Judgment : SUDHIR Narain, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 22-12-1993 passed by the Prescribed Authority rejecting the objection of the petitioner filed by him under Section 23 of U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). 2. THE facts in brief are that respondent No. 2 purchased building in dispute bearing Municipal No. 88/54 Prem Nagar, Kanpur on 29-5-1986. He filed an application for release against Smt. Shahnaz Begum, widow of Sri Mohammad Qayyum, respondent No. 3, for release of the disputed accommodation under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act in the year 1992 on the allegation that Mohammad Qayyum, husband of respondent No. 3, was tenant of the premises in question. After his death respondent No. 3 was paying the rent. THE accommodation in question was required for his personal need. His family consists of six members and he is residing in House No. 99/170, Nala Road, Kanpur wherein he has only two rooms which is hardly sufficient for his residential purposes and for children who are studying in schools. The application was contested by respondent No. 3 and it was alleged that the need of the landlord was not bona fide. Later on a compromise application was filed by respondent No. 3 on 3rd February, 1992 before the Prescribed Authority. In the application she admitted that the landlord bona fide requires the accommodation in question. 3. THE Prescribed Authority, considering the averments of the landlord in his application and the fact stated by respondent No. 3 in the compromise application, allowed the application for release by his order dated 14-2-1992 and granted two months time to vacate the accommodation in question. Respondent No. 3 did not vacate the accommodation within the time granted by the Prescribed Authority. Respondent No. 2 filed an application for enforcement of the order dated 14-2-1992 under Section 23 of the Act. THE petitioners Nos. 1 to 6 claiming themselves as sons of late Mohammad Qayyum and petitioner No. 7 claiming herself as his daughter, filed objection under Section 23 of the Act on the allegation that Mohammad Qayyum was tenant of the premises in question and they were not impleaded as parties in the application filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 21 of the Act and the said order cannot be enforced against them. 4. RESPONDENT No. 2 filed reply to the said objection and it was stated that the mother of the petitioners informed him that the had got surrendered the tenancy of her children in her favour because the said children are living under her custody. The Prescribed Authority found that respondent No. 3 was in fact representing the interest of her minor children also in the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. The petitioners, even if they had not surrendered the tenancy, their status was that of a joint tenants and they were fully represented by their mother, respondent No. 3, in the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. The order passed in the said proceedings was binding upon them. The objection of the petitioners was rejected on 22-12-1993 which is under challenge in this writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that admittedly Mohammad Qayyum was tenant of the premises in question and after his. death his widow, sons and daughter inherited the tenancy rights. They became co-tenants and were necessary parties to be impleaded in the application under Section 21 of the Act filed by respondent No. 3 but except respondent No. 3 none of the petitioners, who were sons and daughter of Mohammad Qayyum, were impleaded as party. The Prescribed Authority illegally relied upon the agreement dated 2-4-1991 alleged to have been executed by Mohammad Parvez and Mohammad Suhail, petitioners Nos. land 2. 5. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that the Prescribed Authority relied upon the agreement dated 2-4-1991 which was alleged to have been executed by Mohammad Parvez and Mohammad Suhail, petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of their mother, Smt. Shahnaz Begum, whereby it was agreed that all the matters relating to the tenancy may be dealt with by their mother and she will be the sole tenant of the accommodation in question but this document was forged and fictitious document. It was never signed by them. Secondly, Mohammad Suhail was minor at that time and he could not have executed the agreement. 6. IT is admitted that on the death of Mohammad Qayyum all the petitioners were minors. It was never signed by them. Secondly, Mohammad Suhail was minor at that time and he could not have executed the agreement. 6. IT is admitted that on the death of Mohammad Qayyum all the petitioners were minors. The date of birth of Mohammad Parvez is alleged to be 20th June, 1973 and he attained the age of 18 years on 20-6- 1991 and at the time when the order was passed by the Prescribed Authority on 14-2-1992 he was hardly 19 years of age. The date of birth of Suhail is 15th June, 1974 and he attained the age of majority on 15th June, 1992. He was minor at the time the Prescribed Authority passed the order under Section 21 of the Act. Admittedly Petitioner Nos. 1 to 7 are minors. Respondent No. 3 was admittedly paying the rent to respondent No. 2. She is a guardian of the minors. Even assuming the agreement was not executed by petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 if it is established that she was representing the interest of the minors as well as petitioner No. 1, she could have contested the application for herself and on behalf of her minor sons and daughter. As regards the petitioner No. 1 he will only be treated as joint tenant. There is no allegation that the interest of respondent No. 3 was adverse to the petitioners or she colluded with respondent No. 2 deliberately to frustrate the interest of the petitioners. She does not gain any advantage personally by entering into the compromise with the landlord as under the said compromise she was also liable to be evicted along with the petitioners. 7. IT is admitted that the petitioners were living together with their mother in the disputed promises. Mohamad Suhail, petitioner No. 2, filed affidavit before the Prescribed Authority and in Para 3 of the affidavit he admitted that all the petitioners were residing together. If they were residing together it cannot be believed that the petitioners had no knowledge regarding proceedings initiated by respondent No. 2 under Section 21 of the Act for eviction of the tenant. Petitioners never filed an application for their impleadment in the said proceedings. 8. If they were residing together it cannot be believed that the petitioners had no knowledge regarding proceedings initiated by respondent No. 2 under Section 21 of the Act for eviction of the tenant. Petitioners never filed an application for their impleadment in the said proceedings. 8. IN any proceeding when a joint tenant is impleaded as a party in the case, he represents the interest of all the joint tenants unless it is shown that such joint tenant colluded with the landlord or such other person who contested the matter. There is a presumption that a joint tenant represents the interest of all other tenants. In Harish Tandon v. Additional District Magistrate, Allahabad, U. P., 1995 (1) ARC 220, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that after the death of the tenant his heirs become joint tenants and not tenants-in-common. It is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs and there is no division of the premises or of the rent payable therefore and the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. The result is that the action of any of the joint tenants binds the other. 9. A Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Anju Sharma v. Suresh Chand Jain and others, 1993 (1) ARC 291, wherein after the death of original tenant a suit was filed for eviction against some of the heirs, it was held that the other heirs though not impleaded in the suit is binding upon such heir. The decree for eviction will bind all the joint tenants and even such tenants who had not been impleaded in the suit for eviction. 10. IN Sunil Kumar Singh v. Special Judge, Jaunpur, 1994 (2) ARC 194, it was held that a person is not entitled for impleadment and contest the matter afresh in appeal if the matter was fully represented by some of the joint tenants in a suit. As discussed above the petitioners having failed to prove that their mother was acting against their interest deliberately in collusion with the landlord, respondent No. 2, they cannot challenge the order passed by the Prescribed Authority in the proceedings under Section 23 of the Act. Section 23 is in the nature of execution of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority under Section 21 of the Act. Section 23 is in the nature of execution of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority under Section 21 of the Act. He can use or cause to use such force as may be necessary for evicting any tenant against whom an order is made under Section 21 or in appeal under Section 22 as the case may be for putting the landlord into possession. 11. IN the result there is no merit: in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.