Judgment :- 1. The above Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 824/81 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Salem, who succeeded before the trial court, but have lost in the first appellate court, against the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, Salem dated 30.6.1982 in A.S. No. 94/81 reversing the judgment and decree of the District Munsif, Salem, dated 31.8.1981 in O.S. No. 824/81. The case of the plaintiffs before the courts below was that the plaintiffs are the owners of Mohannad Peak Estate, Yercaud, that there was an earlier litigation between the plaintiffs on the one hand and the defendants and the family members on the other hand in respect of various estates owned by them in common and suits were filed for partition and thereafter in O.S. No. 501/75, on the file of the Sub Court, Salem, a compromise final decree was passed in I.A. No. 399/77 on 23.3.1977 and that thereafter the plaintiffs were enjoying the whole of Mohannad Peak Estate without any let or hindrance and the defendants were enjoying likewise Carrara Estate as owners. The case of the plaintiffs was that both parties arc bound by the various terms of the compromise embodied in the final decree, that there is a tank in Carrara Estate, the water from which could be and was being utilised for spraying and other purposes for the benefit of Mohannad Peak Estate also and to enable the plaintiffs to do so, a specific provision was made with reference to this right in clause 12 of the memorandum of compromise (clause 14 of the compromise decree) permitting the plaintiffs to continue to draw water through the existing 3? pipeline for spraying and other purposes from Carrara Tank which lies below the Carrara Estate Pump House. The further claim of the plaintiffs was that they have been exercising these rights of the user of the tank water for the purpose of spraying etc., through the regular 3? pipeline for spraying and other purposes from Carrara Tank which lies below the Carrara Estate Pump House. The further claim of the plaintiffs was that they have been exercising these rights of the user of the tank water for the purpose of spraying etc., through the regular 3? pipes connected from the tank, that the defendants had no right to interfere with the said exercise of the right by the plaintiffs, but however the defendants were giving much trouble to the plaintiffs in enjoying the said right of the plaintiffs by the defendants men coming to the border of Mohannad Peak Estate on 2.1.1978 to meddle with the pipeline so that the water cannot flow into Mohannad Peak Estate. Such attempts were said to have been thwarted and therefore the present suit came to be filed and numbered originally before the Sub Court, Salem as 1071/76 and thereafter due to the revision in the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts in the District level, the suit was transferred to the Court of the District Munsif at Salem and numbered as O.S. No. 824/81 and the relief of permanent injunction subsequently came to be amended as relief of mandatory injunction by virtue of the amendment ordered on 20.8.1979 in I.A. No. 245/79. 2. The first defendant who represents the other defendant by means of Power of Attorney filed a written statement as also an additional written statement contending that clause 12 in the compromise memo and 14 in the compromise decree was brought about by fraud and misrepresentation as far as the right of drawing water in Mohannd Peak Estate was concerned and therefore, was not binding on the defendants, that there was no pipeline existing between the Carrara Tank and the Mohannad Peak Estate at the time of compromise and even before or after the compromise also, that on a misrepresentation by the plaintiffs that such a pipeline exists, the signature of the defendants were obtained in the compromise, that in view of the above factual position even subsequent to the compromise no water was taken at any time through the alleged pipelines since there was no such connecting pipe line between the Carrara tank and Mohannad Peak Estate. It was also contended that the alleged pipelines connecting Carrara tank and Mohannad Peak Estate were not in existence before the filing of the suit or before or after the Commissioners visit and as per the Commissioners plan and report, the pipelines found in existence at the time of Commissioners visit were only to take water to the Estate of the defendants themselves and not to the plaintiffs estate, and therefore, there was no question of disconnecting the said pipelines by the defendants since the fact remains that there was no such pipe line in existence at any time by connecting the Carrara tank to Mohannad Peak Estate. The defendants also pleaded that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any mandatory injunction as prayed for. 3. On the above pleadings the suit was tried and on the side of the plaintiffs there was no oral evidence and only the certified copy of the decree in O.S. No. 501/75 dated 23.3.1977, came to be marked as Ex. A1. On the side of the defendants, the Advocate Commissioner was examined and no exhibits as such were marked. The Commissioners report and plan as also the interim report and plan were marked as Exs. C.1. to C.4. On considering the materials placed before the court, the learned trial judge held that the defendants who are parties to the compromise decree Ex. A1. which has become final are bound by the same and therefore, they cannot deny the claim of the plaintifs and that the dispute of the nature said to have been raised by the defendants would amount to approbation and reprobation in the sense of accepting other clauses but denying clause 12 in the compromise which is really clause 14 in the decree. The learned trial judge also held on the basis of the materials disclosed by the report of the Commissioner that the defendants have meddled with the pipelines in question after the first visit of the Commissioner on 4.9.1978 and that such meddling with the Carrara Estate would have been done only by the defendants who are the owners of the said Estate. The plea of fraud and misrepresentation also came to be rejected and finally, the learned trial judge held as hereunder:— “However, in view of the reasons already stated above that the existence of the pipeline connecting Carrara tank and the Mohannad Peak Estate had been clearly established as per the clause 12 of Exhibit A1 and also due to the pleading put forward by the defendants that due to the misrepresentation about the existence of the pipelines by the plaintiffs they have signed the compromise which could not be correct and after that though the defendants are the owners of the Carrara Estate and tank and also ful ly aware of the physical features of the same, kept quite till date. Hence the pipeline was in existence and it continued to be in existence even on the date of suit as well on the first visit of the commissioner on 4.9.1978 and the western end of the pipeline was also tampered even on 4.9.1978 due to the recent mark of the rinches as per the report and plan Exhibit C3 and Exhibit C4 it is well established that the said pipeline was in existence prior to the suit and on the date of the suit and the same had been subsequently meddled and tampered with or removed by the defendants within the Carrara Estate who are owners of the said estate. So the defendants must restore the pipeline. So for the reasons stated above and as per clause 12 of Exhibit A1 which is binding upon the defendants also issue No. 1. is answered that the plaintiff is entitled to take water from the Carrara tank to their own Mohannad Peak Estate for spraying and other purposes and for Issue No. 2 the plaintiffs are entitled to permanent and mandatory injunction as prayed for by them. Hence I answer issues 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. Issue No. 3: In view of the findings on issues 1 and 2 and the reasons stated thereon the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs asked for in the suit. In the result, the suit is decreed as prayed for with costs.” 4. Hence I answer issues 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. Issue No. 3: In view of the findings on issues 1 and 2 and the reasons stated thereon the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs asked for in the suit. In the result, the suit is decreed as prayed for with costs.” 4. Aggrieved the defendants filed an appeal origionally before the District Court, Salem in A.S. No. 201/81 which subsequently came to be transferred to the learned Subordinate Judge of Salem as A.S. No. 94/81 and disposed of by him as such. The learned Subordinate Judge also concurred with the trial judge to hold that the case of fraud and misrepresentation as vitiating the clause in question pleaded by the defendants was devoid of merit since the appellants have not chosen to take such a stand seriously in the appeal. As for the claim relating to the existence of the pipeline in question, the learned first appellate Judge disagreed from the findings of the trial judge and held that as on the date of suit there was no pipeline as such in existence connecting Mohannad Peak Estate with the tank in Carrara estate and water was not taken from Carrara tank to Mohannad Peak Estate. Learned Subordinate Judge was also of the view that even if the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants have meddled with the existing pipelines is true the plaintiffs cannot be granted any mandatory injunction since according to the learned judge the cause of action for the restoration of the tank was said to have arisen after the filing of the suit, and at any rate, even otherwise, the remedy of the plaintiffs is to ask for a declaration of their right and for restoration of the pipes not only on the basis of the compromise decree, but also by way of grant and in as much as this course of action has not been adopted by the plaintiffs, they cannot be granted even the relief of mandatory injunction, even though it is assumed that the defendants were responsible for the disconnection of the pipes. Further, the first appellate judge has held that the plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence at all to prove the allegations made in the plaint and they have not taken the witness stand to testify to the fact that on the date of suit viz., 4.9.1978 the pipe line existed and that they were enjoying the right of taking water from Carrara tank to the Mohannad Peak Estate. The absence of any oral evidence according to the first appellate judge to prove that only after receipt of the communication the disconnection was effected disentitled the plaintiffs to get the relief of mandatory injunction. Further infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial court according to the first appellate court was that the decree has not been properly drafted and as it stood it was impracticable and unworkable in that in the absence of any direction to the defendants to restore the pipeline within a stipulated time so that beyond the period within which such restoration has to be effected consequential action can be taken, and the manner action to be taken in case of default by the defendants, so also according to the learned first appellate judge the mere mention of pipelines in the compromise decree will not be conclusive proof of the plaintiffs case and therefore, he also came to the conclusion that the pipelines were not in existence on the date of the suit, and therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction as prayed for. 5. The aggrieved plaintiffs have therefore come up before this Court. Mr. K.P. Sivasubramaniam, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/appellants contended that the lower appellate court committed grave error of law in dismissing the suit and coming to the conclusion that in the absence of a prayer for relief of declaration, the mandatory injunction could not have been sought for and that the clause 12 in the memo of compromise in question (clause 14 in the compromise decree) by itself does not either confer the right or prove the existence of the pipeline in question to lake water from Carrara Estate tank to the Mohannad Peak Estate. Learned counsel also took me at length through the findings of the trial court as also the manner of consideration made by the first appellate court and the reports of the Commissioner etc., to contend that there are overwhelming materials on record to substantiate the existence of the pipeline and their interference by the defendants with the same justifying the need and necessity for granting the mandatory injunction as sought for. The learned counsel also submitted that the clause in question in the compromise decree confers valid and substantial rights which can be enforced and the lower appellate court having held that the plea of fraud and misrepresentation was devoid of merit ought to have only decreed the suit as prayed for and the absence of any oral evidence on the side of the plaintiffs is no ground to reject the claim of the plaintiffs in the teeth of the materials already available on record. Learned counsel also relied upon certain judicial pronouncements to highlight the efficacy and binding force of a compromise decree and a reference will be made to those judgements hereinafter. 6. Per contra, Thiru S. Gopalarathnam, learned senior counsel contended that the clause in question does not refer to either the estate of the plaintiffs or any land to which the water has to be taken for use and that there was absolutely no evidence whatsoever to prove the actual user of the water through the alleged pipelines in question prior to the suit. The learned senior counsel also submitted that the word “Permitted” used in the clause in question is indicative of only the grant in the nature of a licence and not a conferment of any right as such of either property or right connected with the use of any property and therefore, it was always open to the defendants to revoke or bring to an end such licence and there is no form or specific prescribed procedure to bring to an end the licence and consequently the plaintiffs cannot claim any relief as prayed for in the nature of mandatory injunction. While inviting my attention to the plan submitted by the Commissioner along with his final report dated 16.12.1978 in I.A. No. 1332/78 in O.S. No. 1071/88 the learned counsel pointed out that three pipelines emanated from the tank in question and the conspicuous omission in the clause in question on which rights are claimed by the plaintiffs to even specify which of the three pipelines was used or permitted to be used for taking the water from the tank in question to the plaintiffs estate would itself show that the claim of the plaintiffs about the existence of the so called pipelines has no merit or substance and that the lower appellate court was right in interfering with the judgment and decree of the learned trial judge. According to the learned senior counsel for the respondents, every one of the reasons assigned by the learned first appellate judge are sound in law and would justify his conclusion to reverse the judgment and decree of the trial court. To substantiate the claim on the nature and character of the right envisaged in the clause in question, reference has also been made to Sections 4 and 52 of the Indian Easements Act. 1882. 7. Before adverting to a consideration of the respective submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side, a reference to the judgments placed for may consideration may be usefully made. In Shankar Sitaram v. Balkrishna Silaram ( AIR 1954 S.C. 352 ) the Court was concerned with the efficacy and binding force of a consent decree in a partition suit. Learned judges of the Supreme Court while repelling the claim of the appellant before them held as follows:— “We hold, therefore, that the compromise closed once for all the controversy about taking any account of the joint family businesses including the motor business after the 31st March. 1946, and the plaintiff is bound by the terms of the compromise and the consent decree following upon it. 9. The obvious effect of this finding is that the plaintiff is barred by the principle of ‘res judicata’ from reagitating the question in the present suit. It is well settled that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as a decree passed by invitum. 9. The obvious effect of this finding is that the plaintiff is barred by the principle of ‘res judicata’ from reagitating the question in the present suit. It is well settled that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as a decree passed by invitum. The compromise having been found not to be vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, misunderstanding or mistake, the decree passed thereon has the binding force of ‘res judicata ’.” 8. In Sailendra Narayan v. State of Orissa ( AIR 1956 S.C. 346 ) a Constitution Bench of five learned Judges of the Supreme Court had once again an occasion to consider the efficacy and binding nature of a consent decree and it held as hereunder:— “the plea of estoppel is sought to be founded on the compromise decree, Ex. ‘O’ passed by the Patna High Court on 2.5.1945, in F.A. No. 15 of 1941. The compromise decree is utilised in the first place as creating an estoppel by Judgment. In-‘In re South American and Mexican Co., Ex parte Bank of England.” (1895) 1 Ch 37 (C), it has been held that a judgement by consent or default is as effective as estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. Upholding the judgment of Vaughan Williams, J. Lord Herschell said at page 50:— “The truth is, a Judgment by a consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end. And I think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action.” To the like effect are the following observations of the Judicial Committee in-‘ Kinch v. Walcott ’, 1929 AC 482 at p. 493 (D):— First of all, their Lordships are clear that in relation to this plea of estoppel it is of no advantage to the appellant that the order in the libel action which is said to raise it was a consent order. For such a purpose an order by consent, not discharged by mutual agreement, and remaining unreduced, is as effective as an order of the Court made otherwise than by consent and not discharged on appeal.” The same principle has been followed by the High Courts in India in a number of reported decisions. Reference need only be made to the case of-“ Secy, of State v. Attendranath Das ”, 63 Cal 550 at P. 558 (E); ‘ Bhaishankar v. Moraji ’, 36, Bom 283 (F) and-‘ Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal Raja Bahadur ’, v. ‘ Thatha Ramasamy Chetty ’, 35 Mad 75 (G). In the Calcutta case after referring to the English decisions the High Court observed as follows:— “On this authority it becomes absolutely clear that the consent order is as effective as an order passed on contest, not only with reference to the conclusions arrived at in the previous suit but also with regard to every step in the process of reasoning on which the said conclusion is founded. When we say “every step in the reasoning” we mean the findings on the essential facts on which the judgment or the ultimate conclusion was founded. In other words the finding which it was necessary to arrive at for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in the particular case will operate as estoppel by judgment.” The correctness of these principles laid down in these decisions is not disputed by Mr. P.R. Das. Proceeding on the basis that there is such a principle of estoppel by judgment, he contends that the test laid down in the decisions referred to above is whether the judgment in the previous case could have been passed without the determination of the question which was put in issue in the subsequent case, where the plea of estoppel by the previous judgment is raised. This leads us to a consideration of the facts, which are material to this question.” 9. In Govind Waman Shanbhag v. Muralidhar Shrinivas Shanbhag (ILR 1953 Bombay 948) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had an occasion to consider the question in the context of a challenge to a clause in compromise decree restraining alienation being opposed to the provisions of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Mr. In Govind Waman Shanbhag v. Muralidhar Shrinivas Shanbhag (ILR 1953 Bombay 948) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had an occasion to consider the question in the context of a challenge to a clause in compromise decree restraining alienation being opposed to the provisions of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar, as he then was, speaking for the Bench, on elaborate consideration of the case law held as hereunder:— “We think that a consent decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be treated on the same footing as a contract between the parties. It is true that before a court passes a consent decree, it can and should examine the lawfulness and validity of the terms of the proposed compromise. But once that stage is passed and a decree follows, different considerations arise. Indeed, Mr. Murdeshwar has not cited before us any decision of this Court which actually decided that a compromise decree wh ich contains a term contrary to law is for that reason a nullity. On the contrary, as we have just pointed out, a large number of reported judgments of this court have taken a contrary view. Therefore, in our opinion, the lower appellate court was right in coming to the conclusion that despite the fact that one of the terms of the compromise decree is opposed to the provisions of S. 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, the decree is still binding between the parties and cannot be said to be a nullity. If it is not a nullity, its terms must be enforced and the plaintiff would be entitled to claim possession of the property.” 10. In Vasudeva Prabhu v. Madhava Prabhu (AIR 1993 Kerala 68) a learned single judge of the Kerala High Court while dealing with the circumstance under which the justification for the grant of a mandatory injunction has been made out, held as hereunder:— “On behalf of the defendants it is contended that no decree for mandatory injunction can be granted in view of the delay in moving the Court. According to them the gate on the compound wall had been closed about five to eight years back. The case of the plaintiffs is that in the first week of December 1981 the defendants had removed two gates on the boundary wall and also closed the pathway. According to them the gate on the compound wall had been closed about five to eight years back. The case of the plaintiffs is that in the first week of December 1981 the defendants had removed two gates on the boundary wall and also closed the pathway. The notice was issued on 12.12.1981 and the same suit was filed on 28.2.1981. In Ext. A.2 notice it was pointed o ut that a masonary wall was constructed in the place wherefrom gates were removed. The obstruction was created on different dates according to the plaintiffs. As pointed out by the lower appelate court Ext. C.1 report did not give any assistance in this regard. Therefore there was no evidence for delay in moving the Court seeking mandatory injunction. Apart from that, if any co-owner creates any obstruction for the convenient enjoyment of the pathway by other sharers, such acts shall be invalid automati cally as per clause (7), That means the saction of defendants by way of removing two gates on the compound wall and closing of the pathway had always been invalid. Therefore, the date of obstruction will not assume much importance. A decree cannot therefore be denied to the plaintiffs on this ground.” 11. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. In my view the learned first appelate judge committed a grave error of law in coming to the conclusion that in the absence of a specific prayer for the relief of declaration of title, the clause in question alone would not suffice either to confer such right or substantiate the existence of the pipelines or the user of the right to warrant grant of relief of mandatory injunction. The consent decree is as effective as one passed on contest and binding on all parties as a decree passed by invitum and the parties to the decree would be precluded from reagitating the matter or driving one or the other parties to the decree to the necessity of seeking for or securing a fresh declaration once over again. A decree passed on consent also operates by metes and bounds to carry out certain obligations from either revolting against the mandate contending the decree or attempting to wriggle out of the obligations both by the principles of estoppel by judgement and by the principles res judicata . A decree passed on consent also operates by metes and bounds to carry out certain obligations from either revolting against the mandate contending the decree or attempting to wriggle out of the obligations both by the principles of estoppel by judgement and by the principles res judicata . Consequently, the view taken by the learned first appellate judge that in the absence of fresh declaration obtained by the plaintiffs, no rights flow from the clause in question to the appellants so as to entitle them to straightway seek for the relief of mandatory injunction constitutes a total negation the decree itself cannot be said to be either a proper approach or the correct decision to be made in law. The conclusions of the learned Subordinate Judge therefore cannot be sustained. 12. It becomes now necessary to consider the nature and character of the rights conferred under the clause in question in the teeth of a claim having been made by the learned senior counsel for the respondents/defendants that the grant in the clause in question partakes the character of licence revocable at the will and option of the defendants by a mere denial or assertion in derogation of the grant in the clause in question at any point of time. Clause 14 in the agreement which is the same as clause 12 i n the memo of compromise is as follows:— “That the defendants 3, 4, 6 and 8 be and are permitted to continue the drawal of water through the existing 3? pipeline for spraying and other purposes from the Carrara tank which lies below the Carrara Estate Pulp house.” A proper understanding of the nature and character of the grant requires also an appreciation of the attendant circumstances and the nature of disputes involved in the light of which the stipulation of the nature referred to above came to be made by way of a term of compromise which got engrafted into a final decree binding between the parties to the proceedings. The suit was for partition and at a point of time when civil disputes and litigations arose between various sharers who were parties to the proceedings culminating into a compromise decree made in I.A. No. 399/79 in O.S. No. 501/75 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge of Salem. The suit was for partition and at a point of time when civil disputes and litigations arose between various sharers who were parties to the proceedings culminating into a compromise decree made in I.A. No. 399/79 in O.S. No. 501/75 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge of Salem. Till disputes arose between parties and their shares got divided, the entire properties have been held and used by all the sharers for several years past as co-owners. In view of the misunderstandings or disputes the need for division came to be felt and the properties for the first time came to be divided among the various sharers. It is in that process, as could be seen from the various clauses contained therein that the Mohannad Peak Estate have come to be alloted to the share of defendants 3, 4, 6 & 8 therein of course with certain liabilities attached thereto and similarly the Carrara Estate and other properties fell to the share of the defendants. While reconciling and readjusting the rights of various parties by separation once and for all, several rights and obligations have been created and conferred mutually among the various sharers as part of the scheme of division effected to make the division and the subsequent possession and enjoyment of properties divided more perfect and effective. Clause 14 in the decree (Clause 12 in the memo of compro mise) is therefore one such granting a right in favour of the defendants 3, 4, 6 & 8 and the use of the word ‘protected’/‘permitted’ has thus to be construed in the context and cannot be given undue emphasis to whittle down the nature of the grant and to make it a mere license, revocable at will and whim of one party. That it should be the only and proper method of construction or appreciation of the character of the stipulation is fortified by the fact that even defendants 3, 4, 6 & 8 were the co-owners of the Carrara Estate and the tank till it was allocated to the share of others including the defendants in the compromise to divide the entire properties in the manner provided by the various terms and conditions contained therein would go to show that it cannot be equated to a grant envisaged under Section 14 of the Indian Easements Act, which comprehends in my view such of the grants as are made by one person to another who did not own or possess such rights earlier or de hors such specific grant. On the other hand, the compromise decree had the effect of crystallising into individual rights what were till then in the form of common rights enjoyed by all the owners and in such circumstances the stipulation by way of a specific condition of the compromise decree has to be, in my view construed only as a right reserved to one or more of the co-owners and not as a grant revocable at the sweet will of one and at any time of his choice. To such a case, in my view, the definition of “licence” in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1982 has also no application. Even if it is to be viewed as an easement, it would be not only an easement of necessity as well as by grant, but in view of my conclusion that the clause confers, rather reserve, a right in defendants 3, 4, 6 & 8. It is unnecessary to elaborate further on the issue as to whether it may be construed to be an easement or otherwise. In view of the above conclusions of mine, it becomes wholly unnecessary for the plaintiff s in this suit to independently prove their rights or entitlement once over again in a fresh suit or in the suit under consideration itself. As noticed earlier, both the courts below have negatived the plea on behalf of the defendants in the present suit that the clause in question has been fraudulently and by way of misrepresentation introduced in the compromise decree. As noticed earlier, both the courts below have negatived the plea on behalf of the defendants in the present suit that the clause in question has been fraudulently and by way of misrepresentation introduced in the compromise decree. The rejection of such a plea by the courts below would, in my view, lead to the inevitable conclusion that the plaintiffs/appellants would become entitled to the use of the water from the Carrara tank to the Mohannad Peak Estate allotted exclusively to the share of defendants 3, 4, 6 & 8. The absence of any mention specifically of the name of the Mohannad Peak Estate or the identity of the lands of the estate to which the water has to be taken even in the clause in question itself does not in any manner undermine the efficacy of the clause or throw or cast any doubts in this regard if the compromise decree and the various clauses contained therein are considered as a whole, as they ought to be without construing clause 14 in the compromise decree alone in isolation and in the abstract. 13. The question next to be considered is as to whether the plaintiffs in this case have made out a case for the grant of mandatory injunction. In my view, in the light of my conclusions as above in the nature of the right and binding force of the clause in question on the defendants and the materials disclosed from the report of the Commissioner itself sufficient case has been made out to justify the grant of the mandatory injunction. The absence of any specific stipulation in the clause itself as to out of which of the three pipelines the plaintiffs have to avail of the supply of water from the Carrara tank does not in any manner help the defendants to deny the existing user of the water in a particular manner which has been conserved for the benefit of the plaintiffs under the compromise decree particularly under the clause in question. Except denying the right of the plaintiffs, it is not the case of the defendants that there was any other scope for ensuring supply of water for the purposes envisaged in the clause in question otherwise than from the Carrara tank and that the particular need envisaged in the clause in question was hitherto satisfied by any alternate or other mode of supply of water. The learned first appellate judge in my view was also wrong in concluding that the defect, if any, in the omission to make necessary stipulation regarding the mode and manner of execution of the decree itself, and vitiates the judgment, and nothing precluded the learned Subordinate Judge who also could and ought to have equally proceeded to rectify the lapses noticed as the first appellate court with powers co-extensive with that of the trial court and in respect of the time limit make suitable provision for compliance with the manner of executing the mandatory order of injunction even in case of default of compliance by the defendants themselves and these lapses cannot be assigned as reasons for denying the very relief of mandatory injunction itself. 14. For all the reasons stated above the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court dt. 30.6.1982 in A.S. No. 94/S1 is set aside and the judgement and decree of the learned trial judge is restored. The plaintiffs/appellants shall be at liberty to move the trial court for further directions with reference to the identification of the pipeline to have them restored; to stipulate the time within which such restoration shall be effected and the manner in which the restoration has to be ensured through court on default of compliance by the defendants. 15. The Second Appeal is allowed with the above further directions. No costs.