S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANT before this court is the original plaintiff who instituted RCS No. 77/72 in the Court of civil Judge (JD) at talaja against the respondent-defendants claiming his share in parcels of land bearing S. No. 19 admeasuring 2 acres 7 gunthas and S. No. 20 admeasuring 10 acres 27 gunthas at village Madhavpura. His case was that one Gaga was the common ancestor who had four sons, namely, (i) 1ghugha, (ii) Shiba, (iii) Bhikha and (iv) jeeva (present appellant-plaintiff ). He further pleaded that the said parcels of land were cultivated by Gaga the father of aforesaid four parties as a tenant of barkhalidar. His further case was that on coming into force of Saurashtra Barkhali abolition Act, 1951, the said parcels of land were entered into the name of the eldest brother Ghugha and the occupancy certificate of the lands in question was granted in the name of Ghugha with the consent of all three other brothers, i. e. Shiba, Bhikha and Jeeva. It is his case that the lands were thereafter being cultivated jointly and the present defendant- respondents being the sons of deceased ghugha were cultivating the said lands in jointness with the plaintiff-Jeeva. He averred that the said parcels of land were partitioned 1/2 to 1/2 between the branch of ghugha on the one hand and Shiba and bhikha on the other hand while the plaintiff-Jeeva continued to remain joint with the respondent-defendants. It is his case ,that when he demanded his share in the suit fields same was denied and hence he has filed the suit for partition claiming his 1/2 share out of balance lands which have remained with the respondent-defendants. ( 2 ) THE respondent-defendants appeared and disputed the claim of the plaintiff. Their case was that the plaintiff was never in possession of the lands in question nor was he in joint possession with them. The plaintiff was serving in Western Railway since last 30 years and was in every respect separate from the family. They further contended that in fact occupancy certificate was obtained in the name of Koli Ravji gaga-defendant No. 1 and it was never obtained in the name of Gaga as is alleged by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was serving in Western Railway since last 30 years and was in every respect separate from the family. They further contended that in fact occupancy certificate was obtained in the name of Koli Ravji gaga-defendant No. 1 and it was never obtained in the name of Gaga as is alleged by the plaintiff. It was their further case that since two other brothers, namely, Shiba and Bhikha were helping them in agricultural operation, some land was given to them out of said two survey nambers but such property was not partible at all. ( 3 ) ON the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed issues and found that the appellant-plaintiff has succeeded in proving that the aforesaid parcels of lands were joint between the plaintiff and defendants and that occupancy certificate was issued in favour of respondent-defendant No. l and not in favour of deceased Ghugha. The trial court also found that his two other brothers, namely, Shiba and Bhikha got their share from S. Nos 19 and 20 while the plaintiff alone was denied his share and therefore the trial court decreed the suit for partition declaring that the plaintiff was entitled to share out of the balance of lands left with the respondent-defendants. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by said judgment and decree of the trial court, the original defendants preferred Reg. Civil Appeal No. 170/75 in the court of Asstt. Judge at bhavnagar who by judgment and decree dated 1st March 1977 allowed the appeal and quashed and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the lands were joint family properties liable to partition, and further holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the occupancy certificate was obtained in the name of two defendants because they were the sons of eldest brother-deceased Ghugha. ( 5 ) AFORESAID judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court is under challenge before this court. ( 6 ) WHILE admitting the second appeal the learned single judge of this court framed following substantial questions of law: (I) Whether finding of the learned Asstt. Judge, Bhavnagar that the suit properties consisting of S. Nos 19 and 20 were nbt joint family property is justified on the oral arid documentary evidence produced on record? (ii) Whether the inference drawn by the learned Asstt. Judge, Bhavnagar that the suit properties consisting of S. Nos 19 and 20 were nbt joint family property is justified on the oral arid documentary evidence produced on record? (ii) Whether the inference drawn by the learned Asstt. Judge that when there was a partial partition it was for the person claiming property to have remained joint to prove that the property had remained joint? (iii) Whether the finding Of the learned asst. Judge that the occupancy certificate obtained by the respondent No. 1 in his individual capacity was valid and legal in view of the various provisions of the saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act? (iv) The finding of the learned Asst. Judge that the plaintiff was not entitled to get the suit land partitioned was legal and valid? ( 7 ) HAVING set out the substantial questions of law framed by the learned single Judge of this court, in my opinion, it would be necessary to refer to provision of section 100 of C. P. Code providing as to when the Second Appeal is to be entertained by the High Court. As and when a second appeal is filed in a High Court and is circulated for admissional hearing there is obligation on the part of appellant to precisely state the question of law involved in the appeal. However, there is no obligation on the High Court to frame substantial question of law in the very language in which it is framed by the appellant in memo of appeal. U/section 100 (4) it is the obligation of the High Court to formulate the substantial question of law if ft is satisfied that the substantial question of law is involved. The Second Appeal is thereafter required to be heard on the question of law so formulated and the respondent in appeal is free and allowed to argue that the case does not involve substantial question of law which is formulated by the High Court. This provision is advisedly introduced because normally and ordinarily at the admission stage the Learned Judge of the High Court on ex parte hearing formulates the substantial questions of law. It should therefore be open to opposite party to contend on the pleadings or findings of facts reached by the courts below the substantial question of law as formulated does not arise. It should therefore be open to opposite party to contend on the pleadings or findings of facts reached by the courts below the substantial question of law as formulated does not arise. ( 8 ) BEFORE deciding the aforequoted questions framed by the learned single judge while admitting the Second Appeal, this court shall have to decide as to whether such questions can be said to be "substantial questions of law" in the sense in which the phrase is to be understood in the context of Section 100 of C. P. Code. Mr. P. V. Hathi, Ld. Counsel for the appellant submitted that when the lower court has omitted to appreciate properly the oral evidence in the light of entries made in the revenue record, and more particularly, the oral evidence of Sheeba Gaga at Exh. 59 and Kanji Zera at Exh. 60, the findings reached by the court can be said to be perverse and/or are vitiated because substantial evidence is omitted to be appreciated, and therefore, even omission to appreciate oral evidence would amount to a substantial question of law under Section 100 of C. P. C. On the other hand, Mr. D. U. Shah, learned Counsel for respondents submitted that ordinarily re-appreciation of evidence at the Second Appeal stage under section 100 of C. P. C. is never permitted unless the findings reached by the courts below are said to be perverse or so unreasonable which no reasonable judge would reach. He, further, submitted that the questions framed by the Ld. single Judge while admitting the appeal are verbatim taken from the substantial questions of law as framed by the counsel for the appellant in the memo of appeal and in fact the questions framed are not substantial questions of law which arise for consideration of this court in this appeal. He, further, submitted that the questions framed by the Ld. single Judge while admitting the appeal are verbatim taken from the substantial questions of law as framed by the counsel for the appellant in the memo of appeal and in fact the questions framed are not substantial questions of law which arise for consideration of this court in this appeal. ( 9 ) IN order to decide this controversy between the parties as to whether aforequoted substantial questions of law framed by the learned single Judge can be said to be "substantial questions of law", it would be appropriate to set out Section 100 of C. P. C. in its entirety herein; section 100:" (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. " ( 10 ) FIRSTLY if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves substantial question of law, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from decree passed in appeal by its subordinate court. Secondly, it is for the appellant to precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal in the memo of appeal. " ( 10 ) FIRSTLY if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves substantial question of law, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from decree passed in appeal by its subordinate court. Secondly, it is for the appellant to precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal in the memo of appeal. Thirdly, despite formulation of substantial questions of law by the appellant, the obligation is on the high Court when it is satisfied that substantial question of law is involved to formulate that question. The words "it shall formulate that question", in the opinion of this court, cast an obligation on the High court to formulate the substantial question of law which arises as per its own satisfaction. Fourthly, the verbatim reproduction of substantial question of law framed by the appellant in the memo of appeal without adverting to the question as to whether the questions framed would involve re-appreciation of evidence, oral as well as documentary, or entering into the realm of appreciation of evidence is not sufficient to discharge the statutory obligation. The High Court on being satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved is obliged to formulate that question. Very often the distinction between formulation of substantial question of law based on accepted findings and what can be said to be questions of fact based on the appreciation of evidence, at times, oral as well as documentary are framed as substantial question of law. The verbatim reproduction of such questions which are framed as substantial questions of law in memo of appeal throws into insignificance or absolve the High Court of its statutory obligation cast by Section 100 (4) to formulate substantial questions of law. Fifthly, it is always open to the respondent, at the hearing of appeal, to urge that the questions formulated by the High Court as substantial questions of law do not involve such questions. If it is pointed out to the court that in fact under the guise of framing substantial question of law, an attempt is made to call upon the court to reappreciate and reassess the documentary or oral evidence and thereby to upset the findings reached by two courts below, the respondent under Section 100 (5) is allowed to argue that questions formulated are not the questions of law. Sixthly, it is always open to the High Court under Section 100 (6) of C. P. C. while deciding the Second appeal, to formulate other substantial question of law, not already formulated by it. if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. It would, therefore, mean that it is open to the second appellate court while it is deciding the Second Appeal finally to decide as to whether the substantial question of law formulated by the High Court (very often verbatim taken from the memo of appeal) are not involved and/or are in fact not the "substantial question of law" and and that some other question which may be formulated is the substantial question of law or it can still hold that in fact no substantial question of law is involved in Second Appeal. In my opinion, the right given to the respondent by section 100 (5) to urge before the Court that questions formulated by the High Court are in fact not substantial questions of law empowers the judge taking up Second appeal for final hearing to decide as to whether the questions formulated can be said to be substantial questions of law. It may be noted that Section 100 in its present form is substituted by the Amendment Act 1976 and sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) with proviso are newly added. ( 11 ) PRIOR to if amendment Section 100 read its under : Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of the code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to a High Court on any of the following grounds, namely: (A) the decision being contrary to law or some usage having the force of law; (b) The decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law; (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this code or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits; (2) an appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. " 11. " 11. The learned Author, Mulla in his 14th edition of C. P. Code has opined that even old Section 100 allowed Second Appeal only on the grounds set out in Clauses (a), (b) or (c ). Second Appeal accordingly used to lie on one or the other grounds specified. A judge to whom the memo of Second appeal is presented for admission under section 100 as it stood prior to its amendment would consider whether any of the grounds specified in Clauses (a), (b) or (c) in the section existed. The said clauses permitted the High Court to entertain the second Appeal if the decision of the lower court was contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law where the lower courts have failed to determine material usage of law or lastly when a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code or any other law for the time being in force was committed which could have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon merits. Having noted the aforesaid difference, the learned Author commented upon the amendment of Section 100 in following words:"the substitution means that even if the decision of the court of first appeal is contrary to law or some usage or custom having the force of law or even if the decision has failed to determine a material issue of law or suffers from a substantial error or defect in the procedure, no second appeal would lie unless there is involved a substantial question of law. There is thus a possibility of injustice being perpetuated. Sub-section (2) remains the same. Sub- sections (3), (4) and (5) and the proviso to sub-section (5) are new. One wonders why the High Court is required to formulate the substantial question of law under sub-section (4) even though such question is required to be precisely formulated in the memorandum of appeal under sub-section (3) and the High court is required to be satisfied presumably at the time of admission that such a question is involved in the appeal. The section as framed is unnecessarily involved for if the object was to limit the second appeal where a substantial question of law is involved sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) were enough. The section as framed is unnecessarily involved for if the object was to limit the second appeal where a substantial question of law is involved sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) were enough. Even where the High Court is satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law and formulates it, the respondent is still given right to argue that the case dees not involve such a question. Luckily, the proviso retains the power of High Court to hear the appeal on a substantial point of law even though it has not been formulated by it thus ensuring that no injustice is done to the appellant where such a question is not formulated through mistake or inadvertence. " ( 12 ) THE Learned Authors V. R. Manohar and W. W. Chitaley of the c. P. Code in the 9th, Edition of C. P. Code at page 175 have made following observations:"the amendments made in this section by the Amendment Act of 1976 have introduced drastic changes in the law as it existed before. A second appeal is now confirmed to cases where a question of law is involved and such question must be a substantial one. The memorandum of appeal must precisely mention the substantial question of law and the High court should, if satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved, formulate the question and the appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated. " ( 13 ) IT is to be noted that the Editor of 14th Edition of Mulla was late Honblc Mr. Justice J. M. Shelat of the Supreme Court and in the aforequoted observations it is stated that once a substantial question of law is formulated and is precisely stated m the memo of appeal there was no need of retaining sub-Sections (4) and (5) of section 100 of amended provision however, in the opinion of this court meaningful and purposive introduction of sub-sections (4) and (5) in Section 100 is advisedly made. At the stage when such questions are formulated by the High Court based on statements contained in the memo of appeal ordinarily the successful party or the party respondent is not present in the court. At the stage when such questions are formulated by the High Court based on statements contained in the memo of appeal ordinarily the successful party or the party respondent is not present in the court. The contention that question of law formulated does not involve a substantial question of law should always be open to the respondent as in number of cases the respondent can convince the High Court judge taking up appeal for final hearing that questions of law formulated are not substantial questions of law. The proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 is a redeeming feature as it empowers the High court Judge taking up Second Appeal for final hearing even to frame or formulate, for the reasons to be recorded, any other substantial question of law not formulated by the High Court while admitting the second Appeal. In the opinion of this court, the advisability of introducing sub-sections (4) and (5) along with proviso cannot be subjected to any serious criticism to the effect that the section as framed is unnecessarily involved for if the object was to limit the Second Appeal to substantial questions of law sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) were enough. The fact that such substantial question of law is framed, ex parte, very often on oral submissions of the appellant and on birds eye view of the matter is equally to be kept in mind. In country like India where, trial of the suit and hearing of first appeal ordinarily consumes unnecessarily long period of 10 to 15 years, further procrastination of proceedings by liberal provision of Second Appeal would frustrate the litigating parties as delay defeats justice. The Parliament therefore intended to drastically limit and control the right of Second Appeal only in cases where substantial question of law is really involved. ( 14 ) IT may be stated that while undertaking amendment of Section 100 in the year 1976 it was noticed that the need to give finality to the judgment and decree of the civil court at some stage is essential. Provision of number of appeals would keep the successful parties of their rights/title being under cloud so long as the appeals are not finally decided. Provision of number of appeals would keep the successful parties of their rights/title being under cloud so long as the appeals are not finally decided. Inordinate delay caused in deciding the appeals even at the Second appeal stage was noticed with some concern and it was also noticed that at times period of more than two to three decades was consumed in deciding the rights of the parties finally. Therefore limiting the grounds of appeal to "substantial questions of law" was the prime need of the time. The provision restricting the grounds that may be taken in second Appeal is based on the public policy expressed in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. It concerns the state that there is an end to litigation. The condition mentioned in the section must, therefore, be strictly fulfilled before a second Appeal can be maintained and no court has any power to add to or enlarge those grounds to which Second Appeal is now restricted. By deleting sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of original Section 100 the parliament has achieved the object of substantially restricting the scope of Second appeal as aforesaid sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) and more particularly clause (c) gave ample jurisdiction to the court to entertain and maintain Second Appeal even when no substantial question of law was involved. In the opinion of this court since a Judge of the High Court taking up final hearing has final say under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100, a right in the respondent to contend that a substantial question of law formulated in fact does not arise or is not a substantial question of law would achieve the object of conferring the right on the respondent to agitate that question formulated is not a substantial question of law involved. The further right in the Judge taking up final hearing to formulate, if any other substantial question of law is involved and decide the same albeit after recording reasons would sufficiently safeguard the interest of the appellants. The further right in the Judge taking up final hearing to formulate, if any other substantial question of law is involved and decide the same albeit after recording reasons would sufficiently safeguard the interest of the appellants. Substantial Question of Law : ( 15 ) IF the language employed in the old section 100 of C. P. Code is put into juxtaposition with the language employed by the legislature while drafting present section 100 of C. P. Code by Amendment act of 1976 there is no manner of doubt that the legislature has intended to substantially curtail and limit the scope of second Appeal. Original Section 100 in the old Code did not specifically provide that the Second Appeal shall lie on question of law but it provided that it shall lie on three grounds enumerated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c ). In the new section these three clauses are deleted, and it is provided that the second Appeal shall lie to the High Court if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves is a SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION of LAW. What is "substantial question of law" is not defined by the legislature, but the very change in the language is suggestive of the fact that the legislature never intended that the Second Appeal shall lie, as a matter of course, on any of the grounds on which the Second Appeals were entertained under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the old Section 100 C. P. Code. ( 16 ) THE Law Commission which recommended the substitution made it clear in its 54th Report on the C. P. Code, 1908, that it did so with the avowed purpose of circumscribing the ambit and to narrow the scope of Second Appeal so that the Second appeal may not become third trial on facts and "yet another dice in the gamble". The law Commission was convinced that "the wide language of Section 100 (as it stood then) and the somewhat liberal interpretation placed judicially on it have practically resulted in giving a go-by to the basic principle that on questions of facts, decisions of the courts in the first instance should be final, subject to one appeal", and that as "a wide scope is not contemplated for the jurisdiction of the High Court" in second appeal, further "limitations on the right of Second Appeal were desirable". ( 17 ) THE question then is as to how to ascertain the exact scope and meaning of the expression "substantial question of law". The legislature has advisedly not attempted to define the expression. It has left to the judicial wisdom and discretion as to how and when the Second Appeal can be said to involve a substantial question of law. Undoubtedly, it expected the judiciary to keep in mind the fact that it has while amending Section 100 of Code deleted the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 100 of the old Code, the liberal interpretation of which gave rise to entertainment of Second appeal even on the question of appreciation of evidence. IT is very difficult to put the expression "substantial question of law" in any strait- jacket formula or to confine expression to definite class of cases only. There is undoubtedly a distinction between "question of law" and "question of fact" which shall have to be kept in mind. The question which requires the second appellate court to decide the question of fact or facts or to record its finding on question of facts based on retrial or reappraisal of evidence can never be said to be a question of law. In fact, the findings reached on question of facts by the first appellate court and based on such findings it shall have to be decided as to whether the matter involves "substantial question of law". When the legislature has not attempted to define said expression, the court in its sound wisdom should avoid to draft or articulate a definition. Very often the courts of law try to reach as near as possible, to the meaning of expression, and if such expression is used or employed in some other statute of the State legislatue or of the Parliament. By adopting the process of reasoning by analogy, help is taken to ascertain the meaning of the expression. One may usefully refer to the language employed in article 133 of the Constituion of India after its amendment by the Constitution 30th amendment Act, 1974. The said Article deals with appellate jurisdiction of the supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of the high Court. One may usefully refer to the language employed in article 133 of the Constituion of India after its amendment by the Constitution 30th amendment Act, 1974. The said Article deals with appellate jurisdiction of the supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of the high Court. Under Article 133 (1) if the high Court certifies that the case involves "substantial question of law of general importance "and that in the opinion of the high Court the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court, the civil appeal would lie to the Supreme Court. Even the 30th Amendment Act, 1974 also does not define the expression "substantial question of law of general importance". For the purpose of certificate under Article 133 (1) of the Constitution it is not a mere question of law but a substantial question of law is required. In order to be "substantial" there may be some doubt or difference of opinion or there is room for difference of opinion. Thus, if the law is well settled by a court of appeal or by an overwhelming consensus of judicial opinion, the mere application of it to a particular set of facts does not constitute a substantial question of law. The question of law is substantial, if the decision turns one way or the other on the particular view taken of the law, e. g. , whether the judgment would operate as res judicata in a case, though the decision may be unimportant to others. For the purpose of Section 100 of C. P. Code the expression "substantial question of law" is not qualified by the words "of general importance". Hence, it may be said that a substantial question of law may be of interest to the parties to the litigation and need not be of interest to the public in general. When the legislature has in its wisdom left such vital expression undefined and has left it to the sound and prudent wisdom of the judiciary, attempt on defining or articulating the scope of the said expression should be eschewed and no strait-jacket formula should be evolved so as to determine the meaning of the expression. When the legislature has in its wisdom left such vital expression undefined and has left it to the sound and prudent wisdom of the judiciary, attempt on defining or articulating the scope of the said expression should be eschewed and no strait-jacket formula should be evolved so as to determine the meaning of the expression. At a point of time when such expression did not occur in Section 100 of the Old Code, a Five Judge Bench of the apex Court in the case of Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons v. Century Spinning and manufacturing Co. Ltd. reported in, AIR 1962 SC 1314 took the following view :"the proper test for determing whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be whether it is of general public importance of whether it is directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this court or by the. Privy Council of by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determing the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles, or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be substantial question of law. "subsequently in the case of Mahindra and mahindra v. Union of India reported in air 1979 SC 798 the Apex Court took the same view. ( 18 ) THE attention of this court is invited to a number of decisions of the Apex Court rendered by it after the Amendment in CP code has come into force, and it is submitted that even in case of appreciation of evidence which is found to be perverse or unreasonable or one which no reasonable man would accept or even on the ground that the findings were based on no evidence or on the ground that the evidence was wholly misread and misunderstood by the courts below, the Second Appeal would lie to the High Court bacause such lapses would amount to "substantial question of law". In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dudh Nath Pandey v. Suresh chandra Bhattasali reported in AIR 1986 sc 1509 where the Apex Court held that in exercise of its powers under Section 100 cpc High Court cannot make fresh appraisal of the evidence and give different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the first appellate court. Reappraisal of evidence or reappreciating the evidence with a view to doubting the finding reached by two courts below was thus not encouraged by the Supreme Corut. Similarly, in the case of P. Velayudhan and ors. v. Kurungotimbichia Moduss son ayammed and Ors. reported in 1990 (Supp) scc 9 the Supreme Court held that the high Court was not justified in reappreciating and interfering with the findings of fact of the first appellate court. ( 19 ) ONCE again, in the case of National insurance Co. Ltd. v. State Bank of India reported in (1993) 2 SCC 673 the Supreme court found on appraisal of evidence that the finding of the appellate court, though inconsistent with the trial court, cannot be characterized as erroneous or arbitrary and therefore it held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the findigs recorded by the first appellate court. In the case of Ramaswamy Kalingaryar v. Mathayan Padayachi reported in AIR 1992 sc 115 the Apex Court found that the concurrent finding reached as regards party being in sole possession of land cannot be questioned in Second Appeal. In the case of habib Fatma and Others v. Mohd. Shafi reported in AIR 1989 SC 2191 the Apex court did not approve of the interference in findings reached by the trial court and directed the High Court to re-examine the questions involved and to come to a fresh finding. In the case of Smt. Annapoorani ammal v. G. Thangapalam reported in (1989) 3 SCC 287 the Division Bench took the view that under Section 100 of CPC question of appreciation of evidence was not a substantial question of law and that the High Court cannot interfere in Second appeal with the findings reached by the first appellate court. In the case of Smt. Annapoorani ammal v. G. Thangapalam reported in (1989) 3 SCC 287 the Division Bench took the view that under Section 100 of CPC question of appreciation of evidence was not a substantial question of law and that the High Court cannot interfere in Second appeal with the findings reached by the first appellate court. ( 20 ) FROM the aforesaid decisions of the supreme Court and from the change brought out in the language employed under section 100 C. P. Code there is no manner of doubt that the findings reached by two courts below are to be accepted as such and no interference in such findings is called for in exercise of powers under Section 100 of c. P. Code. Even if two views are possible on appreciation of evidence it is not permissible for the second appellate court to substitute its own view to the view of evidence taken by the courts below cannot possibly also be attacked on the ground that they are frivolous or unreasonable or are such no reasonable person would reach. In fact it would indirectly permit the High court to reappreciate or reappraise the evidence and to substitute its own findings by holding that that the findings were unreasonable or were perverse. Adjectives "perverse" or "unreasonable" are so strong and are to be so sparingly used for only in few exceptional cases when it is found by the court that the findings are palpably false and are shocking to ones own conscience or are so unreasonable that they cannot stand to reason of any normal reasonable being, that the court may perhaps be justified in interfering under Section 100 of c. P. Code. This court has its own doubt about interference even with such findings by the second appellate court, facts of the present case : . ( 21 ) MR. P. V. Hathi, Ld. Advocate appearing for applicant having seen the position of law and determination of the scope of interference in Second Appeal by this court reference may now be made to the questions of law already framed by the learned single Judge while admitting the second Appeal. The substantial questions of law raised and more particularly set out hereinabove indirectly invite this court to disturb the findings reached by the first appellate court on reappreciation of oral and documentary evidences. The substantial questions of law raised and more particularly set out hereinabove indirectly invite this court to disturb the findings reached by the first appellate court on reappreciation of oral and documentary evidences. Whether an inference of fact can be drawn or not or is correctly drawn or not would fall within the area of appreciation of evidence. In my opinion, all the four questions which are framed as "substantial questions of law" by n. H. Bhatt, J (as His Lordship then was) while admitting the appeal are not substantial questions of law at all. They are the questions which invite this court to interfere with the findings reached by the lower appellate court on reappreciation or reappraisal of evidence and in my opinion such an exercise is not permissible in law. This Second Appeal must, therefore, fail on the ground that the substantial questions of law raised are, in fact, not substantial questions of law which are involved in this appeal and that they are conclusions of facts which cannot be interfered with or set at naught unless reappraisal of evidence is undertaken by this court afresh. Mr. D. U. Shah, Ld. Advocate for respondents also submitted that the substantial questions of law raised by the learned single Judge in fact do not arise and they are not the substantial questions of law but are questions of facts only. ( 22 ) THIS court would, however, proceed to decide the questions framed by the learned single Judge as substantial questions of law. Mr. P. V. Hathi, Ld. Counsel appearing for the appellant- plaintiff has invited attention of this court to the evidences of witnesses Jiva Gaga at exh. 18 and Kala Govind (neighbour) at exh. 49, Jayantilal Jethalal Joshi (Talati- cum-Mantri) at Exh. 22, Shiba Gaga (brother of Jiva Gaga) at Exh. 59 and Kanji jaram at Exh. 60. It is the case of both Jiva gaga and Shiba Gaga that after the abolition of Barkhali rights the occupancy certificate was obtained in the name of their elder brother, i. e. Ghuga Gaga as he was the eldest member in the family. It is an admitted fact that witness Jiva Gaga was not residing in the village and was serving elsewhere from the time he has completed his education and he has never taken part in agricultural operations at all. It is an admitted fact that witness Jiva Gaga was not residing in the village and was serving elsewhere from the time he has completed his education and he has never taken part in agricultural operations at all. It is also clear from the documentary evidence produced that the occupancy certificate is in fact not granted in the name of eldest brother ghugha Gaga, but it is granted in the name of respondents No. 1 and 2 who are the sons of Ghugha Gaga. The theory therefore that the occupancy certificate was granted in the name of Ghugha Gaga because he was the eldest member in the joint family does not get corroborated by the occupancy certificate. It may also be noted that subsequent to grant of occupancy certificate the names of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were entered in the village record and at no point of time the plaintiff has claimed any right whatsoever in the suit field; Plaintiff was in fact serving elsewhere and was not residing in the village at all. From the fact that some portion of the land is given to Shiba Gaga and Bhikha Gaga it was contended that the inference must be drawn that the land was joint family property. Two courts have not found any substance in this submission. Secondly, explanation given by the defendants that same parcel of land was given to said two brothers voluntarily and out of grace is accepted by the two courts below. It is, therefore, not possible for this court to reappreciate the entire evidence and to substitute its own finding in the place of finding reached by the lower appellate court. The finding of the lower appellate court cannot be said to be based on no evidence. It also cannot be said to be perverse of unreasonable. The case which sought to be pleaded before this court is not even supported by the plaintiffs. It is required to be noted that the land in question is governed by the provisions of saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act" ). Under Section 2 (i) of the Act the term "barkhalidar" is defined. Under Section 2 (iv) of the Act the word "tenant" is defined. A "tenant" is a person who is an agriculturist who holds land on lease from a Barkhalidar or a person claiming through him. Under Section 2 (i) of the Act the term "barkhalidar" is defined. Under Section 2 (iv) of the Act the word "tenant" is defined. A "tenant" is a person who is an agriculturist who holds land on lease from a Barkhalidar or a person claiming through him. On coming into force of the said Act it is provided that any person who is lawfully cultivating any land wherein the barkhalidar shall be deemed to be his tenant. Section 5 of the said Act all rights, title and interest of all the Barkhalidars in lands comprised of Barkhali shall cease and be vested in the State of Gujarat free from all encumbrances subject to provisions of the Act. Thus, the effect of the provision is to abolish Barkhali tenure. Section 10 of the Act provides for application to be made by the tenant for acquisition of occupancy rights, and the tenant is required to apply in the prescribed form to the Mamalatdar for acquiring rights in respect of his holding. It may be noted that if the claim of the tenant is accepted and if it is found that he was the person who was holding the land, the mamalatdar after issuing notice to barkhalidars and after making necessary enquiry is empowered to issue occupancy certificate to the tenant under Section 12 of the said Act. In the present case by Exh. 23, the two sons of Ghuga Gaga, namely, the present respondents applied to the mamalatdar to grant them occupancy certificate as they were the tenants of the land in question. It may be noted that their father-Ghuga Gaga has never applied for occupancy certificate. The Mamalatdar has ; thereafter made necessary enquiry and has thereafter issued the occupancy certificate in favour of present respondents. It may be noted that the occupancy certificate was not issued in favour of Ghuga Gaga, the brother of the deceased plaintiff. Such act of issuance of certificate is certified which is known as certificate of entry document at exh. 24. The actual occupancy certificate which is granted is produced at Exh. 28 and : it may be noted that such occupancy certificate is also in the name of Ravji ghugha and Kalu Ghugha, the present respondents. Such act of issuance of certificate is certified which is known as certificate of entry document at exh. 24. The actual occupancy certificate which is granted is produced at Exh. 28 and : it may be noted that such occupancy certificate is also in the name of Ravji ghugha and Kalu Ghugha, the present respondents. It is thus clear that even the occupancy certificate in the present case is granted in favour of present respondents and the theory put forward by the plaintiff that the occupancy certificate was granted in the name of deceased Ghagha because he was the elderly person in the family thus stands negatived by the documentary evidence in the court. Mr. D. U. Shah, therefore, is fully justified in submitted that the findings reached by two courts below are consistent with the findings which are consistent with the documentary as well as oral evidences on record. In my opinion, the findings are in accordance with law and they do not call for any interference of this court. In the result the appeal must fail firstly because it does not involve any substantial question of law and secondly I also do not find any error committed by the lower appellate court in appreciating the evidence on record. Appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. .