JUDGEMENT - A.P. SHAH, J. :---This appeal by the State of Maharashtra is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge whereby the learned Judge has set aside the order of cancellation of Form BRL licence issued to the respondent and further directed restoration of the said licence to the respondent. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the respondent is a private limited company engaged in the business of manufacturing beer and is having its brewery at MIDC, Satara. The respondent was granted licence in Form BRL under Rule 3 of the Maharashtra Manufacturers of Beer and Wine Rules, 1966 ('Rules' for short) for the manufacture of beer. The said rules have been framed by the State Government under section 143(2) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 ('Act' for short). Originally the licence came to be granted to the respondent in or about 1972 and the same was renewed from time to time every five years. The last of such renewal was made on 1st April, 1982 and the said licence was valid upto 31st March, 1987. 2. Some time in August, 1985 the State Government received information that the production of large quantity of beer at the brewery of the respondent was suppressed and its bottling and sale was being carried by the respondent by evading payment of excise duty to the Government. The Government, therefore, directed investigation in the matter and if necessary, to carry out raids on the premises of the respondent at Satara. The raids were carried out on 23rd August, 1985 in the licensed premises of the brewery and on 26th August, 1985 at the registered office of the brewery at Bombay. On 5th September, 1985 the residential premises of the Assistant Security Officer of the respondent were raided on information that incriminating documents were kept there. On 24th October, 1985 the Prohibition Excise Department submitted its report to the Government. It was stated in the report that there was systematic evasion of the excise duty by the respondent causing loss to the State exchequer to the extent of Rs. 72,28,166.17 ps. The report also revealed the modus operandi adopted by the respondent for evasion of the excise duty. On a further investigation it was found that the tax evasion was nearly Rs. 83,00,000/-. 3. 72,28,166.17 ps. The report also revealed the modus operandi adopted by the respondent for evasion of the excise duty. On a further investigation it was found that the tax evasion was nearly Rs. 83,00,000/-. 3. From the material collected by the Department and the documentary evidence seized in the raids conducted during the investigation, the Government was satisfied that the cancellation of licence issued to the respondent would be appropriate legal step and therefore the Government passed the order dated 18th November, 1985, cancelling the licence in Form BRL held by the respondent. It will be useful to reproduce the impugned order which reads as follows : "Whereas it has been brought to the notice of the Government of Maharashtra that there is sufficient evidence to indicate the evasion of excise duty by M/s. Doburg Lager Breweries (P.) Ltd. having their registered office at Commonwealth Building, 1st floor, 82, Nagindas Master Road, Fort, Bombay-400 023 and holding a licence in Form BRL under the Maharashtra Manufacturers of Beer and Wine Rules, 1966 and that the evasion of the excise duty may be as much as over Rs. 72 lakhs during the period from 1981 to 20-8-1985 and 2. Whereas the Government of Maharashtra is satisfied from the material placed before it that the evasion of excise duty was wilful and deliberate act on the part of the licensee and was a result of collusion between the licensee viz., M/s. Doburg Lager Breweries (P.) Ltd., and others to deprive the Government of its legitimate excise dues to a large extent and it is therefore expedient and in the public interest to cancel forthwith the licence in Form BRL held by M/s. Doburg Lager Breweries (P.) Ltd. 3. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred under section 56(1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, the Government of Maharashtra is hereby pleased to cancel the licence in Form BRL held by M/s. Doburg Lager Breweries (P.) Ltd., and to further direct that a part of the licence fee commensurate with the unexpired portion of the licence should be refunded after deducting amount, if any, due from them to the State Government. 4. The State Government also launched prosecution against the directors and other officials of the respondent in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Satara. The criminal case which is numbered as 275 of 1985 is still pending. 4. The State Government also launched prosecution against the directors and other officials of the respondent in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Satara. The criminal case which is numbered as 275 of 1985 is still pending. The Inspector and Sub-Inspector in-charge of the brewery, who were primarily concerned with the supervision of the stock manufactured as well as sold and the recovery of commensurate excise duty have also been made accused in the said criminal case. 5. Upon service of the impugned order dated 18th November, 1985, the respondent approached this Court by filing a writ petition on November 28, 1985. In pursuance of the notice of the petition, Shri L.B. Ringe, Deputy Secretary to the Government. Home Department filed his affidavit in reply opposing the admission. The writ petition thereafter came to be adjourned from time to time and during this period certain interim orders were passed. The writ petition was then placed for admission on 10th January, 1986 before Bharucha, J. (as he then was) and the learned Judge after hearing both the parties passed the following order : "Leave to amend. Rule. Under the orders of the Court, the concerned Secretary shall afford the petitioners a hearing on 22nd instant in respect of the charges levelled in the affidavit of Mr. Ringe dated 2-12-1985 and shall pass an order in respect of the hearing by 29th instant. The order shall be forthwith communicated to the petitioners. In view of the fact that there are no other charges, as Mr. Singhvi has stated, a show cause notice is dispensed with. To be on board on 3-2-1986 for consideration of interim relief." On 7th March, 1986 Bharucha, J., passed a speaking order refusing interim relief and the appeal filed against the said order to the Division Bench by the respondent was also dismissed. 6. Pursuant to the aforesaid order passed by Bharucha, J., dated 10th January, 1986, Mr. B.B. Sharma, Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra. Home Department (Prohibition Excise) heard the respondent and passed a reasoned order dated 29th January, 1986. The operative portion of the said order which is material for our purpose reads as follows : "..... 6. Pursuant to the aforesaid order passed by Bharucha, J., dated 10th January, 1986, Mr. B.B. Sharma, Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra. Home Department (Prohibition Excise) heard the respondent and passed a reasoned order dated 29th January, 1986. The operative portion of the said order which is material for our purpose reads as follows : "..... Therefore the action taken by the Government to cancel the licence held by the Company under section 56(1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, is just and proper and needs no interference." On receipt of the order of the Secretary, the respondent sought leave to amend the writ petition and pursuant to the leave granted, the respondent amended the petition challenging the legality and correctness of the order dated 29th January, 1986. On behalf of the respondent Mr. L.B. Ringe, Deputy Secretary, Home Department and Mr. Mangesh Parshuram Shirsat, Deputy Secretary, Prohibition filed the returns opposing the writ petition. 8. Before the learned Single Judge, the following six contentions were raised on behalf of the respondent : (1) Facts disclosed rendered the order ultra vires of provisions of section 56 of the Act as the ground of cancellation clearly falls under section 54(1)(a) of the Act ; (2) Recording of reasons under section 56(1)(b) to dispense with the notice is a condition precedent for exercise of powers under this provision and in the absence of reasons being recorded in that behalf much less communicated the order must render without jurisdiction; (3) Section 56 of the Act is ultra vires of Article 14 and consequently action thereunder is barred ; (4) Under Rules 6 and 10 of the Rules and Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the Secretary of the Home Department had no jurisdiction to hear the matter, the authority being Minister for Prohibition alone. Waiver, acquiescence estoppel confer no jurisdiction. (5) Assuming that the action is referable to section 54, in the absence of express exclusion of hearing there is inherent implied duty to hear the party (during pre-decisional hearing) and admittedly the order dated 18-11-1985, having been passed without notice and without hearing, the hearing now given by Mr. Sharma, Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, being a post-decisional hearing cannot cure the earlier order. (6) Impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind because extremely relevant and germane circumstances have not been considered by the Secretary. 9. Sharma, Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, being a post-decisional hearing cannot cure the earlier order. (6) Impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind because extremely relevant and germane circumstances have not been considered by the Secretary. 9. Out of the aforesaid six contentions, the contention No. 3 relating to constitutional validity of section 56 of the Act was rejected by the learned Judge, but all other contentions excepting contention No. 6 found favour with the learned Single Judge. To put it in nutshell, the learned Single Judge held that the order of cancellation is ultra vires of section 56 as the grounds of cancellation fall under section 54(1)(a) of the Act; that the impugned order under section 56 is also without jurisdiction for failure to record reasons for dispensing with 15 days' notice; that as the original order dated 18th November, 1985 was passed without notice and without hearing, the post-decision hearing given by the Secretary cannot cure the defect in the earlier order; and that under the rules of business, the Secretary of the Home Department had no jurisdiction to hear the matter and therefore the order dated 29th January, 1986 passed by the Secretary is also without jurisdiction. In view of the conclusions reached by the learned Single Judge, he felt it unnecessary to decide the last contention of the respondent that the order of cancellation of licence suffer from non-application of mind. 10. We have heard learned Advocate General for the appellant and Mr. Dharmadhikari for the respondent. We have given our anxious thought to the rival submissions advanced by them and if we have to indicate our mind at this stage, we may state that we find ourselves unable to agree with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge since in our considered view the order of cancellation of the licence does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. With this we proceed to record the reasons for our conclusion. As the controversy mainly centers round two provisions of the Act, namely, sections 54 and 56, it would therefore be necessary to reproduce the said sections. Section 54 reads as under: "54(1) The Authority granting any licence, permit, pass or authorization under this Act may for reasons to be recorded in writing cancel or suspend it; (a) if any fee or duty payable by the holder thereof is not duly paid; (b) ..... Section 54 reads as under: "54(1) The Authority granting any licence, permit, pass or authorization under this Act may for reasons to be recorded in writing cancel or suspend it; (a) if any fee or duty payable by the holder thereof is not duly paid; (b) ..... (c) ..... (d) ..... (e) if the licence, permit, pass or authorization has been obtained through wilful misrepresentation or fraud. (2) ..... (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the State Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend or cancel any licence, permit, pass or authorization." Section 56 reads as under: "56(1) Whenever the authority granting a licence, permit, pass or authorization considers that it should be cancelled for any cause other than those specified in section 54, he may cancel it either (a) on the expiration of not less than 'fifteen days' notice in writing of his intention to do so; or (b) forthwith without notice, recording his reasons in writing for doing so. (2) ....." 11. These are the only relevant provisions which are required to be considered in this appeal. Both the provisions confer power on the licensing authority to cancel the licence granted under the Act. But the basic distinction between the two sections is that section 54 confers power to cancel the licence for the causes specified in the said section. Section 56, on the other hand, confers power on the licencing authority to cancel the licence for any cause other than those in section 54. The further distinguishing feature is that section 56 authorizes the licencing authority to cancel the licence on the expiration of fifteen days' notice in writing as per Clause (a) of section 56(1) and even forthwith without notice after recording reasons in writing for doing so under Clause (b) of section 6(1). It is a common ground that as far as the present case is concerned, the licencing authority is the State Government. It is also common ground that the impugned order dated 18th November, 1985 was passed by the State Government without show cause notice and without giving prior hearing to the respondent. The said order states categorically that it is made in exercise of the powers conferred under section 56(1)(b) of the Act. It is also common ground that the impugned order dated 18th November, 1985 was passed by the State Government without show cause notice and without giving prior hearing to the respondent. The said order states categorically that it is made in exercise of the powers conferred under section 56(1)(b) of the Act. With this preface we now turn to the first contention raised by the respondent before the learned Single Judge which has been stressed before us with equal vehemence. 12. In effect, the contention of the respondent is that the facts disclosed in the order dated 18th November, 1985 clearly falls within the ambit of section 54(1)(a) of the Act and if that is so, the said order which is admittedly passed in exercise of powers conferred under section 56(1)(b) becomes without jurisdiction and consequently must be held to be a void order. It is contended that section 56 defines the field of operation namely, that if the case is not covered by any of the clauses under section 54, then only provisions of section 56 can be invoked. Sections 54 and 56 operate in two distinct fields and, therefore, if the cause for cancellation of the licence of the licensee falls under section 54, no order can be passed under section 56 as has been done in the present case, therefore, the order is without jurisdiction and void. As a sequitur to this argument, it is further contended that while exercising power under section 54, there is implicit duty cast on the State Government to comply with the rule of audi alteram partem and therefore any order passed in violation of the said rule will be void ab initio. In order to substantiate these contentions heavy reliance has been placed upon the provisions contained in section 105 and 106 of the Act. It is vehemently contended that the scheme of the Act is such that until payment of excise duty or countervailing duty, as the case may be as per the rates prescribed by the State Government is paid either in the Government treasury or in the account of the Excise Department, the Bank notified by the State Government and unless challan evidencing such prepayment is verified, not a single drop of beer much less the bottle could be removed from the bonded warehouses. Therefore, it is argued that even assuming that the respondent in collusion with the officers of the Excise Department has sold or exported beer without prepayment of excise duty and thereby evaded the same, such a mischief would fairly and squarely attract the provisions of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 54. In short the case of the respondent is that Clause (a) of section 54(1) applies to a case of tax evasion as there is no other eventuality where Clause (a) can be invoked and if the said clause was applicable it was obligatory on the State Government to follow the elementary principles of natural justice before directing cancellation of the respondent's licence. 13. The contention undoubtedly appears to be attractive at the first blush but on a closer scrutiny we find the same devoid of any merit. Section 54(1)(a) provides for suspension or cancellation of licence if any fee or duty payable by the holder thereof is not duly paid. Thus the said provisions will be applicable to a case where any fee or duty payable by the licensee is not duly paid. In our opinion, this provision contemplates a situation where the licensee accepts liability to pay fees or duty but does not make good and thereby renders himself liable for action under section 54(1)(a) of the Act. However, in the present case we are concerned with the clandestine sale and export of goods without prepayment of the duty and the licensee is denying its liability to pay the duty. We are dealing with a case where the licensee is charged with clandestine removal of large quantity of goods in collusion with the excise officials. This is an offence under the Act. In such a situation Clause (a) will not be attracted. If it is revealed that the licensee is indulging in a preplanned evasion of the excise duty, bearing in mind the gravity of the situation, the licensing authority will be fully justified in taking recourse to section 56(1)(b) of the Act. The Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that evasion of excise duty has the effect of adversely affecting the economy of the State. It has the effect of paralysing the economy of the State. The Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that evasion of excise duty has the effect of adversely affecting the economy of the State. It has the effect of paralysing the economy of the State. We are fully aware of the fact that such evasion is not possible without the active connivance of the excise officials, who have been posted at the bonded warehouses. It is precisely to take care of such grave and serious situation and to enable the authorities to pass appropriate orders without insisting for prior notice of hearing, the legislature has inserted section 56 in the statute book. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Government was wrong in resorting to section 56(1)(b) of the Act. 14. Mr. Dharmadhikari strenuously contended that power under section 56(1)(b) can be exercised only in exceptional cases where failure to exercise such power would result in hazardous situation or grave consequences. For example, if the brew is found to be contaminated and poisonous and if such brew is allowed to be marketed and consumed by the consumers, it may result in disastrous consequences. Mr. Dharmadhikari argues that exercise of power under section 56(1)(b) is meant to prevent such situation. Less graver situation attracts section 56(1)(a) where the authority can cancel the licence on the expiration of not less than 15 days' notice in advance and further indicating the authority's intention to do so. We are afraid that the interpretation given by Mr. Dharmadhikari to section 56(1)(b) is too narrow. It is not possible to confine the powers conferred on the Government only to a limited number of situations. Whether such power should be invoked or not will depend upon several factors like gravity and seriousness of the default committed by the licence holder; degree of urgency involved in the matter and the extent of loss likely to be caused in case prompt action is not taken. In case it is found that there is a large scale evasion of excise duty with the active collaboration of the excise officials posted at the warehouses, the Government will be justified in dispensing with the 15 days' notice, which is a condition precedent under section 56(1)(a). No fault can be found with the Government's decision to invoke section 56(1)(b) where it has been discovered that there is systematic fraud played by the licence holder on the revenue. The argument of Mr. No fault can be found with the Government's decision to invoke section 56(1)(b) where it has been discovered that there is systematic fraud played by the licence holder on the revenue. The argument of Mr. Dharmadhikari that the ground of tax evasion is covered, by section 54(1)(a) is without any foundation. The provisions of section 54(1)(a) speak of non-payment of duty and not evasion of duty. For instance, if through mistake, proper rate of duty is not recovered while clearing the goods from the bonded warehouse or through mistake, the duty is not paid by the licensee on a part of the consignment, section 54(1)(a) will be attracted. In that case, there is no dispute about the liability; but duty is either not paid fully or remained to be paid, but a systematic attempt of tax evasion is not covered by Clause (a) of section 54(1)(a). In such situation, the Government will be right in resorting to section 56(1)(b). It is not permissible to insist for observance of principles of audi alteram partem before passing an order under the said section. 15. It is now well settled that the principles of natural justice are not rigid rules; they are flexible and their application depends upon the setting and the background of statutory provision, nature of the right which may be affected and the consequences which may entail in the facts and circumstances of each case. These principles do not apply to all cases and situations. Application of these uncodified rules is excluded in the interest of administrative efficiency and expedition. Sometimes legislation itself excludes the application of rules by express provision or by implication. Section 56(1)(b) clearly excludes the principles of natural justice. It gives power to the Government to cancel the licence without prior notice and hearing. It is not permissible for the Court to read the principles of natural justice in these provisions and insist for compliance of the same. It was, however, argued that recording of reasons under section 56(1)(b) to dispense with the notice is a condition precedent for exercise of powers under these provisions and in the absence of reasons being recorded in that behalf, the order is rendered completely without jurisdiction. This was the second contention raised before the learned Single Judge. It was pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the reasons for invoking section 56(1)(b) are implicit in the impugned order. This was the second contention raised before the learned Single Judge. It was pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the reasons for invoking section 56(1)(b) are implicit in the impugned order. It was stated in the impugned order that there is sufficient evidence to indicate the evasion of excise duty. It was also stated that the evasion was a wilful and deliberate act on the part of the licensee and was a result of collusion between the licensee and others. In our view, it is not necessary to give reasons separately for dispensing with notice if such reasons are sufficiently indicated in the main order itself. But let us assume for the sake of argument that there is a failure to record reasons as provided by section 56(1)(b) and consequently a prior notice of fifteen days was necessary as provided by Clause (a) of section 56. We feel that the defect, if any, in the impugned order is cured by giving full opportunity of hearing to the respondent under the orders passed by the learned Single Judge. We have already indicated that pursuant to the order passed by Bharucha, J., the respondent was fully heard by the Secretary and a speaking order came to be passed indicting the respondent-company for tax evasion. The Secretary has given elaborate reasons for coming to the conclusion that the licensee was guilty of tax evasion. In our opinion the principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. In our view, the respondent was given a fair opportunity or hearing by the Secretary and therefore the complaint that there was violation of principles of natural justice cannot be sustained. 16. The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. In our view, the respondent was given a fair opportunity or hearing by the Secretary and therefore the complaint that there was violation of principles of natural justice cannot be sustained. 16. Coming then to the fifth contention of the respondent that a post-decisional hearing cannot cure the earlier order, which has been passed without observing the principles of natural justice, the respondent has placed strong reliance on the statement of law by Megarry V.C. In (Mcinnes v. Onslow Fane)1, (1978)3 All E.R. 211 (Ch D), Megarry V.C. dealt with the question whether the grant or refusal of licence by the Board of Control is subject to any requirement of natural justice or fairness which would be enforced by the courts. In dealing with the nature of the right to claim a licence, the learned Vice Chancellor said that it was nothing but a privilege. The learned Vice Chancellor then went on to say that there was a substantial distinction between forfeiture cases and application cases. In forfeiture cases, there is a threat to take something away for some reason. In such cases, the right to an unbiased tribunal, the right to notice of the charges and the right to be heard in answer to the charges which were the three features of natural justice are plainly applicable. In application cases, on the other hand, nothing is being taken away, and in all normal circumstances, there are no charges and so no requirement of an opportunity of being heard in answer to the charges. It was further held that the third category i.e. intermediary category of the expectation cases, may in some respects be regarded as more akin to forfeiture cases than application cases. Relying on the observations of the learned Vice Chancellor, it is contended that the present case being a forfeiture case, it was incumbent to comply with the rule of audi alteram partem. In order to further substantiate this argument, reliance was also placed upon the observations of the Supreme Court in (Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India)2, (1984)3 S.C.C. 465 . In that case the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Imports Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and Clauses 8(a), 8(b) and 10 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955. In order to further substantiate this argument, reliance was also placed upon the observations of the Supreme Court in (Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India)2, (1984)3 S.C.C. 465 . In that case the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Imports Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and Clauses 8(a), 8(b) and 10 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955. In para 21 of the said judgment on which reliance is sought to be placed by the respondent, the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "21. As we have seen, both Clauses 8 and 8-B contemplate action of an interim nature pending investigation into allegations under Clause 8. Ordinarily in the absence of anything more, it would not be necessary to give an opportunity to the person concerned before proceeding to take action under Clause 8-A or Clause 8-B. But while Clause 8-B deals with the right to obtain licences and the right to obtain allotments, Clause 8-A deals with rights which have flowered into licence and allotments. A person to whom licences have been granted or allotments made may have arranged his affairs on that basis and entered into transactions with others, and, to him the consequences of action under Clause 8-A may be truly disastrous whereas the consequences of action under Clause 8-B may not be so imminently harmful." 17. It is undoubtedly true that there is distinction between forfeiture cases and application cases. In forfeiture cases, there is a threat to take something away for some reasons. Normally in such cases, rules of natural justice require a prior hearing. But we have already indicated that rules of natural justice can be excluded by the legislature either expressly or by necessary implication. In that event it is not permissible to insist for observance with the principles of audi alteram partem at the pre-decisional stage. In such situation, the post-decisional hearing will be a sufficient compliance with the principles of natural justice and fair play. The rules of natural justice are not statutory rules. They are flexible and can be adopted and modified by statutes and statutory rules. In such situation, the post-decisional hearing will be a sufficient compliance with the principles of natural justice and fair play. The rules of natural justice are not statutory rules. They are flexible and can be adopted and modified by statutes and statutory rules. In (Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel)3, (1985)3 S.C.C. 398 , the Supreme Court observed : "The audi alteram partem rule can be excluded where the right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt action; or where the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and scheme of the relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion; or importing it would have the effect of paralysing the administrative process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency of taking action so demands. If legislation and the necessities of a situation can exclude the principles of natural justice including audi alteram partem rules; fortiori so can a provision of the Constitution, for a Constitutional provision has a far greater and all-pervading sanctity than a statutory provision." 18. It will be useful to refer to the decision of (Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation)4, (1985)3 S.C.C. 545 wherein a question arose in the context of section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act as to whether the Court should direct remand to the Municipal Commissioner to afford an opportunity to the petitioners to show why the encroachments committed by them on pavements or foot-paths should not be removed. The Supreme Court observed that remand was not necessary because the opportunity which was denied by the Commissioner was granted by the Court in an ample measure, both sides having made their contentions elaborately on facts as well as on law. Thus the question whether post-decisional hearing is a sufficient compliance with the principles of natural justice and fair play will have to be determined in the context of the facts of the case. This legal position is reiterated by the Supreme Court (Carborundum Universal Limited v. C.B.D.T.)5, 1989 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 462. The Supreme Court held that exclusion of principles of natural justice can be made expressly or impliedly by statutory provisions. It was also held that personal hearing cannot always be insisted upon. In a more recent judgment of the Supreme Court in (State of U.P. v. Pradhan Sangh Kshetra Samiti)6, 1995 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 462. The Supreme Court held that exclusion of principles of natural justice can be made expressly or impliedly by statutory provisions. It was also held that personal hearing cannot always be insisted upon. In a more recent judgment of the Supreme Court in (State of U.P. v. Pradhan Sangh Kshetra Samiti)6, 1995 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 305, the question arose whether action of de-limitation of Panchayat areas and Gram Sabhas, without giving an opportunity of hearing in view of the urgency, was valid. The Supreme Court observed that in a matter which is urgent even post-decisional hearing is sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice, namely, audi alteram partem. Accordingly, the authorities were directed to grant post-decisional hearing to the petitioners in that case. The omnipresence of the principles of natural justice undoubtedly act as deterrence to arrive at an arbitrary decision in violation of fair play. But applicability of the principles of natural justice is not a rule of thumb or strait jacket formula as an abstract proposition of law. It depends on the facts of the case, nature of inquiry and the effect of the order on the right of the persons and attendant circumstances. Considering the facts of the present case, in the light of the above decisions, it is not possible for us to hold that there is non-compliance with the principles of natural justice. The State Government has power to cancel the licence under section 56(1)(b) without prior notice to the licensee. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the Government's decision to resort to the provisions of section 56(1)(b) to prevent the loss to the State revenue was in any way, illegal or unjustified. 19. As a last resort, Mr. Dharmadhikari contended that where pre-decisional hearing was possible and denied, the order is void. He further contended that the order is therefore unsustainable because the same has been made in violation of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. In support of his submission, Mr. Dharmadhikari relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India)7, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 818. He further contended that the order is therefore unsustainable because the same has been made in violation of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. In support of his submission, Mr. Dharmadhikari relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India)7, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 818. He particularly relied upon paragraph 42 of the judgment which reads as follows : "In short, the general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, excluded this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be constructed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely, if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person effected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fairplay 'must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands'. The courts must take every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, to recall the words of Bhagwati, J., the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise." We do not think that the above observations of the Supreme Court advance the case of the respondent any further. In the first place, the Supreme Court has clearly distinguished the cases where the statute itself has clearly excluded the rule of prior hearing. We have already indicated that section 56(1)(b) clearly excludes the rule of audi alteram partem. Therefore, it is not open for the courts to insist for the requirement of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. In the first place, the Supreme Court has clearly distinguished the cases where the statute itself has clearly excluded the rule of prior hearing. We have already indicated that section 56(1)(b) clearly excludes the rule of audi alteram partem. Therefore, it is not open for the courts to insist for the requirement of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. Secondly, we find that the Supreme Court has quoted with approval the observations of Professor de Smith in paragraph 41 of the judgment wherein the learned Author has recognised the well known exception to the rule of pre-decisional hearing, namely, that where there is a paramount need for prompt action, or where it is impracticable to afford antecedent hearing, absence of a hearing can be adequately compensated for by a hearing ex post facto. There is one more aspect of the matter of which we would like to take note of at this stage. We are dealing with a liquor licence. It is well settled that grant of a liquor licence does not involve any right or expression but it is a matter of privilege. In (Harshankar v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner)8, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1121, the Supreme Court after referring to the earlier authorities in (Cooverjee v. The Excise Commissioner)9, 1954 S.C.R. 873 and (Nashirwar v. State of M.P.)10, 1975(1) S.C.C. 29 observed as follows : "These uniform decisions of five Constitution Benches uniformly emphasized after a careful consideration of the problem involved that the State has the power to prohibit trades which are injurious to the health and welfare of the public, with elimination and exclusion from business is inherent in the nature of liquor business, that no person has an absolute right to deal in liquor and that all forms of dealings in liquor have, from their inherent nature, been treated as a class by themselves by all civilised communities." This legal position has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in (Chigleput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Company)11, (1984)3 S.C.C. 258 and in (Khode Distilleries v. State of Karnatak)12, (1995)1 S.C.C. 574 . To the same effect is a latest judgement of the Supreme Court in (State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. McDowell and others)13, J.T. 1996(3) S.C. 678. To the same effect is a latest judgement of the Supreme Court in (State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. McDowell and others)13, J.T. 1996(3) S.C. 678. Even in the case of Liberty Oil Mills relied upon by the respondent, the Supreme Court clarified by way of abundant caution in paragraph 20 of the said judgment that the considerations relating to pre-decisional hearing may not however apply to cases of liquor licensing which involve the grant of privilege and are not a matter of right. Therefore, if the statute itself empowers the licensing authority to terminate the licence without prior notice and hearing, it is not possible to hold the order of termination as illegal on the ground of non-compliance with natural justice. In these circumstances, the post-decisional hearing would be more than appropriate in order to ensure that the citizen gets a fair deal. 20. Turning then to the contention of the respondent that the Secretary had no jurisdiction to hear the case, we are of the view that this contention has now become purely academic in view of our conclusion that the original order of cancellation of licence was legal and valid. Moreover, we do not think that it is permissible for the respondent to raise this contention in as much as they have accepted and acquiesced to the order dated 10th January, 1986 passed by this Court. This Court directed the Secretary concerned to hear the respondent and pass appropriate orders by 29th January, 1986. The respondent having not complained or challenged this order in the higher Court, the same is binding upon them. The respondent has appeared before the Secretary and made their submissions. Now they cannot turn around and question the jurisdiction of the Secretary. What is required to be seen is whether the respondent has got fair opportunity to represent their case in the post-decisional hearing afforded to him. On perusal of the order passed by the Secretary it is seen that he has given full opportunity to the respondent. He has also considered all the aspects of the case before confirming the decision of cancellation of licence. In these circumstances, it is not permissible for the respondent to question the jurisdiction of the Secretary by raising technical pleas. 21. Coming then to the contention of the respondent that the order of the Secretary suffers from non-application of mind, Mr. He has also considered all the aspects of the case before confirming the decision of cancellation of licence. In these circumstances, it is not permissible for the respondent to question the jurisdiction of the Secretary by raising technical pleas. 21. Coming then to the contention of the respondent that the order of the Secretary suffers from non-application of mind, Mr. Dharmadhikari was unable to show to us any error or infirmity in the said order. It is not permissible for this Court in its power under Article 226 of the Constitution to sit in appeal over the decision of the Secretary nor this Court can go into the question of facts decided by him. Lastly, as far as challenge to the constitutional validity of section 56 is concerned, it is rightly over-ruled by the learned Single Judge as the entire act has been held to be constitutionally valid by the Supreme Court in (State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara)14, 1951 S.C.R. 682. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside. At this stage, the learned Advocate General makes a statement that the State Government has no objection to continue the B.R.L. licence issued to the respondent. The learned Advocate General informs us that the Government has taken this decision in view of the change of management and keeping in mind the fact that the respondent-company employees more than 100 workers. The learned Advocate General, however, clarified that the State Government shall treat the defaults committed by the erstwhile management as a breach on the part of the respondent and will recover the amount of Rs. 83,15,902.95 ps. being the amount of excise duty evaded by the respondent. The respondent has already deposited nearly Rs. 66 lakhs in this Court under the interim orders passed during the pendency of the appeal. The State Government will be at liberty to withdraw the said amount with accrued interest thereon. As regards the balance, Mr. Dharmadhikari informs the Court that the Demand Drafts/Pay Orders have already been deposited with the respondent's previous advocates and he seeks appropriate directions against the previous advocates for depositing the said Demand Drafts/Pay Orders in this Court. 23. S.O. to 10th June, 1996 for further orders. Petition allowed.