Judgment :- P.K. Balasubramanyan, J. This revision under S.103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is filed by the land owner. He was the respondent in an application made by the first respondent under S.80B of that Act. The husband of the first respondent was permitted to occupy a building situate in the property. Claiming that the building was a'hut' as defined in the Act, the application was made. The landowner objected. He contended that he had himself obtained an assignment of 60 cents of land in which the present building was situate, by applying as a tenant under S.72B of the Act and in the year 1983, he had permitted the husband of the first respondent to occupy the building. The first respondent was only claiming through her husband. She had no independent possession or right. Her husband had one-third share in 43 cents of property held by him along with his two brothers. The person permitted had therefore clearly available an extent of 141/3 cents of land towards his share, for erecting a homestead, and that precluded him from claiming a right of kudikidappu. The right over that land had been inherited by the first respondent. She had hence, other suitable land in which she could erect a homestead. Hence, the application could not be allowed. 2. The Land Tribunal held mat the husband of the first respondent along with his two brothers, did have title and possession over 43 cents of land in R. S. No. 25 of Paravoor Desom and that on the death of the husband, the said right devolved on the first respondent and her children. Of course, I notice that the application for purchase was bad for non joinder of the other legal representatives of Theyyathira, the husband of the first respondent. But, that question did not loom large before the authorities and the case proceeded on the basis that the application was on behalf of all the heirs. The Land Tribunal held that the first respondent though had one third right in43 cents of land held by her jointly with the two brothers of her husband, she would still be entitled to claim kudikadappu. It therefore, allowed the application for purchase. The landowner filed an appeal. The appellate Authority also found that the husband of the first respondent had one-third share in 43 cents of land. It therefore, allowed the application for purchase. The landowner filed an appeal. The appellate Authority also found that the husband of the first respondent had one-third share in 43 cents of land. It also took the view that the same would not disqualify him or the first respondent, his legal representative, from claiming assignment of the kudikadappu. The appellate Authority referred to a decision cited in that judgment as reported in 1995 KLT 51. But that citation is apparently a mistake. 3. Before the authorities below, the first respondent had attempted to pretend ignorance of document No. 2024/54 of the Sub Registrar's Office, Thamarassery, under which the husband of the first respondent had acquired one third right over an extent of 43 cents. The finding now is that her husband under whom the first respondent was claiming, had right over 141/3 cents out of the 43 cents of property held by him along with his two brothers. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the husband of the first respondent was a co-owner in respect of 43 cents of land with a distinct one third share in the co-ownership property and that he cannot therefore be said to be a person who has no land exceeding 10 cents, in any Panchayath area or township in possession as owner, on which he could erect the homestead. In other words, his contention is that even a person who holds land as a co-owner but whose share in the co-ownership property would exceed the extent of 10 cents referred to in S.2(25) of the Act, cannot qualify to be a kudikadappukaran. The object of conferring a right on a kudikadappukaran was stressed and it was pointed out that a building could be put up in the land available to the first respondent. This argument on behalf of the revision petitioner is met by counsel for the first respondent who submits that this court has always taken the view that the mere holding of land exceeding 10 cents towards one's share as a co-owner, would not disqualify that person from being a kudikadappukaran as defined in the Act. The decisions of this court starting from Achuthan v. Sulochana (1971 KLT 549) and ending with the decision in Kochukunju Nair v. Koshy Sosamma (1995 (1) KLT165 YB) wdMooihorakutty v. Chiruthakutty (1995 (1) KLT 251 FB) were relied on. The decisions of this court starting from Achuthan v. Sulochana (1971 KLT 549) and ending with the decision in Kochukunju Nair v. Koshy Sosamma (1995 (1) KLT165 YB) wdMooihorakutty v. Chiruthakutty (1995 (1) KLT 251 FB) were relied on. I may say that the decision in Moothorakutty (1995 (1) KLT 251), does not relate to this aspect as such, but the decision in Kochukunju Nair (1995 (1) KLT 165) does not have relevance to the question. 4. On a scrutiny of the various decisions referred to by learned counsel for the first respondent, I feel that certain important aspects have not been fully considered. In the first of the cases Achuthan v. Sulochana (1971 KLT 549), observing that there was no case that the claimant himself was in possession of such land, Raman Nair C.J. stated that the possession by the tarwad or the wife cannot attract the disqualification, for the simple reason that their possession is not that of the claimant and their ownership is not the' ownership of the claimant, even if he might be a joint owner of the tarward property. With respect, I must observe that his Lordship did not refer to the other cognate provisions of the Act dealing with a co-owner and his rights or the nature and consent of the right of a co-owner. On a rehearing, the case again came up before Raghavan, Acting C. J. and the decision therein is reported in Achuthan v. Sulochana (1971 KLT 846). Again, the various other provisions of the Act were not considered and the view was reiterated by stating that the absurdity of the reasoning canvassed by the land owner in the case would be patent, if the case of a Company which possesses property was taken into consideration, while considering the claim of a person who was a member of the Company. With respect, this anology does not appear to be correct since, a shareholder in a Company does not acquire any interest over the properties of the Company (See Bacha C. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay (AIR 1955 SC 74). In a more detailed consideration of the question, in Pennamma v. St. With respect, this anology does not appear to be correct since, a shareholder in a Company does not acquire any interest over the properties of the Company (See Bacha C. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay (AIR 1955 SC 74). In a more detailed consideration of the question, in Pennamma v. St. Paul's Convent (1972 KLT 12), a Division Bench held that a person can be said to have a thing only if it is his own; if he has only a joint right in a thing, it is not his own; he has it only along with others. It was observed that the provision under S.2(25) of the Act was intended to give protection to a person who had no homestead of his own or sufficient land on which he could construct one. The homestead has to be one where a person has exclusive right. A person who had got a joint right of ownership or aright of residence along with others in a dwelling house, can be said to be one who has no homestead, within the meaning of S.2(25) of the Act. It has to be noted that this case related to the case of a person who had a right in a joint family dwelling house and the Division Bench was considering the question whether he would be disqualified from claiming protection as a kudikadappukaran. I must also observe that S.2(25) does not insist on a person having his own land, to disqualify him as a kudikadappukaran. All that it says is, that he should not have "in possession either as owner or as tenant, land exceeding 10 cents". Neither the nature of the right of a co-owner, nor the provisions of the Act which could give a clue to the interpretation of the term v owner' occuring in S.2(25) of the Act, was considered by the Division Bench in that decision. The other decisions referred to by learned counsel for the first respondent, had only followed the decisions referred to above. But in a later decision of the Division Bench, the Division Bench was careful to point out the distinction between the position obtaining mPennamma 's case (1972 KLT 12) and a case where a person held the land as a co-owner. But in a later decision of the Division Bench, the Division Bench was careful to point out the distinction between the position obtaining mPennamma 's case (1972 KLT 12) and a case where a person held the land as a co-owner. In Vasistha Vadhyar v. Mohini Bai (1975 KLT 365) Khalid, J. (as he then was, speaking for the Bench, after referring to Pennamma's case, observed thus: "Whether the principle enunciated in the above decisions can be extended to tenants-in-common, is a doubtful proposition since possession of a tenant-in-common is different from the possession of coparcener or the member of a tarward". It has also to be noted that after the coming into force of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1978, all joint tenancies stand converted to tenancy-in-common and the doubt expressed by the Division Bench in the Vasistha Vadhyar" s case assumes considerable importance. 5. It is now necessary to refer to the last of the decisions brought to my notice, KochukunjuNairv. Koshy Sosamma (1995 (1) KLT 165 FB). The Full Bench in that decision held that the contention that it would certainly be possible for a person to erect a homestead in the co-ownership property as he has every legal right in it, is not tenable, as his right is not exclusive or absolute. As it would not be possible for one of the co-owner to erect a homestead in the co-ownership property with impunity, it could not be held that mere interest in co-ownership property would disentitle the person from claiming kudikidappu right in his landlord's property. A co-owner has only a coordinate right with other co-owners in the co-ownership property; he has no right to exclude other co-owners from possession of the same. As co-owners right to the property applies to every part and parcel of the common property, it would not be possible for one of them, in normal circumstances, to erect a homestead unilaterally and against the opposition by other co-owners. It was therefore, held that merely because a person had co-ownership right in other property exceeding the limit prescribed under S.2(25) of the Act, that would not disentitle him from claiming kudikidappu right in his landlord's property. Their Lordships referred to the decision in Vasistha Vadhyar's case referred to earlier, but did not particularly deal with the observations contained in paragraph 10 of that judgment, quoted above. Their Lordships referred to the decision in Vasistha Vadhyar's case referred to earlier, but did not particularly deal with the observations contained in paragraph 10 of that judgment, quoted above. Their Lordships referred to with approval, to the decision in Chakkara Ramakrishnan v. Kuruvaikkandy Kumaran (1980 KLN 19). In Ramakrishnan's case, the Division Bench, after referring to the observations contained in paragraph 10 of the decision in Vasistha Vadhyar's case, preferred to follow the decision of George Vadakkel, J. in Damodaran v. Vasukutty (1978 KLT 1), wherein His Lordship held that no distinction can be drawn between the possession of a joint tenant and that of a tenant-in-common or co-owner and since the co-owner has only a share in the common property and he has no right to exclude other co-owners from possession of every part and parcel of common property, the principle laiddov/ninVasisthaVadhyar's case must apply in all its force to cases of co-ownership also. In Damodaran v. Vasiikutty (1978 KLT 1) after referring to Pennamma's case and Vasistha Vadhyar's case, George Vadakkel, J. quoted the following passage from Freeman on Co-Tenancy and Partition: "The several tenancies are best distinguished from one another by considering the unities of each. Beginning with tenancy by entireties, we find five unities, viz., a unity of possession, of title, of estate, of time and of person. Next conies joint-tenancy with the same unities as tenancy by entirety, except that of person. Then, next below joint-tenancy as coparcenary, with its three unities, viz., of title, of possession, and of estate. And lastly, we have tenancy in common, which is different from the other tenancies in this, that it requires but one unity that of possession. It is therefore a sufficient description of tenants in common to say that they "are persons who hold by unity of possession". and thereafter observed: "Since a co-owner has only a share in the common property, he has no right to exclude the other co-owners from possession of it, and this rule applies to every part and parcel of the common property, so that in law he can possess it only along with the other co-owners; even when a co-owner is not in physical possession of the common property and another co-owner is, in law, the former possesses it constructively through the latter, of course, unless ouster is established". His Lordship emphasises the concept of possession by quoting the relevant passage from DevakiAmma v. Kunhirama Marar (1974 KLT 758). It appears to me that the finding in Damodaran's case was that the co¬owner-claimant was not in possession in fact, but was a possession only as a co-owner. The decision in Devaki Amma v. Kunirama Marar (1974 K.L.T. 758) relied on in Damodaran's case, was also a case of a member of a tarward who was entitled to get property on partition. His Lordship Subramonian Poti, J. (as he then was) referred to Pennamma's case in support of his conclusion that there would be no disqualification in such a case. 6. With great respect, it appears to me that undue emphasise has been placed on exclusive ownership or possession by the decisions referred to above. All that Section 2 (25) says is that a person will be a kudikidappukaran if he has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding the prescribed extent in possession either as owner or as tenant on winch he could erect a homestead. It is not stated that he must have exclusive possession or he must be the exclusive owner or he must be the exclusive tenant. No doubt, there is a requirement mat the land should be one on which he could erect a homestead. The question is whether a co-owner could not be said to be a person who is in possession as an owner of land on which he could erect a homestead. In that context, it appears to me that the decisions referred to above have not considered the principle recognised by the Supreme Court in Sri. Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath (1976 (4) SCC 184) and Kan to Gael v. B. P. Pathak (1977 (2) SCC 814) or the principle recognised in Krishnan Nair V. Lakshmi Amma (1986 KLT 558) or the principle noticed in M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lai Sharma (1981 (3) SCC 36). In Sri. Ram Pasricha's case, the Supreme Court has very clearly stated that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property is. It has further been stated that jurisprudentially, it was not correct to say that a co-owner of a property was not its owner. In Sri. Ram Pasricha's case, the Supreme Court has very clearly stated that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property is. It has further been stated that jurisprudentially, it was not correct to say that a co-owner of a property was not its owner. He owned every part of the composite property along with others and it could not be said that he was only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. It was noticed that the position will change only when partition took place. This was reiterated in Kanta Goel's case. The principle applied in proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act by Thomas, J. As the then was) in Krishnan Nair's case (1986 KLT 558). When S.2(25) of the Act uses only the expression'in possession as owner', the possession as a co-owner would also come within that expression in the light of the principle as recognised above. The above principle was recognised and an application by a co-owner for shifting a kudikidappukaran under S.75(2) read with S.77 of the Act from a land held in co-ownership by offering an alterate site held by him in his own right was held to be competent by a Division Bench of this court in the decision in Bhavani v. Aravindakshan (1989(2) KLT 118). In that case, the property where the kudikidappu was situate belonged to a set of co-owners and the requirement of shifting was for the construction of residential buildings for two of the co-owners. The alternate site offered belonged to one of the co-owners who had applied and the question was whether a co-owner could be treated as 'a person in possession of the land' within the meaning of S.75(2) of the Act and whether that expression would take within its sweep, a co-owner in possession with others and whether the offering of a site owned by one of the two co-owners as an alternate site, would satisfy the condition laid down for slutting under the Act. Speaking for the Division Bench consisting of Varghese Kalliath, J. and Pareed Pillai, J. (as he then was) Varghese Kalliath, J. held that the co-owners were entitled to an order for shifting notwithstanding the fact that they were only co-owners with others of the Sand in which the kudikidappu was situate and notwithstanding the further fact that the alternate site offered, belonged only to one of the co-owners. His Lordship observed: "Every one of the co-owners has legal ownership over every part of the whole property". If the position canvassed for by the respondent were correct, it could not have been held that a co-owner could apply under S.75(2) of the Act as 'a person in possession of the land* in which the kudikidappu was situated. It would also be doubtful whether the offer of the alternate site belonging to only one of the co-owners would be sufficient is the eye of law. In the light of the principle above referred to, it is clearly possible to conclude that a co-owner in possession of property along with others holding sufficient extent of land, would not be entitled to claim to be a kudikidappukaran within the meaning of S.2(25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. 7. Even Kochukunju Nair's case, (1995 (1) KLT 165 FB) which has apparently affirmed the earlier decisions of this court referred to by me, has not laid down an absolute proposition that a co-owner holding land in excess of the permissible limit would always be entitled to claim the status of a kudikidappukaran. The Full Bench was cautious in its statement of the law in the question. It has observed: "As a co-owner has right to be in possession of every part and parcel of the common property, one of the co-owners cannot get exclusive possession of the property either in part or whole except on agreement among them or by recourse to proceedings like partition suit. limay not always be possible for a co-owner on his own to go on construction in the property held by him in co-ownership along with others".(emphasise supplied) The Full Bench and has postulated that an enquiry into the question whether the co-owner was in a position to erect a homestead in the co-ownership property was necessary in such cases. limay not always be possible for a co-owner on his own to go on construction in the property held by him in co-ownership along with others".(emphasise supplied) The Full Bench and has postulated that an enquiry into the question whether the co-owner was in a position to erect a homestead in the co-ownership property was necessary in such cases. This is obviously a qualification introduced by the Full Bench in the rather broad proposition of law stated in the earlier decisions of this Court. Going by the ratio of the decision of the Full Bench, the question would be whether the co-owner has shown that he could hot erect a homestead in the property held by him as a co-owner. Since normally, a co-owner is an owner in possession of the property with others, he is in a position to erect a home stead in the property held by him in co-ownership, except in cases involving ouster, he would not be entitled to claim the status of a kudikidappukaran, if the property held by him in co-ownership would exceed the permissible limit. If need be, he can always claim a partition and get exclusive possession to put up his own building. There is no requirement in S.2(25) of the Act that he must at once be able to put up a residence of his own. The ratio in Kochukunju Nair's case shows that a co-owner who is in a position to erect a homestead in the co-ownership property, would not qualify to be a kudikidappukaran. Even going by the said ratio it is clear that before a person who holds land in his capacity as a co-owner wants the benefit of S.2(25) of the Act, he has to clearly plead and prove that he is not in a position to erect a homestead in the co-ownership property. 8. At this stage, it is also necessary to refer to the other provisions of the Act, which might throw light on the interpretation of the provision in question. I find that the other provisions, which in my view have a bearing on understanding the policy of the Act, have not been referred to in the decisions relied on by learned counsel for the first respondent. I find that the other provisions, which in my view have a bearing on understanding the policy of the Act, have not been referred to in the decisions relied on by learned counsel for the first respondent. Just like the right given to a kudikidappukaran to purchase his kudikidappu, the Kerala Land Reforms Act conferred on a cultivating tenant, the right to get an assignment of the rights of his landlord over the land held by him on tenancy. But in conferring such right on him to apply under S.72B of the Act, the Act insists that he shall not be entitled to an assignment under that Section, if he held already, land in excess of the ceiling area as notified under S.83 of the Act. Proviso (b) to S.72B(1), confers the right of assignment on a cultivating tenant who is a member of a family, the right to purchase, only if such family does not own any land or owns an extent of 4and which is less than the ceiling area and further provides that he shall be entitled to the assignment of right, title and interest in respect of only such extent of land as will, together with the land, if any owned by him or his family, be equal to the ceiling area. In other words, in determining whether a tenant would be entitled to the assignment under S.72B of the Act, even the land held by him as co-owner with the other members of his family, has to be reckoned to determine the extent, if any, that he would be entitled to get assignment of, so as not to exceed the ceiling area fixed by the Act. There is no requirement that he should hold the other land exclusively. Similar is the provision while determining the ceiling area of a tenant under S.82 of the Act. S.82 of the Act which defines 'ceiling area' specially provides in sub-s.(3) that in calculating the extent of land held by a family or an adult unmarried person, the shares of the members of the family or the adult unmarried person as the case may be, in the lands owned or held by one or more of such members jointly with any other person, shall be taken into account. This shows that the share that may be due to a tenant from the property held by him as joint property along with others, was also to be taken into account before determining the extent he is entitled to hold, towards, his ceiling area. Even in the case of kudikidappu, where an order for purchase has not been made, S.75 of the Act which provides for fixity, excludes a kudikidappukaran who has another kudikidappu or has obtained ownership and possession of land which is fit for erecting a homestead within a specified distance (see* S.75(1)(iv)). That is if a person remains a kudikidappukaran after the Act came into force, but obtained on partition of another co-ownership property, his share therein, he would lose the fixity conferred on him, by the Act. Could the position be different merely because he first applies for purchase of his kudikidappu, without seeking a partition of his co-ownership property or without attempting to put up a residence in the co-ownership property? In my view, S.75(1)(iv) clearly indicates the policy of the law that the benefit of kudikidappu is intended to be conferred only on a landless person and not on a person who has right over another property as a co-owner and as such holds towards his share, land in excess of the prescribed limit. The view adopted in the decisions relied on the first respondent would mean that, even if a person is a co-owner in respect of 100 acres of land fit for erecting a homestead and his share would came to 50 acres thereof, he would still qualify to be a 'kudikidappukaran'. Is that the policy of the law? In my view, considering the object sought to be achieved by conferring right on kudikidappukars and the scheme of S.75(1)(iv), 72B and 82(3) of the Act, it is not. I must observe with respect, that those provisions, which in my view have a bearing on determining the effect of a person being a co-owner over another extent of land, have not been considered while interpreting S.2(25) of the Act, Moreover, as noticed by me earlier, the concept of exclusive ownership and exclusive possession have been imported into the definition in S.2(25) of the Act when the Statute merely used the word 'in possession as owner on which he could erect a homestead'. The definition of 'owner' in S.2(40) of the Act also does not compel a construction to exclude a co-owner from its purview. 9. According to me, the basic decision on this aspect of the question, namely, Damodaran's case (1978 KLT 1) requires reconsideration though no doubt the principle as stated therein, to some extent, has been affirmed by the Full Bench in Kochukunju Nair's case (1995 (1) KLT 165). As I understand the decision of the Full Bench, it has introduced a qualification into the rather broad proposition laid down in the earlier cases. But for this aspect I would have normally referred this case to a Division Bench after expressing my views, as above, But on the facts of this case, in the light of the Full Bench decision, a reference seems unnecessary in the light of the indication of the position regarding the need for a co-owner applicant, to establish that he could not on his own construct a building in the co-ownership property. As noticed, here, there is no plea by the first respondent that she had an extent of 43 cents of land which she held as a co-owner, with a one third share therein but that, she on her own was not in a position to erect a homestead therein. In fact, she suppressed the existence of such a property and even pretended ignorance regarding the acquisition of it by her husband along with his two brothers, under the deed of 1954. The authorities below have now found that the husband of the first respondent, whom she represents in this proceeding, was entitled to 141/3 cents of land towards his share, out of the 43 cents. That finding alone remains, without any plea by the first respondent that he could not put up a homestead in that property. In such a situation, applying the ratio of the decision in Kochukunju Nair's case, it could be held that the first respondent has failed to prove that she was entitled to an assignment of the kudikadappu, in view of the fact that she did own and possess as a co-owner, an extent of land exceeding 10 cents, and she did not show that she could not construct a house of her own, therein. In view of this, I do not think it necessary to refer this case to a Division Bench for a reconsideration of the entire question. But, I have thought it necessary to express the views as above, so that if and when the question is reconsidered, the said aspects also could be considered by a larger Bench. 10. The authorities below have rejected the claim of the landowner only on the ground that a property held in co-ownership would not disqualify the first respondent from claiming kudikidappu. Though, presumably, the appellate Authority has referred to the decision in Kochukunju Nair's case (though the page number is wrongly given), there is no finding by that authority or by the Land Tribunal that the first respondent is to in a position to erect a homestead in the property held by her in co-ownership with the brothers of her husband. In the absence of such a case for the first respondent and such finding, the decision of the appellate Authority cannot be sustained. The orders of the authorities below therefore called for interference in revision. 11. As noticed earlier, respondent No.1 did not disclose the right over the 43 cents. In his report, the Revenue Inspector specifically referred to the right and possession of the husband of respondent No.1 over 43 cents acquired on lease along with his two brothers, under Document No. 2024 of 1954. He also reported that one of the brothers and the husbands of respondent No.1 were dead. He specifically referred to possession of the husband of respondent No. 1. In his objection, the Revision Petitioner also put forward the plea that the husband of respondent No.1 had a share in 43 cents. The first respondent filed an answer, something like a replication, before the Land Tribunal. It is significant to note that there was no denial of right or possession over 43 cents covered by the document of 1954 as reported by the Revenue Inspector or as contended by the landowner. Respondent No.1 filed a further statement dt. 15.9.1993, in which she only stated that the rights over the property acquired under Document of 1954, did not belong to her husband exclusively. She said that the Revenue Inspector had reported about it correctly and the effect of the said document had to be assessed on the basis of the report of the Revenue Inspector. 15.9.1993, in which she only stated that the rights over the property acquired under Document of 1954, did not belong to her husband exclusively. She said that the Revenue Inspector had reported about it correctly and the effect of the said document had to be assessed on the basis of the report of the Revenue Inspector. In view of these facts and in the absence of any material to show on the side of the first respondent that she was not in a position to erect a homestead in the property held by her in co-ownership, she is not entitled to the assignment prayed for. Consequently, I allows this Revision, set aside the orders of the authorities below and dismiss O. A. No.1 of 1993, the application under S. SOB of the Act, filed by the first respondent. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to suffer their respective costs throughout.