D. K. SETH, J. Mr. S. N. Verma, counsel appearing for the petitioners raises an interesting question as to whether there could be a second reference under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, hereinafter referred to as the said Act, after having once refused to refer the matter under the provisions of the said Act and whether the State Government had the power to review or revise its own order passed under Section 1-K of the said Act at an earlier point of time even when no fresh material has been proceed and when there is no finding that the earlier representa tion was based on frault on fraudulent representation or whether such a reference could be made without giving any opportunity to the employed when once earlier declined. 2. He further contends that the second reference having been made on me basis of a recommendation made by the Minister, the same is without application of mind. Another contention of his is that the petitioners organisation is not an industry and the said fact has not been taken into account. He contended further that nothing has been indicated as to what was the report earlier and why the same is being departed or deviated from and, therefore, the reference is void. His last contention was that the reference relates to a stale case became of long lapse of time in between. 3. In order to appreciate the situation, it/is necessary to refer to the brief facts of the present case which is as hereinafter. 4. M/s. Viklang Kendra is a voluntary humanitarian establishment run and managed by a Society under the Rotary Sponsored Crippled and Youth Welfare Society, Allahabad registered udder the Societies Regis tration Act. It is purely a humanitarian and charitable establishment in which the volunteers from different walks of life participate in the activity of Kendra for the rehabilitation of physically disable persons. The Kendra had to forgo a very ambitious scheme for the benefit of the physically disabled persons on account of the activities of some politically motivated persons. The Kendra attends not only to medical aspect of physi cally disabled and crippled persons but is also engaged in providing vocational and occupational training within the limits of physical ability of an individual for rehabilitating such persons in life. The Kendra attends not only to medical aspect of physi cally disabled and crippled persons but is also engaged in providing vocational and occupational training within the limits of physical ability of an individual for rehabilitating such persons in life. It undertakes to determine the Orthopedic, Psycho-social assessments, nature of disability and therapies required for rehabilitation. It provides physiotherapy, occupational therapy, horticulture play and hydrotherapies. Where necessary, special education is given to integrate the physically and mentally retarded children and cerebral palsy cases. Suitable vocational/occupa tional training is given to selected cases with intention that they may be able to rehabilitate themselves in life through gainful employment. No free is charged from the medical patients or the persons who join the vocational or occupational training except a token of Re. 1. The finances are obtained mostly through donations and charities. Stipends are given to those persons undergoing training for six months for helping them while they pick up the vocational/occupational skills. The period of, training vanes according to individual disability. The Kendra carries out its activities with the aid of persons with humanitarian and charitable disposition who volunteer to serve because of the concern they feel to have for humanity and out of an urge to contribute whatever little they can to mitigate the woes of physically disabled person. The persons who have sought to raise the dispute had entered the predicts of the said Kendra as Volunteers. Out of the 23 persons raising the dispute, 15 were taken in as disabled persons for therapy and rehabilitation. They joined those persons while still they were in the process of rehabilitation and had been receiving stipend. Such persons themselves had stopped partici pating in the activities of the Kendra on 12th October, 1987. Therefore, there was no question of terminating their services who were only volunteers. There was no relationship of employer and employee between the Kendra and the said persons. The said persons were never appointed as employees of the Kendra. Neither any appointment letter was ever issued to them nor any letter of termination was ever issued and those volunteers themselves had stopped coming to Kendra on 12th October, 1987. Despite repeated requests having been made, those persons were not participting in the activities. The said persons were never appointed as employees of the Kendra. Neither any appointment letter was ever issued to them nor any letter of termination was ever issued and those volunteers themselves had stopped coming to Kendra on 12th October, 1987. Despite repeated requests having been made, those persons were not participting in the activities. Therefore, a notice was issued on 1st February, 1988 to the effect that those persons where no more required to participate in the activities of the Kendra. The said persons made an application before the Conciliation Officer on 31st May, 1988 alleging that their services have been terminated. The said application was registered as C. C. Case No. 66 of 1988. The petitioner filed its objections before the Conciliation Officer. After the concilitation was over, the Conciliation Officer submitted a report to the State Government did not think the alleged dispute to be fit for reference under Section 4-K of the said Act. The said order was communicated to the petitioner on 1st May, 1989. (Annexure 4j. In the said communication, it has been stipulated that the purported dispute is unfit for reference under Section 4-K. Subsequently a representation was submitted to the Labour Minister of the State who endorsed it to the conciliation officer to take necessary action on the said representation. Thereupon, the Deputy Labour Commissioner, without applying his mind issued notice on 24th January, 1990 (Annexure 5 ). The petitioner submitted their objection on 30th May, 1990. In the said objection it was pointed out that since after 12th January, 1987, no volunteers have been taken and t le entire work of the Kendra has been organised in a manner that it may be carried out by the existing volunteers. Certain vocational units had to be closed down. It was also pointed out that the Kendra is not a commercial establishment and does not carry out any business activity. It is a voluntary organisation catering to the need of Social Welfare of disabled and cripples. The Deputy Labour Commissioner, however, without applying his mind, submitted a report on 4th May, 1990 wherein he had found that the organisation carries on humanitarian activities and while doing so it earns profit. On the basis of the said report, the Deputy Labour Commissioner issued a show-cause notice without giving opportunity to file objection or hearing. The Deputy Labour Commissioner, however, without applying his mind, submitted a report on 4th May, 1990 wherein he had found that the organisation carries on humanitarian activities and while doing so it earns profit. On the basis of the said report, the Deputy Labour Commissioner issued a show-cause notice without giving opportunity to file objection or hearing. By an order of reference dated 2nd January, 1992 contained in a com munication dated 14-1-1992, it was intimated to the petitioner that the matter was sought to be referred. It is against this order that the present writ petition has been moved wherein the above question has been raised. 5. On the other hand, the learned Counsel Mr. A. P. N. Giri appear ing on behalf of the respondents contends that the writ petition is premature since the present question could be raised as preliminary objection before the Industrial Tribunal and could be decided therein. He further contends that Article 350 of the Constitution entitles a person to make a representation. If a representation is made, the same is to be decided in accor dance with law and has been so decided and, therefore, the same cannot be questioned. He contends further that the reference made by the Minister is to be treated as a reference by the Government. He relies on the case of Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 , In support of his contention that a Ministers reference is a reference by the Government. 6. Now looking into the contention of Mr. Verma with regard to the question of maintainability of a second reference, I do not find any reason to accept such a contention that once a reference is refused there cannot be any second reference, Inasmuch as making of a reference is neither a judicial action nor quasi- judicial activity. The making of reference is purely administrative action. Therefore, the principle of res judicata cannot be attracted. 7. In an administrative action, if it is brought to the notice of the authority that the same requires reconsideration, it is open to the authority to reconsider it. The same may not be termed as revision or review as is understood in judicial parlance. It is rather a reconsideration. Therefore, the contention that review or revision cannot be undertaken, as contended by Mr. Verma, cannot be accepted. The same may not be termed as revision or review as is understood in judicial parlance. It is rather a reconsideration. Therefore, the contention that review or revision cannot be undertaken, as contended by Mr. Verma, cannot be accepted. But the fact remains that in order to make a reference, procedure has been laid down in Section 12 of the Indus trial Disputes Act. After dispute is raised, conciliation proceeding is to be undertaken. If the conciliation fails, the Conciliation Officer has to submit a report to the State Government under Section 12 (4) of the said Act. After considering such report, if the State Government is of the opinion that a dispute exists, then it may refer in terms of Section 12 (5) of the said Act. Therefore, the opinion of the State Government is based on materials placed before it including the report. Once such a report was placed and the State Government, after considering such report and the material found that no dispute exists and, therefore, refrained from making a reference. 8. But such a refusal does not preclude the Government to change its mind and make reference if it was satisfied that its earlier decision had been arrived at on a misapprehension of facts or that new facts have came to light or it had misunderstood the existing facts or for any other relevant consideration it is required to reconsider. There is no doubt about the existence of the power to refer on a second consideration but upon such reconsideration, the Government can make a reference only if the dispute is an industrial one and either exists at that stage or is apprehended and the reference it makes must be with regard to that and no other industrial dispute. 9. I am fortified with regard to my above view by the observations made in the case of M/s. Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. The Western India Match Co. Workers Union, 1970 (1) SCC 225 . In paragraph 9 of the said Judgment, while referring to the case of State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy, 1953 SCR 334 , it was held that the function of the appropriate Government under Section 10 (1) of the Central Act "is an administrative function. Ltd. v. The Western India Match Co. Workers Union, 1970 (1) SCC 225 . In paragraph 9 of the said Judgment, while referring to the case of State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy, 1953 SCR 334 , it was held that the function of the appropriate Government under Section 10 (1) of the Central Act "is an administrative function. It was so held presumably because the Government cannot go into the merits of the dispute, its function being only to refer such a dispute for adjudication. . . . . . . . . . . . In the light of the nature of the function of the Government and the object for which the power is conferred on it, it would be difficult to hold that once the Government has refused to refer, it cannot change its mind of a reconsideration of the matter either because new facts have come to light or because it had misunder stood the existing facts or for any other relevant consideration and decide to make the reference. But where it reconsiders its earlier decision, it can make the reference only if the dispute is an industrial one and either exists at that stage or is apprehended and the reference it makes must be with regard to that and no other Industrial dispute. " 10. In the said case, while interpretation the phrase "at any time" occurring in Section 4 (k) of the Act, the Apex Court had laid down : "from the words used in Section 4 (k) of the Act there can be no doubt that the Legislature has left the question of making or refusing to make a reference for adjudication to the discretion of the Government. But the discretion is neither unfettered nor arbitrary for the section clearly provides that there must exist an industrial dispute as defined by the Act or such a dis pute must be apprehended when the Government decided to refer it for adjudication. No reference thus can made unless at the time when the Government decides make it an industrial dispute between the employer and his employees either exists or is apprehended. Therefore, the expression "at any time", though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears. No reference thus can made unless at the time when the Government decides make it an industrial dispute between the employer and his employees either exists or is apprehended. Therefore, the expression "at any time", though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears. Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the conciliation officer has made a failure report. But the Governor need not wait until such a procedure has been completed. In an urgent case, it can "at any time" i. e. , even when such proceedings have not begun still pending, decide to refer the dispute for adjudication. The expression "at any time" thus that in such cases as where the Government decides to a reference without waiting for conciliation proceed ings to begin or to be completed. As already stated the expression at any time" in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dis pute exists or is apprehend. No reference is contemplated by the section when the dispute is not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, instance, where it is already adjudicated or in regard of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence. 11. While concluding on the basis of the facts of the case as was involved in the said case of Western India Watch Co. Ltd. (supra), it was observed further : "in the present case though nearly four years had gone by since the earlier decision not to make the reference, it the Govern ment was satisfied that its- earlier decision had been arrived at on a mis- apprehension of facts, and therefore, required its reconsideration, neither its decision to do so nor its deter mination to make the reference can be challenged on the ground of want of power. The fact that the dispute between the concerned workman and the management had become an industrial dispute by its having been espoused by the Union since 1957 cannot be disputed. The fact that the dispute between the concerned workman and the management had become an industrial dispute by its having been espoused by the Union since 1957 cannot be disputed. The fact that the workman was then not a member of the Union does not preclude or negative the existence of the community of interest nor can it disable the other workmen through their union from making that dispute their own. The fact that the Government refused then to exercise its power cannot mean that the dispute had ended or was in any manner resolved. " 12. Section 10 of the Central Act which is pari materia the same with Section 4 (k) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act so far as the opening words are concerned, namely, where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". There fore, the Government in order to form an opinion, there must exist sufficient material and with all such materials the opinion that has been formed which though may not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in deciding the disputed question of face but still may at least show judicious formation of opinion without being mechanical. Such formation of opinion if shows patently on the fact of it perverse, then in exercise of writ jurisdiction, such order or reference can be reviewed. If formation of opinion appears to be possible on the facts and circum stances of the case, even though the High Court may be of a different opinion, the High Court cannot substitute its own views in such cases. The High Court may interfere only when on the basis of materials on record it arrives at a finding that formation of opinion is either perverse or that the name was not based on sufficient materials and suffers from non-application of mind or has been made mechanically or on extraneous consideration. 13. In the case of Binny Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1972 SCC 806 , it was held. "the order of reference must on the fact of it show what impelled the Government to depart from its earlier decision and that in the absence thereof the Court must hold that there were no reasons why such a change of opinion is without any force. " 14. "the order of reference must on the fact of it show what impelled the Government to depart from its earlier decision and that in the absence thereof the Court must hold that there were no reasons why such a change of opinion is without any force. " 14. In the said case as well, the power to make a reference after having refused earlier has been recognised. 15. In the case of Prem Kakar v. State of Haryana,l916 (3) SCC 433, it has been held : " (7) Section 12 of the Act deals with duties of Conciliation Officers. If the Conciliation Officer cannot arrive at a settlement of the dispute he sends a report to the appropriate Government. Under Section 12 (5) of the Act, if, on a consideration of the report referred to in sub-section (4), the appropriate Govern ment is satisfied that there is a case for reference, it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor. (8) This Court in State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy and State of Bom. v. K. P. Krishnan, held that the order of the Government acting under Section 10 (1) read with Section 12 (5) of the Act is an administrative order and not a judicial as quasi-judicial one. 16. In the present case on the basis of the recommendation of the Minister, the Deputy Labour Commissioner had put up a different report on the basis whereof the present reference has been made. Nothing has been produced before this Court to show that upon which material the earlier reference was refused and what are the additional materials on which a different report is placed. However, the order of reference is a reasoned one where certain grounds have been made out as I understand from the translation of the said document made at the Bar. Though earlier refusal does not bind the Government to refuse a make a reference on a subsequent occasion, but on the principle that every Government action shall be presumed to have been done correctly, still the Government is required to act judiciously. It can not act whimsically or arbitrarily. The Government has to apply its mind and find out the necessity of making a reference. It can not act whimsically or arbitrarily. The Government has to apply its mind and find out the necessity of making a reference. Though however, while making a reference the Government is not required to decide any question relating to the dispute which can only be decided by the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, the scope and ambit for the consideration of the Government is limited only to the extent of finding out as to whether any dispute, an industrial one, exists at that stage with the limitations as observed hereinbefore. 17. When once it had refused to refer, the State Government has to be a little more careful and apply its mind while making a second reference and should have indicated as to why this time it is making such a reference. Though it may not be necessary to specify such reasons OF indicate its mind in the order of reference, since the order of reference is not a quasi-judicial action, but such reasons must be apparent from the record and materials placed so as to enable the judiciary while reviewing such a situation to arrive at a finding with regard to the decision of the second reference. 18. In the present case, nothing has been produced to show as to what necessitated making of a second reference except the report of the Deputy Labour Commissioner. Therefore, we are to fall back on the report of the Deputy Labour Commissioner for the purposes of finding out as to whether the State Government could take a decision to refer the matter after coming to a finding that a dispute exists. Now the said report discloses that though the organisation is a humanitarian organisation is, at the same time, a profit beaming one. Nothing has been shown as to on which material, the Deputy Labour Commissioner had come to a finding that the organisation is a profit earning one. 19. When once a reference has been denied, in order to reopen and reconsider the question for the purpose of making a second reference, it is necessary to find out that there was some thing which was either overlooked or which was suppressed or that there was some wrong decision or some are committed on the basis of the materials or any fraud was perpetrated on it. Otherwise there would not have been any sanctity of an administrative action as well though however, the principle of estoppel cannot be attracted in such a case. In the present facts and circumstances of the case, there is nothing to indicate that such a situation exists. 20. Admittedly such a report is given by the Deputy Labour Commis sioner on the basis of failure of conciliation proceedings. He should also indicate certain materials on which he had arrived at such a decision parti cularly on the face of the objection, that it is not a voluntary charitable organisation but a commercial establishment. 21. But by now it is a settled principle of law that neither the Con ciliation Officer nor the State Government decides any issue. The Deputy Labour Commissioner only reports failure of conciliation. Whether the organisation is an industry or not cannot be decided by the Deputy Labour Commissioner. The State Government also cannot decide the said question. It can only see as to whether on the face of the record, the organisation is an industry or not. But it really cannot decide the said question in case of any doubt. However, when such a reference is made, the petitioner is also not without a remedy. He could raise the question either as a pre liminary objection or be decided by the Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be. 22. In that view of the matter, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the order of reference does not appear to have been made upon a proper application of mind on account of lack of materials as has been urged in the present case. The facts and circumstances disclosed do not show that there was proper application of mind for the purposes of forming an opinion in the manner as observed hereinbefore. In the facts and circumstances, therefore, the matter is referred back to the Government once again to form its opinion on the basis of the t materials placed before it and decide the question of reference afresh if a reference has already been made. If no reference is made, in that event, it may do so after forming its opinion in the light of the observation made hereinbefore. 23. If no reference is made, in that event, it may do so after forming its opinion in the light of the observation made hereinbefore. 23. In the result, the order dated 2nd January, 1992 being the order of reference is hereby set aside subject to the direction to the Government for reconsideration of the matter on the basis of the materials before it after considering the objection filed by the petitioner and take a fresh decision within a period of two weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before it. The petitioner is directed to produce a certified copy of this order before the respondent No. 1 within a period of two weeks from date. In default of such production within the stipulated period, the order of reference dated 2nd January, 1992 shall stand affirmed. 24. With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition disposed of. .