Selvel Advertising Pvt. Ltd. v. State Of Bihar — 1996 DIGILAW 24 (PAT)

Judgment Dhrampal Sinha, J. 1. -the six petitioners, who are either limited company, registered Society or Firm engaged in the business of advertising, were associated with the beautification of Patna, and were allpwed to put hoardings or boards containing advertisement by the side of some specified roads of Patna, in lieu of making provision for lighting up the roads, and admittedly this arrangement had continued for five years ending in the month of June, 1994. This had been done after considering their proposals by the Beautification Committee and its sub- committee, which had been set up and the terms and conditions of the arrangement had been incorpprated in the communication bearing Memo No.9545 dated 30th September, 1988 issued by the Collector, Patna, (a copy of which is annexure 2 to the writ petition ). In that connexion 9 resolution had also been passed on 6.12.1988 in a meeting which was held under the Chairmanship of the collector, Patna, (who has been referred also as the District Magistrate-Respondent No.4) and been attended by the officers of all concerned authorities namely, the Chief Engineer of Patna municipal Corporation, Dy. Collector, incharge Urban Development, Chief engineer, Patna Regional Development authority, Superintending Engineer, patna Electric Supply Company, Circle officer, Patna Sadar, and some of the representatives of the petitioners, and by that resolution ( a copy of which is annexure 1), also a decision was taken to associate the petitioners with the work of putting lights on various poles on different roads/streets lying in the area of Patna Municipal Corporation. The petitioners under the arrangement got fixed up lamps of specified type and in lieu of the lighting were permitted to put kiosks or boards containing advertisement commonly called boardings. There were several details in this broad arrangements indicating the number and nature of lights to be put up on various roads/streets and the rent/tax which was to be paid or each of the hoardings and the places at which and size of which the hoardings could be fixed up and some details are mentioned in the writ-petition also. It does not seem necessary to mention the details for consideration of the contentions raised during the hearing of the writ-petition. It does not seem necessary to mention the details for consideration of the contentions raised during the hearing of the writ-petition. Broadly the stand taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that they are entitled to continue the arrangement (which according to the petitioners was a scheme) with some modification and prayer has been made in the writ-petition for issuance of appropriate writ/order/direction: " (i) restraining the respondent-authorities from interfering with the right of the petitioners of advertisement by way of fixing hoardings/kiosks. (ii) respondent-authorities be commanded to implement the decision contained in the communication issued by the District development Officer (Respondent No.7)vide memo No.78/mu dated 28.11.1994 (Annexure 7), whereby and where under the petitioners have been allowed to fix the kiosks and hoardings for advertisement in different parts of the town on the terms and conditions incorporated in the said communication. (iii) respondent authorities may be commanded not to disgress from the policy decision communicated to the petitioners by the District Development Officer,patna (Respondent No.7) vide Memo No.58/mu dated 28.11.1994. " 2. According to the case of the petitioners, the State Government was anxious for beautification of Patna town. The Patna Municipal Corporation, which has the legal duty of providing civil amenities including providing street lights, had failed to do so on account of lack of resources and so it was decided to associate private agencies, company, individuals for providing different types of facilities to the residents of the town; and the petitioners had made a proposal for providing street lights of different varieties. After examining the proposal which had been examined thoroughly by the Beautification Sub-Committee, which submitted a report to the Principal Committee headed by the District Magistrate, patna, and with the association of the concerned authorities including the patna Municipal Corporation and Patna regional Development Authority, the arrangement had been done under which the petitioners had made considerable investment in providing street lights, and they, in lieu thereof, had been permitted to put hoardings and kiosks at places which had been specified by the authorities. The petitioners also provided road dividers and did some work at places of carparking etc. According to them, their performance in the matter was satisfactory and they had provided service as contemplated by the decisions contained in annexures 1 and 2. The petitioners also provided road dividers and did some work at places of carparking etc. According to them, their performance in the matter was satisfactory and they had provided service as contemplated by the decisions contained in annexures 1 and 2. After expiry of the period of the five years, the petitioners again made representation before the District Magistrate for renewal of their contract for further period of five years and the District magistrate made a reference to the secretary, Department of Urban development (Respondent No.2) seeking approval and necessary direction of the State Government about continuance of the Scheme. While making reference to the State Government by the letter dated 14.6.1994 ( a copy of which is Annexure 4 to the writ petition), the District Magistrate had noticed that the performance of the petitioners was satisfactory. There was, however, no immediate response to the letter (Annexure 4) by the State government and so the District magistrate issued an order vide Memo no.410, dated 19.7.1994 (a copy of which is Annexure 5 to the writ petition)requiring them to ensure removal of hoardings. After issue of Annexure 5, the State Government, according to the petitioners, in response to the communication (Annexure 4) of the District magistrate approved the previous arrangements by letter No.2140 dated 6th september, 1994 with certain conditions. After issue of the letter of the state Government (Annexure 6) which contained a direction that the arrangement should be continued but the petitioners should also be given some additional task, there was, according to the petitioners, renewal of the contract for a further period of five years by issue of Memo No.58, dated 29.11.1994 by the District Magistrate (a copy of which is Annexure 7 ). The petitioners after issue of Annexure 7 started maintaining street lights which had been respectively ear-marked to them from before. Their stand is that even when there performance was satisfactory and they had started maintaining the lights after issue of the communication (Annexure 7) on the basis of the direction of the State government, the petitioners, all of a sudden, received from the Deputy development Commissioner (Respondent No.5) letter No.207, dated 14.9.1995 (a copy of which is Annexure 8)communicating to them, inter alia, that the electricity work allotted to them were cancelled. 3. 3. According to the petitioners, the street lights provided by them were also taken over by the Patna Electric Supply undertaking, although under the arrangement, they were entitled to remove the lighting equipments provided by them after expiry of the period of five years, during which they had been allowed to provide street lights and fixed up, in lieu thereof, kiosks/hoardings. The possession of the street lights had been taken over by the respondent (Patna Electric Supply Undertaking)even though they were fully functional. 4. The petitioners have alleged that it transpired to them that letter (Annexure 8) had been issued in pursuance of a meeting, that was held in the premises of the Minister of Urban development Department, in which resolution was passed to the effect that the Patna Municipal Corporation could confer right of hoardings and the Patna municipal Corporation could realise tax and the premise on, that had been granted for setting up of hoardings by the District Administration, should be cancelled and in future permission could be granted only by the Patna municipal Corporation. A direction insuance of that resolution was issued in memo No.1196 dated 5.9.1995 ( a copy of which is Annexure 9) by the secretary, Department of Urban development, and in pursuance of that, annexure 8 had been issued. According to the petitioners, although the decision to cancel the previous order as contained in Annexure 7 was not communicated to the petitioners, the District administration asked them to remove the hoardings by the 30th October, 1995, failing which the same would be forcibly removed. 5. Although the petitioners have not made any prayer for quashing any part of Annexure 8 or Annexure 9, the writ petitioners have taken a stand that annexure 9 so far as it indicates that the tax on the hoardings fixed up for advertisement can be realised by the Patna municipal Corporation is misconceived and against the provisions of law because Bihar Finance Act, 1981 , provides that tax on advertisement shall be realised by the Commercial Tax Department and not by the Patna Municipal corporation. According to the petitioners, the reason mentioned in annexure 9 which led to annulment of arrangement contained in Annexure 7 is arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional and it is based on misconceived notion of law. According to the petitioners, the reason mentioned in annexure 9 which led to annulment of arrangement contained in Annexure 7 is arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional and it is based on misconceived notion of law. According to them, when they had been providing civic amenities of lighting the streets and were serving the people in general in a good manner and their performance was satisfactory, the arrangement with terms and conditions as mentioned in Annexure 7 should have been continued. The action of the respondents in discontinuing the scheme is unreasonable and unfair and unjust. It is also said that it amounts to unreasonable disgression from public policy and it contravenes the provisions as enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution of India. 6. A counter-affidavit on behalf of respondent No.4 (District Magistrate, patna), Respondent No.5 (the Deputy development Commissioner, Patna)and Respondent No.7 (District development Officer) has been filed. In the counter-affidavit (vide para 5), there is no denial of the previous arrangement and it seems to be rather admitted that on consideration of their proposal and after examination of the same by the beautification/sub Committee, the petitioners had been allowed to fix up kiosks/hoardings on certain specified places in heu of providing lights by putting up sodium/mercury vapour, lamps in different parts of the city. The arrangement admittedly ended in June,1994. It is the stand of the respondents that after expiry of the period, the petitioners were directed to remove hoardings, and it is obvious from Annexure 5 also. According to the respondents, the work of the petitioners were not satisfactory. Further stand of these respondents is that the responsibility of providing lights in the streets in the corporation area is of Patna Municipal corporation and it is also for the Corporation to grant permission for installation of hoardings, and the petitioners were, therefore, asked to contact the administrator, Patna Municipal Corporation. The continuance of hoardings of the petitioners after 30.6.1994 according to the respondent is without any authority of law. 7. As regards Annexure 7, the stand of these respondents is that it contains only proposal of agreement and this was issued without approval of the district Magistrate for which action was initiated against the person who issued it and the proposal contained in it (Annexure 7) remained merely proposal and it never materialised or was acted upon. 7. As regards Annexure 7, the stand of these respondents is that it contains only proposal of agreement and this was issued without approval of the district Magistrate for which action was initiated against the person who issued it and the proposal contained in it (Annexure 7) remained merely proposal and it never materialised or was acted upon. According to these respondents, the petitioners have no cause of action for filing the writ petition and they have to seek permission from the patna Municipal Corporation for display of hoardings after expiry of the period of previous arrangements. 8. According to the stand of these respondents, the petitioners have/had no right to continue their hoardings after previous arrangement had expired and though the District Magistrate by letter (Annexure 4) had only sought for guidance from the Urban Development department of the Government, the petitioners could not acquire any right only because subsequently letter (Annexure 7) was issued to them. It is also said that the Government could take policy decision in the matter and discontinue the previous arrangement. 9. The petitioners filed a rejoinder to the counter-affidavit. In the rejoinder the petitioners have controverted the stand of the respondents taken in the counter-affidavit that the performance of the petitioners was not satisfactory and they have also controverted the stand that Annexure 7 was merely a proposal and it was not approved by the District Magistrate. Further stand taken in the rejoinder is that the State Government has not asked the respondents to order for removal of the hoardings and there was no instruction to the effect in Annexure 8 or in Annexure 9. The State Govt. according to the petitioners, had approved the arrangements as was indicated from Annexure 6 and even the Patna Municipal corporation had expressed its desire to consider the Scheme as would be indicated from the communication dated 3.11.1995 (a copy of which is Annexure 10 ). They have further taken a stand in the rejoinder that the Scheme (arrangement), that was existing" before june,1994, continued to be operational to the knowledge of the concerned respondent despite issue of Annexure 5 and copies of some correspondences made by certain officials have been brought on the records as Annexure 11 series in support of that stand. 10. Respondent Nos.4,5 and 7 have also filed a supplementary counter affidavit, paragraph 4 of which reads as follows: "4. 10. Respondent Nos.4,5 and 7 have also filed a supplementary counter affidavit, paragraph 4 of which reads as follows: "4. That for the proper adjudication of the case, some of the relevant facts are as follows: (a) That the hoardings/kiosks displayed and fixed by the petitioners at different places in Patna is without the permission of the competent authority and against the statutory provisions of law. (b) That the hoardings/kiosks displayed and fixed by the petitioners in prohibited areas, such as, near Patna High Court,on road Construction Department roads and other prohibited places which is against the by-laws made under the Patna Municipal act, 1951. (c) That the hoardings/kiosks displayed and fixed by the petitioners are on the flanks of the public roads and it creates obstructions in smooth flow of traffic in Patna town and it causes great inconvenience to the public at large. (d) That the District Administration in pursuance of the order passed by the Division bench of the High Court, Patna, in CWJC no.2290 of 1990 (Arun Kumar Mukherjee and others Vs. The State of Bihar and others)in Public Interest Litigation has issued order/direction to remove the unauthorised encroachments on public roads and in pursuance of the said order the District Administration are going to remove the hoardings. " 11. A further supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioners and with this supplementary affidavit an order issued by the Patna collectorate, Patna, Urban Development section, has been annexed to show that the petitioners had been permitted to fix up number of hoardings at specified places indicated therein. 12. I may notice at the very outset that although the Administrator of patna Municipal Corporation has been impleaded as Respondent No.3 and it was said that notice had been served, no counter-affidavit was filed, nor did any body appear on behalf of the Patna municipal Corporation. Counsel of the parties, who appeared, made submissions that considering the urgency of the matter, appropriate final order be passed in this case at the admission stage itself. They were heard at length and thereafter this order is being passed finally disposing of the writ petition. 13. Before noticing the contentions raised by the learned counsel of the parties, a brief reference to certain aspects of the matter seems necessary. They were heard at length and thereafter this order is being passed finally disposing of the writ petition. 13. Before noticing the contentions raised by the learned counsel of the parties, a brief reference to certain aspects of the matter seems necessary. Some contentions were raised during the course of hearing that some of the hoardings which had been fixed up are at unauthorised places and some were in violation of the Municipal by-laws. Paragraph 4 of the supplementary counter-affidavit, which has already been quoted above, would indicate that the respondents have taken a stand that hoardings/kiosks displayed and fixed up by the petitioners at different places in patna without the permission of the competent authority and against the statutory provisions of law and also in some of the prohibited areas and some of them are placed in such a manner that they are creating obstructions in smooth follow of traffic in Patna, causing inconvenience to the public at large. Annexure 12 appears to indicate specifically as to which of the petitioners had been permitted to fix up what number of hoardings and at what places. On this aspect, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted, rather candidly, that if any hoardings or kiosks had been fixed up by any person including the petitioners which are not as indicated in annexure 12 or existed at a place not specified by the concerned authorities, or any of the kiosks/hoardings are fixed up in such a way as do not conform to the specification, or creating obstructions in traffic, the concerned authorities were entitled to remove them even when previous arrangement, which ended in June,1994, was existing and even now according to his submission, the petitioners do not make any prayer for continuance of any such hoardings/kiosks, which are not at a specified places and not according to the specification and are standing in such a way as is causing inconvenience to the public at large in free flow of traffic or against the provisions of any municipal bye-laws. According to his submission, some other persons and agencies (not the petitioners) have also un-authorisedly put up some hoardings/kiosks, though no Governmental authority has even authorised to those persons to do so. According to his submission, some other persons and agencies (not the petitioners) have also un-authorisedly put up some hoardings/kiosks, though no Governmental authority has even authorised to those persons to do so. In view of this submission/concession, the matter for consideration would be only with regard to the question as to whether or not the petitioners could get any relief as they are claiming only with regard to the hoardings fixed up by them at places and with specification permitted or granted by the respondents. 14. Another aspect, which requires mention here relates to the controversy as to whether or not the performance of the petitioners with regard to installation of mercury or vapour lamps for lighting the streets which had been respectively allotted to them was satisfactory. It may be mentioned in this connection that only one agency, namely, bihar Advertising Agency had been found to be deficient in discharging this responsibility given to it and, as it appears from annexure 4 that agency was black listed and the area, in which that association was operating was given to other agency. It appears from the letter of the District Magistrate dated 14.6.1994 (Annexure 4) that the arrangement had been effective and satisfactory. No doubt stand taken in the counter-affidavit is that the performance of the petitioners was not satisfactory and in support of this stand two documents have also been made annexures to the counter-affidavit. One of these is letter No.188, dated 6.4.1993 issued to the three of the petitioners. This letter, however, only shows that some of the lamps which had been fitted were not burning and the petitioners were, therefore, directed to ensure that such lamps start burning within three days. If hundreds of lamps, needed for lighting, the different roads entrusted respectively to the petitioners, were installed and if some of them were not burning at any particular time, it does not necessary mean that the performance as a whole was not satisfactory. Another communication vide Memo No.190 dated 6.4.1993 appears to relate to the Bihar advertising Association which was ultimately black listed on the ground of un-satisfactory performance. 15. The letter of the District magistrate (Annexure 4) definitely indicates that the arrangements, that had been made previously, was effective and satisfactory (Yah Bewastha Kargar and santosh Janak Rahi Hai ). Another communication vide Memo No.190 dated 6.4.1993 appears to relate to the Bihar advertising Association which was ultimately black listed on the ground of un-satisfactory performance. 15. The letter of the District magistrate (Annexure 4) definitely indicates that the arrangements, that had been made previously, was effective and satisfactory (Yah Bewastha Kargar and santosh Janak Rahi Hai ). In view of this statement of the District Magistrate in the letter it may be held that generally the work of providing street lights performed by the petitioners in lieu of putting advertising Board (hoardings) was satisfactory. 16. Now the crucial question which remains for consideration is whether the petitioners can get the relief which they have sought in the writ-petition even if their performance under the previous arrangement is considered to be generally satisfactory. 17. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought for on the following grounds/reasons: the petitioners had been entrusted with the work of giving civic amenity by way of providing street lights under a policy decision taken by the respondents because of the limited financial resources and under this policy decision the petitioners, who are voluntary organisations, had been allowed to fix up kiosks/hoardings in lieu of making provisions of street lights and they made huge investment in making the lighting arrangements and in maintaining the same. In the previous arrangement, as is evidenced from Annexure 2, there was provision for renewal and since their work was satisfactory as had been indicated by the District Magistrate, who was the head of the Beautification Committee, the arrangement should have been continued particularly when the Urban Development department of the State Government in response to the letter of the District magistrate (Annexure 4) had approved the arrangements by letter dated 6.9.1994 (vide annexure 6 ). According to his contention, by annexure 6 even the State Government approving, it was said that some other responsibility of beautification may also be entrusted to the concerned advertising agencies. According to the submission, because of the approval by the State Government as contained in Anexure 6, Anexure 5, by which direction had been given for removal of the boardings was not pursued and Annesure 7 was issued, which according to him, was in accordance with the direction given by the State Government in Annexure 6. According to the submission, because of the approval by the State Government as contained in Anexure 6, Anexure 5, by which direction had been given for removal of the boardings was not pursued and Annesure 7 was issued, which according to him, was in accordance with the direction given by the State Government in Annexure 6. It arrangement had been approved by the State Government and allowed to continue and further communication was issued as contained in Annexure 7, which purported to have been issued by the order of the District Magistrate, there could be no abrupt ending of the arrangements and, the decision to stop it, was arbitrary, when the petitioners had already started maintaining street lights after issue of Annexure 7 and so according to the submission they had right to continue the arrangement subject to the conditions of Annexure 7. 18. The petitioners, according to further submission of their counsel, are entitled to get reliefs on the principle of promistory estoppel inasmuch as after the offer, that was contained in Annexure 7, the petitioners started acting upon it and there could not be any decision contrary to the offer or representation as was indicated by Annexure 7. 19. The learned counsel further submitted that on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the petitioners are entitled to be granted reliefs as prayed for by them. He also cited some decisions in course of his arguments. 20. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that annexure 7 is an unauthorised action of a subordinate officer and it has not been approved by the District Magistrate and so the petitioners cannot base their claim on annexure 7 and cannot require the respondents to abide by its terms and conditions, which they want to be enforced as would appear from the reliefs sought for. According to him, the petitioner have no legal right and the previous arrangement under which they had obtained some contractual right only ended in June, 1994 and thereafter they had no right to continue to fix up their hoardings and providing street lights. It contended that the petitioners have no cause of action at all and principle of promisory estoppel or principle of legitimate expectation are not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. It contended that the petitioners have no cause of action at all and principle of promisory estoppel or principle of legitimate expectation are not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Annexure 7, according to him, is not promise or representation by a competent person and nothing was done by the petitioners after issue of Annexure 7 to them and as they did not alter their positiion by acting upon that Annexure 7, they cannot take shelter of the principle of promisory estoppel. He further submitted that there could be no question of application of principle of legitimate expectation when the petitioners had already been asked by Annexure 5 to remove their hoardings when the previous arrangement had come to an end in June, 1994. According to him, the District magistrate had only sought for guidance by the Urban Development Department by. writing letter (Annexure 4) and the department of Urban Development never said that the arrangement, that was previously existing, should be followed. He pointed out that Annexure 9 which is a subsequent communication by the Urban Development Department shows that this was in response to the letter of the District Magistrate dated 14-6-1994 (Annexure 4) and according to him, since it is the Patna Municipal corporation to take decision as to how civic amenities including the lighting of the streets of the Patna town have to be provided and it is for the Patna municipal Corporation to decide whether it would allow any person to fix up hoardings or kiosks and at what places, the letters (Annexures 8 and 9)are consistent with the responsibility given by the law on the Patna Municipal corporation. He further pointed out that the petitioners never challenged the legality of the Annexure 5 by which they had been asked to remove hoardings and even in this writ petition they have not made prayer for quashing Annexure 5, nor have they made any prayer for quashing Annexures 8 and 9. According to him, only because there was provision in Annexure 2 (by which earlier arrangement had been made effective)for renewal, it was for the authorities to renew the contract or not; and the District Magistrate by clauses (13) and (14) of Annexure 2 had been given absolute power to discontinue the arrangement and his decision in the matter was final. According to him, only because there was provision in Annexure 2 (by which earlier arrangement had been made effective)for renewal, it was for the authorities to renew the contract or not; and the District Magistrate by clauses (13) and (14) of Annexure 2 had been given absolute power to discontinue the arrangement and his decision in the matter was final. His further contention is that after issue of an order as contained is that after issue of an order as contained in annexure 5, whereby it was directed by the District Magistrate to remove hoardings, they could not have expected that the previous arrangement would be allowed to be continued by the respondents, and only because if they have not removed hoardings as required by Annexure 5 and have been permitted to continue the same, they cannot have right to continue. He emphasised during the course of argument the fact that Annexure 7 was an unauthorised letter and the respondents could not be bound by any representation made therein. 21. There is no doubt that Annexure 7 seems to be sheet-anchor of the petitioners claim and from the reliefs sought it will appear that they want that the respondents be commanded to implement the decision as contained in Annexure 7, It may be worthwhile to quote the contents of Annexure 7 here, which reads as follows : 22. Its heading indicates clearly that it was a proposal for agreement. There is nothing on the record to show that this proposal was accepted, and in terms of this proposal any agreement was executed between the parties or any sort of order in the nature of Annexure 2 was issued. After issue of this letter, the petitioners hardly seem to have done anything. In this regard the only statement in the writ-petition (vide paragrph 25) is that "pursuant to the order contained in Annexure 7, the petitioners started maintaining the street lights which were earmarked from before" and "one of the petitioners, namely, M/s. Prathibha Advertising was handed over two additional roads, besides what it was required to maintain earlier. " It is not said that the petitioners made any further investment or changed their position after issue of Annexure 7. If they started maintaining street lights that was nothing new and they did not remove their hoardings as stipulated by Annexure 5. " It is not said that the petitioners made any further investment or changed their position after issue of Annexure 7. If they started maintaining street lights that was nothing new and they did not remove their hoardings as stipulated by Annexure 5. It is rather specifically stated in paragraph 25 of the writ-petition that no further direction as contemplated by annexure 7 was given to the petitioners. 23. It may be noticed here that by annexure 4 the District Magistrate had only stated the facts about previous arrangement and wanted concurrence as well as guidence in the matter. The last part of the letter appears to contain request for giving proper direction or guidance. There is reference of the letter dated 14-6-1994 of the District magistrate in both Annexures 6 and 9. In Annexure 6 written by the Joint secretary of the Urban Development department to the District Magistrate, patna, and it was stipulated that while granting permission for putting up advertising boards to thedifferent advertising agencies, they should be entrusted with further responsibility of beautifying the town and it should also be ensured that no inconvenience is caused to the public in general or obstruction in flow of traffic. This communication (Annexure 6) does not seem to indicate that the Government had approved the previous arrangement unequivocally. It only indicated that permission could be given to the advertising agencies with additional responsibility, and some steps could be taken to ensure that inconvenience to the public is not caused and no obstruction in flow of traffic is made. In view of the contents of the letter. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the arrangement that was prevailing from before, as is evidenced by Annexures 1 and 2 was approved by the Urban Development department of the Govt. of Bihar. 24. It may also be mentioned here that whatever arrangement had been made previously as it indicated from annexures 1 and 2, the same was with consent of all the concerned authorities including the Patna Municipal Corporation. Annexure 1 would indicate that in the meeting, the Chief Engineers of the patna Municipal Corporation and the patna Regional Development Authority, superintending Engineer, Patna electric Supply Undertaking and various other officers and representatives of the petitioners were present. Annexure 1 would indicate that in the meeting, the Chief Engineers of the patna Municipal Corporation and the patna Regional Development Authority, superintending Engineer, Patna electric Supply Undertaking and various other officers and representatives of the petitioners were present. After that arrangement ended, it appears that the District Magistrate without association of the other authorities, had started correspondence (vide Annexure 4), in response to which annexure 6 was issued. There is nothing to indicate that the concerned authorities including the Patna municipal Corporation or even the petitioners were associated at any stage when Annexure 4, or Annexure 6 or Annexure 7 had been issued. It is not in dispute that it is the Patna Municipal corporation, which can grant permission for setting up advertising boards. Of course, the tax for advertisement previously could be realised by the patna Municipal Corporation, but now after amendment in the Bihar Finance act, 1981, the tax is to be realised by the commercial Taxes Department of the government and not by the Patna municipal Corporation. But realization of tax on advertisement is one thing and granting of permission for fixing hoardings at particular place is another. Even according to the case of the petitioners, it is for the Corporation to grant permission for fixing hoardings within the corporation areas and the Corporation can also recover rent for the land on which the advertising boards is to be fixed. There is nothing on the record to indicate that Annexure 7 was issued after consultation with or with consent of the Patna Municipal Corporation, which undoubtedly had the authority to grant permission for fixing hoarding at any place within its territorial jurisdiction. 25. Annexure 7, on its face value, shows that it was issued on the order of the District Magistrate by the District development Officer, Patna. Learned counsel for the petitioners during the course of argument, submitted that since it is written in Annexure 7 that it was issued by order of the District magistrate, the petitioners had no reason (or rather could not have any reason) to think that it was not issued by the order of the District Magistrate and they could only hope that they would be allowed to continue the arrangement of lighting and putting up hoardings in lieu thereof subject to the observance of the other terms and conditions as stipulated in Annexure 7. It may fee true that the petitioners could not have been aware of the fact as to whether this letter (Annexure 7) was actually issued by the order of the District magistrate or not. But even if this may be true from the stand point of the petitioners, it cannot be true for the respondents who cannot be held to be bound by the proposals contained in the letter only because it purports to have been issued by the order of the District magistrate. I do not think that any superior authorizer or any other authority at all can be held bound by any promise or representation contained in any communication issued by any officer, who has not been authorised by competent authority to issue it merely because it is mentioned in the communication that it is being issued by the order of the competent authority/officer. From the stand taken in the counter-affidavit (which the court has no reason to reject) it would appear that the District Magistrate had not authorised issue of the letter (Annexure 7) and that action was also being taken against the person who issued the letter. So I do not think that Annexure 7 which is sheet-anchor to the petitioners claim can confer upon them any right which they can enforce against the respondents on the principle of promissory estoppel. 26. It may be noticed that the learned counsel for the petitioners cited and relied on the decisions reported in (1979) 2 SCC 409 (Motilal Padampat sugar Mill Co. Ltd Vs. State of Uttar pradesh); (1985) 4 SCC 369 (Union of india and others Vs. Godfrey Philip India limited) and (1990) 1 SCC 176 (State of madhya Pradesh and others Vs. Orient paper Mills Limited) and submitted that the principle of promissory estoppel in well-settled principle; and in view of the facts that after issue of Annexure 7 the petitioners had started maintaining the street lights, the respondents should be held bound to allow them to continue the lighting of the streets and in lieu thereof to continue hoardings in accordance with the terms and conditions of annexure 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioners also read some paragraphs of the aforesaid decisions. 27. Learned Counsel for the petitioners also read some paragraphs of the aforesaid decisions. 27. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand strongly contended that on the facts of the case, the principle of promissory estoppel cannot have any application and Annexure 7 itself having been issued unauthorisedly, the representation contained therein cannot bind the respondents and the petitioners have also not done anything further to their detriment in pursuance of Annexure 7. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on a recent decision reported in (1995) 4 SCC 301 (Shabi Construction co. Vs. Industrial Development Corporation and another)in support of his contention that the promise of representation beyond the authority or power cannot be enforced against any public authority. 28. There cannot be any doubt that the principle of estoppel seems to be well settled and has been considered in many decisions of the Apex Court including the aforesaid decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is enough to reproduce here the statement of this principle as noticed by the supreme Court, in paragraph 9 of the decision reported in the case of Union of india Vs. Godfrey Philips India Limited (supra) a part of paragraph 9 reads as follows: "the true principle of promissory estoppel is that where one party has by his word or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise or representations made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise or representation would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealing which have taken place between the parties. It has often been said in England that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot itself be the basis of an action it can only be a shield and not a sword: but the law in India has gone far ahead of the narrow position adopted in England and as a result of the decision of this Court in Motilal Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1979) 2 SCR 641 : air 1979 SC 621 , it is now well settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also found a cause of action. " The principle, in my opinion, cannot be applicable to the facts of the instant case for the reasons already indicated above. For the application of the principle it is necessary that there should be clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to create legal relation in the future. In the instant case, Annexure 7, itself does not appear to contain any unequivocal and clear promise and representation and as noticed above it is also disputed that it was issued by a competent authority. The promise or representation made by a person who is not competent to make the promise or representation cannot, in my opinion, attract the principle of promissory estoppel for the purpose of giving any relief to a party. Apart from it, as already noticed above, there is nothing to indicate that the petitioners acting on that representation as contained in Annexure 7 took any step and changed their position or made any further investment. Of course, they say that they started maintaining the street lights, but street lights had been fixed from before and in lieu thereof they had continued putting hoardings and not removed them despite issue of Annexure 5. Clause (2) of Annexure 7 required that they would have to spend further amount in different categories of road and the amount was specified. It is not stated that in pursuance of this clause they made any further investment. Rather it is stated in the writ petition that no further items had been given to them with regard to other beautification scheme. So in view of all this, the principle of promissory estoppel, in my opinion, cannot be of any avail to the petitioners in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 29. Rather it is stated in the writ petition that no further items had been given to them with regard to other beautification scheme. So in view of all this, the principle of promissory estoppel, in my opinion, cannot be of any avail to the petitioners in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 29. Now coming to the applicability of principle of legitimate expectation. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that even if it is held that the petitioners may not have enforceable right in private law, in the field of public law or administrative law, their legitimate expectation should be taken into consideration by the authorities and the benefit or privilege which they had been enjoying by way of fixing of hoardings making certain advertisement for the other parties with whom they had contract cannot be taken away by the authorities abruptly and without giving them opportunity. The learned counsel has cited in support of his argument the decisions reported in (1992) 4 SCC 477 (Navjyoti co-operative Group Housing Society and others Vs. Union Of India); (1993) 1 scc 71 (Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries); (1993) 3 SCC 499 (Union of India and others Vs. Hindustan Development Corporation and others and (1994) 5 SCC 509 (Madras City Wine Merchants association and another Vs. State of T. N. and another ). On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that there was no basis or foundation for legitimate expectation which could be entertained by the petitioners (and against the respondents ). 30. I have perused the decisions and I am of the considered opinion that to the facts of the instant case, the ratio of none of the aforesaid decisions can be held to be applicable. During the course of argument, some paragraphs of the aforesaid decision relating to this principle of legitimate expectation had been read before me. But it is not at all necessary to reproduce them. Some observations relating to this principle made by the Hon ble Supreme in (1993)3 SCC 499 may only be noticed here: "it has to be noticed that the concept of legitimate expectation in administrative law has now, undoubtedly, gained sufficient importance. But it is not at all necessary to reproduce them. Some observations relating to this principle made by the Hon ble Supreme in (1993)3 SCC 499 may only be noticed here: "it has to be noticed that the concept of legitimate expectation in administrative law has now, undoubtedly, gained sufficient importance. It is stated that "legitimate expectation" is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the courts for the review of administrative action and this creation takes its place besides such principles as the rules of natural justice, unreasonableness, the judiciary duty of local authorities and in future, perhaps, the principle of proportionality. in paragraph 33 of the judgment the Apex Court noticed as follows: on examination of some of these important decisions it is generally agreed that legitimate expectation give the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightway from the administrative authorities as no crystallized right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, where a persons legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. Therefore, even if substantive protection of such expectation is contemplated that does not grant an absolute right, to a particular expectation may be denied or restricted. A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a void by representation or by past practice aroused expectation which it would be within its power to fulfil. The protection is limited to that extent and judicial review can be within those limits. But as discussed above a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, must satisfy that there is a foundation and thus has locus standi to make such a claim. In considering the same several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present. The decision taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and not taken in public interest. In considering the same several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present. The decision taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and not taken in public interest. If it is a question of policy, even by way of change of old policy, the courts cannot interfere with a decision. In a given case whether there are such facts and circumstances giving rise to a legitimate expectation, it would primarily be a question of fact. If those tests are satisfied and if the court is satisfied that a case of legitimate expectation is made out then the next question would be whether failure to give an opportunity of hearing before the decision affecting such legitimate expectation is taken, has resulted in failure of justice and whether on that ground the decision should be quashed. If that be so then what should be the relief is again a matter which depends on several factors. " 31. Some of these decisions clearly lay down that the question whether any legitimate expectation would arise from the facts and circumstances of the case is essentially a question of fact and though it seems to be settled that legitimate expectation in certain cases may require protection by court in different ways, I do not think that in the present case the petitioners can avail the principle of legitimate expectation which recently have been recognised as an equitable principle in the field of public law. The basis of legitimate expectation is said to be a clause of Annexure 2 which made provision for renewal of the arrangement and Annexure 7 which, according to the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners, indicated the terms and conditions on which they should be allowed to continue their advertising business. As regards the renewal clause in annexure 2, it only lays down (vide clause 9) that after completion of five years period the arrangement could be renewed with the consent of both the parties. But the same document (Annexure 2) also contains clauses 13 and 14 which give discretion to the Collector to stop the arrangement and also stipulate that the decision by the Collector would be final. But the same document (Annexure 2) also contains clauses 13 and 14 which give discretion to the Collector to stop the arrangement and also stipulate that the decision by the Collector would be final. After issue of Annexure 5 by which the Collector asked the petitioners to remove hoardings it would have been obvious to the petitioners that the renewal clause of annexure 2 was not going to be made operative in future. The rights and liabilities arising under the previous arrangements seem to be only contractual and it cannot be said that there was a policy or practice prevailing in favour of the petitioners from before. It was only one five-year terms arrangement which admittedly expired in June,1994. During five years period, the petitioners, under the arrangement provided street, lights and in lieu thereof they were permitted to put Kiosk/hoardings for the purpose of advertisement. If there would nave been follow up action according to the terms and conditions laid down in annexure 7 that would have been a fresh arrangement which would not have been identical to the previous arrangement as it would appear from the fact that various clauses in Annexure 7 contained terms and conditions different from those mentioned in Annexure 2. In such a situation, I do not think that the petitioners can base their claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation that they expected renewal of the arrangement that had existed till June, 1994. 32. The petitioners have made assertion in the writ-petition (vide paragraph 9) that the Government and its authorities being fully aware and conscious of its limitations, had been contemplating different schemes in different areas and the basic thrust of all such schemes had been to involve private agencies, companies, individuals for providing different type of facilities. It may, however, be noticed that it was never any scheme or policy of the-Government authorities that only these petitioners (and no other organisation)could be always associated with the scheme of providing light and in lieu thereof to put up hoardings/kiosks in future. The respondents authorities, in my opinion, should be considered to be free to make any arrangement for providing civic amenities and they might select any agency which may not necessarily be the petitioners, who were allowed for a period of five years to provide lights in certain roads in Patna in lieu of putting up hoardings/kiosks. The respondents authorities, in my opinion, should be considered to be free to make any arrangement for providing civic amenities and they might select any agency which may not necessarily be the petitioners, who were allowed for a period of five years to provide lights in certain roads in Patna in lieu of putting up hoardings/kiosks. I do not think that there could be rational policy decision or scheme, adopted by the authorities that the petitioners would be repeatedly given duty to provide street lights and in lieu thereof the right to put hoardings. They might have desire and hope that they would be allowed to continue, but I do not think that there is any legitimate basis for this desire and wishful hope, particularly after issue of direction as contained in Annexure 5 on the expiry of five years ending on June,1994. 33. It may be mentioned that by annexure 8, the petitioners were asked to contact the Administrator of the patna Municipal Corporation and since the Patna Municipal Corporation is competent authority for providing civic amenities including lighting of streets and also for granting permission, in the matter of allowing installation of hoardings for advertisement, there is nothing wrong in it. 34. There may be some force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Annexure 9, on the basis of which Annexure 8 was issued appears to be based on some confusion or law regarding realisation of advertisement tax, inasmuch as after the Bihar finance Act,1981, tax on advertisement tax can be realised by the Commercial taxes Department and not by the Patna municipal Corporation. That, however, is a matter to be considered and resolved between the Patna Municipal corporation and the Department of commercial Taxes on the one hand and the petitioners cannot get advantage of it. In any case, there is hardly any doubt that permission for fixing hoardings/kiosks is granted by the Patna municipal Corporation, which also can take decision with regard to the places where it would allow any person to put up hoardings/kiosks. Anything done after expiry of June,1994, only the District Administration without the consent or even consultation with the Patna municipal Corporation in a matter over which the latter has jurisdiction cannot, in my opinion, provide basis for legitimate expectation for the petitioners. Anything done after expiry of June,1994, only the District Administration without the consent or even consultation with the Patna municipal Corporation in a matter over which the latter has jurisdiction cannot, in my opinion, provide basis for legitimate expectation for the petitioners. Nor do I think that the action of the respondents in Annexure 8 can be termed as arbitrary of unfair or unjust. 35. Learned Counsel for the petitioners pointed out and emphasised the fact that despite expiry of the period of the previous terms in June,1994, the arrangement had been allowed to continue and it was in the notice of the government also, which, according to him, will appear from the fact mentioned in Annexure 9 (vide last sentence of paragraph 1) that the District magistrate had made arrangement accordingly in the light of the previous letter dated 14.6.1994. But Annexure 9 apparently refers to letter dated 14.6.1994 and by that letter guidance had been sought for by the District magistrate who had stated that some arrangement had been made and found satisfactory. Since there is reference to the letter dated 14.6.1994 in Annexure 9 which is dated 5.9.1995 and there is nothing on the record to show that there was any further correspondence between the District Magistrate and the urban Development Department, it can only be informed that what is stated in paragraph 9 relating to arrangement having been made related to the arrangement referred to in letter dated 14.6.1994 (vide Annexure 4) and it cannot necessarily be inferred that to the notice of the Government previous arrangement had been allowed to continue. This letter (Annexure 9) seems to have been issued long after issue of Annexure 7 which is dated 24.11.1994 and there is nothing on the record to show that in between this period any further action was taken in pursuance of Annexure 7. I do not think that in the circumstances, when the petitioners, who were asked by Annexure 5 to ensure removal of the hoardings, but they did not and they continued or were permitted to continue the lighting arrangement on some roads and fix up hoardings/kiosks in lieu thereof because of inaction on the part of the District magistrate, the petitioners can get any right, or rightful or protectable legitimate expectation. 36. 36. In the light of the discussion made, and the reasons indicated above, I am of the opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to get any of the reliefs which they have sought for on any of the grounds upon which their learned counsel based their claim for the reliefs sought. I, accordingly, decide the point for decision; and dismiss this writ petition. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition Dismissed.