JUDGMENT Per P.K.Palli, Judge: - The matter arises out of a reference whereby the learned Single Judge of this Court after having doubted the correctness of the judgment given in Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation Vs. S.N.D. Industries and others, (Civil Suit No. 129 of 1990) decided on July 24, 1992 and being unable to subscribe to the view taken therein has decided to frame the following question for decision by a larger bench; "When the personal remedy on a mortgaged debt is lost but the remedy against the mortgaged property survives and plaintiff-Corporation realises the mortgage debt by the sale of the mortgaged property under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations, Act, and the mortgage ceases to exist, but the sale proceeds are not sufficient to cover the whole of the claim, can such a plaintiff be allowed to obtain a personal decree for the recovery of balance outstanding dues after the expiry of three years from the date of the breach of covenant contained in the mortgage deed”. 2. Before the question is examined, it would be better to understand as to how the present controversy arises for determination. 3. The plaintiff-Financial Corporation has filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. , 9,26,794,31 paise against the defendants alleging that defendants No. .1 to 5, who are partners of M/S. Meenu Engineering Works, defendant No.6, applied for the grant of a loan for the purposes of setting up an industrial unit for manufacturing of bifurcated rivets. Admittedly, the loan amount of Rs. 3,30,000/- was sanctioned, which the defendants utilised in the years 1973-74. A mortgage deed was executed by the defendants on March 1, 1973, which was registered on the same date. 4. The defendants having failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage deed and having failed to pay instalment of the principal amount and interest in accordance with the schedule of re-payment, as agreed upon under the terms of the mortgage deed, the entire amount is said to have become recoverable notice is said to have been served calling upon the defendants to pay the entire amount. A notification was issued under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, herein-after referred to as the Act on July 7, 1981, which was published in the Gazettee on July 25, 1981. A notification was issued under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, herein-after referred to as the Act on July 7, 1981, which was published in the Gazettee on July 25, 1981. Due to the failure of the defendants to repay the outstanding balance, proceedings were initiated under Section 29 of the Act and the unit was taken over by the plaintiff alongwith mortgaged assets on October 25,1982.The Unit was sold on March 21, 1985. The machinery fetched Rs. 90,000/-and the building was sold for Rs. 2,00,000/- 5. After adjustment of the aforesaid sale proceed, the plaintiff found that the amount realised was not sufficient in respect of the out standing dues. A notice is said to have been sent to the defendants on May 27,1985 claiming the balance amount which on April 29, 1985 stood at Rs. 8,60,345.21 paise including the interest. To this amount further interest has been added as on September 15, 1985 and the liability to pay the suit amount is said to be joint and several of ail the defendants. It is here that para12, wherein pleadings in respect of cause of action have been given, needs to be re-produced in verbatim: "that cause of action accrued to the plaintiff Corporation against the defendants when first default in payment of principal and interest was made by the defendants on 10.3.1975, then on subsequent dates when instalments of payment towards principal amount and interest fell due an the defendants failed to pay the amount and the entire amount became payable at once and then on dates of demand and on 4.1.1977 on which date the defendants were called to pay the entire amount and thereafter on 25.7.1981 when take over notification was published in H.P. Govt. Gazette, then on 25.10.1982 when the possession of mortgaged assets were taken over and were sold on 27.5.1985 when the defendants were asked to pay the balance amount but they failed to pay the same and on each day thereafter." 6. Decree for the aforesaid amount was prayed together with costs and future interest. 7. In the written statement, a preliminary objection has been taken that the suit is not maintainable on account of limitation. Decree for the aforesaid amount was prayed together with costs and future interest. 7. In the written statement, a preliminary objection has been taken that the suit is not maintainable on account of limitation. It has also been pleaded from the side of the defendants that the plaintiff had resorted to the proceeding under the provisions contained in Sections 31 and 32 (8) of the Act and these proceedings terminated on October 23, 1978 and December 18,1980 and the plaintiff could not have resorted to the provisions contained in Section 29 of the Act and again the demand is illegal. It is also pleaded that the amount became due and payable on March 1, 1973 and the suit could be filed up to February 28, 1976. In any case, it is alleged that the claim of the plaintiff became barred on July 25, 1981. The plaintiff had taken the possession of the Unit in sequence of the notification and no cause of action is said to have arisen on July 25, 1981, October 25,1982, March 2, 1985 and May 27, 1985, as alleged. 8. The learned Single Judge before whom the controversy had arisen proceeded to examine the question of limitation in the aforesaid situation. It has been noticed that the defendants also executed guarantee deed on the same date, i.e., on which the mortgage deed was executed and, thus, the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagees came on the surface between the parties. The various dates as given above are not disputed. According to the plaintiff, cause of action had arisen when the sale proceeds were adjusted towards the outstanding does on July 25, 1985 which remains un-paid. 9. The various dates as given above are not disputed. According to the plaintiff, cause of action had arisen when the sale proceeds were adjusted towards the outstanding does on July 25, 1985 which remains un-paid. 9. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff has invited our attention to clause 7 of the mortgage deed, which runs asunder: "Without prejudice to the above rights and powers conferred on the Corporation by these presents and by Section 29 & 30 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, and as amended in 1956 and 1972 and the special remedies available to the Corporation under the said Act, it is hereby further agreed and declared that if the partners of the industrial concern fail to pay the said principal sum with interest & other moneys due from him under these presents, to the Corporation in the manner agreed, the Corporation shall be entitled to realise its dues by sale of the mortgaged properties, the said fixtures and fittings and other assets, and if the sale proceeds thereof are insufficient to satisfy the dues of the Corporation, to recover the balance from the partners of the industrial concern and the other properties owned by them though not included in this security". 10. Stress is being laid on the under lined portion of this clause and it is submitted that the plaintiff, in order to recover the balance, could have filed a suit after the sale proceeds of the mortgaged properties were adjusted. Surprisingly in the Act, no limitation stands prescribed for filing of such suits. An argument was pressed that it would be Article 113 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, which would be applicable in the situation. The said Article is re-produced herein: "Description of suit period of Limitation Time from Which Period Begins To run 113. Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years When the right to sue accrues." It is submitted that under Section 29 of the Act the plaintiff-Corporation is empowered to take over the management, control and possession of the Unit alongwith all rights of transfer by way of sale or lease an realise the amount from the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned. 11. Three years When the right to sue accrues." It is submitted that under Section 29 of the Act the plaintiff-Corporation is empowered to take over the management, control and possession of the Unit alongwith all rights of transfer by way of sale or lease an realise the amount from the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned. 11. Undisputedly, the right to recover under the provisions can be very well exercised, when the defaulter is under a liability for the realisation of the amount due and has defaulted towards the payment of instalment and interest as stipulated, it is at this stage that It would be relevant to re-produce Section 29 of the Act as it exists on the statute, which runs as follows. "29. Rights of Financial Corporation in case of default. (1) Where any industrial concern, which is under a liability to the Financial Corporation under an agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof (or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guarantee given by the Corporation) or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation, the Financial Corporation shall have the-(right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern), as the (right to transfer by way of lease or sale) and realise the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation. (2) Any transfer of property made by the Financial Corporation, in exercise of its powers under sub-section (1), shall vest in the transferee al rights in or to the property transferred (as if the transfer) had been made by the owner of the property. (3) The Financial Corporation shall have the same rights and powers with respect to goods manufactured or produced wholly or partly from goods forming part of the security held by it as it had with respect to the original goods. (3) The Financial Corporation shall have the same rights and powers with respect to goods manufactured or produced wholly or partly from goods forming part of the security held by it as it had with respect to the original goods. (4)(Where any action has been taken against an industrial concern) lender the provisions of sub-section (1), air costs, (Charges and expenses which in the opinion of the Financial Corporation have been properly incurred) by it (as incidental thereto) shall be re coverable from the industrial concern and the money which is received by it shall, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, be held by it is trust to be applied firstly, in payment of such costs, charges and expenses and, secondly, in discharge of the debt due to the Financial corporation, and the residue of the money so received shall be paid to the person entitled thereto.) (5)Where the Financial Corporation has taken any action against an industrial concern) under the provisions of sub-section (1), the Financial Corporation shall be deemed to be the owner of such concern, for the purpose of suits by or gains the concern, and shall sue and be sued in the name of (the concern). 12. It is alleged that according to the scheme as contained in the Section, after taking over the management, control and possession, the same vests in the Corporation and the sale proceeds are to be appropriated in respect of the mortgaged property as stipulated under subjection (4) of Section 29 of the Act. The balance left out shall - be found only after giving the credit for the sale proceeds. It is, thus, urged from the side of the plaintiff that it would be Article 113 of the Limitation Act which would govern the present case and the limitation in the peculiar situation would stat from the date of the sale of the assets and not from the date, the possession of the Unit was taken over. 13. The case of the defendants, as projected at the hearing, is that the loan was advanced under one instrument and the property stood mortgaged, but plaintiff had pursued this remedy for the realisation of the outstanding balance by sale of mortgaged property and after exhausting it, has lost the right to-claim personal decree in respect of the balance amount against the defendants. A personal decree for the balance cannot be enforced as the Limitation stands expired. It is Article 55 and not /Article 113 of the Limitation Act, which is said to be applicable in the given situation. 14. The learned Single Judge after appreciation of the points involved and having considered the case law cited by the parties, has observed that mortgage deed is by itself an agreement and the suit has been filed for the recovery of the balance amount pursuant to the breach of covenant of the registered mortgage deed executed by the parties to it. 15. We have already given above the concerned clause No. 7 as it appears in the mortgage deed itself. It was not disputed that for a claim to obtain personal decree, the limitation is three years for filing a suit, it was found that since there is only one contract from which the liability for the principal and interest arises, but the balance has been claimed after adjustment of the sale proceeds of the mortgaged property and has been calculated on its breach. There is a provision of re-paying the amount through instalments as per schedule which forms part of the agreement, but so far as the cause of action is concerned, the same is on account of breach of contract which is neither divisible nor severable and the right to sue would begin from the date the said breach is alleged to have taken place. 16. The Teamed Single Judge has also observed that the covenant for the payment of the balance after adjustment of the sale proceeds of the mortgaged property is not an independent or separate agreement, the breach to which has given rise to a separate cause of action. The learned Judge, thus, came to conclude that as the suit is for the enforcement of a breach of personal covenant, as contained in the mortgage deed, the suit is governed by Article 55 of the Limitation Act and not by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. It will be useful to take notice of -Article 55 of the Indian Limitation Act which reads as follow: "Description of suit period Period of limitation Time from which begins to run. 55. It will be useful to take notice of -Article 55 of the Indian Limitation Act which reads as follow: "Description of suit period Period of limitation Time from which begins to run. 55. For compensation for the or breach of any contract, breach-express or implied not m respect of specially provided for suit is instituted occurs the breach is continuing) Three years When the contract is broken (where there are successive es) when the breach Which the or (where when it ceases." 17. The teamed Single Judge is of the opinion that the right under the contract is to seek a personal decree in respect of the balance infant amounts to personal covenant as shown in the mortgage deed and, therefore, the suit for its enforcement, i.e., for the enforcement of personal covenant, express or implied, in a registered mortgage deed is governed by Article, 55 of the India Limitation act. 18. It was noticed that there was some doubt about the implication of certain observations made by their Lordships of the judicial committee in Ganesh Lal Vs. Khetramohan (A.I.R. 1926 PC 56), but the controversy stands settled in view of full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Ratnasabapathi Chettior Vs. Devasigamony Pillai (A.I.R. 1929 AIL 69), another full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court as well as a Division Bench Judgment of the Lahore High Court in Kesrimal Umrao Singh Vs. Tansukh Rai Kidarnath (A.I.R. 1934 Lah. 765) and few other decisions the article which would apply for the enforcement of personal covenant in the registered mortgage deed, would be Article 55 of the Limitation Act. 19. In the case of Collector Vs. Dawn (30 All. 400), an instalment mortgage bond recited that the mortgagor is entitled to possession of the mortgage property, if there was any default in the instalment payment and if the mortgagor failed to deliver possession, the mortgagee would have racecourse to personal remedy against the mortgagor. In this sequence it was held that the suit to recover the amount on the personal covenant would be a suit for compensation for breach of contract and would be governed by Article 55 of the Limitation act. Towards similar effect are the observations made by the Patna High Court in Ramsekhar vs. Muthura (A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 557)- 20. In this sequence it was held that the suit to recover the amount on the personal covenant would be a suit for compensation for breach of contract and would be governed by Article 55 of the Limitation act. Towards similar effect are the observations made by the Patna High Court in Ramsekhar vs. Muthura (A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 557)- 20. It, thus, follows that the moment the defaulter fails to pay any one of the instalment of the mortgage amount as detailed In the mortgage deed, the mortgagee is immediately entitled to claim the entire balance of the mortgaged amount and the suit would be governed by Article 116 of the limitation Act, 1908, the limitation for which was six years from the date of the default. 21. According to the plaintiff, the balance was to be calculated only after the adjustment of the sale proceeds of the mortgaged property and the plaintiff-Corporation is empowered and authorised to obtain a personal decree against either of the defendants and their properties which even did not form the part of the security. The learned Single Judge, thus, came to hold the view that the limitation is to be judged and ultimately based on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case and the plaintiff was wrong in its submissions that the facts giving rise to the cause of action wee such for which no limitation period was provided any where in the schedule. 22. According to the learned Single Judge, the parties had agree to pay and accept the amount covered by the loan in 17 instalments. The first instalment, admittedly, became due on March 10, 1975 and the last was to be paid on March 1, 1983. As notice recalling the entire amount of loan and interest was admittedly issued on January 7, 1977 calling upon the defendants to liquidate the entire outstanding dues, which immediately gave cause of action to the plaintiff to recover the suit amount by whatever process the same was liable to be recovered. 23. It is not disputed that the amount could be recovered by three modes, (i) by obtaining a personal decree; or (ii) by obtaining mortgage decree as also personal decree; or (iii) by enforcing the mortgage debt against the mortgaged property. 24. Concededly, none of these three modes was opted by the plaintiff-Corporation. 23. It is not disputed that the amount could be recovered by three modes, (i) by obtaining a personal decree; or (ii) by obtaining mortgage decree as also personal decree; or (iii) by enforcing the mortgage debt against the mortgaged property. 24. Concededly, none of these three modes was opted by the plaintiff-Corporation. The learned Single Judge observed that since there was one contract and cause of action had arisen from the breach of the covenant which was not divisible and severable, the limitation would start running from the date when the breach took place and, thus, the suit is time barred. 25. A judgment passed in Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation Vs. M/S. S.N.D. Industries and others (Civil Suit No.129 of 1990), decided on July 24, 1992, was pressed from the side of the plaintiff-Corporation before the learned Single Judge. The judgment has been delivered by our learned Brother LS.Panta, a Judge of this Court and after noticing the observations contained in Bheemappa and another Vs. primary Land Development Bank Ltd. And others (1992) 74 company cases 172) and Ramprasad Dagaduram vs. Vijay Kumar Motilal Hirakhanwala (A.I.R. 1967 SC 278), it was ruled that "the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. The right to the debt continues to exist notwithstanding the remedy is barred by limitation." This judgment has been doubted and, thus, this reference. 26. After having carefully perused the order of reference as well as the judgment rendered by our learned Brother Panta, J. and after hearing the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and on scrutiny of the relevant provisions and clauses, notice of which has already been taken in the earlier part of this judgment, we are of the considered opinion that the point that is required to be looked into is as to when did the loss occur?. The answer would be that when factually there was a short fall in the assets and not when the short fall came to be known to the corporation. The argument that the limitation would begin when the payment is asked appears to be ridiculous on the face of it, as it would completely destroy the provisions of the limitation act, as applicable and leave it to the discretion of the plaintiff to choose as to when such a demand is to be made. The argument that the limitation would begin when the payment is asked appears to be ridiculous on the face of it, as it would completely destroy the provisions of the limitation act, as applicable and leave it to the discretion of the plaintiff to choose as to when such a demand is to be made. The moment the Unit was taken over by the plaintiff- Corporation with the right to take over the management or possession or both with the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realise the loan amount from the property pleaded, mortgaged or hypothecated, the Corporation under sub-section (5) of Section 29 of the Act would be deemed to be the owner of such concerned under the provisions of sub-section (1). Once the Corporation be came the owner, the rights created under the mortgage come to an end and there would be no relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee after the Unit has been taken over. 27. In the present case as noted above, the plaintiff did not opt to recover the outstanding dues by either of the three modes. It had chosen to recover it without the agency and intervention of the Court under Section 29 of the Act. In the given situation, if the plaintiff in its wisdom thought that the entire amount of loan alongwith interest has become recoverable, the action could have been initiated by enforcing the mortgage debt against the mortgaged property as well as praying for obtaining a personal decree. Both the reliefs were available to be prayed for in one suit itself. There is sufficient case law on the point that there would be no accrual of the right to sue unless substantive right first comes into existence. The moment it is asserted or stands infringed or threatened to be infringed, it is that right and its infringement which would constitute a cause of action enabling the plaintiff to bring a suit for the recovery of the amount. 28. We have also gone through the pleadings containing the cause of action in para 12 of the plaint where the plaintiff gives the cause action for filing the present suit on March 108 1975, when the default first occurred and the defendants did not pay the first instalment. 28. We have also gone through the pleadings containing the cause of action in para 12 of the plaint where the plaintiff gives the cause action for filing the present suit on March 108 1975, when the default first occurred and the defendants did not pay the first instalment. The cause continued on subsequent dates as and when the instalment fell due on the dates stipulated in the agreement According to the plaintiff itself, the cause of action for filing the present suit on March 10, 1975, when the default first occurred and the defendants did not pay the first instalment The cause continued on subsequent dates as and when the instalment fell due on the dates stipulated in the agreement. According to the plaintiff itself, the cause of action again accrued on January 7, 1977, when the defendants were called upon to pay the entire balance and notice in this respect was given. Cause of action is also said to have accrued on July 25, 1981, when notification under Section 29 of the Act, to take over the Unit, was published. It is again said to have revived on October 25, 1982, when the management and revived on October 25, 1982, When the management and revived on October 25, 1982, when the management and possession of the Unit alongwith its mortgaged property was taken over It is then said that the cause of action also arose when the properties wee sold on March 21, 1985 and it was found that the amount recovered is less, the defendants were asked to pay the balance. 29. According to Cluase-1 of the mortgage deed, the amount of loan was to be re-paid alongwith interest fixed at the rate of 4% above the bank rate subject to minimum of 10% per annum with a rebate of ½ (half) per cent in case the payment is made on due date. Under Cause -5 mortgagors covenanted that In case of default for the payment of the principal or interest and in the event of non-observation of the conditions, it would be lawful for the Corporation to enter upon and take possession of the mortgaged properties alongwith the fixtures and fittings and enjoy the same without interruption or hindrance. 30. Under Cause -5 mortgagors covenanted that In case of default for the payment of the principal or interest and in the event of non-observation of the conditions, it would be lawful for the Corporation to enter upon and take possession of the mortgaged properties alongwith the fixtures and fittings and enjoy the same without interruption or hindrance. 30. In Clause-6, it was further provided and agreed that the powers of the Corporation, as given to it by Section 30 and without prejudice to such right and powers, Corporation shall by notice demand from the industrial concern to discharge in full all its liabilities and if the time for payment has expired, then consequences as laid down therein would follow. It is thereafter that clause-7 which is material for solving the proposition in the case in hand 31 The narration of events given above, would, thus, show that the defendants committed breach in the terms on March 10, 1975. It is at that time that they defaulted and did not take care to adhere to the schedule of re-payment. The plaintiff further called upon the defendants by a notice dated January 7, 1977 to pay the entire outstanding amount. It is to be notice that the loan amount was to be paid by instalments as per terms of the deed, but no such waiver was either pleaded or proved by the Corporation. The plaintiff, thus, proceeded to liquidate the entire amount as per Clause-6, when they failed to repay the amount. The limitation in such situation for filing suit for the breach of contract would be three years and in case the suit is brought putting personal liability based upon an instrument, then certainly the remedy against the person or the mortgagor would become barred but the remedy will remain open for enforcing the demand against the mortgaged property. 32. In our view, as per Cluase-6 of the agreement, the suit in respect of obtaining the personal decree could be filed within three years from the date when there was a breach. At the cost of repetition, it may be again said that the remedy lies with the plaintiff in two ways, one with the intervention of the court by fifing a suit and the other under Section 29 of the act. At the cost of repetition, it may be again said that the remedy lies with the plaintiff in two ways, one with the intervention of the court by fifing a suit and the other under Section 29 of the act. Either of these two remedies could be availed of by the plaintiff only during the subsistence of the mortgage and not thereafter. Once the possession of the Unit is taken over, the plaintiff becomes the complete owner possessed all right title and interest in the property like any other true owner. The mortgage in the present case come to an end on October 25, 1982 when the possession and management of the Unit was taken over. It is also not to be lost sight of that the financial institutions at the time of grant of loan always ensure that the property which is mortgaged or hypothecated is a sufficient security for the realisation of the loan amount for times to come. 33. The matter can be examined from another angle also. Nothing has been stated in Section 29 of the Act as to in what situation and at what point of time the Unit would be taken over. It can be on the first default, or the plaintiff-Corporation can wait till the last instalment is paid. Further, there is a lacuna about the proceedings to be taken after the Unit is taken over In the present case, the plaintiff has taken more than three years after having taker) over the management and possession of the Unit, to sell it in the year 1985 and then has come up with the plea that there was a short fall and now the cause of action and arisen to peruse the remedy of personal decree against the defendants for realisation of the balance amount from other properties belonging to them. Nothing has-been said in the Act that the Imitate being taken over would be sold without further delay so that the plaintiff would be in a position to know that the amount realised is short and take immediate steps for the recovery of the balance within the stipulated time. The plaintiff in the situation has to blame only itself and none else 34. The cause of action in the present case for obtaining a personal decree against the defendants had arisen, as said earlier, from the breach of its covenant. The plaintiff in the situation has to blame only itself and none else 34. The cause of action in the present case for obtaining a personal decree against the defendants had arisen, as said earlier, from the breach of its covenant. In our considered view, the Clause is not divisible or save able and the limitation would not stop running, when it has already started moving from the date when the breach first took place. It, thus, appears that the view taken by our learned Brother Panta, J. is not correct and does not lay down correct law. From the judgment, it appears that the defendants in that case were unrepresented and there was no proper assistance from the said defendants in that case. There can be no second opinion that the right to debt continues to exist notwithstanding the remedy is barred by limitation. In the given situation, although the limitation has run out and the borrower still considers and thinks that it is proper to pay the amount due from him, though the remedy of the plaintiff is barred by limitation he can always do that. The rules of the limitation do not destroy the right of the parties. It is only that the right to recover the amount is became barred under the provisions. The learned Single Judge thus, was not right in holding that the plaintiff-Corporation would come to know that there was a short fall after the sale of the mortgaged property and the adjustment of such sale proceeds towards the balance amount of loan and it was only then that the cause of action would arise and limitation would start running. 35. So far as the controversy in respect of the remedies as provided for in sections 29 and 31 of the Act are concerned, the law stands settled by the Honble Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. Kota Subba Reddy and others (AIR 1994 S.C. 2151). It has been held therein that the right vested in the Corporation under Section 29 of the Act is besides the right already possessed at common law to institute a suit or the right available to it under Section 31 of the Act. 36. It has been held therein that the right vested in the Corporation under Section 29 of the Act is besides the right already possessed at common law to institute a suit or the right available to it under Section 31 of the Act. 36. The ruling cites at the bar from the side of the plaintiff reported in The Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. M/S. Jayantilal L. Gandhi (A.I.R. 1979 Bombay 12) is not applicable on the given facts. The rights and liabilities in that case were following from the statute and to by any agreement. It was held that it was not a suit to claim wharfage and demurrage simpliciter This is a suit to claim the balance of the amount which can be claimed by the appellants in respect of wharfage and demurrage charges after credit is given for the sale proceeds realised from the auction of the goods and for such a suit a clear provision is made in Section 67-A of the Bombay Port Trust Act. 37. In Gobinda Narayan Singh and others v. Sham Lai Singh and others (A.I.R. 1931 Privy Council 89), the expression right to sue as to any action in Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was within the meaning as to the right to bring the particular suit with reference to which plea of limitation is raised, and it was held that the starting point for limitation would be the date when the appellants rights in. Dendua wire first invaded. 38. In Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd. V. The Union of India (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1433), Articles 56, 115 and 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, were examined in respect of building contract. It was found that the claim being made was not in respect of the price of the work done nor arising out of a contract nor for compensation for breach of contract and, thus, the suit would be governed by Article 120. The case is hardly relevant for the purposes of the point in suit. 39. In Mrs. Margaret Lalita Samuel v. Indo Commercial Bank Ltd. (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 102), the Honble Supreme Court examined the starting point of limitation in a suit to enforce continuing guarantee bond under Article 115 of the Limitation Act. This judgment too has no relevancy. 40. The case is hardly relevant for the purposes of the point in suit. 39. In Mrs. Margaret Lalita Samuel v. Indo Commercial Bank Ltd. (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 102), the Honble Supreme Court examined the starting point of limitation in a suit to enforce continuing guarantee bond under Article 115 of the Limitation Act. This judgment too has no relevancy. 40. In Lal Shanti Swarup v. Munshi Singh and others (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1315), the Honble Supreme Court examined the Articles 88 and 116 of the Limitation Act as well as Article 55 in respect of a covenant by the purchaser to pay off encumbrance on the property sold and failure of the purchaser. It was in peculiar situation that the suit was held to be governed by Article 83 of the limitation Act whether the contract of indemnity is express or implied. 41. In State of Bihar & Another v. Motilal Chamria and another (A.I.R. 1964 Patna 127). While interpreting Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the right to sue within the meaning was explained. The suit pertains to a contract for the supply of goods where the plaintiff after supplying the goods to the defendants submitted his bills but the defendants kept them pending for a long time and finally settled them after making certain deductions an the plaintiff filed a suit claiming he deductions on the ground that the defendants were not entitled to make such deductions. It was in the given situation of that case that Article 120 of the Limitation was held to be applicable to the facts of that case. 42. The matter can be examined yet from another angle. Section 29 of the Act prescribes no limitation and assuming no action is taken by the corporation, that is to say for 30 years, tt simply cannot be ruled that the limitation would stop running It is also supervising to see as to how interest is being claimed after the corporation has become an absolute owner of the property and deals with it in that manner. 43. We have also looked into the notice issued by the plaintiff-Corporation in the year 1985, after the sale had been conducted. It is neither based on the mortgage deed nor on the guarantee deed. 44. 43. We have also looked into the notice issued by the plaintiff-Corporation in the year 1985, after the sale had been conducted. It is neither based on the mortgage deed nor on the guarantee deed. 44. In view of what has been said above, we are of the considered opinion that when the personal remedy on the mortgage debt is lost but the remedy against he mortgaged property survives and plaintiff-corporation can realise the mortgage debt by sale of the mortgaged property under Section 29 of the Act and in case out of the realisation of the sale proceeds it is found that they are not sufficient to cover the whole claim the right of the plaintiff to obtain a personal decree for the recovery of the balance outstanding decree for the recovery of the balance outstanding dues after the expiry of three years from the date of breach of covenant contained in the mortgage deed shall become barred. The reference is, thus, answered in the aforesaid terms. 45. The case shall now go back to the learned Single Judge for further proceedings In the suit.