JUDGMENT M. Srinivasan, C. J.—The plaintiff in the suit is the appellant before us. It is a Co-operative Society doing business of growing fruits, marketing and processing the same. The plaintiff entered into a contract for hiring cold storage with the defendants for the purpose of storing its apple boxes The terms and conditions of the contract are admittedly incorporated in the letter dated 3-9-1979 marked as Ex. P-2 written by the plaintiff to the second defendant as well as Ex. P-3, which contains the remaining terms and conditions, as found in every receipt issued by the 2nd defendant to the plaintiff as and when the apple boxes are received for the purpose of keeping in the cold storage. According to the plaintiff, the defendants did not deliver the apple boxes entrusted with them and committed breach of contract on account of which the plaintiff suffered a loss of about Rs 1,05,961 50. which represented the value of fruit boxes withheld by the defendants After adjusting a sum of Rs. 58,240 being the storage charges till the middle of July 1980, the plaintiff claimed a sum of Rs, 47,721.50 as due from the defendants The plaintiff also claimed interest/damages to the tune of Rs. 3,579.10 and a sum of Rs. 249.40 for notice charges etc. Thus, a total amount of Rs. 51,550 was claimed by the plaintiff in the present suit. The suit was filed on 23-12-1980. 2. The defendants resisted the suit by contending that the plaintiff committed breach of the terms and conditions of the contract by failing to pay the storage charges on account of its financial difficulties. The payments made by the plaintiff intermittently left a balance of Rs 44,433 18 due as rent in the month of June 1980 Inspire of various demands and requests, the plaintiff did not pay the same The plaintiff issued a post dated cheque for Rs. 10,000, which was dishonoured by the plaintiffs banker The defendants kept the apple boxes till 1-3-1981, but they were compelled to auction the same The auction was held after due publicity by advertisement in the Newspaper and by issue of band bills. After adjusting the price of Rs 22,545 realized in the said auction, the amount due from the plaintiff was claimed in the written statement by way of a counter-claim. After adjusting the price of Rs 22,545 realized in the said auction, the amount due from the plaintiff was claimed in the written statement by way of a counter-claim. The defendants prayed for a decree in their favour for a sum of Rs. 78,007 98 paise, 3. The plaintiff filed a replication. Besides re-iterating the claim made in the plaint and denying the averments in the written statement, the plaintiff contested the claim made in the counterclaim. The plaintiff also contended that the counter-claim was not maintainable, as there was no notice, as required by section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 197!. The factual particulars given by the defendants in the counter-claim were also disputed by the plaintiff 4. The learned Judge, who tried the suit held that the plaintiff was guilty of breach of contract and was liable to pay a sum of Rs. 64,265.38 to the defendants The learned Judge over-ruled the objection raised by the plaintiff as to the maintainability of the counter-claim construing the provisions of Order 8, Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judge held that no notice was necessary under section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act to file a counter-claim, as contended by the plaintiff. The learned Judge placed reliance on a judgment of the Privy Council in Hansraj Gupta and others v. Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electricity Tramway Co. Ltd, 1933 PC 63, and on a judgment of the Lahore High Court in Secretary of State v. Kundan Singh and others, AIR 1932 Lahore 374. Thus, the learned Judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiff and granted a decree in favour of the defendants for a sum of Rs. 64,265.38 as against the plaintiff. 5- The aggrieved plaintiff has preferred this appeal. The plaintiffs counsel has raised the following contentions before us : (a) The terms of the contract as between the parties as evident from Ex P-2 and Ex. P-3 were modified by the conduct of the parties and under such modified terms, it was not incumbent on the part of the plaintiff to pay the storage charges before taking delivery of the goods. P-3 were modified by the conduct of the parties and under such modified terms, it was not incumbent on the part of the plaintiff to pay the storage charges before taking delivery of the goods. (b) The plaintiff has been making payments periodically to the defendants on running account9 basis and it was not open to the defendants to insist upon a separate payment when the plaintiff sought delivery of 4509 of apple boxes in July 1980, (c) The defendants caused severe loss to the plaintiff by delaying the sale of the apples and if they had sold it earlier than March 1981, they would have realized proper market value of the fruits, which would have been much more than what was realized in the auction held in March 198L (d) The counter-claim filed by the defendants was cot maintainable in view of the mandatory provision of section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act and the failure on the part of the defendants to issue a notice under the said section before filing the counter-claim. 6. We shall now advert to the aforesaid contentions of the plaintiffs counsel seriatim : 7. Contention (a).—There is absolutely no merit whatever in the first contention that the terms and conditions of the contract were modified by the conduct of the parties. No evidence has been placed before us in support of the said contention, nor has such a stand been taken either in the pleadings or in the evidence by the plaintiff at any time Reliance is placed only on the circumstance that payments were being made periodically by the plaintiff to the defendants and not on the due dates, as per the contract It is rightly pointed out by the learned trial Judge that at no time, the plaintiff had ever made any excess payment than what was due and on all occasions, the payments made by the plaintiff were much less than what was due to the defendants We reject the first contention as wholly unsustainable in the absence of any pleading or evidence to support the same. S. Contention (6)—There is equally no merit in the second contention. 8. The statement of account, which is marked as Ex. S. Contention (6)—There is equally no merit in the second contention. 8. The statement of account, which is marked as Ex. DW 4/1 shows that the plaintiff was making payments as and when it chose to do so with out any relevance to the amount due on the dates of such payments. For example, a sum of Rs 10,000 was paid by the plaintiff in December 1979 and the next payment was made only on 4th February, 1980, when a sum of Rs 1,000 was pail. On 18th February, 1980, a sum of Rs 2,000 was paid. Till that date, the total amount paid by the plaintiff was Rs 38,905, whereas the amount due to the defendants by way of rental charges was Rs, 1,58,459 on that date. The last entry in the statement was made on 31st March, 1980, on which date a sum of Rs 3,500 was paid by the plaintiff by cheque. Upto that date, the total amount paid was Rs 1,82,635, but the amount due to the defendants was Rs. 2,14,413. 68. Thus, there was a debit balance of Rs. 31,778.68. For the subsequent period from 1-4-1980 to 31-3-1981, the statement of account is marked as Ex. DW 4/2. The position is in no way different from Ex. DW 4/i. As per the account in Ex, DW 4/2, a sum of Rs. 78,007 98 was due from the plaintiff to the defendants. The said statement also shows the amount spent by the defendants for printing and posting etc, of hand bills. By no stretch of imagination can the account between the plaintiff and the defendants bi said to be a running account. It was also not the plea raised by the plaintiff before the trial Court. The plaintiff has always been a defaulter in the matter of payment of rental charges due to the defendants Hence the second contention is rejected. 9. Contention (c) —There is absolutely no merit in the contention that the defendants should have sold the fruits much earlier than March 1981, If they had done so, the plaintiff would have made a complaint that without giving reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff to make the payment and take delivery of the fruits, the defendants had hurriedly sold the same. Contention (c) —There is absolutely no merit in the contention that the defendants should have sold the fruits much earlier than March 1981, If they had done so, the plaintiff would have made a complaint that without giving reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff to make the payment and take delivery of the fruits, the defendants had hurriedly sold the same. The defendants gave as much time as possible to the plaintiff and repeatedly called upon the plaintiff to take away the apples either by paying the amount due to them or furnishing surety for the value. It was only after they found out that the plaintiff had not kept its part of the contract the defendants had taken steps to hold the auction. The evidence on record has been fully discussed by the learned trial Judge. We do not find it necessary to repeat the exercise in this judgment. The defendants had given sufficient publicity before holding the auction. There is no explanation on the part of the plaintiff as to why it did not choose to get hold of a person, who would buy the fruits after paying the rental charges due to the defendants If the goods were really very valuable, as contended by the plaintiff, it would have definitely taken the necessary steps to get the goods sold for the best price to a person, who was interested in buying the same The plaintiff would have certainly made arrangement for such a sale and not allowed the defendants to auction the goods. Hence we reject the third contention also. 10. Contention (d).-In support of this contention , learned Counsel has referred to the language of section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1971 and submitted that it is pari materia with section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also contended by him that the language is mandatory and no suit can be instituted against any Society without a notice being issued and delivered, as required by the section Elaborating his contention, learned Counsel has drawn our attention to the provisions of Order 8, Rule 6. It is also contended by him that the language is mandatory and no suit can be instituted against any Society without a notice being issued and delivered, as required by the section Elaborating his contention, learned Counsel has drawn our attention to the provisions of Order 8, Rule 6. A of the Code of Civil Procedure Reliance is placed on sub rules (2) and (4) of Rule 6-A. According to the said sub rules, a counter-claim filed under sub rule (1) shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim and that the counter claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the" rules applicable to plaints. It is. therefore, argued that the counter claim m the present case, which should be treated as a plaint for al purpose should have been preceded by a notice under section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, and in the absence of such notice the counter-claim is not maintainable. Learned Counsel has stated frank v that there is no direct authority on the point and that the matter is res Integra However learned Counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench of Madras High Court in Kathersa Romhe y Abdul Rohim Sahib and others, AIR 1942 Mad 580 The Division Bench held in that case that a defendant who pleads a set off under Order 8 Rule 6 it bound by Order 2. Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is deemed to be a plaintiff within the meaning of the said Rule and consequently has to suffer the consequences of an omission. The Bench held that if he omits to include part of the claim to set off which he is entitled to make he has for ever lost his right to the part of the claim omitted and a subsequent suit in respect of it is barred. 11. We are unable to appreciate how the said judgment would help the appellant in this case. Even if it is an omission in the written state meat of a plea, which the defendant might and ought to have raised therein, he would be barred subsequently from raising the plea in a later proceeding. 11. We are unable to appreciate how the said judgment would help the appellant in this case. Even if it is an omission in the written state meat of a plea, which the defendant might and ought to have raised therein, he would be barred subsequently from raising the plea in a later proceeding. On the same principle, the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 would apply to a set off claim in the written statement by virtue of Order 8, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12 Our attention is drawn to a judgment of Bombay High Court in Manikchand Fulchand Katariya v. Lalchand Harakchand Katariya, AIR 1994 Bora 196. The questions before the Bombay High Court were whether the counter claim is limited to a money suit only and whether in a suit for injunction filed by the plaintiff, counter-claim for a decree for possession could be made by the defendant. The Court answered the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative. While doing so, the Court set out the provisions of Rule 6-A of Order 8 of the Code and observed that the defendant in a suit may set up by way of counter claim any right or claim in respect to a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after filing of the suit but before he had delivered his defence or before the time limit for delivering of defence has expired. The learned Judge observed that the very object of Rule 6-A is to treat a counter-claim as an independent suit to be heard together with the plaintiffs suit to enable the Court to pronounce final judgment and, therefore, a counter-claim was not confined to a money suit. We do not find anything in the judgment to support the contention of the appellant herein. 13. Learned Counsel has placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jag Mohan Chawla and another v. Dera Radha Swami Satsang and others, (996) 4 SCC 699 The Supreme Court has held in that case that in a suit for perpetual injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff to a particular property, the defendant could make a counter-claim with reference to an independent cause of action relating to another property. The Court observed : “The counter-claim could be treated as a cross-suit and it could be decided in the same suit without relegating the parties to a fresh suit . ...... Thereby, it is no longer confirmed to money claim or to cause of action of the same nature as original action of the plaintiff. It need not relate to or be connected with the original cause of action or matter pleaded by the plaintiff. The words any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing with the defendant would show that the cause of action from which the counter-claim arises need not necessarily arise from or have any nexus with the cause of action of the plaintiff that occasioned to lay the suit. The only limitation is that the cause of action should arise before the time fixed for filing the written statement expires. The defendant may set up a cause of action which has accrued to him even after the institution of the suit. The counter-claim expressly is treated as a cross-suit with all the indicia of pleadings as a plaint including the duty to aver his cause of action and also payment of the requisite court fee thereon. Instead of relegating the defendant to an independent suit, to avert multiplicity of the proceeding and needless protection (sic protraction), the legislature intended to try both the suit and the counter-claim in the same suit as suit and cross-suit and have them disposed of in the same trial. In other words, a defendant can claim any right by way of a counter-claim in respect of any cause of action that has accrued to him even though it is independent of the cause of action averred by the plain tiff and have the same cause of action adjudicated without relegating the defendant to file a separate suit. Acceptance of the contention of the appellant tends to defeat the purpose of amendment." 14. This judgment does not also help the appellant in the present case. The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the question, which has arisen before us. 15. We have already referred to the fact that the learned trial Judge has negatived the contention of the plaintiff on this question. This judgment does not also help the appellant in the present case. The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the question, which has arisen before us. 15. We have already referred to the fact that the learned trial Judge has negatived the contention of the plaintiff on this question. The relevant part of the judgment of the learned Judge reads as follows : "It is nowhere provided under Order VIII, Rule 6-A of the Code that the counter-claim is a separate suit, although it has the effect of a cross suit. A counter-claim is to be decided in the suit in which it is filed Only one final judgment is to be pronounced meaning thereby that the suit remains one. The filing of a counter-claim does not convert the original suit into two suits and two Judgments and two decrees are not to be delivered. Order VIII, Rule 6-A (4) of the Code further states that the counter-claim is to be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints (emphasis supplied). It clearly suggests that a counter-claim by itself is not a plaint but is to be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules application to plaints. The words plaint and suit are not defined in the Code at Civil Procedure. Suit’ ordinarily means, and apart from some context must be taken to mean, a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint, as has been held in 1933 PC 63, Hansraj Gupta and others v Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electricity Tramway Co. Ltd. In AIR 1932 Lahore 374, Secretary of State v Kundan Singh and others an application under para 17, Schedule 2 of the Code was filed, Such application is numbered and registered as a suit under sub-para 2 of para 17 of the Code. It has been held that such an application is not a suit within the meaning of section 80 of the Code, Thus a counter-claim filed by a defendant is to be treated as a plaint or a cross-suit, still it will be treated as a plaint or a cross-suit, still it will not become a separate suit for the purpose of the Code because no judgment and decree is to be passed on this counter claim and it has only to be decided in the judgment of the original suit filed by the plaintiff. It is a different matter that the plaintiff may get his suit dismissed or withdrawn but still the counter-claim is to be beard and decided. In any case a counterclaim does not become a separate suit and can only be treated as a limb of the original civil suit” 16. We are entirely in agreement with the aforesaid reasoning of the learned Judge, We have gone through the judgment of the Lahore High Court in Secretary of Statla v. Kundan Singh and others, AIR 932 Lahore 374. That judgment was delivered by the great and eminent Judge, Shadi Lai, Chief Justice. He has pointed out that a proceeding, which does not commence with a plaint cannot be considered to be a suit. The same reasoning is also found in the judgment of the Privy Council, which came into existence about nine months later in Hansraj Gupta and others v. Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co Ltd, AIR 1933 PC 63. The Privy Council said that the word suit’ ordinarily means and apart from some context must be taken to mean, a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint. Raising of a counter-claim in the written statement by the defendant cannot be held to be a suit within the meaning of section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, as it is not initiated with the plaint, though for the purposes of applying the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure, it shall be treated as a plaint. It is not a plaint as such. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6-A merely shows that the counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross suit, but the very same rule contemplates and provides for only one judgment in the same suit both on the original claim and on the counter claim. It is not a plaint as such. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6-A merely shows that the counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross suit, but the very same rule contemplates and provides for only one judgment in the same suit both on the original claim and on the counter claim. If for all purposes, the counter-claim is to be treated as a separate or independent suit, then the Code must provide for and enable the Court to pass two decrees, one in the original suit and the other in the counter claim The very fact that the Code only provides for a single judgment and single decree would itself show that the counterclaim is not a cross suit for all purposes Sub-rule (4) of Rule 6-A does not make any difference in the situation whatever The ruling of the Lahore High Court has been followed by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Union of India v Gorakh Mohan Das and another, AIR 1964 All 477, The Division Bench has also made reference to a judgment of East Punjab High Court in Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd v. Bharat Bank Ltd.% AIR 1950 EP 352, in which a similar view was expressed following the judgment of the Lahore High Court. Very recently, the Supreme Court has expressed the same view in Supreme Co-operative Group Housing Society v. M/s. H 5. Nag and Associates (P) Ltd t AIR 1996 SC 2443t holding that though an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act is treated as a suit, the mandatory requirement of section 90 of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, which provides for issue of notice before the filing of a suit does not get attracted to the said application 17. In T K. V S. Vidyapoornachary Sons and other s v. M, R. Krishna-machary, AIR 1983 Mad 291, Single Judge of the said High Court after referring to the provisions of Rules 6-A and 6-C of Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure observed that the provision emphasises by implication that as a general rule a suit claim and a counter-claim ought properly to be regarded as constituting a unified proceeding Thus, there is only proceeding before the Court though a counter-claim has been made by the defendants in the written statement. Hence, the counter-claim cannot be treated as a suit for the purposes of section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1971. 18. Learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurbachan Singh v. Bhag Singh and others. AIR 1996 SC 1087. The Court has held in that case that in a suit for injunction, a counter-claim for possession could be entertained. That judgment does not help the respondents in any manner. 19. There is yet another reason for holding that a notice will not be necessary before filing a counter-claim under Rule 6-A, sub rule (1). The defendant has to make the counter-clairn either in the written statement or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired The rule does not contemplate the Court giving separate time to the defendant in order to enable him to issue a notice before filing a counter-claim. If in a particular case, the Court refuses to grant such time, as may be required for issue of notice and delivery of the same to the plaintiff, the defendant cannot lose his right to file a counter-claim Such a situation is not contemplated at all by the provisions of Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, no notice is necessary before the defendant makes a counterclaim in a suit. 20. On the facts of this case, the matter can be dealt with from a different angle also. Before the plaintiff filed a suit, it had issued a notice on 26-11-1980 under Ex. P-33 through its lawyer. In that notice, the defendants were called upon to pay a sum of Rs. 70,000 including the principal amount, damages/interest thereon and notice charges. In reply thereto, the defendants lawyer sent a notice dated 612-1980 under Ex. P-34 to the plaintiff. In that notice, it is clearly stated in paragraph 7 as follows : "In view of the facts stated above, the contents of your notice are denied. You are further requested to take delivery of the goods within 15 days after making payment of the rent or in the alternative after furnishing a sound security. P-34 to the plaintiff. In that notice, it is clearly stated in paragraph 7 as follows : "In view of the facts stated above, the contents of your notice are denied. You are further requested to take delivery of the goods within 15 days after making payment of the rent or in the alternative after furnishing a sound security. After the passage of 15 days my client would dispose of your goods at your risk and responsibility without any further reference to you and would then sue you for the amount of the rent remaining unpaid after deduction of the sale consideration. In case you take any legal steps inspite of this reply, you shall do so at your own risk and responsibility and would be liable for all the costs of my client." 21. This notice is categoric and it informs the plaintiff that a suit would be filed against the plaintiff for the rent due after deducting the sale consideration in the event of disposal of the goods by the defendants. This notice under Ex. P-3 can certainly be treated as a notice within the meaning of section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Co operative Societies Act, as it has very clearly informed the plaintiff about the claim, which would be made by the defendants against the plaintiff. Yet another notice was issued under Ex. D-133 dated 2nd February, 1981, in which it was reiterated that the defendants were proposing to take separate action by way of filing counter-claim in the suit filed by the plaintiff for the amount due to them. Obviously, by that time, the defendants had become aware of the filing of the suit by the plaintiff and they issued the said notice through their lawyer. The issue of the second notice under Ex. D-153 does not cancel or annul the first notice under Ex. P-34. Hence, the counter-claim filed by the defendants on 11-3 1981 through the written statement was after the expiry of a period of two months from the date of receipt of Ex. P-34 by the plaintiff and, therefore, it can be safely held that the requirements of section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act have been satisfied and that the counter-claim is maintainable in law even od the footing that a notice is necessary before the filing of the counterclaim. P-34 by the plaintiff and, therefore, it can be safely held that the requirements of section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act have been satisfied and that the counter-claim is maintainable in law even od the footing that a notice is necessary before the filing of the counterclaim. A reference is also made in the written statement to the issue of the said notice dated 6th December, 1980 (Ex P-34) in paragraph 5 thereof. In paragraph 7 of the written statement, a reference is made to the later ! notice dated 2nd February, 1981. 22. In Secretary of State v. District Board, Rangpur, AIR 1939 Cal 758, a notice was issued under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and served on the Secretary of State Subsequently, it was discovered that certain plot had been omitted from the first notice and another notice was issued to include that plot. The suit was brought more than two months after the first notice and the Court held that the suit cannot be said to be premature The Court pointed out that the second notice was only in amplification of the first notice and it had not annulled or cancelled the first notice. The same reasoning would also apply in the present case also, as it is the contention of learned Counsel for the appellant that section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act is similar to section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the said ruling of the Calcutta High Court can be invoked in the present case. 23. In J. S. Basappa v. Provincial Government of Madras (now Andhra Pradesh), AIR 1959 AP 192, a Division Bench of that Court held that the object of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to appraise the Government of the nature of the action that is proposed to be laid against it and the terms of such notice should not be taken in a narrow sense. One of the arguments before the Division Bench was that the notice was conditional, as it was stated that the suit would be filed only if the wrongs complained of by the plaintiff are not remedied. The Bench repelled that argument and pointed out that every notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be deemed to be a conditional one in that sense. 24. The Bench repelled that argument and pointed out that every notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be deemed to be a conditional one in that sense. 24. In The State of Madras v. C. P. Agencies and another, AIR 1960 SC 1309, the Court held that the object of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is manifestly to give the Government or the public officer sufficient notice of the case which is proposed to be brought against it or him so that it or he may consider the position and decide for itself or himself whether the claim of the plaintiff should be accepted or resisted. The Court held that though the terms of that section are to be strictly complied with, that does not mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinized in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from common sense. 25. The ruling of the Supreme Court was followed and applied by a Full Bench of Punjab High Court in Union of India and another v. Landra Engineering and Foundry Works and another, AIR 1962 Punj 262. The Full Bench observed that a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be construed with due regard to common sense and to the object with which it has been enacted. The Full Bench said that section 80 does not define the rights of parties or confer any rights on the parties and it only provides a mode of procedure for getting the relief in respect of a cause of action and that the provisions of notice under the section are not intended to be used as a trap for defeating the claimants suit against the Government, 26. The reasoning of the Full Bench will apply in the present case and we hold that the notice dated 6th December, 1980 under Ex P-34 will satisfy the requirements of section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act on the facts and circumstances of the case. 27. Hence, we hold that there is no merit in the objection raised by the plaintiff/appellant that the counter-claim is not maintainable. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the counter-claim is maintainable and the learned trial Judge has rightly entertained the same 28. 27. Hence, we hold that there is no merit in the objection raised by the plaintiff/appellant that the counter-claim is not maintainable. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the counter-claim is maintainable and the learned trial Judge has rightly entertained the same 28. We have already rejected the contentions urged by the plaintiff/ appellant on the merits of the case and we do not find any error whatever in the judgment or decree passed by the learned trial Judge. The appeal is without any merit and it suffers a dismissal The appellant shall pay the costs of respondents in this appeal. Cross-objection No. 53/1985 is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.