officer or such other authority as may be specified by the Administrator can impose penalty with reference to item numbers in Rule 11. Mr. Sharma further draws my attention to section 7 of the Police Act, 1861, which runs as follows : "7. Appointment dismissal, etc, of inferior officers. Mr. Sharma further draws my attention to section 7 of the Police Act, 1861, which runs as follows : "7. Appointment dismissal, etc, of inferior officers. Subject to provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, and to such rules as the State Government may from time to time make under this Act, the Inspector General, Deputy Inspector ^ General, Assistant Inspector General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer of the subordinate ranks whom they shall think, remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or unfit for the same; or may award any one or more of the following punishments to any police officer of the subordinate ranks who shall discharge his duty in a careless or negligent ' manner, or who by any act of his own shall render himself unfit for the discharge thereof, namely: (a) fine to any amount not exceeding one month's pay; (b) confinement to quarters for a term not exceeding fifteen days, with or without punishment drill, extra guard, fatigue or other duty; (c) deprivation of good conduct pay; (d) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument." 7. I have carefully considered, the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents and the facts disclosed in the petition and the , affidavit filed by the parties. 8. The petitioner was originally appointed as Assistant Sub Inspector in the State of Arunachal Pradesh to which he was confirmed by an order dated 9th December, 1982 with effect from 11.11.82 by the Inspector General of Police. Subsequently by a Memo dated 26th May,1988 the Assistant Inspector General of Police initiated a disciplinary proceeding under section 7 of the Police Act read with Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (CC & A) Rules, 1965. The inquiry held by the Inquiry Officer and submitted a report to the disciplinary authority. It appears from the order dated 26th May, 1989 that the disciplinary authority did not agree to the findings of the Inquiry Officer and held that the Inquiry Officer was wrong in holding the charges which have not been proved against the delinquent officer. The inquiry held by the Inquiry Officer and submitted a report to the disciplinary authority. It appears from the order dated 26th May, 1989 that the disciplinary authority did not agree to the findings of the Inquiry Officer and held that the Inquiry Officer was wrong in holding the charges which have not been proved against the delinquent officer. Without giving any further reasonable opportunity in the matter the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar passed an order by way of penalty of reduction to the lowest stage in the time scale of pay of the petitioner for five years. As against the said order the petitioner has moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,1950 though he had also preferred an appeal against the said order. Since the matter relates to patent lack of jurisdiction by the authorities who had passed orders in the case, the Court entertains this writ application and disposes of the matter on merit. I have considered the above submissions of the parties. I agree with the submissions of Mr. Das that nobody below the rank of Inspector General of Police could have imposed the penalty on the petitioner contrary of Rule 12 sub-rule 4 (a) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, as amended from time to time Rule. 12 (4) (a) makes it abundantly clear that no penalty specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 shall be imposed by any authority subordinate to the appointing authority. Admittedly the petitioner was appointed by the Inspector General of Police. As such, the imposition of fine by the Deputy Inspector General of Police was illegal and contrary to the Central. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 9. The second limb of argument of Mr. Das is that since the disciplinary authority did not agree to the finding of the Inquiry Officer, a further opportunity could have been given to the petitioner so that he could have removed the queries and doubts in the mind pf the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary proceedings before the Inquiry Officer till a final finding is made by the disciplinary authority is a continuous single process and till a final finding is made opportunity is to be given to the petitioner to make his submissions on the facts found. According to Mr. The disciplinary proceedings before the Inquiry Officer till a final finding is made by the disciplinary authority is a continuous single process and till a final finding is made opportunity is to be given to the petitioner to make his submissions on the facts found. According to Mr. Das the petitioner is not seeking the second show cause notice against the penalty to be imposed but he is seeking only his right conferred under sub- Article (2) of Article 311 whereby a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of charges is to be given to the petitioner. 10. In support of his above proposition Mr. Das relies on the decision of AIR 1994 SC1074 (Managing Director, ECIL vs. B. Karunakar) at 1090 as follows: "Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to £ the Inquiry Officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the Inquiry Officer and the representation of the employee against it. It will thus be seen that where the Inquiry Officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, c Inquiry Officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second -stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the " right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings." In the five member Bench of the Supreme Court in the said decision has held that there are two stages and two rights involved. After their inquiry report is submitted, firstly the challenge to the finding, secondly challenge to the penalty to be imposed. After their inquiry report is submitted, firstly the challenge to the finding, secondly challenge to the penalty to be imposed. The Supreme Court in the said decisions holds that the first stage of challenge to the finding is a part of the disciplinary proceedings and it continues till the disciplinary authority makes its final finding. 11. In my view of the matter under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India,1950 a person who is a member of the civil service of the Union or an all India service is proceeded under a disciplinary proceedings and his services were to be dismissed, removed, he shall be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard f in the matter till a final finding is made by the disciplinary authority. The holding of inquiry is a part of the first limb of the final finding to be made by the disciplinary authority. The first stage of the inquiry comes to an end only, at the conclusion made by the disciplinary authority on the basis of the evidence adduced and on the basis of the inquiry report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage, however, relates to the imposition of penalty. In g the instant case I find that the disciplinary authority did not agree with the finding of the inquiry report and continued to consider and determine the evidentiary value of the document and ocular evidence produced before the Inquiry Officer by the petitioner and the Department and came to a finding contrary to the finding of the Inquiry Officer. In my view of the matter, since the disciplinary proceedings were adversely contrary to the findings of the Inquiry Officer, in " all fairness and in the interest of justice keeping in mind the principles of natural {justice, the disciplinary authority should have given a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to adequately answer the charges at the final stages of their findings, the same was not done. As such, the finding of the disciplinary authority is bad in law, illegal and contrary to Article 311 of the Constitution of India,1950. As such I quash and set aside the order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police on 26.5.1989.1 have not discussed the other points raised by Mr. Das as I feel that the same are not necessary for the disposal of this matter. The matter is disposed of. As such I quash and set aside the order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police on 26.5.1989.1 have not discussed the other points raised by Mr. Das as I feel that the same are not necessary for the disposal of this matter. The matter is disposed of. No order as to costs. Consequently, I also quash and set aside the order dated 4.12.89 passed by the Inspector General of Police.