Judgment : ARUNACHALAM, J. This case of murder arising out of unmet dowry demand and consequent cruelty, portrays meticulous planning and neat execution of crime, inside the residential premises occupied by the spouses (deceased Gandhimathi and appellant Shanmughasundaram). We have evidence of burning of the deceased as well as medical evidence highlighting death of the deceased, arising out of asphyxia, as a result of manual strangulation 2. Four charges were framed against the appellant in Sessions Case No. 33 of 1988, on the file of Court of Session, Periyar Division at Erode. The first charge indicated the appellant under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, alleging that ever since his marriage with the deceased that had taken place on 27th January, 1980, he not being satisfied with the quantum of dowry brought by her at the time of her marriage, was subjecting her to torture in order to extract more dowry from her. The second charge was framed for an offence punishable under Section 498-A, I.P.C. read with Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, alleging that while the appellant was living with the deceased at Door No. 16, E.V.K. Sampath Nagar, Erode, he demanded dowry, about 15 days prior to the date of occurrence namely, 25-8-1986, and subjected her to cruelty by beating her in the premises mentioned about and further despatched her to her parents house, as a consequence thereof, the third charge was framed under Section 302, I.P.C., for his having caused the death of Gandhimathi, at or about 1.30 a.m. on 25-8-1986 inside the residence by beating her indiscriminately and by strangulating her. The last charge under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code, alleges that in the course of the same transaction, the appellant, knowing that an offence of murder punishable with death, stood committed by him, did cause disappearance of evidence of the said offence, by pouring kerosene over the dead body and setting fire to it, with the intention of screening himself from legal punishment 3. On conclusion of trial, appellant was found guilty under all charges. Under the first charge, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and for the offence under Section 498-A, I.P.C., he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. For murder, he was sentenced to imprisonment for life, while under the last charge, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. Under the first charge, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and for the offence under Section 498-A, I.P.C., he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. For murder, he was sentenced to imprisonment for life, while under the last charge, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. The substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently 4. Brief facts of the prosecution case require narration. Deceased Gandhimathi was given in marriage to the appellant on 27-1-1980. Appellant was not a stranger to the deceased, for he was the son of the aunt of the deceased. P.W. 1, Katthikeyan, is the elder brother of the deceased, while P.W. 2, Subbiah, is her father. P.W. 3, Selvi Selvamani, is the niece of the deceased and P.W. 4, Balambal is a cousin of hers. P.W. 8 Sengottaiyan, is the nephew of deceased Gandhimathi. P.W. 11, Muthuami, is the husband of the elder sister of the deceased. Soon after marriage, appellant and his wife resided for about six months in a house situated in Power House Road, Erode. Appellants father was also staying with them. After initial living for six months, appellant beat his wife and sent her away to her parental house to obtain dowry dues. It is also the case of the prosecution that at or about that time, appellant attempted to pour kerosene over the head of the deceased and set fire to it, but he could not succeed, since his wife escaped from his clutches and ran away. Thereafter, for about three years, deceased continued to live with her parents. Subsequently, Lakshmi, wife of the elder sister of the appellant and the appellant himself requested re-sending of the deceased to her matrimonial home assuring that there would be no cause for concern in future more so, when the younger brother of the appellant was expecting to get himself married. Pacified father and brother of the deceased, allowed the deceased to join her husband only to be shocked by a return, two months there after due to her being thrown out by her husband. Sometime later, appellant took back his wife with him. Thereafter, the appellant and his wife set up a separate establishment at Door No. 16-C, Sampath Nagar, in which area, P.Ws. 1 and 2 were then living. Sometime later, appellant took back his wife with him. Thereafter, the appellant and his wife set up a separate establishment at Door No. 16-C, Sampath Nagar, in which area, P.Ws. 1 and 2 were then living. In that house, appellant and the deceased lived for about four months and during the said period, incessantly the deceased was beaten and sent to her fathers house with a direction to return with the dowry due. Fifteen days prior to the instant occurrence, on infliction of cruelty by the appellant, deceased took refuge in the house of her brother and father. She informed them that the appellant was interested in engaging himself in some trade and therefore was keen on getting the dowry due. In this backdrop, on 21-8-1986, P.W. 1 and others in his household, went away for a marriage, leaving the deceased and P.W. 2 alone as inmates of the house. They returned on the next morning at or about 8.00 a.m. when they came to know about the deceased missing. P.Ws. 3 and 4 informed P.W. 1 that the appellant had taken away the deceased forcibly, after breaking the outer door of the house occupied by P.W. 1. On the next day, Umamaheswaran, younger brother of P.W. 1, went over to the house of the appellant and enquired him. On 24-8-1986, in the morning appellant and the deceased arrived at the residence of P.W. 1 when the latter noticed an injury on the waist of his sister, which, on enquiry of the deceased, was revealed to be a burn caused by the appellant. Appellant and deceased, thereafter, left the house of P.W. 1. At or about 2.00 a.m. on 25-8-1986, when P.W. 1 was in his house, along with P.W. 3 and others, P.W. 6, Janakiraman, along with a watchman and four or five others, arrived at his residence and work them up, stating that they had heard a hue and cry "Ayyo, Ayyo" from the residence of his sister, the deceased, and requested him to proceed and find out the cause. Instinctively, P.W. 1 and his younger brother rushed to the house of the deceased. When they reached the house of the deceased, they found the external door latched from outside. Both of them went inside the house, after unlatching the door. The house was dark and they smelt buring. Instinctively, P.W. 1 and his younger brother rushed to the house of the deceased. When they reached the house of the deceased, they found the external door latched from outside. Both of them went inside the house, after unlatching the door. The house was dark and they smelt buring. P.W. 1 switched on the light and, to his dismay, found his sister lying face downwards, bleeding and burning, in the room facing south. Around her body, there were drips of blood, P.W. 1 and his younger brother hurried to the residence of P.W. 4 and requested her husband, Subramaniam (not examined) to arrange for an ambulance. A phone call was made and in or about 15 minutes an ambulance arrived. Those who arrived, apparently to take the deceased to the hospital, pronounced that she was dead. At or about 3.00 a.m., P.W. 1 in the company of Chitrarasu (not examined) proceeded to Erode North Police Station and finding that no responsible officer was available, went over to the house of P.W. 18, Nachimuthu, who directed him to prefer a written complaint at the police station. P.W. 1 prepared a complaint, Ex.P. 1 and handed it over to P.W. 18 at or about 3.45 am. P.W. 18 registered Crime No. 468 of 1986 on Ex.P. 1, for offences punishable under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and Sections 498-A and 506, I.P.C. Ex.P. 23 is the express printed first information report. He despatched a copy of Ex.P. 23 and Ex.P. 1 to the concerned Magistrate and copies of Ex.P. 23 to his superior Officers. After informing the Superintendent of Police over the telephone, he reached the scene at 5.30 a.m. P.W. 19, Karuppannan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, arrived at the scene at 6.00 a.m. and took up investigation 5. P.W. 19 prepared Ex.P. 2, observation mahazar, and Ex.P. 24, scene sketch. He also prepared Ex.P. 25, another sketch, relating to the surroundings of the scene. He did not examine any witness, since the inquest had to be conducted by the Revenue, Divisional Officer. Since he noticed bloodstains near the dead body, suspecting murder, he proceeded to Government Hospital and came back to the scene at 10.30 a.m. with P.W. 14, Dr. Gnanasakaran, and two others. He did not examine any witness, since the inquest had to be conducted by the Revenue, Divisional Officer. Since he noticed bloodstains near the dead body, suspecting murder, he proceeded to Government Hospital and came back to the scene at 10.30 a.m. with P.W. 14, Dr. Gnanasakaran, and two others. The Medical Officers informed P.W. 19 that they will be in a position to offer their opinion only after conduct of post-mortem and hence the corpse should be despatched to the hospital. With the help of P.W. 9, Swaminathan, a photographer, he had the corpse and the scene pictured. P.W. 12, Arumugam, Revenue Divisional Officer, on receipt of Ex.P. 5, a requisition to conduct inquest, reached the scene and held inquest between 12.30 noon and 4.40 p.m. He examined P.Ws. 1, 2, 5, 6 and others during inquest Ex.P. 6 is the inquest report. After inquest, he forwarded a requisition, Ex.P. 7, to the Government Hospital, for conduct of postmortem. At 5.00 p.m. on the same day, P.W. 19 seized from the venue, M.Os. 1 to 3 (a sock, two tins, one of them containing 200 ml. of petrol, and thalikodi) under Mahazar, Ex.P. 3 6. P.W. 14, Dr. Gnanasekaran, on the basis of Ex.P. 7, commenced postmortem, on 25-8-1986 at 4.50 p.m. along with Dr. Meenakshi (not examined) identification marks on the corpse could not be made out on account of burns. The dead body was that of a female. Arms were flexed slightly at elbows. So the lower limbs. Hair in the arm-pit and pubis were burnt. Similarly burnt hair was seen in the scalp, eye-lids, nose and ears. Tongue was found protruded. Forthy red colour fluid was coming out from the nose. Hands were free. There was no fracture in the extremities. The following injuries were noticed1. Wound 10 x 3 cms. in the inner aspect of right upper arm. The type of wound (incised or lacerated) could not be made out due to burns 2. Whole body skin surface burnt with peeleo skin found in certain places all over the body. No plubs seen anywhere in the body surface 3. Tongue protruded 2 cm. out of the mouth and bitten 4. Depression over the right forehead 4 x 2 cms 5. Whole body skin surface burnt with peeleo skin found in certain places all over the body. No plubs seen anywhere in the body surface 3. Tongue protruded 2 cm. out of the mouth and bitten 4. Depression over the right forehead 4 x 2 cms 5. Red coloured stained area seen in the following places : Right sole, dorsum of left sole, medial aspect of left leg, medial aspect of left knee, left and right palms 6. Areas of dropped red stain over the left middle thigh and right leg. No evidence of petechial haemorrhages or bleeding surfaces to cause the stains as noted in Nos. 5 and 6 7. Dark coloured area 5 x 4 cms. over left mid leg in the medical aspect present. Similar dark coloured areas of varying sizes are seen over the buttocks, dorsum of both hands, sides of the chest, back of abdomen and both thighs 8. Neck : An oblique ligature mark 1/4 cm breadth, depth flushed with the surface seen over the front and sides of the neck 1 cm. about the middle of the neck. No ligature mark seen in the posterior side of the neck 9. Head : 2 x 1/2 cms. curved incised like wound over the occipital region bone depth Internally, clotted blood 3 x 2 cms. was seen in the posterior abdominal wall. There was no fracture of ribs. Hyoid bone was also not fractured. Clotted blood was seen over the skin and subcutaneous tissue, and scalp tissue, corresponding to injuries 4 and 9. There was no fracture of skull, specimens of blood, skin, occipital area, skin of the left leg with dark coloured area, skin of left thigh with stained area, clotted blood with tissues from the posterior abdominal wall, dark coloured loop of intestine, hyoid bone, neck with ligature mark, skin of forehead (injury No. 4), liver with dark coloured area, kidney, lung, stomach, right, arm with wound and brain were preserved for expert opinion. After expert opinion was received from P.W. 15 Dr. Cecila Cyril, P.W. 14 and Dr. Meenakshi, concluded that the deceased would appear to have died of asphyxia with multiple injuries and death would appear to have occurred 16 to 20 hours prior to conduct of post-mortem. The burns were post-mortem burns. In Ex.B. 10 they have recorded their opinion. Ex.P. 22 is the post-mortem certificate. Cecila Cyril, P.W. 14 and Dr. Meenakshi, concluded that the deceased would appear to have died of asphyxia with multiple injuries and death would appear to have occurred 16 to 20 hours prior to conduct of post-mortem. The burns were post-mortem burns. In Ex.B. 10 they have recorded their opinion. Ex.P. 22 is the post-mortem certificate. Exs.P. 13 and P. 14 are opinions of P.W. 15, the expert. The opinion of P.W. 14 and Dr. Meenakshi, was based on Exs.P. 13 and P. 14. External injuries Nos. 4 and 9 and internal injury blood in the posterior abdominal wall were ante-mortem. Injury No. 1 was not an injury, but was result of heat rupture. The absence of blebs over the surface of the body indicated that the burns were post-mortem. The congestion of lungs was due to asphysix. Death was due to asphysia due to manual strangulation. Subluxation of the joint of the hyoid bone was possible by pressing the neck with force and for sufficient time while the deceased was alive. It was only an ante-mortem injury 7. Meanwhile, P.W. 18, Nachimuthu, Sub-Inspector of Police, arrested the appellant at 9.00 a.m. on 27-8-1986, opposite to College House Hotel, Erode. P.W. 19 had information about the arrest of appellant. He examined him at the Police Station 8. When P.W. 19 inspected the venue of crime, he found a letter in the bedroom shelf. Ex.P. 26, is the said letter. He showed the said letter to the brother and parents of the deceased and then enquired them. P.W. 11 then produced Ex.P. 4, a letter written by the deceased. On 17-5-1986 at Erode Taluk Police Station, P.W. 19 obtained sample writings and signature of the appellant. Ex.P. 27 is such sample writing and signature. P.W. 19 forwarded a requisition, Ex.P. 19, for comparison of Exh.P. 4, P. 26 and P. 27 by the Handwriting Expert. Ex.P. 21 is the report of the Handwriting Expert, brought on record though the Expert himself was not put into the witness box. P.W. 19 forwarded the material objects seized to the Laboratory for chemical analysis through the Magistrate. P.W. 13, Raveeswaran, Court Head Clerk, has proved Exs.P. 10, P. 11, P. 13, P. 14, P. 15, P. 16, P. 17 and P. 18, reports of several Experts including reports of Chemical Analysis and serology. P.W. 19 forwarded the material objects seized to the Laboratory for chemical analysis through the Magistrate. P.W. 13, Raveeswaran, Court Head Clerk, has proved Exs.P. 10, P. 11, P. 13, P. 14, P. 15, P. 16, P. 17 and P. 18, reports of several Experts including reports of Chemical Analysis and serology. It is through this Clerk that Ex.P. 21, the report of the Handwriting Expert, was also marked. P.W. 10, Madhavan, was examined to speak about his having taken the appellant at or about 1.00 a.m. on the occurrence night, in his autorickshaw from Jeeva Office Gate, when the appellant asked him to stop his vehicle. Appellant was dropped by him near the Government Hospital, Erode. He claims to have known the appellant earlier. On that night, he was dropping certain passengers, who had boarded his autorickshaw at Achirami Theatre, at Sampath Nagar. It was on his way back from Sampath Nagar that the appellant travelled in his autorickshaw. P.W. 16, Nachammal, a resident of D-1 Block, Sampath Nagar, was examined to speak about her having heard the hue and cry of P.W. 3 at or about 9.00 p.m. on a day, two years prior to her deposition from the house bearing Door No. P.106. When she and her son came out on hearing such alarm, they found the appellant and the deceased fighting with each other. She advised the appellant to take his wife, after her parents returned from the wedding to which they had gone. On Saturday at 5 p.m. she saw the dead body of the deceased. It was P.W. 7, Ramaswami, and another who arrived in an ambulance on that fateful night and pronounced that the deceased was already dead. After completing investigation on 8-6-1987, P.W. 19 laid the final report against the appellant under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and Sections 498-A, 302 and 201, I.P.C 9. When the appellant was examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C. to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in evidence, he denied his complicity in the Crime. However, he did not adduce any evidence in defence 10. Learned trial Judge, on assessment of the oral and documentary evidence, accepted the prosecution case, rejected the defence and dealt with the appellant as stated earlier 11. Mr. However, he did not adduce any evidence in defence 10. Learned trial Judge, on assessment of the oral and documentary evidence, accepted the prosecution case, rejected the defence and dealt with the appellant as stated earlier 11. Mr. K. Asokan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that in this prosecution founded on circumstantial evidence, there were several missing links and hence the appellant cannot be safely convicted either for murder or for other offences, with which he stood charged. He contended that in spite of some differences of opinion between the spouses for some years after marriage, the relationship was cordial between them for a few months prior to occurrence and hence it cannot be held that the appellant had motive to commit the impugned offences. In continuation of this submission, he urged that petty skirmishes between the spouses about 15 days prior to occurrence, or on 21-8-1986 or 24-8-1986, cannot be magnified to unlimited proportions. He also pointed out that there was an attempt on the part of prosecution to exaggerate its version to somehow or other portray that the appellant had a tenancy of attempting to set fire to his wife or causing bum injuries on her. In this context, he submitted that such an attempt allegedly made earlier by the appellant, was conspicuous by its absence in Ex.P. 1, the first information report. He then argued, that if burn injuries were post-mortem, then the case of P.W. 5 that he had heard some alarm from the house of the deceased and there was smoke emanating as well from the said house, cannot be taken at its face value. The next submission was that the first information report had reached the Magistrate only at 11.55 a.m. on 25-8-1987, nearly 8 1/2 hours after its registration and that would cast enough suspicion on the authenticity of the prosecution case. He further brought to our notice, the opinion of the Handwriting Expert brought on record as Ex.P. 21, without examination of the expert, to contend that Ex.P. 26 did contain the writing of the deceased and did not contain the writing of the appellant. That, according to appellants learned Counsel, would be an indication of the deceased having probably committed suicide. He pleaded for reversal of the Judgment of the learned trial Judge .12. While relying to the aforestated contentions, Mr. That, according to appellants learned Counsel, would be an indication of the deceased having probably committed suicide. He pleaded for reversal of the Judgment of the learned trial Judge .12. While relying to the aforestated contentions, Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor, pin-pointed the fact, that the inmates of the house, where the occurrence had taken place at the dead of night, were the deceased and the appellant only and hence, the appellant was bound to offer an explanation as to how the occurrence had taken place if he was not the offender. He underlined that it was not the case of the appellant that there was any other occupant in the said house other than he and his wife. Learned Public Prosecutor brought to our notice that the appellant and the deceased was seen together at 4.00 p.m. on the evening prior to occurrence by P.W. 3 and again P.W. 4 had seen both of them together at 9.00 p.m., just a few hours prior to crime commission. He then referred to the medical evidence, which has fixed the time of death between 8.50 p.m. on 24-8-1986 and 12.50 a.m. on 25-8-1986 and contended that at or about the time of the deceased breathing her last, appellant was seen in the company of the deceased. Another important circumstance, brought to our notice by the learned Public Prosecutor was, that the outer door of the house of the deceased was found latched from outside, soon after an alarm was raised, which led to, P.W. 1 and others, rushing to the venue, on the intervention of P.W. 5. This fact, according to learned Public Prosecutor, finds place even in Ex.P. 1, the earliest information about this crime. On the basis of medical evidence, he submitted, that this was a clear case of homicide and not of suicide and hence Ex.P. 26, the suicide note, which itself appeared to be useless, cannot have any value attached to it. He pertinently pointed out that, this murder was not for gain, since jewels were found intact on the body of the deceased. He emphatically contended, that after kicking and beating the deceased, appellant obviously strangulated her and to conceal evidence of murder, had set fire to the dead body. He pertinently pointed out that, this murder was not for gain, since jewels were found intact on the body of the deceased. He emphatically contended, that after kicking and beating the deceased, appellant obviously strangulated her and to conceal evidence of murder, had set fire to the dead body. He also contended, that the motive for this crime was clear enough, for right from the commencement of marital life, deceased was teased and inflicted with cruelty to bring back from her parental house the dowry due. He contended that without examination of the Handwriting Expert, Ex.P. 21 will have no value and in any event, since the suicide note appeared to be a make-believe affair, nothing more would arise in favour of the appellant out of the said document. He pleaded for upholding of the verdict of the learned trial Judge .13. It is settled law that before a person can be convicted on the strength of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances in question must be satisfactorily established and the proved circumstances must bring home the offence to the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. If these circumstances can be explained by any reasonable hypothesis, then the accused must have the benefit of that hypothesis. The circumstances forming the evidence, must not only be conclusively established, but they must form such a complete chain that it was not only consistent with the guilt of the accused, but was inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. In assessing the hypothesis mentioned above, imaginary possibilities have no place. All that has to be considered, relate to the realm of ordinary human possibilities. In other words, extravagant and fanciful hypotheses suggested by the accused have no place and all that the Court has to consider is the totality and cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each one of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the combined effect of those facts, taken together, is conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction would be justified even though it may be that any one or more of those facts, by itself was not decisive 14. These principles will certainly weigh with us while we consider the impact of the evidence brought on record and its effectivity 15. These principles will certainly weigh with us while we consider the impact of the evidence brought on record and its effectivity 15. Prosecution relies upon the following circumstances to bring home the guilt of the appellant 1) Motive, This head includes prior cruelty, long separation between the spouses, incident that had happened 15 days prior to occurrence, as well on 21-8-1986 and 24-8-1986 2) Appellant and the deceased having been seen together when the deceased was alive on the evening and night of occurrence3) P.Ws. 5 and 6 having heard shouts from the residential portion occupied by the appellant and the deceased at or about 2.00 a.m. on that particular night and their conduct in informing P.W. 1 and others about the said hearing of screams which instinctively took P.W. 1 and others to the residence of the appellant, to notice that the outer door of the house was latched from outside and inside the dark house, there was burning smell and on switching on lights, charred body of the deceased was seen with bleeding injuries as well as burn injuries 4) Appellant leaving the scene of crime at or about 1.00 a.m. in the autorickshaw of P.W. 10 and absconding thereafter till he was arrested at 9.00 a.m. on 27-8-1986 5) Medical evidence that death was due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation as well the other multiple injuries found on the dead body, excluding the burn injuries, which were post-mortem 16. We will initially take up for consideration, the evidence available under the first head. P.Ws. 1 to 4 and P.W. 16, to some extent, have spoken about the motive aspect of the prosecution case. We have already mentioned that P.W. 1 is the brother of the deceased and P.W. 2 is the father of the deceased. P.Ws. 3 and 4 are niece and cousin of the deceased, while P.W. 16 appears to be an independent witness, living in D-1 Block, Sampath Nagar. It is clear from the totality of their versions, that the deceased was given in marriage to the appellant on 27-1-1980 at Erode. The spouses commenced living together and they did so for about six months by residing in a house at Power House Road. Appellants father was then staying with him. It is clear from the totality of their versions, that the deceased was given in marriage to the appellant on 27-1-1980 at Erode. The spouses commenced living together and they did so for about six months by residing in a house at Power House Road. Appellants father was then staying with him. It was thereafter that the appellant had beaten the deceased and driven her away from his house with a direction to come back with the dowry due. Of course, P.W. 1 has also stated that at that point of time, appellant attempted to pour kerosene over the head of the deceased and set fire to her, but she was able to escape from the said attempt. Mr. Asokan contended that this part of the prosecution story, about the appellant having attempted to pour kerosene and set fire to his wife even six months after their marriage, does not form part of Ex.P. 1 and hence no value should be attached to it, more so, when P.W. 2 is also silent on that aspect. P.W. 1 is the elder brother of the deceased and it is possible to visualise that the deceased was prepared to confide in him about the act of the appellant. In any event, since P.W. 2 was silent about the said facet and in Ex.P1 also no such affirmation has been made, we will exclude from considering that part of evidence of P.W. 1, that even six months after marriage, the appellant had attempted to pour kerosene on his wife and set fire to her. P.W. 4 has also spoken about her having seen kerosene on the head of the deceased, when she was driven out of her matrimonial home, six months after her marriage. But, it has been elicited that during investigation that fact was not referred by the witness. However, it is clear that after such exit of the deceased, on compulsion by her husband, and six months after her marriage, resulted in her staying in her parental house for about three years. But, it has been elicited that during investigation that fact was not referred by the witness. However, it is clear that after such exit of the deceased, on compulsion by her husband, and six months after her marriage, resulted in her staying in her parental house for about three years. This speaks volumes of the cruelty that the appellant must have inflicted on the deceased even during the initial period of their marital life, which led his wife to take refuge in her parental house for over three years and the appellant, on his part, would not even move his little finger for such a long time to try for a re-union between him and his wife. It appears that after about three years, appellants younger brother was seeking to enter into matrimony and as a matter of prestige, it was felt that the deceased cannot be allowed to stay away from the appellant, for that may send wrong signals to the party who was offering the bride to the appellants younger brother. It was in that context, Lakshmi, wife of the elder brother of the appellant and the appellant himself pacified the deceased and her father and elder brother and took her back to live with her husband. Apparently, after the marriage of the appellants brother was celebrated, two months thereafter, history repeated itself and the appellant drove away his wife, after beating her. Of course, some time later, appellant took back his wife. Thenceforth appellant and his wife were living separately in Door No. 16-C, Sampath Nagar, the area in which P.Ws. 1 and 2 were living. They were in the said residence for about four months. Even during that four months appellant was pestering his wife to get the dowry due from her brother and father. Fifteen days prior to occurrence, the deceased was constrained to come back to her fathers house, due to one more episode, of inflicting cruelty on her, by the appellant, demanding dowry due. This time, the appellant had told his wife that he was interested in commencing a business for which the balance of dowry was an absolute necessity. Fifteen days prior to occurrence, the deceased was constrained to come back to her fathers house, due to one more episode, of inflicting cruelty on her, by the appellant, demanding dowry due. This time, the appellant had told his wife that he was interested in commencing a business for which the balance of dowry was an absolute necessity. It is in this background, that the deceased, was in the house of P.W. 1, for the members of the family of P.W. 1, inclusive of P.W. 2, had left their residence on the night of 21-5-1986, for a marriage, leaving the deceased and P.W. 3, Selvamani, alone in the house. When they returned on the next morning, they found the deceased missing. They became aware through P.W. 3, Selvamani, and P.W. 4, Balambal, that the appellant had taken away his wife, after breaking open the outer door of the house, and beating his wife. This was witnessed not only by P.Ws. 3 and 4, but in part, by P.W. 16, an independent witness. According to P.W. 16, she heard a hue and cry at or about 9.00 p.m. on a particular night, two years before her deposing in Court, and when she came out, she became aware that the screams were that of P.W. 3. She then noticed the appellant and the deceased fighting with each other. She told the appellant that the parents of the deceased had gone over to a marriage and that he could take his wife back after their arrival. She has also fixed the presence of P.Ws. 3 and 4 at the scene, at the relevant time. It was sought to be contended by Mr. K. Asokan that P.W. 16 has stated in cross-examination, that the spouses were talking in a normal way and that would defy any force having been used and the appellant having taken her away on the night of 21-8-1986. This argument, we are unable to accede, for P.Ws. 3 and 4 have clearly spoken about the beatings inflicted by the appellant on his wife while attempting to take her away in the absence of her parents. Due to forcible beating of the door of the house of P.W. 1, the inner latch got displaced and it was thereafter that the appellant forcibly took his wife away. 3 and 4 have clearly spoken about the beatings inflicted by the appellant on his wife while attempting to take her away in the absence of her parents. Due to forcible beating of the door of the house of P.W. 1, the inner latch got displaced and it was thereafter that the appellant forcibly took his wife away. The evidence of P.W. 3 also affirms that in spite of the deceased refusing to join her husband, she was forcibly dragged away. P.W. 3 was with the deceased inside the house at that point of time and hence she is a competent witness to speak about this part of the prosecution case. It was of course argued by learned defence Counsel that P.W. 3 has not spoken about the presence of P.W. 4 at that point of time. P.W. 4 was not staying in the same house as that of the deceased. Obviously, P.W. 4 had arrived on information being forwarded to him by a driver, that there was some confusion in the house of her senior maternal aunt. It was then that she was able to witness the forcible escorting away of the deceased by the appellant. She had also noticed the breakage of the latch in the house of the deceased, as spoken to by P.W. 3. It has to be mentioned that the evidence of P.W. 16 fixes the presence of .P.W. 4 also at the scene, though a little later and it fully synchronises with the version of P.W. 4 herself. Hence, we have no hesitation in accepting the prosecution case, that in the absence of the parents of the deceased, appellant had forcibly taken away his wife on the night of 21-8-1986, in spite of her not being willing to accompany him 17. P.Ws. 1 and 2, who were naturally perturbed on the absence of the deceased, when they arrived home on the next morning, were anxious enough to find out the fate of the deceased and therefore deputed the younger brother of P.W. 1 to proceed to the house of the appellant. Umamaheswaran (not examined), younger brother of P.W. 1 did go and returned thereafter. It was sought to be contended that when no further steps were taken by P.Ws. 1 and 2, it must be concluded that the spouses were living happily. Umamaheswaran (not examined), younger brother of P.W. 1 did go and returned thereafter. It was sought to be contended that when no further steps were taken by P.Ws. 1 and 2, it must be concluded that the spouses were living happily. We are unable to attach too much of weight for this argument, for the past history coupled with the manner of taking away of his wife, by the appellant on 21-8-1986, cannot be just overlooked. Fight and temporary pacification, for more fights to follow, to get somehow or other, the dowry demanded by him appears to be the modus operandi. On the morning of 24-8-1986, the appellant and the deceased visited the house of P.W. 1. When P.W. 1 to his dismay, found an injury on the left waist of her younger sister, when questioned, she informed, that her husband had caused that burn injury. However, the spouses did not stay for long for they left the house after bath. It was pointed out by learned defence counsel, that P.W. 2 has not spoken about his having noticed any injury on the waist of his daughter on 24-8-1986 and hence no weight could be attached to the version of P.W. 1. We have already mentioned, that all depends on the nature of interrogation and the affinity quotient between the deceased, her brother and father and merely because P.W. 2, the elder man, had not specifically spoken about it, the evidence of P.W. 1 cannot be discarded. In corroboration of the version of P.W. 1 we have the evidence of P.W. 4 who had visited the deceased at 9.00 p.m. on 24-8-1986 at her residence. She noticed the appellant and the deceased inside their house. Deceased was in sorrow. By showing of signs, she took her inside the kitchen and showed to her a burn injury on her waist as that inflicted by her husband, while further narrating about the ill-treatment meted out by him. Each and every aspect of cruelty inflicted on the deceased need not have to be mentioned either in the first information report or spoken to by every witness put into the witness-box. Each and every aspect of cruelty inflicted on the deceased need not have to be mentioned either in the first information report or spoken to by every witness put into the witness-box. That infliction of cruelty was a continuous course of conduct is fairly evidence and if one or other of the witnesses have omitted to mention one part of such infliction of cruelty, it would only show their retentive memory and cannot wipe out the case of infliction of cruelty altogether. We must also recapitulate, the judicial dicta, that the first information report need not be an encyclopaedia and all that would be required to initiate action, would suffice, to from the contents of the earliest document. Mr. Asokan, learned defence counsel contended that when enquired by the Revenue Divisional Officer (P.W. 12), P.W. 1 had not stated about the dowry already offered to the appellant. That can hardly make any difference, for P.W. 1 had mentioned to the Revenue Divisional Officer that due to lack of funds, he and his father were unable to pay 10, 000/-in cash as dowry, as agreed to at the time of marriage. It was then argued by Mr. Asokan, that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 would disclose, that when the deceased was taken back three years after her stay with her father, she went away happily and on the morning of 24-8-1986 too, the spouses came to the house of P.W. 2, for a bath just freely, and went away, and this would defy the motive alleged. Partial happiness between spouses at lucid intervals will not be sufficient to throw away the cogent and clinching evidence of almost all the witnesses, highlighting the cruelty inflicted by the appellant on his wife, the object being, to obtain dowry. Even between fighting spouses, there will always be a lull and temporary happiness for a short while cannot erase the abundant cruelty inflicted on his wife by the appellant, which has been clearly brought in, in evidence, by the prosecution. Behind the curtain of periodical happiness, was the tale of infliction of cruelty based on dowry demand. Certain omissions during investigation brought out on record, which need no listing, are so immaterial that they do not tend to affect even remotely the basic core of the prosecution case. Behind the curtain of periodical happiness, was the tale of infliction of cruelty based on dowry demand. Certain omissions during investigation brought out on record, which need no listing, are so immaterial that they do not tend to affect even remotely the basic core of the prosecution case. We have no hesitation, whatever in concluding, that the appellant did have a motive - long-term and approximate -and that motive had its embryo on dowry unmet, resulting in infliction of cruelty 18. We will now discuss the evidence available under the second head (last seen alive). To recapitulate, the occurrence had taken place at or about 1.30 a.m. on 24/25-8-1996. We have already mentioned that on the morning of 24-8-1986, the spouses went over to the house of P.Ws. 1 and 2. The deceased did have a grievance even then, since her husband had caused a burn injury on her waist. Be that as it may, P.W. 3, Selvamani, has spoken about her having proceeded to the house of the deceased on 23-8-1986, to take along with her the deceased, for purchase of clothes. She accompanied the deceased for the said purpose. At 4.00 p.m. on 24-8-1986, P.W. 3 went over the house of the deceased to pick up her clothes and the school-bag, which she had left there on 23-8-1986. At that time, she had noticed the appellant and the deceased together in their residential house. So, we have evidence available, that on the morning of 24-8-1986, deceased and the appellant were together and again they were seen together at or about 4.00 p.m. at their residence by P.W. 3. We then have the evidence of P.W. 4, a cousin of the deceased, that she went over to the house of the deceased and the appellant at or about 9.00 p.m. on 24-8-1986. She then noticed the appellant present in his house. It was then that the deceased took her inside the kitchen and showed the burn injury sustained by her due to cruelty inflicted by the appellant. Though she was questioned that she had not stated to P.W. 19 about her having visited the house of the appellant and the deceased it 9.00 p.m. on 24-8-1986, we do not find that she had mentioned about this salient fact during investigation. Though she was questioned that she had not stated to P.W. 19 about her having visited the house of the appellant and the deceased it 9.00 p.m. on 24-8-1986, we do not find that she had mentioned about this salient fact during investigation. Similarly, at this stage, we are constrained to point out, that she had stated during investigation that when the deceased arrived at her fathers house six months after her marriage, appellant had attempted to pour kerosene over her and that was then evident. We are constrained to state that P.W. 19, even without reference to the statements recorded by him under Section 161, Cr.P.C., had chosen to offer rash answers, which do not tally with the record. It was thereafter, that around 2.00 a.m. that P.W. 5 and another had heard a hue and cry from the residential portion of the deceased, which impelled them to bring P.W. 1 to the venue of crime. In passing, we must also mention that the evidence of P.W. 10, an autorickshaw driver, makes it abundantly clear that around 1.00 a.m. on that fateful night, appellant travelled in his autorickshaw from Sampath Nagar, to a place near the Government Hospital, Erode. The evidence culled out above, will clearly show that the appellant was in the company of the deceased right from the morning hours, till about 1.00 a.m. when he chose to leave Sampath Nagar, his residential area, through the autorickshaw driven by P.W. 10. Last seen alive evidence is one other clinching circumstance, which we are prepared to accept, after assessment of the versions of several witnesses, we have referred to above 19. Under the third head, we are bound to discuss the evidence of witnesses, who had heard screams emanating from the house of the deceased at or about 2.00 a.m. and the consequent arrival of P.W. 1 and others at the venue, on information furnished by P.Ws. 5 and 6. It was then that the body of the injured victim was found inside the dark house, which emanated burning smell, as soon as the outer door of the house, latched from outside, was opened. P.W. 5 Boopathi, is an employee of Bank of India. He was an occupant of Quarters C-17 in Sampath Nagar, while the deceased was in occupation of Quarters C-16. P.W. 5 Boopathi, is an employee of Bank of India. He was an occupant of Quarters C-17 in Sampath Nagar, while the deceased was in occupation of Quarters C-16. Appellant and the deceased were living in the first floor, while P.W. 5 was a resident of the second floor. At or about 2.00 a.m. on 25-8-1986, from the first floor, he heard the shouts "Ayyo, Ayyo". He got out of bed, came out and saw about seven or eight persons in a crowd in the groundfloor. He called Loganathan (not examined), who was living opposite to him. When he came down, he found the outer door of Quarter No. C-16 closed. He also noticed smoke coming out of the said house. They informed about all that they had seen to P.W. 6 Janakiraman and another. P.W. 6 Janakiraman, was a College Professor then, he was the President of the residents of Sampath Nagar Colony, P.W. 6 became aware, that P.W. 5 and another had heard the screams of a woman from Flat C-16 and that smoke was also emanating from the said house. P.W. 5 and two others then proceeded to the house of P.W. 2 and informed him of all that they had seen. Thereafter, P.W. 1 arrived. The evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 6, who are independent witnesses, deserves total acceptance. Nothing worthwhile has been elicited in their cross-examination to affect their credibility. Since P.W. 6 was the President of the residents of Sampath Nagar, naturally P.W. 5 thought it fit to communicate to him. The only argument that was advanced, by learned defence counsel, to discredit the version of P.W. 5 was that he could not have heard the screams of the deceased, if the burn injuries were post-mortem. We are unable to accede to this argument, for it is fairly clear, that causation of multiple injuries on the body of the deceased and strangulation must have just preceded setting of fire to the deceased after pouring of a combustible substance. We are unable to accede to this argument, for it is fairly clear, that causation of multiple injuries on the body of the deceased and strangulation must have just preceded setting of fire to the deceased after pouring of a combustible substance. P.W. 5, who was in the upstairs portion of the same building need not have to utter falsehood that at dead of night he heard the screams of a woman from the first floor portion, which impelled him to come out of his house and then with the help of P.W. 6 and others proceed to the residence of P.W. 2 to inform him about those details, since they were aware that the deceased was the daughter of P.W. 2. On arrival at the scene, without delay, P.W. 1 found the outer door of the house of the deceased was latched from outside. He was accompanied by his younger brother (not examined). Lights inside the house were not burning. Even then, they were able to smell burning. They promptly switched on the light and found in the rook, on the south side, their sister lying face downwards with bleeding. Her body was also charred. Around her, blood was seen. Immediately with the help of Subramanian, husband of P.W. 4, they telephoned for an ambulance, which arrived in or about 15 minutes. P.W. 7 Ramaswami, driver of the ambulance, on arrival at or about 2 a.m., on the basis of the telephone call, found that the deceased was already dead. It was thereafter that P.W. 1 chose to set the law in motion by preferring Ex.P. 1, that the outer door of the residence of the deceased and the appellant, was closed from outside, stands mentioned even in the first information report, Ex.P. 1, preferred at or about 2.30 a.m. on the occurrence night, by P.W. 1 before P.W. 18. That circumstance is really significant, for the offender, whomsoever it might be, had put out all the lights after committing the crime, bolted the door from outside and then escaped. We have already mentioned, that the appellant and the deceased were the sole occupants of the house in which the deceased was found dead. We have also found, that the appellant and the deceased, when alive, were found together in the said premises. We have already mentioned, that the appellant and the deceased were the sole occupants of the house in which the deceased was found dead. We have also found, that the appellant and the deceased, when alive, were found together in the said premises. It is not the case of the appellant, that without any particular avocation, he had gone away from his house, and in his absence, somebody had killed his wife. If some occurrence happens inside the residential portion of the appellant, wherein he was also available, at or about the time of the incident, he is bound to offer his version as to how the occurrence had taken place. The only other person who can speak about the occurrence will be the deceased and now that she is dead, if at all, the appellant and the appellant alone can offer an explanation. Section 106 of the Evidence Act states that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. It is true that this section cannot be used, so as to shift the onus of proving the offence, from the prosecution to the accused. However, in the present case, there is satisfactory evidence, which fastens or conclusively fixes the liability, for the death of Gandhimathi, on the inmate of the house, present therein at the relevant time. So, in the absence of any other explanation, the only possible inference is that the appellant had participated in the act. If he claims contrary, under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proving that fact is upon him, since that is within his special knowledge. In Shambho Nath v. State of Ajmer, 1956 AIR(SC) 404, 1956 (62) CRLJ 794, 1956 SCJ 429, 1956 (1) SCR 199, 1956 (2) MLJ(SC) 1, 1956 (2) MLJ 1 the scope and object of Section 106 of the Evidence Act came to be considered by the Supreme Court "Section 106 is an exception to Section 101, Section 101 lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word especially stresses that it means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge." * Further, the conduct of the appellant immediately after occurrence, is consistent only with his guilt. Assuming that this was a case of suicide, would not have been the conduct of the appellant different ? He would then have certainly been present at the scene and attempted to set the law in motion, for that would be the normal pattern of human behaviour. P.W. 2, who went over to the scene house, a little later, found his daughter charred in a room inside her house. He was also able to notice blood all around her. P.W. 4 has also deposed that around 2.00 a.m. on occurrence night, P.W. 1 tapped at the outer door of her house. When she questioned him, he stated that the deceased was found inside her house in a charred state and blood was seen around her. It was her husband, who telephoned for an ambulance. She joined her husband and went over to the scene of occurrence. At that time, she found the appellant absent. However, his scooter was found in a leaning position outside his house. She also noticed the charred body of the deceased with blood around her. The third circumstance also links the appellant with the crime, more so, when he had not chosen to offer any explanation, whatever, as to how the occurrence had happened. When he was examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C., to every question addressed to him, his answer was either "false" or "I do not know". Only to Question No. 21, relating to his arrest, he had chosen to state that he was not arrested. He merely stated that this prosecution was false. He never sought to offer an explanation about this crime or even claim that he was not present at the time of the incident, more so when several prosecution witnesses had seen him together with his wife fairly late on the earlier night 20. He merely stated that this prosecution was false. He never sought to offer an explanation about this crime or even claim that he was not present at the time of the incident, more so when several prosecution witnesses had seen him together with his wife fairly late on the earlier night 20. The next circumstance under the 4th head relates to the absconding of the accused from the scene of crime on the occurrence night. We have the evidence of P.W. 10 only on this aspect. He was a resident of Erode Poriavalasu. He is an autorickshaw driver, who claims to have known the appellant earlier. From Abhirami Theatre, he had picked up passengers, who got down from his autorickshaw at Sampath Nagar. While he was coming back after dropping passengers, appellant stopped him near the gate of Jeeva office. He noticed that the appellant was in haste while getting inside the autorickshaw. Appellant got himself dropped near the Government Hospital, Erode. It was argued that P.W. 10, could not have identified the appellant, when he was not in a position to remember about the other passengers, who had travelled in his autorickshaw. This argument overlooks the case of P.W. 10, that he had known the appellant. Though it was not elicited in Chief-examination, as to how he had known the appellant earlier, it has been elicited in cross-examination that he had seen the appellant quite often in the roads of Erode and so his identity was known to him, though he does not know his name. He proceeded to Sampath Nagar on the next morning when he knew about this occurrence and he was promptly examined without delay. His evidence is certainly entitled to very great weight. He was available at the scene, to be examined on the next morning. If it was a case of appellant having been a stranger, then connecting identity link, may have been required. Merely because P.W. 10 has stated that the appellant had taken his autorickshaw at or about 1.00 a.m. while the evidence of P.W. 5 is that he had heard the screams at 2.00 a.m., we cannot doubt the prosecution case. The time mentioned, by these witnesses, is only approximate. Merely because P.W. 10 has stated that the appellant had taken his autorickshaw at or about 1.00 a.m. while the evidence of P.W. 5 is that he had heard the screams at 2.00 a.m., we cannot doubt the prosecution case. The time mentioned, by these witnesses, is only approximate. That it must be so is fairly clear, for the first information report was preferred even at 2.30 a.m., to be registered at 3.30 a.m. The distance between the venue of crime and the police station is about 2 kms. After information was furnished by P.W. 5, it must have taken some time for P.W. 1, to reach the venue of crime to find the charred body of her younger sister. Further time must have been spent before proceeding to the house of P.W. 4, to telephonically get at an ambulance and thereafter, on becoming aware of the death of his sister, proceeding to the police station initially and to the house of P.W. 18 later, before he could set the law in motion. So, it is fairly, clear, that at or about the time, when the appellant had chosen to get away from the scene of crime, the occurrence should have reached it termination. Even if we assume, that the evidence of P.W. 10, may have to be eschewed from consideration, on the submission made, that the identity of the appellant connecting him with the crime through the evidence of P.W. 10 would not be sufficient, as we have already mentioned, the appellant did owe an explanation, about all that had happened inside his house, because, he was an inmate of that house, seen earlier inside it by a group of witnesses. Absconding by an accused by itself is not conclusive whether of guilt or of guilty conscience. If the involvement of the accused does not stand proved abscondance can be of no consequence. Undue importance need not have to be attached to the fact of running away, after the crime. That can even be as a result of instinct of self-preservation. However, when there is other evidence to connect the accused with the crime, the fact of abscondance will be an useful piece or corroborative evidence. It can certainly lend weight to other evidence. Inspite of search by P.Ws. 18 and 19, the appellant could not be traced till he was arrested on 27-8-1986. However, when there is other evidence to connect the accused with the crime, the fact of abscondance will be an useful piece or corroborative evidence. It can certainly lend weight to other evidence. Inspite of search by P.Ws. 18 and 19, the appellant could not be traced till he was arrested on 27-8-1986. This facet of the prosecution case can also be taken note of, as a corroborating circumstance, though not as one of the main circumstances21. The last circumstances is the medical evidence, P.W. 14 Dr. Gnanasekaran, along with Dr. Meenakshi, conducted autopsy on the dead body at 4.50 p.m. on 25-8-1986. We have already extracted the contents of the post-mortem certificate and that would show, that the tongue was found protruded and frothy red coloured blood was coming out from the nose. There was a wound 10 cm. x 3 cm. on the inner aspect of right upper arm. It could not be described, either as incised or lacerated, due to burns. There was also a depression over the right forehead 4 cm. x 2 cm. The Medical Officer had also noticed the red coloured stained areas on the right sole, left sole, dorsum of left foot, medial aspect of left leg, medial aspect of left knee, and left and right palms. Similar areas of dropped red stain were noticed over the left middle thigh and right leg. There was a further dark coloured area 5 x 4 cms. over the left mid-leg in the medial aspect. Similar dark coloured areas were noticed in varied sizes over the buttocks, dorsum of both hands, sides of chest, back of abdomen and both thighs. On the head a curved incised like wound over the occipital region was noticed. These multiple injuries noticed on various parts of the body, according to the Medical Officer, were also the cause for death, apart from death due to asphyxia, being a consequence, of injury No. 8, which is an oblique ligature mark on the neck, flushed with the surface, seen over the front and both sides of the neck, 1 cm. above the middle of neck. No ligature mark was found on the posterior side of the neck. above the middle of neck. No ligature mark was found on the posterior side of the neck. The doctor has stated that protrusion of the tongue, bitten to some extent, indicated asphyxia and struggle for life, on the part of the deceased, Injury No. 4, depression on the right forehead, and injury No. 7 over the left mid-leg, were ante-mortem injuries. It is the further opinion of the Medical Officer that clotting of blood on the post abdominal wall was possible by kicking or fisting over the post abdominal wall. The congestion of lungs was due to asphyxia. The medical evidence discloses that the deceased was beaten before she was strangulated to death22. P.W. 15, Dr. Cecilia Cyril, whose expert opinion was sought, before P.W. 14 offered his opinion, has clearly stated that the lacerated scalp wound, skin with subcutaneous tissue contusion (item No. 2) and item No. 4 described by her relating to skin subcutaneous tissue with portion of intestines blackish area, were all ante-mortem injuries. Similarly, item 5 relating to 44 cm. long loop of intestine with a contusion, was an ante-mortem injury. She has mentioned about contusion of soft tissues having been seen over the right greater horn of the hyoid bone and subluxation having been seen on the right side at the junction of the body with greater horn. This subluxation of the joint of the hyoid bone, was possible by pressing the neck with force, for sufficient time while the deceased was alive, is the firm opinion of P.W. 14. Similarly, P.W. 15 has opined that the other items of injuries described by her were ante-mortem in nature. The burns were post-mortem, while the other injuries were ante-mortem. P.W. 15 has further opined that items 1, 2, 4, 5, 9 and 10 mentioned by her, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Items 6 and 11 mentioned by her were necessarily fatal. P.W. 15 is also categoric that internal injuries could not have been self-inflicted. She has further stated in cross-examination that in a case of suicide, there will be no ligature mark around neck, but it will an oblique, incomplete ligature mark and there will be no internal injury at all. In a case of suicide by hanging, there will be no internal injuries to any part of the body. The opinions of P.Ws. She has further stated in cross-examination that in a case of suicide, there will be no ligature mark around neck, but it will an oblique, incomplete ligature mark and there will be no internal injury at all. In a case of suicide by hanging, there will be no internal injuries to any part of the body. The opinions of P.Ws. 14 and 15 postulate death due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and other multiple injuries found on the body of the deceased. The burns were only post-mortem in nature, showing thereby that the appellant with a view to conceal evidence of murder, and to screen himself from punishment, had chosen to set fire to the dead body. The medical evidence fits in fully with other circumstances, brought on record in evidence. This is one more strong circumstance, in the chain of circumstances23. We must mention at this stage, the attempt made by the investigating officer, to make it appear as though the deceased, had committed suicide. This attempt was made feasible by the alleged seizure of a letter Ex.P. 25, even on 25-8-1986 from the venue of crime. Several seizures were made on 25-8-1986 from the scene and an observation mahazar was also prepared. Exs.P. 2 and P. 3 are the relevant mahazars. They do not mention about the seizure of Ex.P. 26 from the scene. Ex.P. 26 had reached the Magistrate only on 11th September, 1986, after a long delay. We cannot overlook that the appellant was arrested on 27-8-1986 and only thereafter this document could have been forwarded to the Magistrate in September, 1986 without any contemporaneous document evidencing seizure of the same from the scene of crime. P.W. 19 ought to have explained, as to the document through which, he had seized this important letter, written by the deceased. Anyhow, we do not want to delve any more on this letter marked as Ex.P. 26, since we have already held, that the death of the deceased was not suicidal and she had died due to homicidal violence. Probably curdely, the appellant had thought of paving for himself, a path for escape through Ex.P. 26, but he had miserably failed in this attempt. Even for seizure of Ex.P. 4, a letter written by the deceased to P.W. 11, there is no mahazar for seizure. Probably curdely, the appellant had thought of paving for himself, a path for escape through Ex.P. 26, but he had miserably failed in this attempt. Even for seizure of Ex.P. 4, a letter written by the deceased to P.W. 11, there is no mahazar for seizure. It is not known as to how an investigating officer of the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police could effect seizures without contemporaneous documents, evidencing such seizures. Non-following of strict procedure, in seizing documents, in certain cases, may even result in affecting the proper course of administration of justice. Mr. Asokan, appellants learned Counsel was able to notice these infirmities and hence he did not seek to seriously contend that this could be a scene of suicide24. We are of the opinion that using of Ex.P. 21, the opinion of the Handwriting Expert, without putting the expert into the witness-box, more so, when the report of the Handwriting Expert will not fall under Section 293, Cr.P.C., cannot have our seal of approval. In Parvat v. Sukdev, 1956 AIR(Bom) 617 : 1956 CrLJ 1069), Gajendrakadgar, J., as he then was, stated that the opinion sent by the expert in writing cannot prove itself. Unless the expert stepped into the witness-box so as to enable the opponent to cross-examine him, in reference to that opinion, the opinion expressed by him in a communication, to one of the parties cannot be treated as evidence under the Evidence Act. It is an accepted principle that the opinion of the Handwriting Expert cannot be treated to be conclusive and when a report of the Expert is submitted, the Court must see for itself and with the assistance of the Expert about the identity of the handwritings. Generally the opinion of the Handwriting Expert is a weak piece of evidence and the Court should endeavour to see whether there was other evidence to support the opinion evidence of the Handwriting Expert. We have no hesitation in not acting upon Ex.P. 21 25. One other argument addressed by learned defence counsel needs disposal. He pointed out that the first information report stood received by the Magistrate only at 11.55 a.m. on 25-8-1986, though it was registered at Erode at 3.30 a.m., We must at once state, that every delay in despatch of the first information report to the magistrate, cannot enure in favour of the accused. He pointed out that the first information report stood received by the Magistrate only at 11.55 a.m. on 25-8-1986, though it was registered at Erode at 3.30 a.m., We must at once state, that every delay in despatch of the first information report to the magistrate, cannot enure in favour of the accused. In the instant case, the delay is not necessarily fatal, particularly when it has been recorded without delay and no suspicion is attached to its recording. PW. 17, a police constable, who had taken the first information report to the Magistrate, was put into the witness-box. At 5.00 a.m. on 25-8-1986, he was handed over four tapsals, to be taken to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Deputy superintendent of Police, Superintendent of Police and the Magistrate. He claims to have waited at the residence of the Revisional Divisional Officer till about 10.00 a.m. and later handed over the first information report in Court at or about 12.00 noon. We are unable to find anything sinister in the short delay that had occurred. This contention does not enure in favour of the appellant. 26. We are satisfied that the appellant has been correctly found guilty by the learned trial Judge of the offences with which he was charged. We concur with the said findings, by adding our own reasons detailed above. Convictions and sentences imposed on the appellant are confirmed. This appeal, which has no merit, shall stand dismissed.