JUDGMENT AND ORDER (Oral) This writ application has been filed challenging the action of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. 2. The petitioner is the owner of a timber industry which is claimed to be a small scale industry. The petitioner claims that it used to engage two to three numbers of workers on monthly basis and sometime it used to engage 3 to 12 numbers of employees as casual workers as per need. It is claimed that at no point of time, the number of workers exceeded 15. The petitioner was registered under the Assam Shops and Establishment Act and that registration certificate is Annexure III to the writ application. 3. That the petitioner was served with a notice under section 7A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter called the Act). The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, NE Region at Guwahati proposed to conduct enquiry in his office on 27.10.88 and directed the petitioner to attend the office along with the documents. That notice is Annexure IV to the writ application. The petitioner prayed for time but the time was not granted and by Annexure V, the liability of the petitioner was assessed. 4. The dues of the petitioner was determined at Rs.44,478.70 in different account. The petitioner tiled an objection. Thereafter no communication was received and the petitioner was served with Bakijai notice and number of complaints were lodged in the different Courts. Hence, this writ application, with the prayer to quash the notice, the determination of liability and number of complaint cases pending before different Magistrates. 5.1 have heard Sri NM Lahiri, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Sri RP Kakati, learned Additional Central Govt Standing Counsel. Sri Lahiri, learned Advocate for the petitioner Urged the following points : (i) That the industry of the petitioner is engaged in manufacturing/processing of timber and such industry has not been included in Schedule 1 of the Act and as such, the respondents cannot apply the provisions of the Act to the petitioner industry. (ii) That at no point of time 20 or more persons were employed by the industry and as such the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable to the industry of the petitioner. (iii) That the rejection for prayer for adjournment is an arbitrary exercise of power. (iv) That the order is violative of the principles of natural justice. 6. (iii) That the rejection for prayer for adjournment is an arbitrary exercise of power. (iv) That the order is violative of the principles of natural justice. 6. Let us take up Schedule 1 of the Act and the point No.1 as urged on behalf of the petitioner. This question came up for consideration in the case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs. Shibu Metal Works, AIR 1965 SC 1076 wherein the Supreme Court on considering the matter pointed out as follows: "This construction treats the process of production as the crux of the entry, and if this construction were accepted the scope of the content of the entry would be very wide indeed. If every product whose production can be referred to one or the other of the processes mentioned in the entry is construed to fall within its content, then several other entries in the Schedule would, prima facie, appear to be redundant, because this entry itself would be comprehensive enough to take them in. In that case, Explanation (a) which has been added in 1953 would itself appear to be without any purpose, because most, if not all, of the items introduced by the said clause would be included within the original entry itself. In our opinion, such a wide construction would not be justified, because we inclined to hold that it is not the process which is important in construing the entry as the character of the activity with which the industry is concerned. That we are not prepared to accept the very broad construction of the entry suggested by Sri Sen. The proper way to determine the content of this entry appears to us to be to hold that all productions which are generally known as electrical engineering products, or mechanical engineering products, or general engineering products, are intended to be covered by the entry, and the object of Schedule 1 is to include within the scope of the Act every industry which is engaged in the manufacture of electrical engineering products, mechanical engineering products, or general engineering products. It is the character of the products that helps to determine the content of the entry; can the product in question be reasonably described as an electrical engineering product, or a mechanical engineering product, or a general engineering products. It is the character of the products that helps to determine the content of the entry; can the product in question be reasonably described as an electrical engineering product, or a mechanical engineering product, or a general engineering products. That is the question to ask in every case, and as we have already indicated, in considering the question as to whether the product falls under the category of general engineering product, general engineering should be construed in the limited sense which we have already shown. It may be that in a large majority of cases, the products included within the entry may be produced be electrical or mechanical or general engineering process; but that is not the essence of the matter. The industrial activity which manufactures the three categories of products already enumerated by us, brings the industry within the scope of Schedule I, and therefore, attracts the application of the Act. If we bear in mind the three broad categories of products, the manufacture of which brings the industry within the scope of Schedule I, it would be easy to appreciate the times enumerated in clause (a) of the Explanation. Broadly stated, items 1 to 6 can be said to be electrical engineering products. 7 to 10 may be said to be mechanical engineering products and the rest general engineering products. We are free to confess that the inclusion of each of these items in clause (a) of the Explanation cannot be easily explained; but, on the whole, it appears to us that the object of the explanation was to clarity, illustrate and expand the content of the entry in question in order that there should be no doubt as to the classes and categories of industry which were intended to be brought within the purview of the Act. Thus considered, we think that the manufacture of the brass utensils can easily be regarded as an activity the object of which is the manufacture of general engineering products. This interpretation is not as narrow as that suggested by Sri Agarwalla, nor as broad as mat suggested by Sri Sen, and on the whole, it seems to fit in with the scheme of Schedule I considered in the light of die object intended to be achieved by the insertion of the Explanation in 1953 and the subsequent additions made to Schedule I itself." 7. In Free India Industries vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, 1962 (2) LLJ 602 , it was pointed out by the Punjab High Court as follows : "In Free India Industries vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Harbans Singh, Judge, of the Punjab High Court rejected the contention that the work of body building on chassis would be covered under the heading 'engineering products'. His Lordship felt that if body building could be treated as an engineering product, the manufacture of ordinary household fyrniture or even doors and windows would be treated as such. In his opinion there should be something more than a manufacturing process. The process must be such which involves some engineering design or invention." 8. The test to be applied to determine is that it is not the processs which is important in considering the entry but it was the character of the activity with which the industry was concerned. It is the character of the products that helps to determine the content of the entry. The question to be asked in other case is can the product in question be reasonably described as an electrical engineering product or mechanical engineering product or a general engineering product. In the writ petition itself it is described in paragraph 1 and 2 that it is a timber industry and as such this contention that it does not come now under the purview of the Act cannot be accepted. Accordingly, this contention shall stand rejected. 9. Regarding the second point, the finding of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner is that 20 or more persons were employed and after being satisfied with regard to that the notice was issued and the petitioner did not appear before the authority to discharge the burden to prove that they did not employ 20 or " more persons. So, this contention shall stand rejected. Further it is a finding of fact and in exercise of my writ jurisdiction I am not inclined to interfere with this finding. 10. The next contention that the power for adjournment was rejected arbitrarily also is liable to be rejected inasmuch the power to grant adjournment is the discretion of the authority and that discretion exercised by the authority cannot be said to be arbitrary, perverse and or capricious. 11. 10. The next contention that the power for adjournment was rejected arbitrarily also is liable to be rejected inasmuch the power to grant adjournment is the discretion of the authority and that discretion exercised by the authority cannot be said to be arbitrary, perverse and or capricious. 11. Once it is found that the action of the authority is not nullity in the eye of law or absolutely not without jurisdiction, this writ application is to be rejected on the short ground that the petitioner has alternative remedy by way of appeal before the Tribunal. That is it can appeal under section 7 A of the Act against the order passed under section 7A, 7B, 7C or section 14B. As will be evident from Annexure IV to the writ application it was issued by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner under section 7 A of the Act. Section 14B provides for the power to recover the damages. Section 7A (4) provides for a remedy against an exparte order. The authority under section 7A has the requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarilly or capriciously. If the authority is satisfied that the employer avoided the enquiry, the authority can determine/assess the amount due. Further, section 7B provides for review of the orders passed under section 7A. All these alternative remedies available to the petitioner by the statute have not been exhausted by the petitioner. A perusal of the record will show that an enquiry was made on 23.1.85 and it was found by the Provident Fund Commissioner that the number of employees employed bring it under the purview of the Act. Further, on 8.1.85 a statement was filed by the Manager of the Mill giving the list of employees of the Mill as on 30.1.84 and that list itself will show that the number of employees employed are 21 and all of them are in employment for a period of more than four months. 12. The law is that where in an establishment if employees/temporary employees are a part of the regular feature, such employee cannot be construed as casual employees. For instance, an establishment may be carried on daily wage by more than 20 temporary employees and if they continue to work in regular course of business, then the establishment would come within the ambit of the definition under section 1 (3) of the Act. For instance, an establishment may be carried on daily wage by more than 20 temporary employees and if they continue to work in regular course of business, then the establishment would come within the ambit of the definition under section 1 (3) of the Act. Applying that test also, the present industry shall come within the purview of this Act. Further, this is a beneficial piece of legislation to give certain benefits to the employees at the time of their retirement and that should receive a liberal construction and a writ Court cannot strike down an action of the authority passed on technical and/or this or that untenable plea, if the action is not arbitrary of perverse. 13. In that view of the matter, there is no merit in this writ application and the same is dismissed. Stay order passed on 30.8.90 shall also stand vacated. As this matter has been kept pending for more than six years by obtaining stay order causing loss and injury to the workers, this matter is dismissed with a cost of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand only).