Sree Narayana D. S. Trust v. Swami Prakasananda — 1996 DIGILAW 25 (KER)

Judgment :- By order dated 19.6.1995, this court allowed the Civil Revision Petition. Respondent No.1 in the Civil Revision Petition filed Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 13667 of 1995 before the Supreme Court challenging the said order. On 29.6.1995, the Supreme Court passed the following order on that petition for Special Leave to Appeal. "We do not find any ground warranting interference since it is an individual case and that too of an interim order. The S. L. P. is dismissed. However, the trial court is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of this order". 2. On 11.7.1995, the same respondent filed the Review Petition before this Court seeking a review of the order of this court dt. 19.6.1995. Since this court entertained a doubt whether this court still retained the power of review over the order dt. 19.6.1995, in view of the order of the Supreme court dt. 29.6.1995, this court while issuing notice on the Review Petition reserved that question for consideration as a preliminary point. The order of this court dt. 1.11.1995 reads as follows: "Notice. It is made clear that the question whether this court retains the power to review the order already passed in view of he subsequent order of the Supreme court will be considered initially, after notice. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. T. R. G. Wariyar submits that the records may be called for. Call for the entire records from the court below". After service of notice on the opposite party, the Review Petition was taken up. t the counter filed, the opposite party has taken up the contention that the review is not maintainable, since the order of this court dt. 19.6.1995 has merged in the order of the Supreme Court dt. 29-6-1995. In view of the order dt. 1.11.1995 and in view of the contention raised in the counter, the question of the jurisdiction of this court to exercise its power of review was preliminarily heard. This order is on that question only. Obviously, the hearing of the Review Petition on merits would depend on the conclusion of this court regarding the retention by it of the power to review the order dt. 19.6.1995. 3. This order is on that question only. Obviously, the hearing of the Review Petition on merits would depend on the conclusion of this court regarding the retention by it of the power to review the order dt. 19.6.1995. 3. It is argued on behalf of the opposite party that since the petitioner has applied fore Special Leave to Appeal to the Supreme court before this Court, the Review is not maintainable under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision of the Supreme Court in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of A. P. (AIR -1964 Sc 1372), was relied on in support. The decision of the Privy Council in Nagendranath v. Suresh (MR 1932 PC 165) and of the Supreme Court in Shankarv. Krishna (AIR 1970 SC 1) were also relied on, to explain the concept of Appeal. The decision of the High Court of Madras in Chappanv. Moideenkutty (ILR 22 Madras 68) was also referred to. Alternatively, it was contended that the order of the Supreme Court dt. 29.6.1995 is a speaking order and hence the order of this court has merged in the order of the Supreme Court and consequently, this Court had no power to review the order dt. 19.6.1995. 4. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the filing of an application for Special Leave to Appeal cannot be equated to the filing of an appeal and consequently, the bar under Order 47 Rule 1() (a) cannot be attracted. The decision of the Supreme Court in L M. Navakharev. K. E. 7apar(A!R 1993 SC 2596) is relied on in support. It is also contended that what Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure refers to is an appeal under the Code and does not take within its purview, an application for Special Leave to Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar (MR 1986 SC 1780), M/s. Riya Diamonds v. Union of India (AIR 1989 SC 674) and in Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 334) are also referred to, to contend that there is no merger of the order of this court in the order of the Supreme Court dt. 29.6.1995. 5. 29.6.1995. 5. In Thungabhadra Industries case (AIR 1964 SC 1372) the High Court had found as one of the reasons for rejecting an application for review of an order refusing to grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court, the ground that subsequent to the filing of the said review petition, the party had moved the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution for Special Leave to Appeal and that was dismissed. In considering the correctness of that conclusion, their Lordships of the Supreme Court noticed that it was after the filing of the Review Petition and during its pendency that the application for Special Leave was made to the Supreme Court accompanied by a petition for condoning the delay in making that application. The petition for condoning the delay was rejected by the Supreme Court with the result that the petition for Special Leave never legally came on the file of the Supreme Court. Discussing the scope of Order 47 Rule 1(1) of the Code, their Lordships observed that Order 47 Rule 1(1) did not stand in the way of a petition for review being entertained in a case where, on the date the review petition was filed, no appeal had been filed before the Supreme Court. Their Lordships proceeded to observe that the crucial date for determining whether or not the terms of Order 47 Rule 1 (1) of the code are satisfied, is the date when the application for review is filed, if, on that day no appeal has been filed, it is competent for the court hearing the petition for review to dispose of the application on the merits notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal, subject only to the fact that if before the application for review was finally decided, the appeal itself had been disposed of, the jurisdiction of the court hearing the review petition would come to an end. Learned counsel for the opposite party contended therefore that, when the petitioner had already filed a petition for Special Leave before the Supreme Court against the order dt. 19.6.1995, he could not file the application for review on 11.7.1995 before this court since on the day he filed the application for review, he had already approached the Appellate Court. Learned counsel for the opposite party contended therefore that, when the petitioner had already filed a petition for Special Leave before the Supreme Court against the order dt. 19.6.1995, he could not file the application for review on 11.7.1995 before this court since on the day he filed the application for review, he had already approached the Appellate Court. It is in that context that learned counsel sought to contend that an appeal is only an application by a party to an appellate court asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate court and from the point of view, there cannot be any doubt that the petitioner had approached the appellate court before he invoked the jurisdiction of this court under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code. It is in that context that learned counsel relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Nagendranath Dey (AIR 1932 P.C.165) and in Chappan (ILR.22 Madras 68), Learned counsel also brought to my notice the decision of the Calcutta High Court in C.K. Sukla v. Renuka ballav (84 CWN 324) wherein that court held that an application for review of a judgment is riot maintainable if before such an application is made, an application for Special Leave to Appeal against the judgment has been made before the Supreme Court and has been dismissed. A similar view taken by the High court of Andhra Pradesh in the decision in Sitaramasastry v. Sundaramma (AIR 1966 A. P. 173) was also brought to my notice. The Andhra Pradesh High Court took the view that the presenting of an application for leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court amounts in effect to preferring an appeal to the Supreme Court for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code and consequently, a Review Petition can be validly presented only so long as it is not filed after the presentation of an appeal petition. 6. 6. In answer, counsel for the petitioner contended that the nature of jurisdiction under Art.136 of the Constitution is discretionary and is different from the Appellate Jurisdiction, that what Section 114 of the Code contemplates is the filing of an appeal under the Code as a bar to maintainability of an application for review and that the decision in Thungabhadra Industries case is not an authority for the position that on the filing of a petition for special leave, the bar enacted in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be attracted. He questioned the correctness of the decisions of the Calcutta and Andhra Pradesh High Courts taking such a view. Referring to the decision in Arunachalam v. Sadhanantham (1979 (2) SCC 297) the learned counsel pointed out that the appellate power vested in the Supreme Court under Art.136 of the Constitution is not to be confused with ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate courts and appellate Tribunals under specific statutes. The appellate power under Article 136 of the Constitution is plenary and the Supreme Court had itself set the limit by permitting invocation of this power in very exceptional circumstances, namely, when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the court. According to him therefore, an approach to the Supreme Court by way of an application under Article 136 of the Constitution, cannot be equated to an .appeal. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in L, M. Navakharev. K. E, Tapar, AIR 1993 SC 2596, to show that in construing the scope of Section 13A of the Rent Act in question therein, the Supreme Court took the view that the pendency of an appeal by special Leave even where leave has been granted, cannot be treated as the pendency of a proceeding attracting the conditions laid down in Section 13A of that Act. The question involved in that case was whether that Section which purported to apply to pending proceedings before any court or Authority could be applied to an appeal pending before the Supreme Court on the basis of the grant of Special Leave under Art.136 of the Constitution prior to its introduction. The question involved in that case was whether that Section which purported to apply to pending proceedings before any court or Authority could be applied to an appeal pending before the Supreme Court on the basis of the grant of Special Leave under Art.136 of the Constitution prior to its introduction. It is in construing the scope of that section, that the Supreme Court took the view that the pendency of an appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution cannot be treated as a pending proceeding for the application of Section 13A of the Act. The Supreme Court observed: "The bar placed by clause 13A of the Order in question shall be applicable only to a suit or proceeding which was pending in any Court under provisions of any special Act or under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, as the case may be. It shall not become applicable to a special leave petition pending or an appeal registered before this Court on basis of leave granted under Article 136 of the Constitution. This Court while exercising its discretionary power under Article 136 of the-Constitution even while dismissing the appeal shall not be deemed to have passed any decree for eviction. The matter would have been different if clause 13A instead of only imposing a bar on passing a decree for eviction had also prescribed a bar on passing any order for recovery of possession of any premises or on initiation of execution proceedings on basis of any decree passed earlier. In that event, this Court could have taken note of subsequent change in the law and in exercise of its discretionary power could have pursed an order directing the respondent not to recover possession of the premises on basis of the decree for eviction passed in his favour or to pursue the execution proceedings without complying with the requirement of clause DA". It could be seen that what really fell for consideration was the scope of Section 13A of the Rent Act in question and whether in dismissing the appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution by the tenant questioning an order for eviction, the Supreme Court could be deemed to have passed a decree for eviction. It could be seen that what really fell for consideration was the scope of Section 13A of the Rent Act in question and whether in dismissing the appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution by the tenant questioning an order for eviction, the Supreme Court could be deemed to have passed a decree for eviction. The question we are concerned with here did not directly arise for decision in-that case nor was there any occasion for the Supreme Court to consider the effect of the decision in Thungabhadra Industries case. The scope of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code was also not involved in that decision. But, that decision does show that an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution cannot be treated as-a continuation of the proceedings for eviction initiated by a landlord against his tenant before the appropriate Court. To that extent, the said decision may lend support to the argument of counsel for the petitioner that the filing and the rejection of the petition for Special Leave in the present case before the filing of the Review Petition cannot be treated as the filing and dismissal of an appeal in the ordinary sense. In that decision, the Supreme Court relied on an earlier decision of that court in Gyan Chand v. Kunji Behariial (MR 1977 SC 858) wherein also the Supreme Court observed at an application for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court or an appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court is not an appeal within the meaning of Section 13A of the Rajastan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act. 7. In the recent case of M/s. Kabarf Pvt. Ltd. v. Shiv Nath Shrott and others UT 1995 (8) SC 539) the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of Order 47 Rule 1(1) (a) of the Code. 7. In the recent case of M/s. Kabarf Pvt. Ltd. v. Shiv Nath Shrott and others UT 1995 (8) SC 539) the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of Order 47 Rule 1(1) (a) of the Code. Though ultimately the question was left open to be considered in an appropriate case, their Lordships have observed as follows: "In our view there is force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the expression 'from which an appeal is allowed' appearing in clause (a) of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be construed liberally keeping in mind the underlying principle involved in Order 47 Rule 1(a) that before making review application, no superior court has been moved for getting the self same relief, so that for the self same relief, two parallel proceedings before two for a are not taken'. As we have held that application for leave are liable to be dismissed even on merits, the question of maintainability of the said applications for review before the High Court on account of filing the special leave petitions assailing the review applications, need not be gone into by further scrutiny as to whether application for leave to appeal under Art.136 of the Constitution stand on such separate footing that it should not be treated to be an appeal as contemplated under clause (a) of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure even for the purpose of giving, a liberal construction to the expression 'appeal allowed'. Such question therefore, is kept open to be considered in an appropriate case". The controversy arising before me therefore has to be resolved on the basis of the decisions referred to above but bearing in mind that the Said question has been kept open for decision by the Supreme Court in the last of the cases referred to above. 8. Section 114 of the Code entitles a person to apply for a review of a judgment to the court which passed the judgment or made the order from which no appeal is allowed by the Code or from which an appeal is allowed by the Code but from which no appeal has been preferred. 8. Section 114 of the Code entitles a person to apply for a review of a judgment to the court which passed the judgment or made the order from which no appeal is allowed by the Code or from which an appeal is allowed by the Code but from which no appeal has been preferred. But a look at Order 47 Rule 1(1)(a) of the Code shows that the reference to an appeal 'under the Code' referred to in Section 114 of the Code is absent and the bar arises if an appeal is allowed from a decree or order but from which no appeal has been preferred. What is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the substantive provision is Section 114 of the Code and the restriction on the power of Review must be traced to that provision and not to Order 47 Rule 1(1)(a) of the Code. In other words, what is sought to be emphasised is that only if an appeal is provided by the code and such an appeal is filed, could it be said that the power of review cannot be exercised and consequently' the decision of the Privy Council in Nagendranath's case (AIR 1932 P. C. 165) and that of the Madras High Court in Chappan's case (ILR 22 Mad 68) dealing with the meaning of the word 'appeal' cannot have any relevance in considering the question of maintainability of a review under Sec. 144 of the Code. But, if this were the position, there would have been no occasion for the Supreme Court to make the observations quoted above in Kabari Pvt. Ltd. Case (JT 1995 (8) SC 539). 9. But, if this were the position, there would have been no occasion for the Supreme Court to make the observations quoted above in Kabari Pvt. Ltd. Case (JT 1995 (8) SC 539). 9. I also see some force in the contention raised on behalf of the opposite party that if the object of restricting the power of review in cases where an appeal is provided and an appeal is taken, is to prevent a simultaneous approach both to the court which passed the decree or order and to the court which has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal, the same would be defeated by accepting an argument that even though a person had filed an application for Special Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution from the judgment or order, and the same is pending or has been dismissed, he could still file an application for review before this court by invoking Section 114 of the Code read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code. In a sense, Section 114 and order 47 Rule 1 of the Code have imported the principle of election, leaving it to the litigant to elect his remedy by either seeking a review of the judgment or order or by appeal against the decree or order, but hot permitting him to pursue both the remedies simultaneously. The approach to the two for a are mutually exclusive in the scheme of things. "Where either of two alternative tribunals are open to a litigant, each having jurisdiction over the matters in dispute, and he resorts for his remedy to one of such tribunals in preference to the other, he is precluded, as against his opponent, from subsequent recourse to the latter, at least at the point at which he has taken judgment in the first". (See Spencer Bower and Turner on Estoppel by Representation Third Edition, Para. 322). (See Spencer Bower and Turner on Estoppel by Representation Third Edition, Para. 322). If Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code thus incorporate the principle of election by providing a restriction on invoking the power of review, one would be more right in accepting the contention that a litigant having approached the Supreme Court by way of an application for Special Leave under Article 136 of the Constitution and thereby having invoked the Appellate power-no doubt, not the ordinary appellate power- would equally be precluded from filing an application for Review, as a litigant who has filed an appeal as provided by the Code before an appellate Court. In the context of the restriction placed on the power of review and the incorporation of the principle of election, I am inclined to take the view that the interpretation of the expression 'appeal' as adopted in Chappan's case by the High Court of Madras and by the Privy Council in Nagendranath Dey's case could be applied to achieve the object sought to be achieved by the restriction placed by Order 47 Rule 1(1)(a) of the Code on the power of review of the court which passed the order or judgment. It is in this context that one has to remember that in the Thungabhadra Industries case the Supreme Court dealing with the power of review of the High Court, had specifically stated that the crucial date for considering whether an application for review could be entertained is the date on which the application for review is filed and if on that day, there has been an approach already to the appellate Court, the review may not lie. Since the decision in Thungabhadra Industries directly dealt with the power of review as distinct from the cases relied on by counsel for the petitioner regarding the scope of an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, I am inclined to follow the ratio of the decision in Thungabhadra Industries case. In that context, with respect, I am inclined to agree with the views of the Calcutta and Andhra Pradesh High Courts on the question as expressed in C. K. Sukla (84 CWN 324) and Sitarama Sastry (A. I. R.1966 A. P. 173). 10. The next aspect to be considered is the effect of the decision of the Supreme court dt. 29.6.1995. 10. The next aspect to be considered is the effect of the decision of the Supreme court dt. 29.6.1995. While according to counsel for the petitioner, the said order is not a speaking one and consequently it cannot be said to have decided anything on the merits of the controversy, according to counsel for the opposite party, the said order indicates that their Lordships had considered the correctness of the order of this court dt. 19.6.1995 and had found no reason to interfere with that order. Counsel for the opposite party therefore submits that in this case, in any event, there is a merger of the order of this court which that of the Supreme Court and consequently this court has lost its jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the Review Petition on merits. 11. It is to be noticed here that the situation here is one, where the application for special leave was made and dismissed by the Supreme Court before the filing of the review, thus attracting both the situations contemplated by the Supreme Court in Thungabhara Industries case. 12. The order of the Supreme Court shows that a caveat had been entered by the opposite party before the Supreme Court. But, the order does not indicate whether the opposite party was heard or not. The order clearly says that their Lordships do not find any ground warranting interference with the order of this Court, since it is an individual case and that too a case of an interim order. While the first part of this sentence is relied on by counsel for the opposite party to show that the order of this court has been scrutinised on merits, she latter part of the order stating that this was an individual case and was the case of an interim order, is emphasised by counsel for the petitioner to contend that that was the reason for refusing to exercise jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. According to me, even if there is any doubt regarding the effect of the observations of their Lordships in the earlier part of the order, the final direction made in the order directing the trial court to dispose of the suit expeditiously and within a stipulated period does indicate this their Lordships had considered the question whether it was necessary or not interfere with the order of this court dt. 19.6.1995 and had decided that it was not necessary to interfere and it was sufficient if a direction was given to the trial court to try and dispose of the suit expeditiously. In the light of this latter direction and in the light of the observation of their Lordships that their Lordships do not find any ground warranting interference with the order of this court, I am of the view that the order of the Supreme Court dt. 29.6.1995 is an order on merits and consequently, the order of this court has merged in the order of that court. In view of this conclusion, the ratio of the decisions relied on by counsel for the petitioner reported in Indian Oil Corporation case AIR 1986 SC 1780 and Pup Diamonds case AIR 1989 SC 674 do not advance the case of the petitioner. Moreover, I find some merit in the contention of learned counsel for the opposite party that those two cases were cases where originally appeals were attempted before the Supreme court from the award of the Labour court and on leave being refused under Article 136 of the Constitution, applications were made in the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution and that the position is different in a case where the very same order of the High court is subjected to a challenge by filing an application under Art.136 of the Constitution and that application was rejected by the Supreme Court and what is sought for isa review of the order of this court already unsuccessfully challenged before the Supreme Court. I therefore, hold that in view of the order of the Supreme Court dt. 29.6.1995, there is a merger of the order of this court dt. 19.6.1995 in that of the Supreme Court and consequently, this court has lost its jurisdiction to review and order/ dt. 19.6.1995. The above view, according to me, is also supported by the ratio of the decision in U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishadv. Ravi Kumar an and (Al R 1995 SC 2076). 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the order of a Division Bench in R. P.14 of 1994 in MFA450oi:1982. In that case, in proceedings under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and assignment) Act, an appeal was filed before this court. Ravi Kumar an and (Al R 1995 SC 2076). 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the order of a Division Bench in R. P.14 of 1994 in MFA450oi:1982. In that case, in proceedings under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and assignment) Act, an appeal was filed before this court. The decision of this court in appeal was sought to be challenged before the Supreme Court, by seeking special leave to appeal, under Article 136 of the Constitution. That application for Special Leave was dismissed by the Supreme Court by the following order, "Special Leave Petition is dismissed on merits". Thereafter, the State filed a review petition before this court by invoking Section 8C of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and assignment) Act introduced by way of amendment into the parent Act. The said section in so far as it is material read: "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or in the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963), or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any judgment, decree or order of any court of other authority, the Government, if they are satisfied that any order of the High Court on appeal under Section 8A (including an order against which an appeal to the Supreme Court has not been admitted by that court) has been passed on the basis of concessions made before the High Court without authority in writing of the Government or due to the failure to produce relevant data or other particulars before the High Court or that an appeal against such order could not be filed before the Supreme Court by reason of the delay in applying for and obtaining a certified copy of such order, may during the period beginning with the commen cement of the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and assignment) Amendment Act, 1986 and ending on the 31st day of March, 1987, make an application to the High court for review of such order". An objection was raised that the application for review was not maintainable in view of the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the application for leave to appeal. An objection was raised that the application for review was not maintainable in view of the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the application for leave to appeal. Their Lordships after referring to the decision in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (AIR 1986 SC 1780), All India Service Pensioners Association Case (Al R 1988 SC 501) and the, Supreme Court Employees Welfare Fund Association case (AIR 1990 SC 334) took the view that the order involved in that case was not a reasoned one and hence cannot be considered to be a declaration of law so as to attract Article 141 of the Constitution and consequently there was no merger. During the course of the reasoning, their Lordships relied on the decision of the Punjab High Court in Punjab State Electricity Board, Patiala v. Ashok Kumar Sehgal (Al R 1990 P & H 117) taking the view that the rejection of an application for Special Leave to Appeal does not necessarily mean that the judgment against which Special Leave was sought was approved by the Supreme Court. Their Lordships also emphasised the nature of the jurisdiction of the High Court under 226 of the Constitution and observed that the said jurisdiction is regulated differently and a lot of discretion enters in the filed of just icing. 14. As I see it, the order of the Division Bench in R. P.14 of 1984 is essentially based on the finding therein that the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the application for Special Leave was not an order on merits stricto sensu though the word 'merit' was used and consequently there was no merger of the order of the High Court in that of the Supreme Court. The words within brackets in Section 8C(2) of that Act "including an order against which an appeal to the Supreme Court has not been admitted by that Court" made it clear that the dismissal of the application for Special Leave without admitting the appeal, would not prevent the State from filing or bar it from invoking the power of review of the High Court conferred by that Section. The situation here is clearly different in the absence of words like the ones found within brackets in Section 8C(2) of the Vesting Act. The situation here is clearly different in the absence of words like the ones found within brackets in Section 8C(2) of the Vesting Act. Here, on the facts of this case, on an understanding of the order of the Supreme Court, I have came to the conclusion that the order dt. 29.6.1995 has in effect approved the order of this court dt.19.6.1995 and consequently, there is a merger of the order of this court in that of the Supreme Court, The order of the Division Bench in R. P.14 of 1984 is therefore clearly distinguishable. Moreover, as held by the Full Bench of this court in Pankajakshi Amma v. Custodian of Vested Forests 1995(1) K. L.T. 358) Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the review of an order passed under vesting Act and the power of review available under the Vesting Act to the State is not analogous to the power of Review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is different from it. This aspect also persuades me to reject the contention of counsel for the petitioner that the order in R. P.14 of 1984 is an authority for the position canvased for by him that the present review petition, is not barred by the decision of the Supreme Court in the petition for Special Leave. 15. Thus, on an anxious consideration of the relevant aspects, I hod that the present Review Petition cannot be entertained by this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since I have held that this court does not retain the jurisdiction to entertain and consider this review petition on merits, I do not think it necessary to hear the parties on the merits of the contentions raised in the Review Petition. Hence without going into the merits, I dismiss the Review Petition.