ORDER The two respondents, hereinafter, referred to as the accused, stand acquitted of the offences under Section 332 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (II). Amb, vide the impugned judgment dated 12-1-1993. Such acquittal has been assailed by the State by virtue of the present appeal filed under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the present case are these. In the month of June 1989, PW Tarsem Lal and PW Surender Singh were posted as Deputy Ranger and Forest Guard, respectively in Jawar Range of the Forest Department. On 21-6-1989, at about 11.15 pm. they were on routine patrolling duty for detection of the forest offences in the area Jawar Range. Truck bearing No. HIH-1505 was seen coming from Nadaun side. It was stopped. The same was found loaded with Bamboos, a forest produce. Accused Kuldip Kumar was the driver of the truck, while accused Vidya Sagar was the contractor and owner of the said Bamboos. On demand accused Vidya Sagar produced the export permit in respect of the said Bamboos. In order to verify that no other forest produce, except the Bamboos was being transported in the truck. PW Tarsem Lal directed the Forest Guard PW Surender Singh to check the truck. Smell of resin was coming from the truck.When PW Surender Singh tried to check the truck by going towards the rear side of the truck, he was caught hold of by accused Vidya Sagar. Both the accused then started abusing PW Tarsem Lal and PW Surender Singh. Accused Vidya Sagar removed the cap of PW Tarsem Lal and threw it towards the front side of the truck. He also snatched the stick from the hands of PW Tarsem Lal. When PW Surender Singh came to PW Tarsem Lal on having been called by the latter for help, accused Vidya Sagar removed his cap and threw the same in the truck. Both the accused then assaulted PW Tarsem Lal and tried to put him in the truck. PW Tarsem Lal was, however, rescued by PW Surender Singh with the help of Sarvshri Birbal and Pritam residents of Jawar who happened to come to the spot on hearing the cries. The accused in the meanwhile were able to escape with their vehicle. Both the accused then assaulted PW Tarsem Lal and tried to put him in the truck. PW Tarsem Lal was, however, rescued by PW Surender Singh with the help of Sarvshri Birbal and Pritam residents of Jawar who happened to come to the spot on hearing the cries. The accused in the meanwhile were able to escape with their vehicle. The torch belonging to PW Tarsem Lal was taken away by the accused. 3. On the basis of the report made to the police by PW Tarsem Lal, a case under Sections 332/353, Indian Penal Code, came to be registered with police station, Amb, vide FIR No. 91 of 1989. 4. During the course of investigation, PW Tarsem Lal was got medically examined. Four simple injuries with blunt weapon were found on his person. The truck being No. HIH-1505 was seized by the police on 24-6-1989 and handed over on Superdari to the owner Vidya Sagar accused. At the time of seizure of the truck, the two caps, battery torch and two cane sticks belonging to PW Tarsem Lal and PW Surender Singh were recovered from the truck and taken into possession by the police. After the completion of investigation, on a case having been found against the two accused, they were accordingly arrested, challaned, and sent up for trial for the offences under Sections 332 and 353, Indian Penal Code. 5. Both the accused were charged for the offence under Section 332 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code. They pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. The prosecution, in support of its case, in order to bring home the offence against each of the two accused examined eleven witnesses in all. 7. The case of the accused in their statements recorded under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure is that Bamboo were being transported against a valid permit and that they have been falsely implicated in the present case since they refused to pay the amount demanded by PW Tarsem Lal and PW Surender Singh. 8. The learned court below without going into the merits of the case, vide the impugned judgment, proceeded to acquit the two accused of the offence charged against them on a technical ground. The learned Magistrate observed that facts of the case disclosed the commission of the offence under Section 186, Indian Penal Code. 8. The learned court below without going into the merits of the case, vide the impugned judgment, proceeded to acquit the two accused of the offence charged against them on a technical ground. The learned Magistrate observed that facts of the case disclosed the commission of the offence under Section 186, Indian Penal Code. The offences under Sections 332 and 353, Indian Penal Code are aggravated form of the offence under Section 186, Indian Penal Code. It was further observed that for an offence under Section 186, Indian Penal Code, a complaint in writing, as envisaged under Section 195(1)(a), Code of Criminal Procedure was required to be made and in the absence of such complaint, no cognizance of the offence could be taken by the Court. The learned Magistrate went on observe :- "In this case obstruction was done to Tarsem Lal and Surender Singh, while they were discharging their duties as public servants and primarily offence under Section 186, IPC was committed but charge was laid before the court under Sections 332, 353. IPC. Essentially, offence remained under Section 186, IPC and offence under Sections 353, 332, IPC are of aggravated nature. No other offence was committed during the same transaction. As per observations laid down by the Honble Supreme Court of India in AIR 1953 SC 293 : (1953 Cri LJ 1232), cited supra, the real shape of the offence cannot be changed so as to avoid bar created under Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C. I am of the firm opinion that compliance under Section 195, Cr. P.C. was necessary in order to have jurisdiction for the trial of the case. It is not an irregularity but it caused substantial prejudice to the accused. An accused is to be tried by the Cr. Court in accordance with law and procedure laid down therewith. Section 195, Cr. P.C. is a substantial provision of law and it has to be complied with when offence under Sections 186, 332, 353, IPC is claimed to have been committed by the accused person. In case during the same transaction some distinct offences are committed, for those offences there is no bar for the Cr. Code to try the accused person. There is no complaint as provided under Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C. in this case and there is no jurisdiction to try the offence and convict the accused." 9. In case during the same transaction some distinct offences are committed, for those offences there is no bar for the Cr. Code to try the accused person. There is no complaint as provided under Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C. in this case and there is no jurisdiction to try the offence and convict the accused." 9. The final order passed by the learned Magistrate reads :- "In view of my aforesaid findings, there is no complaint as required by law under Section 195(1)(a), Cr. P.C. and as such, accused are acquitted of the charge framed against them under Sections 332, 353, 34 IPC." 10. The impugned order of acquittal as recorded by the learned Magistrate has been assailed by the State-appellant inter alia the ground that the same is based on wrong interpretation of law. It has been contended that offences under Sections 186, 353 and 332. Indian Penal Code constitute separate and distinct offences and that the requirement of making of a complaint by the concerned public servant as postulated by Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to the offence under Section 186, Indian Penal Code cannot be extended to the case of an offence either under Section 332 or under Section 353, Indian Penal Code. 11. The learned counsel for the accused, on the other hand, has supported the impugned order of acquittal on the grounds and for the reasons stated therein. 12. At the very outset, it may be stated that the impugned order of acquittal is bad and is liable to be set aside. 13. In the present case, the two accused were charged for the offence under Section 332, read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code. It would, therefore, not be out of place to quote here the relevant provisions of Sections 186 and 332, Indian Penal Code :- "186. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions. - Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. xxxxxx xxx xxx xxxxxx xxx xxx 332. Voluntarily causing hurt to deter public servant from his duty. xxxxxx xxx xxx xxxxxx xxx xxx 332. Voluntarily causing hurt to deter public servant from his duty. - Whoever voluntarily causes hurt to any person being a public servant in the discharge of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person or any other public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by that person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both." 13-A. Section 195(1)(a), Code of Criminal Procedure, on which reliance has been placed by the learned Magistrate, while acquitting the two accused, provides, inter alia, that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188, Indian Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The statute thus requires that without a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, no prosecution for the offence under Section 186, Indian Penal Code, can be taken cognizance of. It does not further provide that if in the course of the commission of that offence other distinct offences are committed, the Magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance in respect of those offences. 14. The fact cannot be lost sight of that Sections 186 and 332, Indian Penal Code relate to two separate and distinct offences. Section 186, Indian Penal Code relates to a case where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public functions but under Section 332, IPC the ingredient of voluntarily causing hurt as a consequence of assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is discharging his duty with the intent to prevent or deter such public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant, is necessary. The gravity of the two offences is, therefore, different. It is further significant to note that while Section 186 occurs in Chapter X of the Indian Penal Code dealing with contempts of the lawful authority of public servants, Section 332 falls in Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code, dealing with offences affecting human body and life. The gravity of the two offences is, therefore, different. It is further significant to note that while Section 186 occurs in Chapter X of the Indian Penal Code dealing with contempts of the lawful authority of public servants, Section 332 falls in Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code, dealing with offences affecting human body and life. The legislature in its wisdom has made the offence under Section 186, Indian Penal Code as "non-cognizable" while making the offence under Section 332, Indian Penal Code, as a "cognizable" one. Therefore, if the law as interpreted by the learned Magistrate is to hold good, the same would tantamount to making the offences under Sections 353 and 332, Indian Penal Code as "non-cognizable", which would be against the very spirit of the law. 15. In Basir-ul-Huq v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 : (1953 Cri LJ 1232), the reliance on which has also been placed by the learned Magistrate, a contention was raised on behalf of the accused therein that if on the same facts an offence of which no cognizance can be taken under the provisions of Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure, is disclosed and the same facts disclose another offence as well which is outside the purview of the Section and prosecution for that offence is taken cognizance of without the requirements of Section 195 having been fulfilled, then the provisions of that Section would become nugatory and if such a course was permitted, those provisions would stand defeated. 16. Repelling the said contention raised on behalf of the accused/appellants, the Apex Court held (para 14 of AIR) :- "Though, in our judgment, Section 195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that Section, it has also to be borne in mind, that the provisions of that Section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion of the Section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of the public servant is required. The test whether there is evasion of the Section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of the public servant is required. In other words, the provisions of the Section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that Section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, or by describing the offence as being one punishable under some other Section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of Sections mentioned in Section 195, Cr. P.C. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of Section 195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it." 17. Again in Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1775 : (1966 Cri LJ 1491), the Apex Court had the occasion to deal with the question whether the prosecution of the accused therein for the offences under Sections 186 and 353, Indian Penal Code, in the absence of the complaint envisaged under Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was valid. Reiterating the ratio laid down in Basir-ul-Huqs case (1953 Cri LJ 1232)(supra), it was held (para 5) :- "We pass on to consider the next contention of the appellants that the conviction of the appellant under Section 353, IPC is illegal because there is contravention of Section 195(1) of the Cr. P.C. which requires a complaint in writing by the process server or the A.S.I. It was submitted that the charge under Section 353, IPC is based upon the same facts as the charge under Section 186, I.P.C. and no cognizance could be taken of the offence under Section 186, I.P.C. unless there was a complaint in writing as required by Section 195(1) of the Cr. P.C. It was argued that the conviction under Section 353, I.P.C. is tantamount, in the circumstances of this case, to a circumvention of the requirement of Section 195(1) of the Cr. P.C. It was argued that the conviction under Section 353, I.P.C. is tantamount, in the circumstances of this case, to a circumvention of the requirement of Section 195(1) of the Cr. P.C. and the conviction of the appellants under Section 353, I.P.C. by the High Court was, therefore, vitiated in law. We are unable to accept to this argument as correct. It is true that most of the allegations in this case upon which the charge under Section 353, I.P.C. is based are the same as those constituting the charge under Section 186, I.P.C. but it cannot be ignored that Ss. 186 and 353, I.P.C. relate to two distinct offences while the offence under the latter Section is a cognizable offence, the one under the former Section is not so. The ingredients of the two offences are also distinct. Section 186, I.P.C. is applicable to a case where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public functions but under Section 353. I.P.C. the ingredient of assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is doing duty as such is necessary. The quality of the two offences is also different. Section 186 occurs in Ch. X of the I.P.C. dealing with Contempts of the lawful authority of public servants, while Section 353 occurs in Ch. XVI regarding the offences affecting the human body. It is well established that Section 195 of the Cr. P.C. does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts but which is not within the ambit of that Section." 18. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the abovesaid case, the learned Magistrate committed a grave error in placing reliance on the ratio laid down in Batakrushna Das v. The State, AIR 1961 Orissa 14 : (1961(1) Cri LJ 132 (1)), Makaradhwaj Sahu v. The State, AIR 1954 Orissa 175 : (1954 Cri LJ 950) and State v. Kathi Unad Ranning, AIR 1955 Saurashtra 10 : (1955 Cri LJ 52). 19. Similarly, the ratio laid down in Lajja Ram v. The State, AIR 1952 Him Pra 32 : (1952 Cri LJ 821) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 19. Similarly, the ratio laid down in Lajja Ram v. The State, AIR 1952 Him Pra 32 : (1952 Cri LJ 821) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said case, the accused therein on having been tried for the offence under Section 353, Indian Penal Code, was convicted by the trial Court and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- for the said offence. On appeal, the District Magistrate altered the offence to the one under Section 186, Indian Penal Code and reduced the sentence of fine to Rs. 25/-. On revision before the learned Judicial Commissioner, the conviction and sentence was set aside and it was held that the accused could not have been convicted of the offence under Section 186, Indian Penal Code, in the absence of the complaint as envisaged by Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 20. Therefore, in the present case the bar under Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not come into play for the prosecution of the two accused for the offence under Section 332, Indian Penal Code which is an offence distinct from the one under Section 186, Indian Penal Code, though the offence under Section 332, Indian Penal Code is practically based on the same facts as for the prosecution for the offence under Section 186, Indian Penal Code. 21. As stated above, since the trial Court has not gone into the merits of the case, this court has no option but to set aside the impugned judgment and the acquittal of the two accused and to remand the case to the trial Court for being disposed of on merits in accordance with law. 22. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 12-1-1993 and the acquittal of the two accused is set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for disposal afresh on the merits of the case, in accordance with law. 23. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 30-12-1996. The records be returned to the trial Court forthwith, so as to reach well before the date fixed. Appeal allowed