JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—Facts which are not in dispute are that Jag Devi alongwith another, respondents, hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs, filed a suit for injunction against Beli Ram, petitioner, hereinafter referred to as defendant. When this suit was filed an ex parte interim order was also granted in favour of the plaintiffs on 17th of February 1992, Ultimately, the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed by the trial Court on l7th of June 1994, against which, appeal has been filed in the Court of District Judge, Solan, wherein stay against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was granted on 20th of July 1994, and the appeal is still pending adjudication before the lower appellate Court. 2. According to the plaintiffs, since the defendant did not obey the ex parte interim order dated 17th of February 1992, they were compelled to file an application under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure for initiating the steps against the defendant for willful and intentional disobedience against him This application was contested by the defendant In the context of the present case, it may be appropriate to mention that for pursuing this case the plaintiffs had engaged Shri Harish Kaushal, Advocate and Vakalatnama in his favour is at page 17 of the file of application under Order 39, Ruie 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The matter came up before the trial Court on 19th of August, 1993 and following order was passed in the presence of the Counsel for the parties : “ 19-8-1993. Present—Sh Harish Kaushal, Advocate, for applicant Shri T. R. Thakur, Advocate, for respondent. Identified for conciliation, Time taken 40 minutes and conciliation effected. Counsel for applicant has stated that the matter has been compromised As such, he do not want to proceed further with this contempt application which is accordingly dismissed. Be consigned to records. Sd/- Announced Seal of the Sub Judge 1st Class, Arki, 19-8-1993. Court District Solan." 3. After the passing of this order on the application under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for recalling the said order. This application is signed by one of the plaintiffs Smt. Jag Devi and it was resisted and contested by the defendant. After the passing of this order on the application under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for recalling the said order. This application is signed by one of the plaintiffs Smt. Jag Devi and it was resisted and contested by the defendant. Trial Court framed following issues on this application on 8th of March, 1994 : 1. Whether there are sufficient grounds to restore the contempt petition which was dismissed on 19-8-1993, as alleged ? OPA 2. Whether the application is not maintainable ? OPR 3. Relief. 4. In support of these averments Jag Devi appeared as AW 1 and her learned Counsel Shri Harish Kaushal appeared as AW 2. 5. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and after considering the material on record, the trial Court allowed the application for restoration of the application under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the plaintiffs. It is this order dated 25th of November, 1995 passed by trial Court, which is impugned by the defendant in the present revision petition. 6. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the stand of the parties, original files of proceedings under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil procedure as well as of application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restoration of the said application were summoned 7. I have heard—learned Counsel for the parties and have scanned through the record with their able assistance. 8. Mr Sood. learned Counsel for the defendant has forcefully argued that the plaintiffs had no right to insist upon that he should be heard in the matter, as according to him, after informing the Court the matter was primarily between the Court on one side and the person complained against of disobeying the same on the other hand. It was further contended by Mr. Sood that after the permission for withdrawal was allowed, the trial Court must be deemed to have condoned the delay on its authority, Once the Court allowed the withdrawal of the contempt application, the remedy, if any, was by way of appeal. 9 On the other hand, Mr. It was further contended by Mr. Sood that after the permission for withdrawal was allowed, the trial Court must be deemed to have condoned the delay on its authority, Once the Court allowed the withdrawal of the contempt application, the remedy, if any, was by way of appeal. 9 On the other hand, Mr. Q, D Verma, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, has submitted that in this case the Counsel Shri Harish Kaushal was not having the authority to have made the statement regarding compromise, other limb of the argument of Mr. Verma was that there is no jurisdiction! error in the impugned order within the ambit of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure calling for interference in the present revision. Mr. Verma also forcefully submitted that the matter relating to Order 39, Role 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure is not only between the Court and the person disobeying the order, but his clients being aggrieved were well advised to file an application firstly for initiating contempt against the defendant and after its unauthorised withdrawal to have prayed for restoration of the same, 10. Ordinarily, this Court may not have interfered with the order in question. But looking to the facts which are borne out of the records of the case, there is no escape but for the setting aside the impugned order for the reasons which are going to be recorded hereafter, 11. The averments made in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the application for restoration are material for considering the respective submissions, which are reproduced herein below :— "4. That when the matter was came up for hearing on 19-8-1993, the original counsel who was conducting the case Sh. Dinesh Sharma could not appear as he was out of station. The said matter was thereby attended by Sh, Harish Kaushal, Advocate who was only authorised to seek adjournment in the matter as instructions were to be obtained whether the said matter has been finally compromised between the parties or not. 5. Sh. Harish Kaushal, Advocate was not imparted any instruction regarding any compromise effected between the parties and a wrong statement was made by him before the honorable court that the matter has been compromised and the petitioners would not like to press the contempt application. 5. Sh. Harish Kaushal, Advocate was not imparted any instruction regarding any compromise effected between the parties and a wrong statement was made by him before the honorable court that the matter has been compromised and the petitioners would not like to press the contempt application. On the contrary he informed that the date has been given in the case as the honorable Judge would not take up the matter on that day as he was already under transfer. On this statement of the Advocate the contempt petition was dismissed and consigned to record, in the absence of applicant/plaintiffs. Had there been any alleged compromise between the parties, the same should have been reduced into writing and read over and explained to the parties and in this regard a compromise-deed effected in writing was to be placed on the record of the case file. In the instant case the provisions of Order 23, Rules i, 3, C P. C has not been duly complied with, thus, making the compromise illegal, void and ab initio, bad in the eyes of law." 12. After a reference is made to the application filed under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, it appears that the averments are not only incorrect, but false Sait Jag Devi, who has not only filed this application, but has sworn in an affidavit in support thereof, which is at page 47 of the application for restoration Confronted with this situation. Mr. Verma was not in a position to further advance his submissions and rightly so because the averments made in the application were not only incorrect, but are contrary to the record of the case. Mr. Verma was not in a position to further advance his submissions and rightly so because the averments made in the application were not only incorrect, but are contrary to the record of the case. The evidence produced on behalf of the plaintiffs in support of the application for restoration is not only contrary to the record, but is factually incorrect Further, a presumption of correctness is attached to the judicial records and orders passed by the Courts are conclusive of the facts so recorded and cannot be permitted to be challenged before the higher Courts Needless to point out that the Judges say in their judgment as to what transpired done, said or admitted in their Court is the last word on the subject and is not questionable Besides this, the statement of the learned Judge as absolute verity and this Court ought to take his statement precisely as a record and act on it in the same manner as on a record of Court which of itself implies an absolute verity. Judicial proceedings emphasise the importance of rigidly maintaining the rule that a statement by a learned Court as to what took place during the course of trial before him is final, it is not to be criticised or circumvented much less is to be exposed to animad version In addition of this, it may further be pointed out in the context of the present case that where a litigant feels aggrieved by the statement in a judgment or order that an admission has been made, the most convenient and satisfactory course to follow, whenever practicable, is to apply to the Judge without delay and ask for rectification or review of the said judgment. In these circumstances, the Judges record is conclusive and neither the lawyer nor the litigants may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge himself, but nowhere else 13. In these circumstances, the Judges record is conclusive and neither the lawyer nor the litigants may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge himself, but nowhere else 13. A Division Bench of this Court in Didar Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh and others, AIR 1987 HP 42, has observed that "in view of the declaration of law in the aforesaid terms, the learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be allowed to urge before us that what has been recorded in the judgment of the learned single Judge does not correctly reflect what transpired at the hearing before him and to attack the judgment on that ground or, on that basis, to advance any other grounds in support of the appeal". 14 In the face of the aforesaid legal position and looking to the facts of the present case, Mr Verma was unable to pursue his line of argument in support of his contention above noted. This is a clear cut case where the trial Court has not only acted illegally as well as has committed material irregularity while passing the impugned order, but has also failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it in accordance with law Accordingly, the impugned order is neither sustainable on the facts of the case nor on the basis of the law applicable in that behalf. 15. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, this revision petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the trial Court is accordingly quashed and set aside thereby application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is dismissed. The plaintiffs are also burdened with costs of this revision petition which are fixed at Rs. 1,000. Petition allowed. -