G. R. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) - This appeal is directed against the order and judgment dated the 12th July, 1989 passed by U. C. Banerjee,j. in suit No. 747 of 1988, by which the learned Judge stayed the said suit and all proceedings thereunder till the final disposal of the complaint case No. 1233 of 1988 and 1488 of 1988 including the Park Street Police Station case No. 455 dated, the 27th July, 1988. The plaintiff company (the appellant herein) filed the said suit on the allegation that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (that is, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 herein) jointly carried on business as share and stock brokers and that, during the period April, 1984 to April 1985 the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 1,98,00,000 to the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for the purpose of acquiring shares in various companies and with specific instructions to do so including 3,51,300 shares of the defendant No. 3 (Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.) of the value of Rs. 1,39,34,513 to be purchased in the name of plaintiff or its nominee. It was also the allegation of the plaintiff that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 purchased the said 3,51,300 shares in the Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. for and on behalf of the plaintiff with the money provided or the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 by the plaintiff for the said purpose, but the said defendants however delivered only 1,75,000 shares in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. to the plaintiff and refused and neglected to deliver the balance 1,76,300 shares. In the suit the plaintiff therefore prayed for specific delivery of the said 1,76,300 shares in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 along with appropriate documents as might be required for the registration of the said shares in the name of the plaintiff, with certain incidental reliefs. The plaintiff also alternatively prayed for a decree of Rs. 1. 06,00,000 as the value of the said shares along with interest thereon. The plaintiff also filed a separate application in the said suit for appointment of receiver. The defendants Nos. The plaintiff also alternatively prayed for a decree of Rs. 1. 06,00,000 as the value of the said shares along with interest thereon. The plaintiff also filed a separate application in the said suit for appointment of receiver. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 then filed in the said suit an application for staying the suit and all proceedings thereunder on the ground that the plaintiff earlier filed through its employee two petitions of complaint under section 156 (3) Cr PC covering the self-same matter on the basis of which the police started the Park Street P. S. Case No. 455 dated the 27th July, 1988 under section 409/34, Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) IN the first petition of complaint filed an behalf of the appellant company, M/s. Apeejay (P) Ltd. it is stated that the company through its associate companies entrusted to the accused persons (who are the defendants/respondents Nos. 1 and 2) a sum of Rs. 1,98,00,000 with instruction to purchase various shares on behalf of the appellant company and that, the company was made to understand by the accused persons that they had purchased different shares for the appellant company, as per direction valued at Rs. 1,97. 48. 354 and further that, out of the shares in different companies purchased by the accused persons, certain shares were sold by the accused person as per the instruction of the appellant company and they deposited in favour of the appellant company only certain amount out of the said sale-proceeds leaving a balance of Rs. 63,93,605 but inspite of repeated assurance the accused persons did not make over the said sale proceeds to the appellant company and thus committed the offence punishable under section 409/34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the said petition of complaint although the purchase of equity shares in EID Parry Limited and Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. was mentioned, yet it was stated therein that separate criminal proceedings in respect of the same would be started against the accused persons, in due course. In the said petition of complaint although the purchase of equity shares in EID Parry Limited and Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. was mentioned, yet it was stated therein that separate criminal proceedings in respect of the same would be started against the accused persons, in due course. The second petition of complaint filed on behalf of the appellant company under section 409/34 IPC was in respect of the shares of the said two companies, namely, EID Parry Ltd. and Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. in the second petition of complaint the allegation inter alia is that the accused person were instructed as share brokers to purchase 86,400 shares of EID Parry Ltd. and 3,51,300 shares of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. and to deliver the said purchased shares to the appellant company and that, accordingly they purchased the shares but despite several reminders the accused persons only delivered to the appellant company 78,038 shares of EID Parry Ltd. and 1,75,000 equity shares of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. leaving a balance of 8. 362 equity shares of EID Parry valued at Rs. 1,21,249 and 1,76,000 equity shares of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. valued at Rs. 69,94,013 which shares have not been delivered by the accused persons despite assurance given by them and that by not returning the purchased shares in respect of the aforesaid two companies for which the accused had received full payment from the appellant company the accused persons committed criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 71,15,262 being the aggregate value of the shares of the aforesaid two companies which have not been received by the appellant company. It is also alleged therein that the accused persons criminally misappropriated the said amount knowing fully well that they were under legal obligation to make over the purchased shares or the value thereof to the appellant company which is the property of the appellant company. That petition of complaint was also referred to the police under section 156 (3) Cr PC and the police accordingly started the Park Street P. S. , Police case in respect of the complaint as mentioned earlier. It was the contention of the defendants/respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before the trial court that since police investigation was pending in respect of Complaints lodged under section 409/34 IPC in respect of the self-same matter, the civil suit should be stayed till disposal of the criminal proceeding. It was the contention of the defendants/respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before the trial court that since police investigation was pending in respect of Complaints lodged under section 409/34 IPC in respect of the self-same matter, the civil suit should be stayed till disposal of the criminal proceeding. The learned Judge, by his impugned order, granted the prayer of the defendant / respondents and stayed the civil suit till disposal of the criminal proceedings. Being aggrieved by the stay order, the appellant/ plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. ( 3 ) IT may be noted here that although the complaints under section 156 (3) Cr PC in respect of the offence punishable under section 409/34 IPC covered allegations concerning shares of various companies mentioned therein including Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. yet the suit has been filed, as we have seen, only in respect of the undelivered shares of Mahindra ad Mahindra Ltd. it is also to be noted that in the suit the plaintiff prayed for specific delivery of the undelivered shares in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 or for the value thereof quantified at Rs. 1,06,00,000. It is also to be mentioned that in the suit the plaintiff claimed on the plea that there was an obligation an the concerned defendants to deliver the concerned shares to the plaintiff, but the case in the criminal proceedings is based on the further allegation that the accused persons have committed criminal breach of trust and mis-appropriation in respect of the concerned shares. It is also to be noted here that while in the criminal proceedings the accused cannot be found guilty of the offence under section 409 IPC unless the ingredients of the offence of the criminals breach of trust or criminal misappropriation are established against them, the relief claimed in-the civil suit for delivery of the shares or for recovery of the value thereof is based on the mere obligation to deliver the shares irrespective of the question whether any criminal breach of trust or criminal misappropriation has been committed in respect of the same. In other words, while in the civil suit the success of the claim of the plaintiff company will depend upon the question whether it has been able to establish that the defendants have an obligation to deliver the concerned share, and if so, whether they have failed to discharged that obligation, in the criminal proceedings that will not suffice for finding the accused guilty and it will have to be established yet beyond reasonable doubt that there was entrustment and criminal breach of trust/ misappropriation in terms of the definitions contained in the appropriate sections of the Indian Penal Code. This aspect of the matter is highlighted only to indicate that even if the plaintiff obtains a decree in the civil still against the accused defendants, that by itself will not establish a charge under section 409 IPC against them for which the ingredients are different and which will have to be established beyond reasonable doubt before the criminal court by leading appropriate evidence for finding the accused guilty under section 409 IPC. notwithstanding a money decree or a decree for specific delivery of shares from the civil court against the accused defendants. ( 4 ) THE learned trial Judge has stayed the civil suit as he is of the opinion that since them is identity of the subject matter in the civil suit as well as in the criminal proceedings there is no question of further proceeding in the civil suit and the question of continuance of the civil suit does net arise fill the disposal of the criminal matter. The learned Judge has based his decision in the matter mainly on two grounds namely, that the continuance of the suit will deprive the accused defendants of their protection against testimonial compulsion as provided in Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India and that a decision in favour of the plaintiff in the civil suit will almost automatically lead to a conviction of the accused defendants in the criminal proceedings without the procedural benefits of a criminal trial. The learned trial Judge, it seems, was also impressed by the argument advanced an behalf of the defendants in the suit that the accused have the constitutional right to maintain silence and they cannot be compelled to state their defence in the criminal proceedings by filing affidavit in the civil suit. The learned trial Judge, it seems, was also impressed by the argument advanced an behalf of the defendants in the suit that the accused have the constitutional right to maintain silence and they cannot be compelled to state their defence in the criminal proceedings by filing affidavit in the civil suit. ( 5 ) NOW let us first examine the question whether the continuance of the civil suit would infringe the right to protection against self-incrimination or testimonial compulsion as provided in Article 20 (3) of the Constitution which the learned trial Judge thought would be infringed if the suit was allowed to proceed and the accused defendants contested the claim of the plaintiff appellant in the suit as they would be thereby disclosing their defence in the criminal proceedings. In connection with the Article 20 (3) of the Constitution the learned trial Judge has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in M. P. Sharma and Ors. v. Satish Chandra AIR 1954 SC 300 . In the [impugned judgment of the trial court there is however no discussion of the said decision or as to how the said decision is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The learned trial Judge at the very starting of the judgment records thus : 'an interesting question of law as regards the true effect or Article 20 (3) of the Constitution falls for consideration in this application. It is to be noted that one of the fundamental principles of British system of criminal jurisprudence is that there is total prohibition " regards the compulsion of self-incrimination. The Indian Law also provides an immunity on the basis of such compelled evidence. The Supreme Court decision in the case of M. P. Sharma and Ors. v. Satish Chandra. AIR 1954 SC 300 lends assistance to the views expressed above'. How the said decision was applicable to the facts of the present case however has not at all been discussed. ( 6 ) ARTICLE 20 which finds place in the chapter of fundamental rights in the Constitution or India is reproduced below :"20. (1 ). v. Satish Chandra. AIR 1954 SC 300 lends assistance to the views expressed above'. How the said decision was applicable to the facts of the present case however has not at all been discussed. ( 6 ) ARTICLE 20 which finds place in the chapter of fundamental rights in the Constitution or India is reproduced below :"20. (1 ). No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged, as an offence nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more then once. (3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself". We thus find that the protection afforded by Article 20 (3) is that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The decision of the Supreme Court in M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (supra) does not anywhere say that the continuance of a civil suit in the circumstances as in the present case would amount to a violation of the sale protection which is commonly known as a protection against testimonial compulsion. The question which directly arose in the decision of the Supreme Court in M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (supra) was whether a search and seizure of documents from a person against whom a first information report had been lodged with the police, amounted to compelling him to be a witness against himself within the meaning of Art. 20 (3 ). It was held in that case by the Supreme Court that things could be seized from the accused or from his premises, though he could not be compelled to produce them, and that compulsory search did not violate Article 20 (3 ). it was observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of the said decision at page 304 thus:"indeed every positive volitional act which furnishes evidence is testimony, and testimonial compulsion connotes coercion which procures the positive volitional evidentiary acts of the person, as opposed to the negative attitude of silence or submission on his part. it was observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of the said decision at page 304 thus:"indeed every positive volitional act which furnishes evidence is testimony, and testimonial compulsion connotes coercion which procures the positive volitional evidentiary acts of the person, as opposed to the negative attitude of silence or submission on his part. "apart from merely making passing reference to the sold decision of the Supreme Court in M. P. Sharma V. Satish Chandra (supra) the learned trial Judge in the present case also quoted a passage from the decision of a learned single Judge (P. B. Mukherjee, J.) of this court in re: Central Calcutta Bank Ltd. reported in AIR 1957 Cal 520 . It seems that the learned trial Judge was under the impression that the passage quoted by him from the said decision of P. B. Mukherjee, J. would necessarily warrant an order of stay in the present civil suit. But on a plain reading of the quoted passage it would however be apparent that the same did not contain any such import. The learned Judge (P. B. Mukherjee, J.) observed thus as quoted in the judgment of the learned trial Judge:- 'testimonial compulsion, therefore, is not a legal fetish. It is a necessity. Testimonial compulsion is the general rule. The constitutional prohibition of self-incrimination evidence is an exception designed to defend justice ad ensure the accused against self created criminal traps. Legal protection against self-incrimination, therefore, is one of the pillars of liberty of criminal justice in a civilised society. But such liberty should be confined within the limits of its doctrine and not expanded into sentimentality that testimonial compulsion is always a kind of unproclaimed tyranny to be shunned in law. Testimonial compulsion is a necessary obligation of a responsible citizen to aid the machinery of justice and thus help it to discover truth'. (Emphasis supplied)* The quoted observations of the learned Judge obviously do not warrant that a civil suit of the present nature will have to be stayed on the ground of protection against testimonial compulsion simply because a criminal proceeding is also pending on the same manner. (Emphasis supplied)* The quoted observations of the learned Judge obviously do not warrant that a civil suit of the present nature will have to be stayed on the ground of protection against testimonial compulsion simply because a criminal proceeding is also pending on the same manner. On the other hand what is indicated in the quoted observation is that the import of the protection against the self incrimination should be confined within the limits of its doctrine and should not be expanded into sentimentality so is to misapply the protection to a sphere where this is not applicable in our opinion, the learned trial Judge has in the present case, missed the import of the observations of the learned Judge in the decision in re: Central Calcutta Bank Ltd (supra ). ( 7 ) IT may be noted here that a Bench of 11 Judges of the Supreme Court had to consider the question of the constitutional protection against testimonial compulsion in Store of Bombay v. Kathi Kato Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808 . In the said decision it was inter alia held by the Supreme Court that giving the impression of foot, palm or finger or giving specimen hand writing, or showing parts of body by way of identification does not infringe Article 20 (3 ). It was further held that the mere questioning of an accused by a police officer resulting in a voluntary statement which may ultimately turn or to be incriminatory, is not 'compulsion'. It was also held that the statements of an accused admissible under section 27. Evidence Act are not within the prohibition of Article 20 (3) unless compulsion has been used in obtaining the information and that, the mere fact that the accused was in police custody at the time when he made the statement did not make it a compelled statement. It will thus be seen that when the accused in reply to interrogation made by police while in police custody makes a voluntary statement which leads to discovery of incriminating materials such statement becomes admissible in evidence against the accused under section 27 of the Evidence Act. The accused giving thumb impression or specimen hand writing for the purpose of comparison is also, in view of the Supreme Court decision, not entitled to any plea of protection under Article 20 (3 ). The accused giving thumb impression or specimen hand writing for the purpose of comparison is also, in view of the Supreme Court decision, not entitled to any plea of protection under Article 20 (3 ). In the circumstances can there be any scope of arguing that if the accused defendant files any written statement or examines himself as a witness in a civil suit, that would be tantamount to compelling him to be a witness against himself in respect of the criminal charge that may be pending against him? The answer cannot but be an emphatic 'no'. The cardinal point involved in the protection of Article 20 (3) relates to the question of compulsion. There is no question of compulsion in the defendant's filing a written statement in the civil suit or in examining himself as a witness to protect his own interest in such suit The rule against testimonial compulsion does not go to the extent of making the accused a universally privileged person. Even in criminal proceedings the law requires that the accused has to be asked to plea whether he is guilty or not guilty of the charge brought against him. If he volunteers to plead guilty in answer to the question put to him, the same may be accepted and acted upon by the court and the Court may even conflict hint an such plea. No question of violation of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution arises in such case. Then again section 313 Cr PC empowers the court to put questions to the accused at any state of the trial and also requires the court to put questions in him after the prosecution evidence has been concluded, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It is also provided in sub-section (4) of section 313 Cr PC that the answers given by the accused while examined under section 313 Cr PC may be taken into consideration in the enquiry or trial in which such examination was made, and may even be put in evidence for or against the accused in any other enquiry or trial for any other offence which such answers may tend to show he was committed. The examination of the accused under section 313 Cr PC in the very criminal proceeding itself does not violate Article 20 (3) of the Constitution and the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration, obviously against the accused himself also in such trial or even in any other trial, Also. The confessional statement of an accused recorded under section 164 Cr PC is admissible as evidence against him in criminal trial and this is so even if the confession has been retracted by the accused. The evidentiary value of a retracted confession is indeed a separate consideration not relevant for our present purpose. Section 315 Cr PC permits an accused to be a witness for the defence in a criminal trial and also permits the accused to give evidence on oath in disproof of the charges made against him. There is no violation of the protection of testimonial compulsion if the accused, of his own accord, prefers to examine himself as a witness in the criminal case to disprove the charges brought against him, because there is no compulsion against him to examine himself and it is no compulsion that the accused chooses to examine himself as witness in disproof of the charges which he does obviously to protect his own interest. If that is the position regarding the applicability of the rule against testimonial compulsion in the criminal trial itself, it is only quite untenable to say that there will be violation of the rule against testimonial compulsion if the accused-defendant files any defence or examines himself in the civil suit in order to protect his own interest therein. ( 8 ) IN T. G. Gaokar v. R. N. Shukla, AIR 1968 SC 1050 there were simultaneous proceedings against the appellant one, a criminal prosecution in court under section 135 of the Sea Customs Act and the other, a proceeding before the Customs Authority for imposition of penalty under section 112, Sea Customs Act, 1962. The Customs Authority, during the pendency of the criminal proceedings in court issued a notice to the appellant to show cause why the seized smuggled gold should not be confiscated under section 111 of the Sea Customs Act and why a penalty should not be imposed on him under section 112 of the same Act. The Customs Authority, during the pendency of the criminal proceedings in court issued a notice to the appellant to show cause why the seized smuggled gold should not be confiscated under section 111 of the Sea Customs Act and why a penalty should not be imposed on him under section 112 of the same Act. Identical issues arise in proceedings for imposition of penalty under section 112 (b) of the Sea Customs Act, 1962 and in a trial for an offence punishable under section 135 (b) of the same Act. In paragraph 5 of the decision in T. G. Gaokar v. R. N. Shukla (supra) the Supreme Court observed that the Customs Officers had a discretion to stay the proceedings under sections 111 and 112 during the pendency of the trial in the criminal court and when in exercise of that discretion they refused to stay the proceedings and it was not shown that their action was mala fide or arbitrary, the court would not issue a mandamus to control this exercise of their discretion. The appellant also took a plea before the Supreme Court that the proceedings under sections 111 and 112 of the sea Customs Act were in violation of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution and that unless the proceedings were stayed the appellant would be compelled to enter the witness box to rebut the evidence of one X and would be forced in cross-examination to give answers incriminating himself, The Supreme Court repelled this contention of the appellant and in this connection made the following illuminating observations in paragraph 6 of the decision :"the appellant is, therefore, a person accused of an offence. But it is not possible at this stage to say that he is compelled to be a witness against himself. There is no compulsion on him to enter the witness box. He may, if he chooses, not appear as a witness in the proceedings under sections 111 and 112. The necessity to enter the witness box for substantiating his defence is not such a compulsion as would attract the protection of Article 20 (3 ). Even in a criminal trial any person accused of an offence is a competent witness for the defence under section 342a of the Criminal procedure Code and may give evidence on oath in disproof of the charge, made against him. Even in a criminal trial any person accused of an offence is a competent witness for the defence under section 342a of the Criminal procedure Code and may give evidence on oath in disproof of the charge, made against him. It may be very necessary for the accused person to enter the witness box for substantiating his defence. But this is not reason for saying that the criminal trial compels him to be a witness against himself and is in violation of Article 20 (3 ). Compulsion in the context of Article 20 (3) must proceed from another person or authority. He is not compelled to be a witness if he voluntarily gives evidence in his defence. "it may be noted here that section 342 A referred to in the above question corresponds to section 315 of the present Criminal 'procedure Code. The decision of the Supreme Court in T. G. Gaokar v. R. N. Shukla (supra) is thus a complete answer to the fallacious idea that the continuation of civil suit or departmental proceeding during the pendency of criminal proceeding is a violation of Article 20 (3 ). ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court decision in Dushyant Somal v. Sushma Somal, AIR 1981 SC 1026 is also very relevant in this connection. In substance a question was raised before the Supreme Court whether during the pendency of a criminal case under section 363 IPC against the husband for kidnapping the child, the wife could simultaneously maintain and proceed with writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution against the husband for production of the child and whether the husband could be compelled in the writ proceeding to disclose his defence in the criminal case, by leading evidence on his side and by cross-examining the wife and her witness in her writ proceeding. The husband's contention was that such a course would offended against Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. In repelling the said argument advanced on behalf of the husband, the Supreme Court observed thus in paragraph 5 in Dushyant Somal v. Sushma Somal (supra) :"there was no question at all of compelling the appellant petitioner to be a witness against himself. He was free to examine himself as a witness or not. If he examined himself he could still refuse to answer questions, answers to which might incriminate him in pending prosecutions. He was free to examine himself as a witness or not. If he examined himself he could still refuse to answer questions, answers to which might incriminate him in pending prosecutions. He also free to examine or not other witness on his own behalf and to crossexamine or not witnesses examined by the opposite party. Protection against testimonial compulsion did not convert the position of a person accused of an offence into a position of privilege, with immunity from any other action contemplated by law. A criminal prosecution was not a fortress against all other actions in law. 'to accept the position that the pendency of a prosecution was a valid answer to a rule for Habeas Corpus would be to subvert the judicial process and to mock at the Criminal Justice system. All that Article 20 (3) guaranteed was that a person accused of an offence shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, nothing less and certainly, nothing more. Immunity against testimonial compulsion did not extend to refusal to examine and cross-examine witnesses and it was not open to a party proceeding (sic) (proceeded against) to refuse to examine himself or anyone else as a witness on his side and to cross-examine the witnesses for the opposite party on the ground of testimonial compulsion and then to contend that no relief should be given to the opposite party on the basis of evidence adduced by the other party. We are unable to see how Article 20 (3) comes to the picture at all. "these decisions of the Supreme Court in Dushyant Somal v. Sushma Sound (supra) and T. G. Gaokar v. R. N. Shukla (supra), amongst others, demonstrate that it is wholly untenable to say that the continuance of a civil suit or a departmental proceeding during the pendency of the criminal case relating to the same matter will be violative of Article 20 (3) which affords protection against testimonial compulsion. The position in law is very clear that if an accused makes any statement not under any compulsion in the sense in which the term has been referred to in Article 20 (3) but voluntarily for the purpose of his own convenience or for protecting his own interest or for any reason whatsoever including the purpose of inviting punishment even, as happens when he voluntarily pleads guilty or makes confession under section 164 Cr PC, that does not bring the case within the ambit of Article 20 (3 ). We therefore reiterate that the accused cannot stall a civil suit or a departmental proceeding during the pendency of a criminal proceeding on the ground of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution which is not at all available for such purpose for reasons elaborately discussed above. The assumption of the trial court that the continuance of the civil suit during the pendency of the criminal proceeding would be a violation of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution is not correct. Incidentally it has to be mentioned here that a person appearing as a witness in a case may be compelled to answer any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in that its inspite of the fact that such answer may incriminate him, but in such case the proviso to section 132 of the Evidence Act gives necessary protection to the witness that the answer which the witness may be compelled to give shall not be proved against him in any criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer. Thus section 132 of the Evidence Act gives so much of protection as will ensure the protection of Art. 20 (3 ). Thus, in the suit if the defendant appears as a witness on his own behalf and is then compelled to give an incriminatory answer, such answer can no doubt be used in the suit, but the same cannot be used against him in the Criminal proceeding in view of the proviso to section 132 of the Evidence Act. This is the protection which the accused is entitled to, and he will have it, but such protection cannot be extended to a fanciful and unreasonable extent in every situation under the sun by treating the accused as a privileged person immune from all accountability in respect of civil liability or other non-criminal liability. This is the protection which the accused is entitled to, and he will have it, but such protection cannot be extended to a fanciful and unreasonable extent in every situation under the sun by treating the accused as a privileged person immune from all accountability in respect of civil liability or other non-criminal liability. Stay of the civil suit, as a mandatory preposition, is thus wholly untenable. ( 10 ) THE learned trial Judge, in this connection also relied upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court, namely Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Van, AIR 1960 SC 806 and Tata Oil Mills Company v. D. Workmen, AIR 1965 SC 155 . It is however to be mentioned that in none of those cases Article 20 (3) was canvassed in support of the plea for stay of the departmental enquiry pending criminal proceedings on same facts. It is evident that no such plea of Art. 20 (3) was raised in those cases because the said Article was patently not available for staying a departmental enquiry pending the disposal of a criminal proceeding for reasons discussed above. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills V. Kaushal Van, AIR 1960 SC 806 the facts as relevant for our purpose were thus. A charge was brought against an employee regarding theft of cycle. Over the same matter both disciplinary proceeding and criminal case were started against the concerned employee. The employee did not participate in the disciplinary proceeding on the ground that the criminal case was pending and he did not want to produce any defence till the matter was decided by the court. The disciplinary proceeding was however completed and the employee was dismissed from service. The employer company made an application under section 33 (2), Industrial Disputes Act to the tribunal for approval of action taken against the employee. Before the matter came up for hearing before the tribunal the criminal court acquitted the accused employee on the ground that the case against him was not free from doubt. In view of such order of criminal court the tribunal refused to approve the order of dismissal of the employee. The employer company then approached the Supreme Court on appeal by special leave. In view of such order of criminal court the tribunal refused to approve the order of dismissal of the employee. The employer company then approached the Supreme Court on appeal by special leave. The Supreme Court in paragraph 3 of the Sold decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Van (supra) observed that it was true that very often employers stayed enquires pending the decision of the criminal trial courts and that was also fair, but it could not be said that principles of natural justice required that an employer must wait for the decision at least of the criminal trial court before taking action against an employee. It was however added by the Supreme Court that if the case was of a grave nature or involved questions of fact or law, which were not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case might not be prejudiced. It is however evident that despite its advisory observations, the Supreme Court in that decision says in categorical terms that it cannot be said that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for the decision of the criminal trial court before taking action against an employee. Not only that in that decision, inspite of the order of acquittal of the employee by the criminal court the Supreme Court upheld the order of dismissal passed against the employee by the employer on completion of departmental enquiry on the self-same allegation before the conclusion of the criminal trial. This decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills, for from assisting the respondents defendants and far from supporting the view taken by the trial court rather demonstrates that even during the pendency of the criminal proceeding in respect of the self-same matter a departmental enquiry against the accused employee can be concluded by the employer and on the basic of such enquiry the employee may even be dismissed from service and such dismissal may be upheld notwithstanding the fact that the criminal court on trial acquitted the accused employee on the ground that the case against him was not free from doubt. ( 11 ) THE next case relied upon by the trial court is the decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Oil Mills v. Workmen. ( 11 ) THE next case relied upon by the trial court is the decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Oil Mills v. Workmen. AIR 1965 SC 155 . The facts relevant for our purpose as involved in the said case are thus. On the allegation that the employees assaulted another employee of the company while he was returning home after performing his duty, a departmental enquiry and a criminal proceeding were started. On conclusion of the departmental enquiry the company applied to the Industrial Tribunal for approval of dismissal of the delinquent employees and the approval was granted and the employees were dismissed from service. The respondent Union of the workmen raised an industrial dispute regarding dismissal of one of the employees and the tribunal held that the dismissal of the employee was not justified and ordered for his reinstatement. Against that order the company came up before the Supreme Court by special leave. It may be noted here that the industrial tribunal also took the view that since criminal proceeding had been started against the employee, domestic enquiry should have been stayed till disposal of the criminal proceeding. The Supreme Court look note of its earlier decision in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd (supra) holding it, desirable that if the incident giving rise to the charge framed against a workman in domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal court, the employer should stay the domestic enquiry pending the final disposal of the criminal case. The Supreme Court observed (in Tarn Oil Mills) that it would be particularly appropriate to adopt such course where the charge against the workman is of a grave character because in such a case it would be unfair to compel the workman to disclose the defence which he might take before the criminal court. The Supreme Court then in paragraph 9 of the decision in Tata Oil Mills (supra) went ahead observing thus:-"but to say that domestic enquires may be stayed pending criminal trial is very different from anything (sic) that if an employer procceds with the domestic enquiry inspite of the fact that the criminal trial is pending, the enquiry for that reason alone is vitiated and the conclusion reached in such an enquiry is either bad in law or mala fide. In fairness, we ought to add that Mr. In fairness, we ought to add that Mr. Menon did not seek to justify this extreme proposition. Therefore we must hold that the industrial tribunal was in error when it characterised the result of the domestic enquiry as malafide partly because the enquiry was not stayed pending the criminal proceedings against Raghavan. We accordingly hold that the domestic enquiry in this case was property hold and fairly conducted and the conclusions of fact reached by the Enquiry officer are based on evidence which he accepted as true. "the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal and answered the reference made to it in favour of the appellant, that is, the employer company. This decision of the Supreme Court also thus does not propose to lay down any concrete or inflexible rule that in case of simultaneous proceedings, such as, the departmental enquiry and the criminal proceeding the former should be stayed invariably. Inspite of observations regarding the desirability of the course to be adopted in certain circumstances the Supreme Court in that case maintained the order of dismissal passed in the departmental enquiry by the employer during the pendency of the criminal proceeding. ( 12 ) THE learned trial court in this connection also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Kusheshwar Dubey v. M/s. Bharat at Coking Coal Limited, AIR 1988 SC 2118 . The facts of that case as relevant for our purpose may be stated thus. On the ground of assaulting a Supervising Officer, an employee of the company was subjected to disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecution. The employee brought an action in civil court, that is, that court of Munsif in which the civil court ordered stay of further proceedings in the disciplinary action till disposal of the criminal case. There was so appeal against that order but the appeal was dismissed. The matter then came up before the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The High Court however lifted the stay. The matter then went to the Supreme Court by special leave. It is indeed true that the Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court and restored the trial court's order of stay as affirmed in appeal, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court however lifted the stay. The matter then went to the Supreme Court by special leave. It is indeed true that the Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court and restored the trial court's order of stay as affirmed in appeal, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. But the significant thing to be noted in this connection is that although invited to settle the law in a strait jacket formula as judicial opinion appeared to be conflicting, the Supreme Court observed that the court did not propose to heard such a step as that would create greater hardship ad individual situations may not be available to be met and thereby injustice was likely to ensue. The Supreme Court took notice of the judicial pronouncements in the matter including its own decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Limited and Tata Oil Mills Company Limited (supra ). The Supreme Court however in paragraph 3 of Kusheshwar Dubey v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coat Limited (supra) observed thus:"we would like to point out that there are is, authorities in support of the position that there is nothing wrong in parallel proceedings being taken-one by way of the disciplinary proceeding and the other in criminal court. "after quoting certain observations from its earlier decisions in Delhi Cloth and General Mills ( AIR 1960 SC 806 ). Tata Oil Mills ( AIR 1965 SC 155 ) and Jang Bahadur Singh. v. Baijnath Taiwari ( AIR 1969 SC 30 ), the Supreme Court in the decision in Kusheshwar Dubey (supra) in paragraph 6 observed thus :"the view expressed in the three cases of this court seem to support the position that while there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet there may be cases where it could be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent/employee to seek such and order of stay or injunction from the court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the court will decide in the given circumstances in a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the court will decide in the given circumstances in a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. As we have already stated that it is neither possible not advisable to evolve a hard and fast strait Jaket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation. For the disposal of the present case we do not think it necessary to say anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down any general guideline. " (Emphasis supplied ). It is therefore patent and cleat that the Supreme Court in Kusheshwar Dubey (supra) has, in unambiguous language, on review of its earlier decisions, clearly held that it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any hard and fast strait jacket formula in this matter valid for all cases and for general application. 'the law has been made clear that there is no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken but the question whether in any particular case, a departmental proceeding is to be stayed till disposal of the criminal case has to be decided on the facts and circumstances obtaining in the particular case. As we have seen, inspite of invitation to lay down the law in a strait jacket formula in the matter, the Supreme Court in Kusheshwar Dubey (supra) has refused to evolve any such hard and fast formula. The matter therefore is left to the judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the facts and circumstances in each case. ( 13 ) IN this connection the learned trial court has also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in M. S. Sheriff. v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397 . The facts of the case as relevant for our present purpose may be stated thus. There were prosecutions in criminal court for perjury under section 193 IPC against two Sub-Inspectors of Police for denying the allegation of wrongful confinement and also there were civil suits against them for damages for wrongful confinement. In all these matters a common question involved was whether there was wrongful confinement. There were prosecutions in criminal court for perjury under section 193 IPC against two Sub-Inspectors of Police for denying the allegation of wrongful confinement and also there were civil suits against them for damages for wrongful confinement. In all these matters a common question involved was whether there was wrongful confinement. The question that was raised before the Supreme Court in that back-ground was that the simultaneous prosecution of those matters, namely, the prosecutions started for perjury and the civil suits for damages for wrongful confinement, would embarrass the accused. The Supreme Court however felt, as recorded in paragraph 14 of the said decision (bid), that the simultaneous prosecution of the criminal proceedings and the civil suits would embarrass the accused and the court therefore had to consider the question of determining as to which should be stayed in that decision the Supreme Court then recorded thus :-"15. As between civil and criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No. hard and fast rule can be laid down. But we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment. 16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure: that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This however is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This however is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, civil case or the other criminal proceedings may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution order under section 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suit should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished. " (Emphasis supplied ). ' It is therefore evident that here also the Supreme Court refused to lay down any hard and fast rule in the matter. The matter has been rather left to be decided in the particularities of the facts and circumstances in each case. It is also to be pointed out here that the difference between the factual aspects in the case of M. S. Sheriff v. State of Madras (supra) and the present case cannot be unnoticed. In the case of M. S. Sheriff the civil suits were filed for damages for wrongful confinement whereas in the suit involved in is present matter the plaintiff prayed for delivery of shares or for the value thereof for which the plaintiff allegedly made advance payments to the defendants. If the plaintiffs claim is true, then it can be easily appreciated that the plaintiff will have to continue to suffer undue monetary deprivation of fund to the extent of an amount around a crore of rupees which was parted with by the plaintiff earlier. Such financial deprivation related in depletion of fund is not suffered in a case where the plaintiff files a suit for damages for wrongful confinement. The former is a case of recoupment of fund already spent while the latter is a case of enrichment of fund. Stay in a case of the former nature is likely to cause greater hardship to the plaintiff than in a case of the latter nature, for obvious reason. Thus factually also the Supreme Court decision in M. S. Sheriff v. State of Madras (supra) is clearly distinguishable. Stay in a case of the former nature is likely to cause greater hardship to the plaintiff than in a case of the latter nature, for obvious reason. Thus factually also the Supreme Court decision in M. S. Sheriff v. State of Madras (supra) is clearly distinguishable. ( 14 ) IN Kusheswar v. Bharat at Coking Coal Limited (supra) the concerned proceedings were a departmental enquiry and a criminal proceeding and not a suit and a criminal proceeding as is the case here in the present case. The learned Advocate for the respondents submitted that in the said Supreme Court decision in Kusheswar Dubey (supra) the Supreme Court took note of the fact that criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings were grounded upon same set of facts and since in the present case also the civil suit and the criminal proceeding are based on same set of facts the civil suit should be stayed. In our opinion the fact that the two actions were based on the same set of facts were indeed not intended by the Supreme Court to be a universal deciding factor for determining that the departmental proceeding or the suit must be stayed, firstly because the question of stay in such a case will arise only where the two proceedings are based on same set of facts and if that were the universal deciding factor the Supreme Court would have laid down the 'rule that in all such cases the departmental proceeding or the civil suit will have to be stayed till the disposol of the criminal case because they are based on same set of facts as it must always be in cases of this nature which the Supreme Court did not do and secondly because the Supreme Court rather specifically recognised the legal position that there is no legal bar for simultaneous Proceedings. Having regard to what has been discussed above we are of the opinion that the position of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in its various discussed above does not require mandatory that the civil suit in the present matter must be stayed. Having regard to what has been discussed above we are of the opinion that the position of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in its various discussed above does not require mandatory that the civil suit in the present matter must be stayed. We are also of the opinion that in considering the question whether the civil suit should be stayed in the present matter the monitory deprivation of fund which the plaintiff has been allegedly suffering should not be lost sight of, and indeed it is desirable that the plaintiffs claim also should be decided early on trial, one way or the other without shunting it to the dumping ground of immobility. We are therefore of the opinion that the court in this case should be slow in leaning towards a decision to stay the civil suit. Rather both civil and criminal actions may be allowed to proceed simultaneously in the present matter.