S. R. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) - This is an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal which is time barred by 471 days. When the appeal was presented a Bench of this Court directed the appellant to serve copies of the application upon the opposite parties by registered post with acknowledgment due and thereafter the matter be listed. When the case was listed on 17th of June. 1996 after perusing the application under section 5 we were not satisfied that the case for condonation of delay is made out. However, the order passed on 17th of June, 1996 was not signed as the learned Counsel for the appellant wanted to address the court in support of section 5 application. Accordingly, the case was posted today. ( 2 ) WE have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant at some length. ( 3 ) THE reasons mentioned in the application under section 5 are as follows:"hundreds of claim cases arising out of Motor Car accidents are filed each year in different Tribunals all throughout the country in which the petitioner is made a party and it is difficult for the petitioner to follow up proceedings of each case by contracting lawyers and as such the usual procedure followed by your petitioner is to entrust a case to a particular Advocate who is required to keep your petitioner posted with the development from time to time. The said MACC No. 134 of 1980 was entrusted to an Advocate practising in Alipore Court who was to act in accordance with the said procedure. The last information about the position of the said case was intimated to the petitioner by the said learned Advocate as per his letter dated 25th April, 1980. Thereafter no information in regard to the position of the case received by the concerned Divisional office at the petitioner at Howrah. "in paragraph 7 (b) it has also been stated as follows:"on or about l2th January, 1993 your petitioner received a letter dated 29. 12. 92 from its Head Office at New Delhi enclosing therewith a notice dated 28. 11. 92 received from the opposite party No. 1 asking for the reason as to why the award dated 4. 10. 91 passed in the said matter was not satisfied. 12. 92 from its Head Office at New Delhi enclosing therewith a notice dated 28. 11. 92 received from the opposite party No. 1 asking for the reason as to why the award dated 4. 10. 91 passed in the said matter was not satisfied. " ( 4 ) THEREAFTER it has been stated that enquiry was made and applying for the copy the appeal was filed. ( 5 ) A perusal of the explanation would go to show that the real cause shown in support of the condonation is the administrative exigency and as a matter of fact it does not disclose the reasons that who was the advocate who was entrusted with the case and once a letter as far back as on 25th of April. 1980 was received from the said Advocate who is said to have been entrusted with the case. Thereafter it was the duty of the Divisional Office or any other office having authorisation to look after the case pending before the claims Tribunal to find cut as to what happened in the case and for a period of about 13 years, the office was sleeping over the matter and it is only on 12th of January, 1993 when a letter from the Head Office, New Delhi was received then the Divisional Office started making enquiry of the case. It is not a case where from the very beginning the appellant has no knowledge of the case, but, on the other hand, they received notice and they also appeared before the Claims Tribunal, but on the later days the case was taken up for hearing on 2. 8. 89, 20th of March, 1990, 31st of July, 1990, 5th and 19th of February, 1991 and 25th of September, 1991. The case was taken up as we find from the judgment impugned which are as follows: ( 6 ) IN presence of Sri Dipak Kumar Mukherjee Advocate for the petitioners and of Sri T. K. Banerjee, Advocate for opposite party No. 2 and of Sri S. Guha Thakurata, Advocate-for O. P. No. 2 (a), in the memo pertaining to the judgment Oriental Insurance Company, appellant as opposite party No, 2 and National Insurance Co. as opposite party No. 2 (a) though in the application in support of the condonation application it has stated that it is true that on earlier days, the learned Counsel for the appellant was present but on the last date of the hearing, inspite of the repeated call he was not present which is said to be taken out of the order sheet of that date said to have been supplied by the learned Counsel for the appellant. It is a clear case of sheer negligence on the part of the appellant in pursuing this case and we are not satisfied that the explanation offered in support of section 5 application makes out a case and if it is the negligence on the part of the office or there is no material before us to show that the office of the appellant has done its duty and it was the mistake on the part of the learned Counsel in not looking after the case. A class one officer of the State Bank met with an accident. He was about 38 years of age. The Insurance Company carrying on a business towards the miseries of human being arising out of accident is supposed to deal with the cases of compensation with due diligence. It is obvious on the record of the present claim case that there was no system in the administrative department of the appellant (insurance Company) and the authorities have voluntarily neglected in pursuing the matter although the matter was kept pending before the claims Tribunal for such a long period of about 13 years. ( 7 ) SECTION 5 of the Limitation Act extends prescribed period of limitation in filling an application or an appeal. What constitute sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra AIR 1976 SC 237 , the Appex Court held that the discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallised to as to convert a discretionary matter into rigid rule of law. The Apex Court has further said that the expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In New India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra AIR 1976 SC 237 , the Appex Court held that the discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallised to as to convert a discretionary matter into rigid rule of law. The Apex Court has further said that the expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. As has been held in Inder Singh v. Kanshiram AIR 19 17 Privy Council it was observed that the true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal in such matter what is relevant consideration for exercising the discretionary that unless want of bonafides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. ( 8 ) IT is true that in Lala Mata v. A Narayan (1970) 2 SCR page 90 the Apex Court held that there is no general proposition that a mistake of a learned Counsel by Itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bonafide or was merely a devise to cover an ulterior purpose. The crux of the matter is that when the mistake of a learned counsel was a bonaflde then section 5 is clearly attracted. Whether there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is an essentially a question of fact depending upon the facts circumstances of a case. It is also to be taken note of that in the normal course the leaning of the court to decide a matter on merit and when a question of discretion of exercising the jurisdiction under section 5 of the Limitation Act arises as stated earlier it should receive a liberal construction but when a party with a false plea to get rid of limitation-barred by not supplying the materials so that the bonafide of a party could be considered. The Court should not encourage such a person by condoning the delay in the present case when the claim petition on the death of a person was filed in the year 1980 we have already observed that the delay has not been explained and the reasons mentioned in support of section 5 application are not bonafide. The Court should not encourage such a person by condoning the delay in the present case when the claim petition on the death of a person was filed in the year 1980 we have already observed that the delay has not been explained and the reasons mentioned in support of section 5 application are not bonafide. Accordingly we are satisfied from, the materials on the record that no sufficient cause has been made out for condoning the delay. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay under section 5 is rejected. The appeal becomes incompetent and accordingly, it is dismissed as incompetent. The stay order, if any, stands vacated. The learned Counsels for the parties are permitted to take out the gist of the order. S. Narayan, J.-I agree appeal dismissed