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1996 DIGILAW 233 (GUJ)

Ramesh Ashram Pathak v. State of Gujarat

1996-04-23

S.K.KESHOTE

body1996
ORDER : S.K. Keshote, J. 1. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. The petitioner a Sub Inspector in the Police Department of the State of Gujarat, was placed under suspension under the order dated 1-9-1992 as a criminal case under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act has been filed against him. After the suspension, the petitioner filed applications from time to time with the respondents for revocation of the order of suspension. He has come up with the case that in the case of similarly situated persons, the order of suspension has been revoked while on his representation nothing has been done. The petitioner therefore has approached this Court by way of this Spl. C.A. I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order of suspension has to be revoked as it has been revoked in other cases. Each case has to be considered for the revocation of the order of suspension on the basis of its own facts and in such matters one case cannot be considered to be similar to the other. While considering the case of revocation of suspension of an officer or employee, the authority concerned has to take into consideration many factors. A case of one person may not be precedence or an example or a case of parity for others. Shri Bambhania, Counsel who is appearing for the respondents has made twofold contentions. Firstly, he prayed that this writ petition deserves to be dismissed, only on the ground that the petitioner has concealed the very' important and material fact from this Court. It was next been contended that the petitioner has been placed under suspension because there were serious charges against his under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The criminal case is pending against him in which the charges have also been framed. 2. So far as the first contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is concerned, I find sufficient merit. The petitioner is guilty of suppression of material and relevant facts. The petitioner is a Police Sub Inspector and he is not an ordinary litigant like a casual labourer, workman or Class IV employee. Suppression of the fact which has been made by the petitioner has to be taken seriously. The petitioner is guilty of suppression of material and relevant facts. The petitioner is a Police Sub Inspector and he is not an ordinary litigant like a casual labourer, workman or Class IV employee. Suppression of the fact which has been made by the petitioner has to be taken seriously. The petitioner undisputedly challenged the order of his suspension by filing Civil Suit No. 557/92 before the civil Judge (S.D.). The Civil Court had been per waded to grant the interim injunction to the petitioner vide its order dated 14-9-1992. The respondents preferred Civil Misc. Appeal No. 204/92 against the aforesaid order of the Civil Judge and the Appellate Court was allowed the appeal on 12-1-1993. The petitioner preferred SpI. C.A. No. 229/93 before this Court against the order of the appellate Court. This Spl. C.A. has been dismissed by this Court on 13-4-1993. 1 do not agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that these facts are not relevant as the petitioner is not challenging the order of suspension in this writ petition. The only challenge in the writ petition is the action of the respondents not to consider his case for) revocation of the order of suspension. These are the material facts and the petitioner has to disclose the same. The writ petition deserves to be dismissed only on the ground of suppression of these material facts. However, the respondents have admitted that they will consider the application of the petitioner for revocation of the suspension order and will decide the same on merits. On this concession, it is ordered that the representation of the petitioner regarding revocation of the order of suspension may be considered and appropriate order may be passed with in a period of eight eeks from today. Rule is discharged subject to the aforesaid directions. Order accordingly.