M. P. CHINNAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revision petitions came to be filed against the order passed by the educational appellate tribunal and district judge, mangalore, dakshina kannada, in e. a. t. No. 7 of 1990, dated 11-3-1993. ( 2 ) THE parties will be referred to as the appellant and the respondents, hereinafter for the sake of convenience, as arrayed before the appellate tribunal. ( 3 ) THE brief facts of the case are: a. raghupathi bhat was appointed as the principal of the 1st respondent since 29-6-1972. There were differences amongst members of the management and therefore, he was put to trouble time and again by one group or the other. An enquiry was held in about the year 1973 and by an order dated 22-12-1973 his services were terminated. He challenged that order successfully before the educational appellate tribunal in miscellaneous appeal No. 306 of 1973. The tribunal by its order dated 17-9-1976 while allowing the appeal set aside and sent back the matter with a direction that the enquiry should be held after giving sufficient opportunity to have his say in the matter, and to adduce his evidence. However, it is not known as to what happened later. It is stated that as the principal was not given the benefits of the revised pay scale in 1987, he approached the high court in writ petition No. 21289 of 1989 for a direction to the 1st respondent to give the benefit of pay scale of 1987. It appears, this provoked the management and in about the month of may, 1989 a memo dated 8-5-1989 containing 29 charges and another memo dated 9-5-1989 were served on the appellant. The sum and substance of the accusations appear to be that the appellant had misappropriated the funds of the students welfare and teachers benefit fund and inclusive of other charges. The appellant submitted his explanation dated 16-5-1989. However, the management appears to have taken a decision to hold an enquiry into the allegations and accordingly constituted a committee consisting of 3 members viz. , 1. Sri b. s. nayak, advocate, mangalore, as chairman, 2. Sri raghupathi shenoy bijai, mangalore, as member, and 3. The joint director of public instructions, Mysore (department nominee) and informed the appellant by letter dated 27-5-1989. , 1. Sri b. s. nayak, advocate, mangalore, as chairman, 2. Sri raghupathi shenoy bijai, mangalore, as member, and 3. The joint director of public instructions, Mysore (department nominee) and informed the appellant by letter dated 27-5-1989. In the meantime, the management appears to have made an order keeping the appellant under suspension with effect from 10-3-1989. Therefore, the appellant questioned the suspension order in the high court in writ petition No. 7801 of 1989 and he contended that the suspension order was stayed by the order dated 25-5-1989. The joint director of public instructions by his letter dated 26-11-1989 and 27-11-1989 directed the 1st respondent to reinstate the appellant and to pay him subsistence allowance for the period under suspension. Since the 1st respondent did not comply with the direction, the appellant appears to have again filed a writ petition in writ petition No. 7069 of 1990. ( 4 ) THE chairman, enquiry committee by his letter dated 16-4-1990 pointed out to the appellant to appear before the committee and to answer the charges. On receipt of this notice, the appellant sent a representation dated 21-4-1990 questioning the jurisdiction of the enquiry committee and also informed the committee that it will be difficult to appear and defend himself in the enquiry unless he is paid the subsistence allowance and is reinstated. On 26-4-1990 he gave another representation to the chairman of the enquiry committee requesting him for permission to engage an Advocate to defend himself in the enquiry. The chairman by his letter dated 1-5-1990 declined permission to engage an Advocate to defend himself in the enquiry. He made another representation to the chairman of the enquiry committee on 21-5-1990 and yet another on 30-5-1990. On 26-4-1990 a month's time was granted and the date of hearing was fixed to be on 30-5-1990. In view of the representation dated 30-5-1990, the enquiry committee took it that the appellant is not interested in prosecuting the proceedings and proceeded to examine 3 witnesses. On 30-6-1990 the committee appears to have submitted the report to the management holding that charges 1 and 2 of the commissioner of public instruction, karnataka, Bangalore and charges 4 to 8, 14, 26 and 30 are proved against the appellant. On 30-6-1990 the committee appears to have submitted the report to the management holding that charges 1 and 2 of the commissioner of public instruction, karnataka, Bangalore and charges 4 to 8, 14, 26 and 30 are proved against the appellant. Then the report was considered by the management at the meeting held on 15-7-1990 and resolved to terminate the services of the appellant with effect from 11-3-1989 and not to recover the subsistence allowance paid to the appellant from 11-3-1989 to 10-9-1989. A show-cause notice dated 21-7-1990 was issued to the appellant calling upon his explanation, that appears to have been served on the appellant on 23-7-1990. Immediately thereafter, he sent his explanation dated 26-7-1990 by registered post. In the meantime, it appears on 30-7-1990 the board of management resolved to dismiss the appellant from service with effect from 11-3-1989. On 31-7-1990, the respondent issued the termination order and sent it to the appellant by registered post with acknowledgement due. The correctness and legality of this order was questioned by the appellant on various grounds enumerated in the memo before the educational appellate tribunal, in e. a. t. No. 7 of 1990. The operative portion reads as follows:"in the result, for the reasons stated above this appeal is allowed with costs and the order impugned dated 31-7-1990 is hereby set aside. The 1st respondent shall consider the directions of the department contained in letters dated 22-6-1989, 22-11-1989/27-11-1989 regarding payment of subsistence allowance and also reinstatement and take appropriate action thereon forthwith. However, it is made clear that if the 1st respondent is still of the opinion that there is need for enquiry and action thereon, it is at liberty to continue the enquiry from the stage at which the irregularity has occurred and shall proceed with the enquiry, bearing in mind the observations made during the course of this judgment, giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellant and in accordance with law". ( 5 ) IN civil revision petition No. 2362 of 1993 the prayer of the petitioners is as follows:"wherefore for the aforementioned and other grounds the petitioner prays to set aside the part of the order under revision by allowing this revision petition with cost and by granting reasonable interest on arrears, in the interest of Justice and equity". ( 6 ) THE respondent/institution in civil revision petition no. ( 6 ) THE respondent/institution in civil revision petition no. 934 of 1993 has sought for the following reliefs:"the petitioners therefore pray that this Hon'ble court be pleased to: (i) call for the records from the tribunal; set aside the impugned order; (ii) grant such other or further reliefs as this Hon'ble court deems fit to grant, in the interest of justice, including costs of this revision petition, in the interest of justice". the impugned order directing that if the 1st respondent is still of the opinion that there is need for enquiry and the action thereon, it is at liberty to continue the enquiry from the stage at which the stage at which the irregularity has occurred and shall proceed with the enquiry bearing in mind the observations made during the course of this judgment, giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellant and in accordance with law, according to both the parties is unsustainable in view of different reasoning. ( 7 ) HE further submitted that the finding as aforesaid is contrary to the decision rendered by this court in president, golden valley education trust, oorgaum, Kolar Gold Fields v District Judge and Educational Appellate Tribunal, kolar and others. On that ground he submitted that the matter may be remanded to the educational appellate tribunal by setting aside the order directing him to hold enquiry in the interest of justice. ( 8 ) AS against that, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is no need for any enquiry as the respondents have not made any application before the tribunal expressing the desire to lead evidence to establish the charges alleged against the petitioner herein. Therefore, the order of the learned tribunal is contrary to the Provisions of law. Hence no enquiry need be conducted and therefore, the matter need not be remanded to the educational appellate tribunal and in support of his argument she placed reliance on a decision in Shambhu Nath Goyal v Bank of Baroda and others. Therefore, the order of the learned tribunal is contrary to the Provisions of law. Hence no enquiry need be conducted and therefore, the matter need not be remanded to the educational appellate tribunal and in support of his argument she placed reliance on a decision in Shambhu Nath Goyal v Bank of Baroda and others. In this case their lordships of the Supreme Court have held:"the application of the management to seek the permission of the labour court or industrial tribunal for availing the right to adduce further evidence to substantiate the charge or charges framed against the workman is the application which may be filed by the management during the pendency of its application made before the labour court or industrial tribunal seeking its permission under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act to take a certain action or grant approval of the action taken by it. The management is made aware of the workman's contention regarding the defect in the domestic enquiry by the written statement of defence filed by him in the application filed by the management under Section 33 of the act. Then, if the management chooses to exercise its right it must make up its mind at the earliest stage and file the application for that purpose without any unreasonable delay. But when the question arises in a reference under Section 10 of the act after the workman had been punished pursuant to a finding of guilt recorded against him in the domestic enquiry there is no question of the management filing any application for permission to lead further evidence in support of the charge or charges framed against the workman, for the defect "in the domestic enquiry is pointed out by the workman in his written claim statement filed in the labour court or industrial tribunal after the reference had been received and the management has the opportunity to look into the statement before it files its written statement of defence in the enquiry before the labour court or industrial tribunal and could make the request for the opportunity in the written statement itself. If it does not choose to do so at that stage, it cannot be allowed to do it at any later stage of the proceedings by filing any application for the purpose which may result in delay which may lead to wrecking the morale of the workman and compel him to surrender which he may not otherwise do". from a perusal of the impugned Order, it is abundantly clear that at no point of time, the respondent had asked the appellate tribunal to give him an opportunity to lead evidence though they were aware that the appellant had sought for setting aside the enquiry held by the respondents. However, the tribunal also, as indicated above has directed the respondent to hold afresh an enquiry if it so desires. Under those circumstances, it is clear that the appellate tribunal also has not decided the primary question as to whether the enquiry is necessary while setting aside the order of the respondent. It may be recalled here that the enquiry committee submitted its report and on the basis of this report, the respondent issued an order of termination as far as this appellant is concerned. The appellant has questioned the impugned domestic enquiry report on the ground that he was not permitted to engage an Advocate to cross-examine the witnesses and to conduct the case on his behalf. The enquiry committee has not furnished the copies of certain material documents in favour of the appellant. The respondent failed to make the payment of subsistence allowance during the pendency of the enquiry. The respondent also did not even wait for receipt of the explanation of the appellant before the impugned order was passed and further, the enquiry report also was not served. All these contentions were accepted by the appellate tribunal while setting aside the order. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, the learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently argued that as the appellate tribunal did not answer the preliminary question as to whether enquiry is necessary, there was no opportunity for the respondent to seek permission of the court for further enquiry. Even otherwise, it is not necessary to request the tribunal to permit him to lead evidence. On that ground he submitted that the impugned order may be set aside. Even otherwise, it is not necessary to request the tribunal to permit him to lead evidence. On that ground he submitted that the impugned order may be set aside. Further, he submitted that the order passed by the tribunal directing the enquiry to be held by the enquiry committee is not correct as under Section 8 of the Act, it is for the tribunal to hold an enquiry if it was held that the enquiry is necessary and in support of it, he placed reliance on a decision referred to above. ( 10 ) IN the decision cited by the learned counsel in president, golden valley education trust's case, supra, the facts are :"respondents 2 and 3 were the employees of a private educational institution. The management of the said institution called for the explanation to a show-cause notice alleging certain misconduct against them and terminated their service. Respondents 2 and 3 filed appeals before the educational appellate tribunal under Section 8 of the Karnataka private educational institutions (discipline and control) Act, 1975. The said tribunal set aside the orders of termination. The management filed writ petitions seeking to get the said orders quashed". it is held:"the object of the Karnataka private educational institutions (discipline and control) Act, 1975, particularly as disclosed in Section 10 (4) of the act is the speedy and final disposal of disputes in accordance with the satisfaction of the tribunal, and is similar to the corresponding provision of Section 11 and 11-a of the Industrial Disputes Act. The tribunal in deciding the appeals before it under the Act, should follow the same procedure which is required to be followed by the industrial tribunal and the labour court. The tribunal in deciding the appeals before it under the Act, should follow the same procedure which is required to be followed by the industrial tribunal and the labour court. The procedure required to be followed by the educational appellate tribunal constituted under the Act, when an appeal is presented before the tribunal by an employee against the management of a private educational institution is as follows: (1) where management has not held the enquiry or does not claim the benefit of the enquiry even if it had been held: if the management had imposed the penalty without holding the enquiry or even if any, enquiry had been held, the management gives up the benefit of such enquiry and offers to prove the charges the management can offer to adduce evidence in support of the charges on the basis of which the penalty was imposed, before the tribunal, and the employee can, adduce defence evidence and the tribunal has. The power and jurisdiction to come to its own conclusion on the appreciation of the evidence so adduced. (2) where the enquiry held by the management is found to be defective: if the management claims to have held a valid enquiry and the employee challenges the validity of the enquiry, the tribunal should, in the first instance, decide as a preliminary issue, the validity of the domestic enquiry. If it is found to be violative of rules, if any, regulating the proceedings or found to be violative of the principles of natural justice, the enquiry should be set aside. Thereafter, the tribunal should proceed to record evidence if offered to be adduced by the management in support of the charges levelled against the employee, and the defence evidence, if any, adduced by the employee and to record its own findings on the charges. Thereafter, the tribunal should proceed to record evidence if offered to be adduced by the management in support of the charges levelled against the employee, and the defence evidence, if any, adduced by the employee and to record its own findings on the charges. (3) when the enquiry held by the management is found valid: in cases where the domestic enquiry held by the management is found to be valid, the procedure that has to be followed thereafter is, (i) the tribunal can proceed to reappreciate the evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry can come to its own conclusion on the charges levelled against the employee; or (ii) if the tribunal considers that it is necessary to record further evidence, when either party offers to adduce evidence, the tribunal should proceed to record the additional evidence and has the power and jurisdiction to record its independent findings on the charges taking into account the evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry as also the additional evidence adduced before it, by the parties. Thus under all circumstances, the final satisfaction about the proof of the charges levelled against the concerned employee is that of the tribunal and if the tribunal comes to the conclusion that the management failed to prove the charges on the basis of which the penalty was imposed, on the concerned employee, the tribunal has to set aside the order imposing the penalty made by the management. (4) power to reduce penalty even if charges are proved: after the tribunal records its findings even incases where the tribunal comes to the conclusion that all or any of the charges levelled against an employee are established, Section 10 (4) of the act specifically authorises the tribunal to examine as to whether the penalty imposed by the management, is proportionate to the gravity of the charges or harsh and excessive. If the tribunal is of the opinion that the penalty imposed is excessive, it is empowered to substitute any lesser penalty which in its opinion is commensurate to the gravity of the charges found proved. The contention that the educational appellate tribunal has no power to take evidence except on an application and in conformity with the Provisions of order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not sound. The contention that the educational appellate tribunal has no power to take evidence except on an application and in conformity with the Provisions of order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not sound. The proceedings before the educational appellate tribunal are original in nature, and as the object of Section 10 (4) (c) is that the tribunal itself should be satisfied both as regards the guilt of the employee concerned and the reasonableness of the penalty, once the matter conies up. Before the tribunal, it has the power and duty to decide the case finally after recording evidence also wherever it is necessary to do so. both the parties, the appellant and the respondent are entitled to adduce evidence or additional evidence as the case may be before the educational appellate tribunal". ( 11 ) FROM this decision it is abundantly clear that the object of Karnataka private educational institutions (discipline and control) Act, 1975, and as disclosed in Section 10 (4) of the Act, it is the speedy and final disposal of disputes in accordance with the satisfaction of the tribunal, and is similar to the corresponding provision of sections 11 and 11-a of the Industrial Disputes Act, the tribunal in deciding the appeals before it under the Act, should follow the same procedure which is required to be followed by the industrial tribunal and the labour court. ( 12 ) SEVERAL charges were framed against the appellant including that of misappropriation of funds. However, the tribunal having come to the conclusion that the enquiry held by the respondent is biased and the principles of natural Justice are not followed, has not given any finding to the effect whether a further enquiry is necessary. ( 13 ) ON the other hand, the discretion was given to the respondent-institution to hold the enquiry, if it so desires. On the other hand in view of the decision cited above, it was incumbent on the appellate tribunal to find out as to whether further enquiry was necessary or not. If it was held that the enquiry was necessary, it should have held the enquiry, instead of remanding the matter. Therefore, that portion of the order is liable to be set aside. If it was held that the enquiry was necessary, it should have held the enquiry, instead of remanding the matter. Therefore, that portion of the order is liable to be set aside. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner however submitted that no enquiry need be held in view of the fact that the respondents have not sought for any permission, notwithstanding the fact that they were aware of the case of the appellant that the enquiry held by the respondent is invalid. Under those circumstances, it cannot be permitted to hold a fresh enquiry. It is not out of place to mention that the misunderstanding between the appellant and respondents arose somewhere in 1973 and obviously it appears that this misunderstanding arose in view of the fact that there was misunderstanding amongst members of the -management. In view of the difference of opinion between the members of the board of education, a suit in original suit No. 168 of 1971 was filed by some of the members of the board of education in the court of munsiff at karkala. The munsiff, karkala, appointed one k. Sundar hegde, advocate, as receiver to manage the affairs of the institution and thereafter, the appellant also filed several writ petitions before this high court at various stages for the payment of his subsistence allowance and other reliefs. Ultimately, the respondent had appointed a committee to hold an enquiry. On the basis of that committee report the services of the appellant were terminated. As stated earlier, the petitioner was suspended from service somewhere in 1973 itself and he was facing an enquiry and he also filed writ petitions before this Hon'ble court. The appellate tribunal has not given any definite finding as to whether an enquiry is necessary or not. In the absence of a definite finding that an enquiry is necessary, it cannot direct the respondent to hold enquiry if it so desires. On the other hand, the tribunal should have come to the conclusion that the enquiry is necessary and such enquiry should have been held by it by giving proper opportunity to both the parties. At this belated stage, no useful purpose would be served by directing the appellate tribunal to hold an enquiry. On the other hand, the tribunal should have come to the conclusion that the enquiry is necessary and such enquiry should have been held by it by giving proper opportunity to both the parties. At this belated stage, no useful purpose would be served by directing the appellate tribunal to hold an enquiry. It may also be mentioned here that the appellant has not made any application before this court setting out as to whether the respondent has decided to hold an enquiry from the stage at which it was pending as per the direction of the appellate tribunal. It is also not stated in any application that a fresh enquiry is necessary. On the other hand, merely relying on the decision cited supra, the respondents contend that the matter may be remanded to the appellate tribunal for holding enquiry. Therefore, it is clear that the respondent has not made out, that an enquiry is necessary and what are the charges to be proved before the tribunal. More than two decades have passed and at this belated stage, if the matter is remanded to the appellate tribunal to hold fresh enquiry, no useful purpose would be served. Besides that, their lordships of the Supreme Court have also categorically stated in the decision in shambhu nath goyal's case, supra, that in the event domestic enquiry which lead to the termination of service is held to be vitiated or invalid, he must be given opportunity to lead evidence to substantiate the charge of misconduct. The court further observed that if the request is made before the proceedings are concluded, the labour court or industrial tribunal should afford opportunity to adduce evidence. It was further observed that if such a pleading is raised and an opportunity is sought, it has to be given. If there is no such pleading either in the original application or in the statement of claim or written statement by way of an application during the pendency of the proceedings, there is no duty cast in law or by the rules of justice, reason and fair play that a quasi-judicial tribunal should adopt an advisory role by informing the employer of its rights. It is also held that if a separate application is made, it would be open to the labour court to examine the question whether it should be granted or not, depending upon the stage when it is made, the omission to claim the relief in the initial pleading, the delay and the motivation for such delayed action, without being specific, it can be said that such an application has to be examined as if it is an application for amendment of original pleadings keeping in view all the aforementioned considerations and if it does not appear to be bona fide or has been made after a long unexplained delay or the explanation for the omission of claiming the relief in the initial pleading is unconvincing, the tribunal is perfectly justified in rejecting the same. ( 15 ) IT is further held by their lordships that the observation was made to lay down the proposition of law that as and when it suits, the convenience of the employer at any stage of tho proceedings, it may make an application seeking such opportunity and the labour court/industrial tribunal was obliged to grant the same. Their lordships have further observed that if no such request is made at any stage of the proceeding, there is no duty in law cast on the labour court or industrial tribunal to give such an opportunity and if there is no such obligatory duty in law fallure to give any such opportunity cannot and would not vitiate the proceedings. This principle of law is also applicable to the proceedings before educational appellate tribunal in view of the decision in president, golden valley education trust's case, supra. ( 16 ) IN this case, as stated earlier, at no stage of tho proceedings, the respondent has made any application either before the tribunal or before this court. Under those circumstances, the observation of the tribunal reserving the liberty to the respondents to hold an enquiry if he so desires cannot be sustained. Similarly, this court also cannot at this stage direct the tribunal to hold an enquiry in the absence of any application being filed before this court requesting this court to direct the appellate tribunal to hold an enquiry. For the foregoing reasons, i hold that the revision petition of the respondent is liable to be dismissed. Similarly, this court also cannot at this stage direct the tribunal to hold an enquiry in the absence of any application being filed before this court requesting this court to direct the appellate tribunal to hold an enquiry. For the foregoing reasons, i hold that the revision petition of the respondent is liable to be dismissed. Similarly, the appellant has not made out as to whether he is entitled for any interest for the amount claimed. However, the appellant has established that that portion of the order of the appellate tribunal is liable to bo set aside. ( 17 ) IN the result therefore, i proceed to pass the following: (a) the civil revision petition No. 934 of 1993 is dismissed. (b) civil revision petition No. 2362 of 1992 is allowed. The order passed by the tribunal that if the 1st respondent is still of the opinion that there is need for enquiry and action thereon, it is at liberty to continue the enquiry from the stage at which the irregularity has occurred and shall proceed with the enquiry bearing in mind the observations made during the course of that judgment giving reasonable opportunity to hear the appellant and in accordance with law, is set aside. However, the prayer of the appellant to grant reasonable interest on arrears is rejected. --- *** --- .