Judgment Satyabrata Sinha, J. 1. These two appeals as well as the two contempt applications; one filed by the appellant in F.M.A.T. No. 2289 of'1993 and the other by the respondents in the said appeal and the appellants in F.M.A.T. No. 3560 of 1995 and also an application for necessary orders filed by the appellants in F.M.A.T. No. 3560 of 1995 were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The appellant Akhilesh Gupta admittedly was an employee of .Jamalpur Thana Co-operative Agricultural Marketing Society' Limited, the respondent No. 1 of F.M.A.T. No. 2289 of 1993 and appellant of F.M:A.T. No. 3560 of 1995, The appellant Akhilesh Gupta was' placed under suspension on :12.1.81 as a .criminal case was initiated against him, namely, G.R. Case No. 21 of 1981. under S. 408 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant was, however; acquitted of the said criminal charges against him by the learned Magistrate, by a judgment dated 22.12.92. The writ application was filed during pendency of the aforementioned criminal case, which was marked as C.O. No. 10047 (W) of 1989. In view of the aforementioned order of acquittal, an application for necessary order was filed which was disposed of by an order dated 28.6.93. The Society admittedly was not present when the matter was heard. By reason of the impugned order dated 28.6.93, the learned trial Judge passed the following order: "Having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, 1 dispose of this application, as also the writ application, ,by quashing the suspension order, being 'annexure 'c' to the writ petition. The petitioner be reinstated in service immediately.' He will be entitled' to get all arrear dues and other service benefits as if he had not been placed under suspension. Such benefits are to be made available to the petitioner within three months from the date of communication of this order. I make it , clear that this order will not prevent the Society from proceeding against the petitioner departmentally, in accordance with law, if they so desire. The application, as also the writ petition are disposed of accordingly." 3. Such benefits are to be made available to the petitioner within three months from the date of communication of this order. I make it , clear that this order will not prevent the Society from proceeding against the petitioner departmentally, in accordance with law, if they so desire. The application, as also the writ petition are disposed of accordingly." 3. The Society filed an application for recalling of the said order which was dismissed by the learned trial Judge by an order dated 30.6.95 holding: "In that view of the matter, I dispose of this application by directing the concerned respondents to re-instate the petitioner in service as directed in the order of 28th June, 1993 immediately" but the same will, be subject to any further order that may be passed in the Criminal' Revision application said to be pending in this court against the order of acquittal, passed by the learned Magistrate." 4. F.M.A.T. No. 2289 of1993 has been filed by the appellant against that portion of the order whereby and where under leave has been granted by the learned trial Judge in favour of the Society to initiate departmental proceeding as against him. The Society has also preferred an appeal as against the aforementioned order dated 30.6:95. 5. Mr. Roy appearing on behalf of the appellant Akhilesh Gupta submitted that the learned trial Judge has committed an illegality in granting, leave to the Society in a manner aforementioned, in as much as, a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated by the Society pursuant to or in furtherance of the said leave. Learned counsel submitted that no disciplinary proceeding could have been initiated after acquittal of the appellant. In any event, learned counsel contended, the, said disciplinary proceeding is bad in law on many grounds. Learned counsel in support of his aforementioned contention inter alia, relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil Lines, Nagpur & Anr. vs. Ramchandra & Ors. reported in (1981) 2 SCC 714 . 6. Mr. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the Society, on the other hand, submitted that the purpose of initiation of the criminal case arid the disciplinary proceeding are different. According to the learned counsel, acquittal of a delinquent employee by the criminal court by itself cannot stand as a bar, for initiating a departmental proceeding by the employer against him. 6. Mr. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the Society, on the other hand, submitted that the purpose of initiation of the criminal case arid the disciplinary proceeding are different. According to the learned counsel, acquittal of a delinquent employee by the criminal court by itself cannot stand as a bar, for initiating a departmental proceeding by the employer against him. Reliance in this connection has been placed on a decision reported in AIR 1960 SC 806 . Before this court, an application was filed for necessary orders on 24.7.96 and by an order dated 25.7.96 passed in F.M.A.T. No. 3560 of 1995 this court directed: "Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we dispose of the application filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner by directing the appellant to pay subsistence allowance on the basis of the salary that might have been payable to the respondent No. 1 on the date of his reinstatement pursuant to the order passed by the learned ,Trial Judge without prejudice to his right and contention in the appeal and subject to any order or further order that may be passed, while disposing 'of the appeal." 7. For alleged violation of the said order, a contempt application has been filed. 8. An application has also been filed by the Society for passing necessary order for prosecution of the appellant under Ss.195 and 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, inter alia, on the ground that the appellant has taken different stand before different forums and thus has filed false affidavit. 9. From the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Judge it appears that the order of suspension was quashed on the basis of a decision of this court in the case of Jatindra Nath Mondal vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported in AIR 1969 Cal 461 . 10. Mr. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the Society, when questioned however, conceded that in view of the order of acquittal, the order of suspension should come to an end, but according to the learned counsel, as a criminal revisional application had been filed against the said order of acquittal, the action of the Society was not unjustified. Learned counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge has also committed an error in directing the Society to pay all arrears as if no order of suspension had been passed. 11. Learned counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge has also committed an error in directing the Society to pay all arrears as if no order of suspension had been passed. 11. The matter relating to placing an employee under suspension is covered by Rule 16 of Appendix to Chapter VI of the said Rules which reads thus: "16. Suspension-(a) An employee of a co-operative society whose conduct requires investigation on a charge of misconduct enumerated in clause (a) of paragraph 14 may be placed under suspension pending inquiry, if in the opinion of the disciplinary authority the attendance of such employee on duty during the period or investigation into such charge is likely to vitiate the proceedings. (b) An employee of a co-operative society may be placed under suspension where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial. (c) An employee who has been suspended shall not be entitled to absent himself from his ordinary place of residence during the period of his suspension, except without permission of the authority by whom has been suspended. (d) During the period of suspension, an employee shall be entitled to subsistence grant equal to 50 per cent of his pay on the date of suspension and dearness allowance at the rate at which it was drawn by him on the date of suspension: Provided that if the period of suspension exceeds one year, the board may enhance the subsistence grant by 50 per cent if in the opinion of the suspending authority the period of suspension has been prolonged for reasons not directly attributable to the employee: Provided further that such order shall• continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the appropriate authority. (e) When the charge against the suspended employee is not established or is held to have been unjustifiable or not wholly justifiable and he is reinstated. He shall be entitled to the full pay and allowances .to which he could have been entitled if he had not been suspended; and, the period of suspension shall be treated as period spent on duty." 12. In view of the aforementioned provision, there cannot be any doubt that the Society had a right to place the appellant under suspension. 13. In view of the aforementioned provision, there cannot be any doubt that the Society had a right to place the appellant under suspension. 13. The only question which, therefore, may arise for consideration is as to whether the learned trial Judge could have directed payment of all arrears as if the appellant had never been placed under suspension. As noticed hereinbefore, the learned trial Judge had refused to recall the said order only on the ground that the said order is a speaking order and has been passed in view of the order of acquittal as also the fact that the continuation of the said order of suspension for a long time. No exception can be taken to the aforementioned findings of the learned trial Judge. 14. We also do not agree 'with Mr. Roy that the learned trial Judge could not have granted leave to the Society to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant. In (1981) 2 SCC 714 , the Apex Court has, in the facts and circumstances of the case held: "The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. Normally where the accused is aquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction in any way fettered. However, as quite some time has elapsed since the departmental inquiry had started the authority concerned will take into consideration this factor in coming to the conclusion if it is really worthwhile to continue the 'departmental" inquiry in the event of the acquittal of the respondents. If, however, the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the inquiry, it can certainly do so. If, however, the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the inquiry, it can certainly do so. In case the respondents are acquitted, we direct that the order of suspension shall be revoked and the respondents will be reinstated and allowed full salary thereafter even though the authority chooses to proceed with the inquiry. ............" 15. A bare perusal of the aforementioned proposition of law would clearly show that there is absolutely no bar on the part of the employer to initiate a departmental proceeding after an employee is acquitted of a criminal charge. It is now well settled that the purpose for initiating a criminal proceeding and a departmental proceeding, is different. Furthermore, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the power of the disciplinary authority to initiate a disciplinary proceeding despite an order of acquittal of the delinquent in a criminal proceeding is there. In that view of the matter, the Society could have initiated a departmental proceeding against the appellant even without such leave. In that view of the matter, the rights of the parties had not been determined by reason of grant of such leave by the learned trial Judge. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that F.M.A.T. No. 2289 of1993 is not maintainable. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that if there is any illegality in the said departmental proceeding and/or any subsequent order that may have been passed, the appellant would be entitled to move such forum for redressal of his grievance as is available to him in law. 16. So far as the appear preferred by the Society is concerned we find that there is some substance in the appeal. The learned trial Judge could have recalled the order despite the fact that the matter was disposed of on merits. This aspect of the matter is clearly covered by a decision of a learned single Judge of this court in the case of Ajoy Kumar Rit Vs. Iswar Dharma Thakur & Ors., reported in CLT 1995(1) HC 432. It is also now well known that the courts have a procedural power of review apart from the substantive power. If a person could not appear before the court as a result whereof principles of natural Justice have been violated there cannot be any doubt that the court may recall its order. It is also now well known that the courts have a procedural power of review apart from the substantive power. If a person could not appear before the court as a result whereof principles of natural Justice have been violated there cannot be any doubt that the court may recall its order. The learned trial Judge himself has come to the conclusion that the State could not have represented the cooperative society and it was the Society itself which could oppose the prayer of the appellant. Although no exception can be taken to that part of the order of the learned trial Judge that the order of suspension was bound to be revoked, but the learned trial Judge could have considered the fact as to whether the direction for payment of arrear salary, as if the order of suspension was never passed, was justified. To that extent, we are of the opinion that the appeal filed by the Society should be allowed and the matter be considered by the learned trial Judge afresh. 17. So far as the contempt application is concerned, from the order dated 25.7.96, it appears that the said order was passed without prejudice to the rights and contentions in the appeal of .the' parties and subject to any order or further order that may be passed while disposing of the appeal. 18. It is stated by Mr. Banerjee that pursuant to this court's order, subsistence allowance payable to the appellant has been substantially increased and he is now getting subsistence allowance as is admissible to him in law. Mr. Roy denies and disputes the said submission and has drawn our attention to the fact that while calculating the amount of actual salary which could be paid to the appellant, the Society has not taken into consideration the fact that the appellant was also entitled to the increments and revised pay scale. 19. The order of suspension has been passed in the disciplinary proceeding, which was not the subject matter of the writ petition. If the appellant is not being paid proper subsistence allowance, despite our order dated 25.7.96, in our opinion, he should take up the said matter with the Society and/or on his failure to obtain any justice from the Society, be may seek his remedy, before an appropriate forum. If the appellant is not being paid proper subsistence allowance, despite our order dated 25.7.96, in our opinion, he should take up the said matter with the Society and/or on his failure to obtain any justice from the Society, be may seek his remedy, before an appropriate forum. By preferring this appeal the appellant cannot be permitted to change the subject matter of the writ petition and raise contention about the legality and validity of the disciplinary proceeding.. 20. Keeping in view the order passed by us, we are of the opinion that as according to the Society itself, the appellant has allegedly filed a false affidavit before the learned trial Judge, it would be open to the Society to tile the said application before the learned trial Judge himself who may consider the said aspect of the matter and pass an appropriate order. 21. The appeals and the applications are thus disposed of without any order as to costs: 22. Satyanarayan Chakrabarty, J.: I agree. Appeals disposed of.