Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant of Title (Eviction) Suit No. 2 of 1992 which was decreed against him on ground of bonafide necessity on 17.6.1995. then appeal was preferred by the defendant being title Appeal No. 38 of 1995 and the same has also been dismissed against the defendant by judgment and decree dated 13.12.1995. 2. The eviction suit was filed by the plaintiffs-respondents on three grounds: namely (1) unauthorised construction being made by the defendant; (2) on ground of defaulter and (3) on the ground of bonafide necessity of plaintiff No. 1. The Original court dismissed the ground of unauthorised construction and defaulter but decreed the suit on ground of bonafide necessity. The appellate court maintained the ejectment decree not only on the ground of bonafide necessity but also on ground of defaulter a it though, there is no Cross Appeal filed by the plaintiffs-respondent. 3. Now, the law is clear that even if some finding is against the respondent then appeal being filed by the adversely, the respondent can press the grounds gone against him without even filing the Cross Appeal. Be it what it may, Mr. M.M. Banerjee, appearing for and on behalf of the respondents has given up the ground of defaulter and submitted that the ejectment decree can be maintained on the ground of bonafide necessity alone. Such submissions of both the parties have been recorded by this Court in Order dated 29.3.1996. As point regarding bonafide necessity related to the evidence adduced by the parties, the lower court records were called for, for deciding the matter once for al within the scope of Order XLI, Rule 11, CPC 4. Mr. V.P. Singhs submission is that the learned courts below had erred in law not" discussion the evidence on record regarding the bonafide necessity when the same has been challenged vehemently and rebutted by adducing evidences from the side of the defendant-appellant and as such the judgment of both the fact finding court suffer from illegality and on that point alone the Second Appeal need be admitted as contemplated under Sec. 100, CPC 5. Originally the suit was filed by the plaintiff No. 1 alone on the ground that although the suit property originally belonged to their father and after fathers death the suit property alongwith otherwere amicably partitioned and suit shop house fell into the share of plaintiff No. 1. But that amicable partition etc. has been challenged from the side of the defendant in his written statement and as such all other brothers of plaintiff No. 1 had also joined the suit as co-plaintiffs and they supported the cause of plaintiff No. 1. 6. It is the case of the plaintiff No. 1 that he has. no accommodation or space to run his business of tea stall and snacks and he is doing the same business in the foot-path, having always the apprehension of being evicted by the lawful authority for such unauthorised occupation in the government land and as such he needed the suit house for opening up his business. On the other hand, defence version is that the plaintiff No. 1 was doing business of readymade garments in Hatia and that he runs his tea stall business after forcible eviction of Narsing Prasad Raj who was also having a shop room just contiguous to that of the suit shop premises. Narsing Prasad Raj has adduced evidence. According to him, he was illegally dispossessed in the year 1989 by the plaintiffs and as such he filed criminal case against them. So, he is definitely inimical against the plaintiffs-party. Although, he stated that the plaintiff No. 1 Ram Kumar Sharma was doing business of teal stall and snacks within his shop house after his eviction, but his statement is belied by his own statement when he stated in the year 1993 that the plaintiff No. 1 was doing business in that shop for last 5-6 years. Similar are the stary statements made by D.W. 4, Raj Nandan Mishra and the defendant himself. 7. Mr. V.P. Singh tried to impress this Court by referring to the evidence of one of the brother of plaintiff No. 1, Kamleshwar Prasad Sharma, wherein he stated in cross-examination that Ram Kumar Sharma had given two houses on. rent during the proceeding of the case. There is no such case of the defendant. 7. Mr. V.P. Singh tried to impress this Court by referring to the evidence of one of the brother of plaintiff No. 1, Kamleshwar Prasad Sharma, wherein he stated in cross-examination that Ram Kumar Sharma had given two houses on. rent during the proceeding of the case. There is no such case of the defendant. He has also referred to a suggestion, wherein Kamleshwar Prasad Sharma stated that "it is not a fact that Ram Kumar Sharma was doing his tea stall business on the foot-path". It appears that such suggestion has wrongly bee written by the learned court below as on scrutiny of the evidence as a whole, it was found that this Kamleshwar Prasad Sharma had always maintained that Ram Kumar Sharma was doing his tea stall business on the foot-path. Such sort of suggestion do not take away the evidence as a whole. The whole of the evidence is to be read, not of any stray statement neither and theither. The courts below had discussed the defence evidence regarding -denial of bonafide necessity of plaintiff No. 1 and then came to the finding that plaintiff No. 1, Ram Kumar Sharma was doing his business of tea stall and snacks on the foot path and as such the plaintiff No. 1 is in urgent necessity of getting space for shifting up of his business to the suit shop house. 8. A Landlord cannot be expected to do business on the foot-path by allowing a tenant to occupy the suit premises. 9. I do not find any force in the submission of Mr. V.P. Singh. It is true that the learned appellate court did not discuss the evidences of the defence witnesses invidually but the sum and substance of the evidence from the side of the defence has been discussed. I do not find any force in this Second Appeal and hence the same is dismissed. There is no question of law involved in this Second Appeal not to speak of substantial question of law. 10. Hence, the same is rejected under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the circumstances, no order as to costs.